# Romania in the President's Daily Brief, 1961–1977 From 1961 to 1977 the CIA wrote a few top-secret pages about the world, almost every day, for Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. Declassified in 2015 and 2016, they name Romania, then a communist country of some 20 million people in Moscow's military alliance, on 379 days. Every paragraph is here as it was typed, with white boxes over the lines that are still secret. 379 days out of 4,885 · 178 with an item about Romania · 85 with text withheld On the evening of Friday, 30 August 1968, speaking in San Antonio, Texas, Lyndon Johnson said: “So, let no one unleash the dogs of war.” Ten days earlier Soviet-led troops had entered Czechoslovakia. The next morning, at his ranch, the first item in the brief the CIA had prepared for him was Romania. The President's Daily Brief is a booklet of a few pages that the CIA writes every day except Sunday for the president of the United States. Kennedy first received it on 17 June 1961, under the name President's Intelligence Checklist; the present name dates from December 1964. It sets out briefly, one paragraph to a subject, what the agency has learned from all its sources: people, intercepted communications, satellite photographs, the press. The CIA released the briefs written for Kennedy and Johnson in September 2015 and those written for Nixon and Ford in August 2016: almost 5,000 documents. Lines still considered secret were covered with white boxes, marked in the margin with a code. Romania is named on 379 days out of the 4,885 on which a brief appeared, about one in 13. On 178 of them it has an item of its own. On 85, part of that item, sometimes all of it, lies under a white box. ## August 1968, day by day: the president's brief beside Romania's party newspaper On the night of 20–21 August 1968, troops of the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact states entered Czechoslovakia. Romania, a member of the same alliance, took no part. On 21 August Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania's communist leader since 1965, condemned the intervention before a crowd in Palace Square in Bucharest. In the days that followed, Romanian diplomats and the American government asked the same question: is Romania next? What follows is the paragraph written for Lyndon Johnson and the front page of that day's Scînteia, the party newspaper: every day with a brief from 21 August to 4 September, then 6 and 9 September, the next two days on which the brief names Romania. Where it helps, a note underneath says what was happening in Washington that day, from the diplomatic documents the State Department publishes as Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Of the 17 briefs that appeared between 21 August and 9 September, 11 name Romania. ### Wednesday, 21 August 1968 The night before, the troops entered Czechoslovakia. In the brief of 21 August the first item is Czechoslovakia. Romania is not named on any page of the released text. Two of the six items are entirely covered by white boxes. Scînteia: Vizita conducătorilor de partid și de stat în zone industriale ale municipiului Pitești The invasion is not in this issue. The front page is about the car factory at Pitești (“Visit of the party and state leaders to industrial areas of the city of Pitești”). On page 3 Ceaușescu, back three days earlier from Prague, says that “the destinies of the Czechoslovak people are in safe hands”. The same day in Washington: The evening before, at 8:15 p.m., the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, had brought President Johnson the news of the intervention. FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 93 ### Thursday, 22 August 1968 The brief of 22 August opens with a late item on Czechoslovakia. Romania is not named on any page of the released text. Scînteia: Comunicat · Adunarea populației din Capitală în Piața Palatului Republicii Almost the whole front page is the crisis: the communiqué of the party and state leadership, the rally in Palace Square, Ceaușescu's speech. “Nothing can justify this act, the military occupation of socialist Czechoslovakia,” the communiqué says. Ceaușescu announces “the formation of armed patriotic guards, made up of workers, peasants and intellectuals” and says: “the whole Romanian people will allow no one to violate the territory of our homeland”. ### Friday, 23 August 1968 Romania's national day. > **2. Rumania - Soviet Union** > > Rumanian Embassy officials in Bonn and Washington have expressed fears of a possible Soviet invasion of their country. Ceausescu is reported to have announced yesterday that "we are now in a state of full mobilization." The previous day he announced the establishment of "armed guards of workers, peasants, and intellectuals" to defend national independence. [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 23 August 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976319) Scînteia: Lucrările sesiunii extraordinare a Marii Adunări Naționale · Trăiască 23 August The Grand National Assembly, Romania's parliament, adopts a declaration on foreign policy. On page 2: “The Warsaw Treaty Organisation cannot be used or invoked for military actions against any socialist country.” Page 7 prints the national-day telegrams: from the Soviet leaders, from Tito and from Lyndon Johnson, who sends “the congratulations and good wishes of the people of the United States of America”. The same day in Washington: The secretary of state, Dean Rusk, tells Ambassador Dobrynin that in the last few hours there have been “a number of alarming rumors about a possible Soviet invasion of Romania”, and stresses that they did not come from the Romanians. Dobrynin replies that he has “neither seen nor heard any indication whatever of any contemplated Soviet action against Romania”. FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 87 ### Saturday, 24 August 1968 > **2. Rumania** > > The Rumanians are deeply concerned over the possibility of a Soviet invasion. [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 24 August 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976321) Scînteia: Parada militară și demonstrația oamenilor muncii din Capitală The front page is the 23 August parade (“Military parade and demonstration of the working people of the capital”). On page 2, under the heading “The patriotic guards, the armed arm of the people”, the guards march “in blue overalls, with tricolour armbands and with combat weapons”. The same day in Washington: At the State Department the bureau for Europe sends Rusk a memorandum on what the United States might do “in the event of Soviet invasion of Romania”: from visibly raising NATO's vigilance to returning to Europe American forces then being withdrawn. FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 164 ### Monday, 26 August 1968 No brief appeared on Sunday, 25 August. > **2. Yugoslavia-Rumania** > > Relations between Eastern Europe's independent-minded and orthodox Communist regimes have been severely damaged by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito told Ambassador Elbrick on 23 August that Yugoslav-Soviet relations from now on would be devoid of the trust and confidence that had been slowly building up. > > Rumanian leader Ceausescu has for the first time been attacked by name by the Soviet and Hungarian press. Mostly low-level Soviet bloc types showed up for Rumanian National Day celebrations at various diplomatic posts last Friday. > > Tito and Ceausescu met Saturday at a Yugoslav border town, presumably to coordinate contingency plans concerning the Czech crisis. They will probably not risk provoking the Soviets by overdramatizing