# Source ledger: The cold war under the chatbot

Reviewed: 16 August 2026  
Scope: public evidence available by 16 August 2026  
Author: Marius Comper

## Research perimeter

This project examines the US–China AI competition as a whole-stack and institutional contest. It covers:

- strategic language and the “new Cold War” analogy;
- Pax Silica, WAICO, China’s AI governance agenda and US export-stack policy;
- minerals, refining, energy, fabs, lithography, advanced-node manufacturing and data centres;
- model capability, capital, research output and deployment indicators;
- middle-power overlap, with Kazakhstan as a documented crossing case;
- the UN’s universal AI-governance lane; and
- security implications, while avoiding battlefield prediction.

It does not claim to rank nations, predict a military conflict, or treat policy announcements as implementation evidence.

## Terms and epistemic rules

**Pax Sinica** is used as a contested analytical term for a China-centred order. It is not presented as the name of a current Chinese AI programme. **Chinese AI War** is the user’s framing. The evidence supports a connected family of domestic, diplomatic, infrastructure and governance initiatives, not a single official programme with that name.

The page marks claims as fact, calculation, inference, scenario or unknown. Official statements are evidence of what an institution says it is building; they are not proof that the promised outcomes will occur. Company disclosures describe a firm’s position, not the whole country’s capability. Forecasts remain forecasts.

## Claim map

| ID | Claim used on the page | Status | Scope and caveat |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| PAX-01 | Pax Silica began with seven initial signatories and a non-binding declaration. | Fact | Australian government description, 12 Dec 2025. This is the initial formation, not the later membership total. |
| PAX-02 | The declaration links secure supply chains with economic and national security, AI, energy, minerals, manufacturing and infrastructure. | Fact | Primary declaration text. Purpose language does not establish delivery. |
| PAX-03 | Kazakhstan joined Pax Silica on 25 Jun 2026. | Fact | Kazakhstan government announcement. Membership does not reveal full strategic alignment. |
| WAICO-01 | Chinese government sources reported 29 founding countries and an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Shanghai. | Fact | Chinese official account, 17 Jul 2026. “Founding countries” is the source’s reported category; institutional outcomes remain open. |
| WAICO-02 | Chinese MFA frames WAICO as global AI cooperation and governance under a UN-linked framework. | Fact | Official framing. The geopolitical meaning is an inference, not a quoted institutional purpose. |
| CHINA-01 | China’s Global AI Governance Action Plan combines development, sovereignty, safety, fairness, infrastructure, standards, open-source cooperation, Global South capacity and UN channels. | Fact | Chinese MFA text, 26 Jul 2025. A plan is not an implementation record. |
| CHINA-02 | China’s AI Plus policy sets staged goals for AI integration across the economy and public life. | Fact | Chinese ministry source, 26 Aug 2025. Targets are policy objectives. |
| US-01 | The US American AI Technology Stack export programme describes hardware, chips, servers, storage, cloud, networking, data, models, cybersecurity and applications as an exportable stack. | Fact | White House executive order, Jul 2025. Export ambition is not the same as global adoption. |
| US-02 | US controls target advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, software, HBM and named entities tied to China’s advanced-chip capability. | Fact | BIS announcement, Dec 2024. Controls change over time and require rereading. |
| US-03 | US semiconductor licensing can combine controls with case-by-case review and end-user conditions. | Fact | BIS policy, 13 Jan 2026. This is evidence of managed restriction, not a claim that trade is open. |
| STACK-01 | China accounted for about 91% of rare-earth refining in 2024 in the IEA’s cited concentration measure. | Fact | IEA rare-earth summary. Measure and year matter; this is not a claim over every mineral or every mine. |
| STACK-02 | IEA’s base case puts data-centre electricity use near 945 TWh in 2030, more than double 2024 demand. | Forecast | IEA Energy and AI. It is a base case, not a guaranteed outcome. |
| STACK-03 | ASML describes itself as the only EUV lithography-system maker. | Fact | Company annual report. A company statement should be paired with industry context. |
| STACK-04 | TSMC reports 7nm-and-below revenue share and 2nm high-volume manufacturing milestones. | Fact | Company annual report. Revenue mix is not the same as total global manufacturing capacity. |
| MODEL-01 | Stanford’s 2026 indicators show near-parity in frontier model performance, US strength in private capital and data centres, and Chinese strength in several publication, citation, patent and robotics measures. | Fact with scope | Stanford HAI categories and datasets. Private funding undercounts state-directed capital; leadership depends on the measure. |
| UN-01 | 193 states adopted the Global Digital Compact in 2024. | Fact | UN institutional page. Adoption does not mean implementation or agreement on every policy question. |
| UN-02 | The 2026 Global AI Dialogue uses four themes: opportunity, divides, trustworthy AI and human rights. | Fact | UN FAQ. A universal forum is not a settled treaty. |
| COLD-01 | Scholarship warns that technology-war narratives can usefully focus attention while distorting complex, multi-actor systems. | Secondary analysis | Global Studies Quarterly, 2025. This supports the analogy test; it does not decide the geopolitical thesis. |