their position. Rumanian Premier Maurer does not see any "immediate" danger of Soviet armed intervention. There is, in fact, still no hard evidence that the Soviets intend to carry their intervention in Eastern Europe beyond Czechoslovakia. > — President's Daily Brief, 26 August 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976323) Scînteia: Toate eforturile, către țelul major: întărirea unității și prieteniei țărilor socialiste On Saturday Ceaușescu had met Tito at Vršac, just across the Yugoslav border. Sunday's Scînteia announced the meeting at the top of the front page, with one sentence on its content: “an exchange of views on bilateral relations and on current international problems of interest to the two countries”. Monday's issue has on its front page a leading article on the unity of the socialist countries (“All efforts toward the major goal: strengthening the unity and friendship of the socialist countries”) and a short notice: Ceaușescu received the ambassador of the Soviet Union, “at his request”. On page 3 the leading article says that in the press of some of the countries that sent troops into Czechoslovakia, articles have appeared which “present Romania's position in a distorted way”, and that the party does not mean to be drawn “down the slope of ripostes and polemics”. ### Tuesday, 27 August 1968 Romania is not named on any page of the released text. Two of the brief's six items are entirely covered. Scînteia: Vizita conducătorilor de partid și de stat în județele Brașov, Covasna și Harghita The leadership has left on a tour of Transylvania (“Visit of the party and state leaders to Brașov, Covasna and Harghita counties”). At Brașov Ceaușescu says that “nothing can prevent the good collaboration, the friendship between Romania and the Soviet Union”. In another speech, printed on page 6: “we are just as determined not to allow anyone, on any ground, to violate our national sovereignty”. ### Wednesday, 28 August 1968 > **2. Rumania** > > The atmosphere in Bucharest is more relaxed than over the weekend, when Rumanian armed forces appeared to be in an initial state of alert. [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 28 August 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976327) Scînteia: Vizita conducătorilor de partid și de stat în municipiul Odorheiul Secuiesc On the front page János Fazekas, speaking at a rally in Odorheiu Secuiesc, a largely Hungarian-speaking town in Transylvania, says the invasion is disapproved also “by the Hungarians of Romania”, and attacks the journalists who, “whether in Hungary, in Budapest, or in other countries”, accuse the party of nationalism. The patriotic guards, named in Scînteia on 22, 23, 24, 25 and 27 August, do not appear again in any of the issues read from here on. ### Thursday, 29 August 1968 > **3. Bulgaria-Rumania** > > [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 29 August 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976329) Scînteia: Declarația Comitetului Executiv al Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român The declaration of the party's Executive Committee asks for the “complete” withdrawal of the troops from Czechoslovakia “in the shortest time”, and adds that “it is imperative that absolutely nothing be undertaken that would sharpen these relations”. On the same page: Ceaușescu has received a delegation of the Soviet–Romanian friendship association and Dezső Nemes, a member of the Hungarian party's leadership. ### Friday, 30 August 1968 Romania is not named in the released text. The brief has five items, followed by a page with three white boxes and no heading. Scînteia: Adunarea festivă consacrată aniversării a 20 de ani de la înființarea Securității Statului The front page is the twentieth anniversary of the Securitate, the state security police. The enemy named in Ceaușescu's speech is the one “from outside”, “the agents of imperialism”. On page 6, an item from New York: the foreign minister, Corneliu Mănescu, has met the American ambassador to the United Nations, George Ball. What they discussed the paper does not say. The same day in Washington: In the evening, in San Antonio, Johnson adds to his speech a passage on Eastern Europe: “There are even rumors late this evening that this action might be repeated elsewhere in the days ahead in Eastern Europe. […] So, let no one unleash the dogs of war.” At 9 p.m. in Washington Rusk sees Dobrynin, who had asked for an appointment the next day, and tells him that “in the last 24 hours we had received a number of reports of troop movements, incidents on the frontier, etc.” If action against Romania is contemplated, he asks “in the name of all humanity” that it not be done. The speech · FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 165 ### Saturday, 31 August 1968 The item is marked “As of 5:00 AM EDT”: the situation at five in the morning, Washington time. > **1. Rumania (As of 5:00 AM EDT)** > > [withheld] the movement of some Soviet forces toward the Rumanian border. It is too early to say whether this is meant as a pressure tactic or in fact indicates an intent to move into the country. > — President's Daily Brief, 31 August 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976333) Scînteia: Vizita tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu și a altor conducători de partid și de stat în județul Cluj On the front page: the leaders' visit to Cluj county, productivity in mining, ships delivered ahead of schedule. Czechoslovakia is not named on this page. Johnson's speech was not found in the text of this issue. The same day in Washington: The Romanian ambassador, Corneliu Bogdan, asks at the State Department what new evidence lay behind the speech. He is told that the “military-type evidence remained inconclusive”. In the evening Dobrynin brings Rusk Moscow's answer: “fears and rumors regarding Soviet military moves against Rumania were completely without foundation”. The message reaches Johnson's ranch at 11:01 p.m. Texas time. FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 166 · doc. 167 ### Monday, 2 September 1968 > **2. Rumania** > > The situation remains unchanged with no abnormal Soviet or Bulgarian military moves [withheld] Bucharest is calm. Yesterday Associated Press carried a story alleging that Ceausescu had proposed a series of concessions to the Soviets including a formal declaration of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and increased trade with Eastern Europe. [withheld] We have seen nothing as yet to confirm it. > > Moscow has not reacted publicly to the President's statement. The Polish party paper, however, said yesterday any suggestion that further intervention in Eastern Europe might be contemplated was "completely fabricated." > — President's Daily Brief, 2 September 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976335) Scînteia: Se impune un înalt nivel de organizare și eficiență în toate întreprinderile pentru mecanizarea agriculturii A front page about the mechanisation of farming, with a football photograph. In the whole issue the Soviet Union appears in one place only, in the phrase “Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement”. ### Tuesday, 3 September 1968 > **3. Rumania** > > The situation is quiet. [withheld] have not been able to find any evidence of troop concentrations near the Rumanian border. Military activity in northeast Bulgaria is limited to a training exercise. The Rumanians, with their most recent careful commentary on Czechoslovakia, seem to be trying to avoid provoking the Soviets. > — President's Daily Brief, 3 September 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976337) Scînteia: O puternică opinie de masă pentru reducerea cheltuielilor materiale de producție An ordinary front page: production costs, local administration, coloured cement for export, an international congress of vine and wine. ### Wednesday, 4 September 1968 > **1. Czechoslovakia - Soviet Union** > > Tensions in Czechoslovakia continue to subside slowly. The press reports that some Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops have left for home. Soviet soldiers have withdrawn from some important buildings in Prague. > > Deputy Premier Sik, a liberal who has long been anathema to Moscow, resigned yesterday shortly after being vilified in Izvestia. Izvestia also criticized Foreign Minister Hajek in terms which suggest it expects him to follow suit. > > There is still no indication that the Soviets or their associates are getting ready to move against Rumania or Yugoslavia. > — President's Daily Brief, 4 September 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976339) Scînteia: Aplicarea măsurilor inițiate de partid privind dezvoltarea democrației economice Eight pages on the management of the economy, the new school year and autumn supplies. No news from Prague. The same day in Washington: The National Security Council meets at the White House. Johnson: “If we speak out about a threatening situation and the situation does develop, we are accused of over-reacting.” General Wheeler says that “19 Soviet divisions could move into Romania with two or three days notice.” FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 93 ### Friday, 6 September 1968 > **3. Rumania** > > The nine-day truce in Soviet press attacks on Rumania was broken Wednesday when Pravda let it be known Moscow is still displeased with Bucharest's criticism. There are no new military developments relating to Rumania, however. The Bulgarians continue a military exercise; Yugoslav and Rumanian troops remain on alert. > — President's Daily Brief, 6 September 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976343) Scînteia: Vizita conducătorilor de partid și de stat în întreprinderi industriale din Capitală At the Vulcan works in Bucharest Ceaușescu speaks of “the difficult situation created in relations between the socialist countries”, without naming any country. No Soviet newspaper is named anywhere in the issue. ### Monday, 9 September 1968 > **4. Rumania** > > During a recent talk with Ambassador Davis, Foreign Minister Manescu said the "danger is not entirely over," but his remarks and manner suggested a calmer view of the situation. Manescu stressed the point that Rumania's leaders considered President Johnson's 30 August statement as having had a "cooling" effect on a dangerous trend. > > The Bulgarian military exercise near the Rumanian border ended last Friday. Rumania and Yugoslavia, however, apparently have not reduced the alert status of their armed forces. > — President's Daily Brief, 9 September 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976347) Scînteia: Agriculturii — utilaje moderne, pentru irigații On the front page: irrigation machinery, the Iron Gates hydroelectric dam on the Danube, a telegram of congratulation to Bulgaria's leaders. On page 3, a protocol notice: the British foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, has arrived in Bucharest. Johnson's statement of 30 August, which Mănescu had told the American ambassador had a “cooling” effect on a dangerous trend, was not found in any of the issues of Scînteia read for the days after it. Read together, the two papers say different things. The American president is told of the Romanian diplomats' fears, of the army's alert and of Soviet troops moving toward the border. The reader of Scînteia learns, until 27 August, of the patriotic guards and the resolve to defend the country; after that the paper still calls for the troops to leave Czechoslovakia, but the guards vanish from its pages, and working visits, the harvest and telegrams of support take their place. None of the 17 issues read for these days mentions foreign troops on Romania's borders. How much of what Johnson was told was true cannot be told from these pages: the sources are under the white boxes. What can be told is what the CIA itself did not know. On 31 August it wrote that it was “too early to say” whether the movement of troops was pressure or preparation for an invasion, and at the State Department the military evidence was judged “inconclusive”. ## Every day: each brief from 1961 to 1977 Each square is a day on which a brief appeared, from June 1961 to January 1977; each row is a year, with the days of the week from top to bottom. The dark squares are the days on which the brief names Romania. Choose a day to read its paragraph, move from day to day with the arrows, or type a date: the day you were born, for instance, if it fell between 1961 and 1977. ## A footnote, then a suspicion (1961–1963) In the brief's first months Romania appears rarely and only in passing. On 26 August 1961 Kennedy's brief says that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Romania's communist leader, has told the American chargé in Bucharest, the capital, that he plans to “visit New York” in the autumn. A Romanian credit of 50 million dollars to Indonesia follows, and Raúl Castro passing through Bucharest, apparently on his way to Moscow. The first item headed “Rumania”, the spelling American officials then used, comes only on 1 November 1962. It is one sentence long. > **F. Rumania** > > Reports of rural disturbances stemming from food shortages and harsh treatment of the peasantry are beginning to appear more substantial. > — President's Intelligence Checklist, 1 November 1962 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996014) From the spring of 1963 the tone changes. Romania resists the plans of CEMA, the Soviet bloc's economic organisation (Comecon), for each member to specialise in certain products, fearing they would hold back its industry and leave it a supplier of farm goods and raw materials. On 6 May the CIA tells the president that it has collected enough “bits and pieces” to wonder how Romanian-Soviet relations now stand. > **2. Rumania** > > a. We have a mounting collection of bits and pieces which have led us to wonder about the status of Rumanian-Soviet relations. > > b. [withheld] Rumanian resistance to certain CEMA plans for an integration of the Rumanian economy with that of the bloc. [withheld] Rumania has threatened to withdraw from CEMA over the issue. > > c. We note a present willingness by Bucharest to criticize certain Soviet World War II political actions. > > d. In contrast to the other satellites, Rumania has been relatively mum on the Sino-Soviet dispute and may even be playing footsy with the Chinese--new agreements have upped Rumanian trade with China and Albania a notch, and Rumania returned an ambassador to Albania in late March. > > [withheld] > — President's Intelligence Checklist, 6 May 1963 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996331) In June the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev pays an unannounced visit to Bucharest. The brief follows it for two days running without being able to confirm it, and on 9 July notes that Moscow “is still trying to cover up” the trip. In September, an item of two sentences: > **D. Rumania-USSR** > > Russian has been dropped as a mandatory language in Rumanian schools this year. Instead, it is now an elective along with French and English. > — President's Intelligence Checklist, 12 September 1963 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996554) The year ends, on 24 December, with “yet another gesture of independence from the USSR”: Romania will