## Primary and official sources

### Pax Silica and middle-power alignment

- [PAX-01 — Australian Department of Industry: Pax Silica declaration and initial signatories](https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/pax-silica-declaration-countries-attending-pax-silica-summit-12-december-2025) — official overview, 12 Dec 2025.
- [PAX-02 — signed Pax Silica Declaration](https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-12/pax-silica-declaration-signed.pdf) — primary declaration text, 12 Dec 2025.
- [Pax Silica](https://paxsilica.org/) — initiative overview and stack framing; use as an organizational source alongside government records.
- [PAX-03 — Kazakhstan joins Pax Silica](https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/maidd/press/news/details/1248924?lang=en) — Kazakhstan government announcement, 25 Jun 2026.
- [India joins Pax Silica](https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2230648) — Press Information Bureau, 20 Feb 2026.
- [Singapore’s participation at the Pax Silica Summit](https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/mddi-statement-on-singapore-s-participation-at-the-pax-silica-summit/) — Singapore government statement.
- [UAE joins Pax Silica](https://www.mofa.gov.ae/MediaHub/News/2026/6/27/UAE--Pax-Silica) — UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 Jun 2026.

### United States, export controls and AI-stack policy

- [US-01 — Promoting the Export of the American AI Technology Stack](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/promoting-the-export-of-the-american-ai-technology-stack/) — White House executive order, Jul 2025.
- [America’s AI Action Plan](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2025/07/white-house-unveils-americas-ai-action-plan/) — White House, Jul 2025.
- [US-02 — BIS strengthens advanced semiconductor export controls](https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military) — BIS, Dec 2024.
- [US-03 — BIS revises semiconductor license-review policy](https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-revises-license-review-policy-semiconductors-exported-china) — BIS, 13 Jan 2026.
- [BIS guidance on advanced compute and China-headquartered entities](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-guidance-may-31-2026.pdf) — BIS guidance, 31 May 2026.
- [Congressional Research Service: AI diffusion and supply-chain gaps](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642) — CRS, 2026.
- [Congressional Research Service: Taiwan’s semiconductor position](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47558) — CRS backgrounder; nearly 90% of leading-edge production is the cited historical concentration measure.
- [Testimony on Pax Silica and strategic dependencies](https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20260224/118902/HHRG-119-FA00-Wstate-HelbergJ-20260224.pdf) — US House testimony, 24 Feb 2026; secondary policy testimony, not a neutral count of outcomes.

### China’s AI governance, domestic capacity and international institutions

- [WAICO-01 — 29 countries establish the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202607/17/content_WS6a59a226c6d00ca5f9a0c432.html) — Chinese government account, 17 Jul 2026.
- [WAICO-02 — Chinese MFA briefing on WAICO](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202607/t20260717_11985234.html) — official framing, 17 Jul 2026.
- [China’s Global AI Governance Action Plan](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202507/t20250729_11679232.html) — Chinese MFA, 26 Jul 2025.
- [China’s AI Plus action](https://www.miit.gov.cn/xwfb/szyw/art/2025/art_f8bd63905b384841a84e643c1b9455c7.html) — Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 26 Aug 2025.
- [China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and AI priorities](https://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_zt/moe_357/2026/2026_zt03/yw/202603/t20260314_1430877.html) — Chinese government education ministry page, 2026–2030 planning context.
- [China’s 2026 government work report](https://english.www.gov.cn/2026special/2026npcandcpcc/202603/05/content_WS69a92040c6d00ca5f9a09916.html) — State Council, 2026.
- [China’s reported AI-industry figures](https://english.scio.gov.cn/chinavoices/2026-03/06/content_118365271.html) — Chinese government communication; reported domestic figures should be treated as official claims.
- [China’s position on military AI](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/AI/202112/t20211214_10469512.html) — Chinese MFA position page.
- [China’s Digital Silk Road](https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-the-digital-silk-road) — CNAS analysis of digital infrastructure, standards, technology aid and security concerns.
- [China’s rare-earth export-control announcement](https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/Policies/AnnouncementsOrders/art/2025/art_0dd87cbee7b045bf93fabe6ab2faceee.html) — Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2025.
- [Indonesia joins WAICO](https://ekon.go.id/publikasi/detail/7017/indonesia-resmi-jadi-founding-member-waico-menko-airlangga-tegaskan-komitmen-untuk-jembatani-kesenjangan-ai-global) — Indonesian government, 2026.

### Material and infrastructure stack

- [STACK-01 — Rare Earth Elements](https://www.iea.org/reports/rare-earth-elements/executive-summary) — International Energy Agency, 2025.
- [Critical Minerals Outlook 2025](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025/executive-summary) — IEA, concentration and diversification context.
- [Critical Minerals Outlook 2026](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/market-overview) — IEA, updated concentration context.
- [USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026](https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2026) — United States Geological Survey.
- [STACK-02 — Energy and AI](https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/executive-summary) — IEA, data-centre electricity and AI-server projections.
- [Electricity 2026](https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/executive-summary) — IEA, grid and demand context.
- [STACK-03 — ASML 2025 annual report](https://www.asml.com/en/investors/annual-report/2025) — company disclosure on EUV lithography.
- [STACK-04 — TSMC 2025 annual report](https://investor.tsmc.com/static/annualReports/2025/english/index.html) — company disclosure on advanced-node manufacturing and fabs.

### Capability, analogy and universal governance

- [MODEL-01 — Stanford AI Index 2026 technical performance](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report/technical-performance) — frontier-model comparison.
- [Stanford AI Index 2026 report](https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2026-ai-index-report%C2%A0) — investment, data centres, research, patents and robotics measures.
- [COLD-01 — New and Old Cold Wars](https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/5/2/ksaf038/8115944) — Global Studies Quarterly, 2025.
- [AI Cold War narrative and the Global South](https://uknowledge.uky.edu/patterson_facpub/10/) — He and Heeks, 2025; secondary scholarly analysis.
- [Promethean Rivalry](https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/promethean-rivalry) — CNAS analysis of AI and strategic competition.
- [Pax Sinica as an analytical concept](https://academic.oup.com/book/62664/chapter-abstract/561922083) — Oxford Academic, concept background.
- [UN Global Digital Compact](https://www.un.org/global-digital-compact/en) — adopted by 193 states in 2024.
- [UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance FAQ](https://www.un.org/global-dialogue-ai-governance/en/faq) — 2026 process, themes and participation.

## Method and review triggers

Primary official documents are used for institutional purpose, membership and policy language. Company reports are used for company-level disclosures. Intergovernmental sources are used for energy, mineral and universal-governance context. Scholarly and policy analysis is used to test the Cold War analogy and identify where the framing can mislead.

Re-review this page when membership, policy or a cited figure changes. Update the date and scope with each new number.