supply China with aviation fuel and jet fuel, products Peking had until then obtained only from the Soviets. ## “A declaration of independence” (1964) On Sunday, 26 April 1964, Scînteia (“The Spark”), the daily newspaper of Romania's ruling party, gives its whole front page to one text, which runs on to page 3: a “Declaration on the position of the Romanian Workers' Party on the problems of the international communist and workers' movement”. Page 3 says: “There is not and cannot be a ‘parent’ party and a ‘son-party’.” On Tuesday, 28 April, the statement reaches Lyndon Johnson's brief, at letter G: > **G. Rumania** > > The Rumanian party has issued a major statement of policy. On first reading it appears to be no less than a Rumanian "declaration of independence" from the USSR. While it represents a serious defeat for Khrushchev, it does not line Bucharest up with Peiping, but rather places it on the road of national Communism. [withheld] > — President's Intelligence Checklist, 28 April 1964 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959139) The quotation marks are the CIA's. The Romanian title speaks of the party's “position”, and in the text independence appears as a principle, beside national sovereignty and equal rights. In the brief the phrase catches on quickly: on 19 May it appears without quotation marks, “last month's declaration of independence”. In May the party explains the declaration at meetings held throughout the country. The brief of 19 May notes that Khrushchev is called there a “thief” and a “corn and pig specialist” who lectures Romanian farmers without knowing what he is talking about. On 30 May the brief tells the president how Romanians have taken the meetings: > **3. RUMANIA:** > > A. THE ROUND OF ANTI-KHRUSHCHEV, ANTI-SOVIET RALLIES IS HAVING AN EXTRAORDINARY IMPACT ON THE RUMANIAN MAN IN THE STREET. > > B. ACCORDING TO WHAT THE US LEGATION HEARS, THE RUMANIANS HAVE REACTED WITH "ELATION, INCREDULITY AND ADMIRATION" FOR THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT IS EXPRESSING ITS INDEPENDENCE. > > C. GRATIFYING AS THIS MUST BE, THE GOVERNMENT IS STILL A BIT DISTURBED SINCE THE RESPONSE IN SOME CASES HAS BEEN STRONGER THAN WAS DESIRED. > > D. THE LEGATION FEELS THAT THIS COULD LEAD THE AUTHORITIES TO BEAT A TACTICAL RETREAT TO TAKE SOME OF THE EDGE OFF. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL GO SO FAR AS TO ABANDON THEIR PROUD NEW INDEPENDENT COURSE. > > E. THAT COURSE IS ALREADY HAVING AN IMPACT IN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES. WE HEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT VOICES ARE BEING RAISED IN HIGH CZECH CIRCLES IN FAVOR OF SOME PUBLIC SHOW OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR. > — President's Intelligence Checklist, 30 May 1964 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959207) The brief of 22 June reports that Tito, the leader of neighbouring Yugoslavia, told the American ambassador the previous week that the Romanians were “going much too far” in attacking the Soviets, and that Western encouragement could bring them “dangerous” consequences. In 1964 Romania is named on 45 days, more than in any other year before 1968. ## Ceaușescu, the Warsaw Pact and the tanks Israel captured (1965–1968) On 22 March 1965 the party's Central Committee elects Nicolae Ceaușescu first secretary in place of Gheorghiu-Dej. Scînteia announces the election the next day, under the headline “Communiqué”. Johnson's brief has it on 22 March itself, in item 6: > **6. Rumania** > > Nicolae Ceausescu has been elected as the new party first secretary to succeed Gheorghiu-Dej. Ceausescu will probably follow the independent line of his predecessor in foreign affairs and may introduce some relaxation of hard-line policies at home. The rapidity of his selection suggests the top party leadership remains strongly unified. > — President's Daily Brief, 22 March 1965 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967584) In June 1965 come two items about the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance led by Moscow, to which Romania belonged. The first, on 14 June: > **5. Rumania** > > The Rumanians are exploring ways to end their membership in the Warsaw Pact. > > The Rumanian ambassador in Paris has formally asked the French Foreign Office for precise information on how France proposes to "disassociate" itself from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization while maintaining its Western alliance. Bucharest, he says, wants to "get rid of the Warsaw Pact" while keeping its alliance with the Soviets. > > Rumania has been unhappy with the Pact for some time, but this is the first time they have indicated an interest in terminating this tie. > — President's Daily Brief, 14 June 1965 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967730) The second, on 29 June, begins: “Rumania has told the USSR that its armed forces are no longer considered directly subordinate to the Warsaw Pact command”. The rest of the sentence is under a white box. Further down, the CIA reports that Marshal Grechko, the alliance's Soviet commander, had come to Bucharest in mid-June to complain of “Rumania's insubordination”. In 1966 and 1967 Romania appears mostly through what it does outside the bloc: it receives the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (16 June 1966), establishes diplomatic relations with West Germany (in the briefs of 3, 8 and 11 February 1967), and its prime minister, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, goes to Hanoi again and again: “four trips there in four years” (27 September 1967). On 26 January 1968 the brief says these journeys may be Maurer's attempt to bring the Vietnam war to the negotiating table. On 5 April 1968, an item of three sentences: > **7. Rumania** > > Large amounts of Soviet-made armor which the Israelis captured last summer have been bought by Rumania. Moscow has been reluctant to supply hardware to the unreliable Rumanians recently. That Bucharest has found a way around the problem is going to be especially irritating to the Russians. > — President's Daily Brief, 5 April 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974365) ## After August: satellite photographs and a night meeting (September 1968 – January 1969) The alarm of late August does not end with the Soviet ambassador's assurances. On 23 September Romania is again the first item in the brief: > **1. Soviet Union - Rumania** > > Satellite photography of mid-September shows that an army in the Odessa Military District, near the Rumanian border, has been mobilized. At least one of the army's three divisions has been brought to full combat strength and deployed to a training area near its home garrison. Signs of mobilization were also apparent at other places in the district. > > [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 23 September 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976371) The next day the CIA writes that the Romanians “may be learning to live with” the Soviet forces mobilised near their border. In November the alarm returns. On 22 November the brief tells the president that a watch committee of the American intelligence agencies met the evening before and concluded that “an invasion is unlikely, though the necessary military deployments could be carried out without our observing them”. The day after: > **1. Rumania** > > The leadership in Bucharest continues a "business-as-usual" appearance; no alarming military moves have been noted in or around Rumania. > — President's Daily Brief, 23 November 1968 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976477) On 15 January 1969, five days before Richard Nixon takes the oath, the brief carries an annex on “Soviet military pressures on Rumania and Yugoslavia”. Its conclusion: “The chances of extreme military action against either are not great.” The same annex appears again on 29 January, in the new president's brief. ## Nixon's visit and a changed letter (1969) Until 12 June 1969 the CIA writes “Rumania”. From 18 June it writes “Romania”, and so it stays to the end of the collection, with a single slip in 1972. On 2 August 1969 Richard Nixon lands in Bucharest. In the weeks before, the brief mostly watches Moscow's reaction. On 8 July it notes that nothing shows a visit by Soviet warships to Cuba to be a response to “President Nixon's upcoming trip to Romania”. The brief of 11 July finds the Soviet foreign minister, Gromyko, in a speech the day before, “seeming to swallow any displeasure”. The brief of 12 July reports that the Soviet leaders have postponed their own visit to Bucharest. On 15 July, about the hosts: > **Soviet Affairs** > > In anticipation of the President's upcoming visit, Bucharest has made a few friendly moves, particularly in the cultural field, to prepare the way. USIA Director Shakespeare was received with unusual courtesy during his recent unofficial visit and due notice was paid to his presence in the press. In contrast, former director Marks got only perfunctory treatment and no publicity during a visit in 1967. Shakespeare was treated as a VIP by the Foreign Office, even though the trip was unofficial, as well as by the State Committees for Art and Radio and Television. He was guest at several social functions and was invited back for an official visit by the First Deputy Foreign Minister. > > In talks with Shakespeare, the Romanians seemed ready to reach agreement on the questions of establishing a US library in Romania and exchanging magazines. Both of these issues have been under negotiation for some time, and Bucharest would probably like to formalize agreements on them during the President's visit. > — President's Daily Brief, 15 July 1969 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976879) In the briefs of 1, 2, 4 and 5 August Romania is not named in the released text; on Sunday, 3 August, no brief appeared. On 6 August the CIA summarises for the returning president an article in the Soviet magazine New Times, Moscow's “sharpest comment yet” on the visit. Scînteia of 3 and 4 August gives the visit its whole front page. At the departure, “tens of thousands of Bucharesters, along the route”, greet the motorcade. Of the subjects of the talks the paper names European security, disarmament, Vietnam and the Middle East. China does not appear in either issue. What Nixon said in Bucharest is in another file. In the record of the conversation of 2 August, published by the State Department, he tells Ceaușescu and Maurer: > We have no interest in creating a bloc or other arrangements in Asia which can be interpreted as fencing off Communist China. > — Richard Nixon, Bucharest, 2 August 1969. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XXIX, doc. 183. ## The flood map and a wrong capital (1970) On Friday, 22 May 1970, Nixon's brief has a full page with a map of Romania, the area of major flooding marked on it, and a note on the next page: > **Recent Floods Causing Extensive Damage in ROMANIA** > > General area of major flooding [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 22 May 1970 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977468) > **Romania:** > > Nearly one-half of Romania has suffered serious flood damage, and rains are continuing in many parts of the country. The death toll is over 100, with approximately 120,000 homeless and over a million acres of farm land under water. Flood waters have subsided slightly in the north, but southern Romania is in grave danger from the Danube and its tributaries. East Germany and Yugoslavia are the only Communist countries to offer relief thus far. The USSR, which is also affected by the floods, has not offered to help, although the Soviets had ample opportunity during President Ceausescu's visit to Moscow early this week. > — President's Daily Brief, 22 May 1970 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977468) Scînteia of Monday, 25 May, runs the headline “A new wave of floods” and counts the towns under water and the hectares covered, with no death toll at all. About American aid it is open: “93 tents […] from the USA” have arrived by air at Alba Iulia, a town in Transylvania. Soviet aid does not appear in this issue. Two days before the note in the brief, an aide to Henry Kissinger, the president's national security adviser, had written to him that the American ambassador had offered emergency help and the Romanians had answered with “a long shopping list”: seeds and construction machinery as well as tents and blankets. On 20 June Kissinger proposes to the president a package of 8.5 million dollars, noting that the announcement should be timed with Brezhnev's visit to Bucharest in mind. That visit does not take place. On 5 July, on a page typed entirely in capitals, like a telegram, the brief explains why the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev is not coming to sign the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty. Except that the text sends him to Budapest, the capital of Hungary. Someone has circled the word by hand. > **USSR-ROMANIA** > > A "CATARRHAL AILMENT," AS ANNOUNCED BY TASS YESTERDAY, MAY BE ONE OF THE REASONS WHY BREZHNEV IS NOT GOING TO BUDAPEST TO SIGN THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY, BUT THERE ARE OTHERS. THE ROMANIANS' OF COURSE BELIEVE--NOT WITHOUT GOOD REASON-- THAT MOSCOW HAS DOWNGRADED ITS REPRESENTATION. KOSYGIN WILL GO IN BREZHNEV'S PLACE--A DELIBERATE SNUB TO CEAUSESCU, WHO OF LATE HAS BEEN TALKING UP ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE WITH RENEWED VIGOR. > > ALSO, BREZHNEV IS NOW INVOLVED IN THE NASIR TALKS, WHICH MAY HAVE DRAGGED ON LONGER THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. BREZHNEV MAY ALSO WANT TO BE IN MOSCOW WHILE THE REGIME ASSESSES PRESIDENT NIXON'S REPORT ON INDOCHINA AND HIS TELEVISION INTERVIEW. > — President's Daily Brief, 5 July 1970 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977549) ## The Chinese loan, the July Theses and a summer of watching the border (1971) On 5 January 1971 the source of an item about China and Romania is named openly: the Romanian ambassador in Washington. > **COMMUNIST CHINA - ROMANIA** > > The Romanian ambassador in Washington says that the long-term, interest-free credit extended Bucharest by Peking last November amounts to $100 million in convertible currency. [withheld] > > A $100-million cash loan would be the largest China has ever extended. It comes at an appropriate time for the Romanians, who face substantial repayment commitments to a number of countries over the next several years. The Soviets will take further umbrage at this latest instance of Romanian independence, but Bucharest believes the economic benefits outweigh the credit's political risks. > — President's Daily Brief, 5 January 1971 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992405) The ambassador was Corneliu Bogdan. Six days later, on 11 January, the same man brings Kissinger a message from the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, received by way of Bucharest. The conversation is recorded in a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, published by the State Department: > If the U.S. has a desire to settle the issue and a proposal for its solution, the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special envoy in Peking. > — Zhou Enlai's message, as Ambassador Bogdan gave it to Kissinger on 11 January 1971. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, doc. 102. In the 14 paragraphs naming Romania in the briefs of October 1970 – July 1971, the message and its route through Bucharest do not appear. In June Ceaușescu visits China, North Korea and North Vietnam. On his return the party leadership adopts the proposals known ever since as the “July Theses”. On 10 July the CIA reads them as a gesture made for Moscow: the call for “ideological and cultural orthodoxy” “appears to stem from uncertainty over relations with Moscow following Ceausescu's recent Asian tour” and “seems designed to remove grounds for any Soviet questioning of Ceausescu's commitment to Communism”. August 1971 has nine days naming Romania out of 27, level with September 1968: the most in the whole collection. The Soviet leaders meet all their East European allies except Romania, and the Soviet press sets it beside the “Balkan heretics”, Albania and Yugoslavia. The brief of 28 August brings an answer from a satellite: > **Warsaw Pact:** > > Warsaw Pact: Satellite photography through [withheld] strengthens the conclusion that there is no military activity in western USSR that could be construed as an imminent threat to Romania. The photography shows no signs of troop concentrations or alerts. At military installations, there was no massing of civilian trucks indicative of a mobilization, nor were there any concentrations of military transport aircraft similar to those photographed prior to the Czech invasion of 1968. Photography [withheld] showed preparations then under way for the exercises now taking place in Bulgaria, but there was nothing unusual near the Bulgarian-Romanian border, and military activity appeared normal elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including Romania. > — President's Daily Brief, 28 August 1971 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992829) ## Cairo, Boeing, Mangalia (1972–1974) After 1971 Romania appears in the brief mostly as the state that does what its allies do not. The brief of 5 April 1972 reports that Ceaușescu and the Egyptian president, Sadat, “talked past one another” in Cairo three days earlier: the guest insists on the “integrity and sovereignty of all states”, which, the CIA notes, by implication includes Israel. On 6 March 1973: > **Romania:** > > Romania has become the first Warsaw Pact country to buy US passenger aircraft. A contract for the purchase of three Boeing 707-320C long-range jet airliners, spare parts, and spare engines, valued at $45 million was signed last week. One of the aircraft will be configured for VIP service. > — President's Daily Brief, 6 March 1973 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993764) On 26 June 1973 an item that opens with a white box describes ten “Chinese-designed” gunboats under construction at the shipyard of Mangalia, on Romania's Black Sea coast: “Romania's first non-Warsaw Pact arms since World War II”. The brief of 6 November, after the Arab-Israeli war of October, describes a visit to Bucharest by the Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, at the Romanians' invitation, for “urgent talks”. On 3 December Ceaușescu “arrives in Washington at a time when his country is uncomfortably prominent in international affairs”. About life inside the country the brief says little. One of the exceptions, on 12 July 1974: > **Romania:** > > Factory workers set at least one industrial fire in Romania recently, the first confirmed case in some time of serious worker-instigated sabotage. Further incidents could mean that Ceausescu faces some of the most serious popular discontent in his nearly ten years of rule. The regime's main response has been to tighten security at industrial facilities. Ceausescu's emphasis on developing heavy industry at the expense of improved living conditions and the production of consumer goods is an important factor in worker dissatisfaction. Romania's living standard is the lowest in Eastern Europe, except for Albania. > — President's Daily Brief, 12 July 1974 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007763) ## Ford in Bucharest, a bruised ego at Helsinki and the rumours of May (1975–1976) Gerald Ford arrives in Bucharest on Saturday, 2 August 1975. The next day's Scînteia speaks, in its headline, of “hundreds of thousands of Bucharesters” who came out to greet him. The day before he lands, the brief tells the president that the timing of the visit, “in Bucharest's view”, “could scarcely be better”: Congress has just opened the way to most-favoured-nation tariff status, and Romania, hit by floods again, “needs an economic shot in the arm”. On 10 September, a note about Ceaușescu at the Helsinki conference on European security, with six white boxes: > **NOTES** > > Romanian President Ceausescu [withheld] suffered a bruised ego [withheld] at the Helsinki summit [withheld] Ceausescu-- [withheld] was upset because he was not in the spotlight at Helsinki. He was annoyed by the Romanian Foreign Ministry's failure to line up more talks for him with other chiefs of state. [withheld] the East European leaders tended to ignore him and treated him like an outsider. [withheld] > — President's Daily Brief, 10 September 1975 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014898) In May 1976 the rumour in Bucharest is that reservists are being called up. > **ROMANIA-USSR:** > > There are rumors in Bucharest that Romania is calling up reservists because of a fear of Soviet intervention. > > There is no evidence that a general mobilization of Romanian forces is in progress, but some reservists may have been called up to participate in regular spring field training exercises. There has been no indication of any unusual Soviet military activity along the Romanian border. [withheld] President Ceausescu, when faced with increased pressure from Moscow in the past, has used the tactic of pointing to a magnified Soviet menace in order to strengthen his country's resolve and show national unity. > > The current spate of rumors has caused some panic buying by Romanian citizens. > — President's Daily Brief, 20 May 1976 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015114) Two days later the brief clears it up: it had been an “unannounced but planned mobilization and alert exercise”. The last item about Romania is dated 26 November 1976, after Brezhnev's first official visit to Bucharest. The last mention, on 16 December, concerns fishing in the waters of the European Community. The two released collections end on 20 January 1977, the day Jimmy Carter became president. ## How often Romania appears, and how much is still hidden The count below is of days, because on some days two documents appeared. A day “with Romania” is a day on which at least one paragraph of the released text names Romania, a Romanian town or a Romanian leader. Labels on maps were not counted. The busiest years are 1968, with 57 days, and 1964, with 45. By president: | President | Days with a brief | Days with Romania | Share | About Romania | With text withheld | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | Kennedy (from 17 June 1961) | 766 | 29 | 3.8 % | 12 | 3 | | Johnson | 1607 | 161 | 10.0 % | 77 | 40 | | Nixon | 1760 | 137 | 7.8 % | 65 | 32 | | Ford | 752 | 52 | 6.9 % | 24 | 10 | | Year | Days with a brief | Days with Romania | About Romania | With text withheld | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1961 | 171 | 4 | 0 | 0 | | 1962 | 315 | 6 | 1 | 0 | | 1963 | 315 | 22 | 13 | 4 | | 1964 | 311 | 45 | 22 | 12 | | 1965 | 310 | 13 | 6 | 3 | | 1966 | 312 | 18 | 6 | 4 | | 1967 | 311 | 22 | 11 | 4 | | 1968 | 313 | 57 | 29 | 15 | | 1969 | 299 | 39 | 8 | 3 | | 1970 | 324 | 12 | 8 | 3 | | 1971 | 328 | 23 | 15 | 11 | | 1972 | 327 | 21 | 12 | 4 | | 1973 | 311 | 34 | 16 | 11 | | 1974 | 305 | 19 | 11 | 4 | | 1975 | 307 | 26 | 11 | 4 | | 1976 | 310 | 18 | 9 | 3 | | 1977 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ### Romania beside the other communist states of Europe How often does Romania appear beside the other communist states of Europe? The table counts, for each, the days on which the brief writes its name or the name of its capital, by the same rule and in the same machine transcription of all the briefs, the one published by Carson, Min and Van Nuys. That is why the figure for Romania, 355, is a little lower than the one above, which comes from reading the scans. Over the whole period Romania is fourth by number of days, after East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Of the eight it was the one named most often in 1973, 1974 and 1975. East Germany appears often because of Berlin, and Czechoslovakia collects more days in 1968 than Romania in any three years together. ### How much of what the president was told about Romania is still withheld Of the 187 paragraphs about Romania, 89 have at least one white box inside them or directly after the text: 48 per cent. In 27 cases only the heading is left: the president was told something about Romania that day, and half a century later what it was is still not known. Beside the boxes, in the margin, is a code such as 50X1 or 25X1. The digit 1 points to the first category in the American rules on declassification: text that would reveal an intelligence source or method, that is, who said it and how it was learned. The 50 and the 25 are the years beyond which the text stays secret. On 31 August 1968 the sentence is left but not its beginning; on 24 August, one sentence followed by a column of boxes; on 29 August, only the heading, “Bulgaria-Rumania”. Every statement on this page that the brief “does not say” something refers to the released text. ## The archive: every paragraph about Romania, year by year All 409 paragraphs that name Romania, in the order in which they were written. Under each scan is its transcription, made from the image, and a link to the whole document. ### 26 August 1961 · A. RUMANIAN PRESIDENT GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ CASUALLY TOLD THE US CHARGE IN BUCHAREST THAT HE PLANS TO "VISIT NEW YORK" THIS FALL. SINCE HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT ATTEND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNLESS OTHER BLOC LEADERS PARTICIPATED ALSO, HIS REMARK MAY BE A TRIAL BALLOON TO DETERMINE US REACTION TO A POSSIBLE VISIT BY KHRUSHCHEV FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRYING TO ARRANGE FOUR POWER NEGOTIATIONS OVER BERLIN. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959015 ### 21 September 1961 · E. An agreement under which Rumania will extend Indonesia a $50,000,000 credit, mostly for rehabilitation of the latter's oil industry, will probably be used by Djakarta to improve its bargaining position vis-a-vis the three Western oil companies operating in the country. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959045 ### 26 September 1961 · 1. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S UN ADDRESS. A. MOSCOW HAS NOT GONE BEYOND A BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT, BACKPAGED IN PRAVDA REPEAT PRAVDA, NOTING THE GENERAL TOPICS RAISED IN THE SPEECH. OF MORE INTEREST IS THE NEWSPAPER'S REPRINTING, IN THE SAME ISSUE, OF A RECENT ARTICLE ON THE PRESIDENT BY JAMES WECHSLER IN THE NY POST REPEAT NY POST. AMONG THE PASSAGES IN THE ARTICLE IS THE FOLLOWING: "COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA TRIES TO EQUATE ALL AMERICAN ACTIONS WITH VICIOUS INTRIGUES OF WALL STREET IMPERIALISTS...IF KHRUSHCHEV BELIEVES THIS DOCTRINAIRE NONSENSE THEN HE IS A MADMAN AND WE ARE ALL DOOMED;" B. CHINESE COMMUNISTS DISMISS THE SPEECH AS THE "USUAL EMPTY PROPAGANDA;" C. THE EAST GERMANS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON CONDEMNING THE STATEMENTS ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM,BUT POLISH, RUMANIAN AND CZECH COMMENTARIES HAVE CENTERED THEIR CRITICISMS ON US DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS. THEY NOTE THE PRESIDENT'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, BUT DENY SEEING ANY SIGNS OF A DEPARTURE FROM STANDARD US FORMULATIONS; D. BELGRADE,HOWEVER, HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE SPEECH DESERVES CAREFUL STUDY AND NOTED A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT; E. THE CUBANS OUTDO THE BLOC, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CHINESE, IN UNCONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM; F. INITIAL INDIAN COMMENT SAYS THE ADDRESS IS REGARDED BY MANY AS A STRIKING REFLECTION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S FLEXIBILITY AND FAIRNESS THE PRESIDENT'S FRIENDLY REFERENCES TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ARE NOTED. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959049 ### 10 November 1961 · D. Raul Castro was seen in Sofia on Sunday and in Bucharest on Monday, apparently enroute to Moscow. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992029 ### 24 May 1962 · A. We anticipate that Khrushchev's upcoming trip to Rumania will resemble his trip to Bulgaria in having as its main purpose the whipping of another satellite into line in the drive to refurbish the bloc's fraternal ties with Yugoslavia. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992347 ### 2 July 1962 · A. Khrushchev is scheduled to go on the air later today, ostensibly to report on his recent trip to Rumania. He can be counted on, however, to go beyond that subject and could offer some hint on how Moscow views the Taiwan Strait situation. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005995783 ### 3 September 1962 · B. Indonesia-Bloc In a communiqué winding up the visit of Rumania's premier to Indonesia, Djakarta has become the first neutral to line itself up with the Bloc position on a German peace treaty and a West Berlin "free city." President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001516544 ### 1 November 1962 · F. Rumania Reports of rural disturbances stemming from food shortages and harsh treatment of the peasantry are beginning to appear more substantial. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996014 ### 27 November 1962 · 5. North Korea a. We may be seeing the first signs that North Korea, which has long tried to avoid choosing sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, is now veering toward the Chinese. b. Early in November, all North Korean ambassadors to Soviet Bloc nations were called home--presumably for a foreign policy parley. c. New ambassadors have since been appointed to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania; so far no one has gone back to Bulgaria, where relations have been sticky since a student incident there last summer. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996059 ### 22 December 1962 · D. SOVIET BLOC ECONOMY: PLANS FOR ACHIEVING A HIGH DEGREE OF INTEGRATION OF BLOC ECONOMIES ARE UNFOLDING WITHIN THE COUNCIL OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE PROJECT IS FAR ENOUGH ALONG AFTER A RECENT CEMA MEETING IN BUCHAREST THAT THE PARTY FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES (MINUS CHINA, ALBANIA AND NORTH KOREA) ARE EXPECTED TO MEET SOON TO PUT THEIR SEALS ON IT. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996102 ### 22 February 1963 · G. EASTERN EUROPE: THE COMMUNIST IMAGE MAY SUFFER FURTHER DAMAGE IN AFRICAN EYES. AFRICAN STUDENTS IN BUCHAREST, ENCOUNTERING PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE EXPERIENCED IN SOFIA, ARE HOPING TO ORGANIZE A STUDENT UNION; AFRICAN STUDENTS IN MOSCOW ARE SAID TO BE "EXTREMELY" DISTURBED BY THE TROUBLES IN BULGARIA. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996204 ### 23 April 1963 · F. Rumania-USSR Moscow is having its difficulties in organizing and coordinating the economies of Eastern Europe through CEMA--the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Rumanians are bucking a February CEMA decision that they abandon most of their plans for major new industries and concentrate instead on petroleum products, fertilizers and agriculture. Party leaders in Bucharest have sought and received support for their stand at the grass roots level and will find it difficult to back down should the Soviets elect to press the issue. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996309 ### 1 May 1963 · 5. Soviet Bloc a. Soviet/Satellite economic planning seems to be running into snags. b. The Executive Committee of the Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) is to meet within the next 10 or 12 days. It concluded a meeting only last week and it normally meets only every other month. c. We know that one issue in dispute is Rumania's reluctance to accept its allotted role in CEMA's plans for economic integration. d. The Polish delegate, in a statement to the press after the last meeting, dropped a hint that the problem could be broader than the specific issue of Rumania. He said the "debates" were "pervaded by the concern" with which members "approached the expansion and deepening of cooperation." President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996323 ### 6 May 1963 · 2. Rumania a. We have a mounting collection of bits and pieces which have led us to wonder about the status of Rumanian-Soviet relations. b. [withheld] Rumanian resistance to certain CEMA plans for an integration of the Rumanian economy with that of the bloc. [withheld] Rumania has threatened to withdraw from CEMA over the issue. c. We note a present willingness by Bucharest to criticize certain Soviet World War II political actions. d. In contrast to the other satellites, Rumania has been relatively mum on the Sino-Soviet dispute and may even be playing footsy with the Chinese--new agreements have upped Rumanian trade with China and Albania a notch, and Rumania returned an ambassador to Albania in late March. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996331 ### 18 May 1963 · 5. Soviet Bloc a. A meeting of the first secretaries of the Soviet bloc parties--the first to be held since mid-1962--appears scheduled for June in Moscow. b. Problems of economic integration--particularly the Rumanian wrangel with CEMA--will probably be well up on the agenda. c. The Polish party is attaching a great deal of importance to this meeting, which is expected "to significantly affect the Polish economy." d. The meeting will fall between the Soviet party plenum set for 18 June and the two-sided encounter between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists which will begin on 5 July. This timing will give the Soviets a chance to put the East European ranks in step before facing the Chinese. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996353 ### 28 May 1963 · A. Rumania A fact-finding mission has gone from Bucharest to Indonesia to explore the possibility of obtaining raw materials for Rumania's industries. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996370 ### 3 June 1963 · 3. Rumania-USSR a. Rumanian leaders apparently remain convinced that Moscow's plans for economic integration would leave Rumania a second class citizen in the Bloc. b. Soviet Presidium member Podgorny has been in Bucharest to persuade them otherwise. But on Wednesday, he was treated to an uncompromising public speech by Rumanian party secretary and Presidium member Ceausescu. c. Ceausescu quoted Lenin to support Bucharest's view that "equalization of the level of construction of Socialist states is indispensable for the construction of Communist society." d. This is a favorite Chinese chestnut, too. e. Curiously, when the Soviet government newspaper Izvestiya carried Ceausescu's speech, it deleted this offending paragraph and another relating to indispensability of heavy industrial development. Pravda ran the text in full. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996379 ### 4 June 1963 · C. Soviet Bloc Forces At least one phase of this year's Warsaw Pact exercises appears now to be underway in southeastern Bulgaria, involving Bulgarian as well as Soviet and Rumanian units of at least divisional size. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996381 ### 25 June 1963 · E. USSR: REUTERS THIS MORNING WAS REPORTING RUMORS FROM MOSCOW THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD SUDDENLY LEFT FOR RUMANIA, OR WAS ABOUT TO. AS OF 0800 EDT (OUR PRESS TIME) WE HAD NO CONFIRMATION AND HAD NO NEWS OF UNSCHEDULED VIP FLIGHTS FROM MOSCOW. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996418 ### 26 June 1963 · 1. USSR: A. IF KHRUSHCHEV HAS IN FACT GONE TO RUMANIA AS RUMORED--WE STILL ARE NOT SURE, BUT A SPEECH IN MOSCOW ON TUESDAY WAS READ FOR HIM--HE MUST THINK RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES WITH THE USSR NEED HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION BEFORE THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION NEXT WEEK. B. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SEEN NO SIGNS OF THE MOVEMENT OF VIP AIRCRAFT TO BUCHAREST, WHICH WE WOULD NORMALLY EXPECT. [withheld] C. ALTHOUGH THE RUMANIAN DEVIATION IS NOT ONE TO WHICH THE CHINESE WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC, BUCHAREST AND PEIPING ARE EACH TRYING TO EXPLOIT THE OTHER'S QUARREL WITH MOSCOW. D. RUMANIA IS THE ONLY EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO PUBLISH A SUMMARY OF THE LATEST CHINESE PARTY LETTER, WITH ITS IMPLIED CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET "ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION" OF THE SATELLITES. E. KHRUSHCHEV IS NOW DUE IN EAST BERLIN ON FRIDAY--TWO DAYS BEFORE ULBRICHT'S BIRTHDAY PARTY, THE OFFICIAL EXCUSE FOR HIS VISIT. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996420 ### 29 June 1963 · 1. USSR: A. KHRUSHCHEV'S RAMBLING 21 JUNE SPEECH TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, JUST PUBLISHED, LOOKS LIKE AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE SOVIET PARTY BEFORE THE FORTHCOMING CONFRONTATION WITH THE CHINESE. B. LASHING OUT AT BOTH DEVIATIONISTS AND RECALCITRANT INTELLECTUALS HE WARNED THAT DEVIATION FROM THE KREMLIN LINE COULD GET ONE THROWN OUT OF THE PARTY. C. THE SPEECH GAVE NO NEW INSIGHTS ON MOSCOW'S TACTICS IN THE 5 JULY SINO-SOVIET MEETING OR ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. D. KHRUSHCHEV WILL PROBABLY UTILIZE THE GATHERING TOMORROW OF EAST EUROPEAN PARTY CHIEFS IN EAST BERLIN--ALL BUT RUMANIA'S GHEORGHIU-DEJ--TO COORDINATE STRATEGY FOR NEXT WEEK'S MEETING. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996426 ### 9 July 1963 · B. USSR-Rumania Moscow is still trying to cover up Khrushchev's hurried visit to Bucharest on 24-25 June. Soviet Ambassador Zhegalin stated flatly in Bucharest that Khrushchev received the Women's Congress group in Moscow 24 June. However, Moscow's Mayor greeted the opening session and the Soviet delegate read Khrushchev's message to the group. We continue to believe Khrushchev made the trip. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996443 ### 22 July 1963 · 1. Sino-Soviet Dispute a. The two parties managed this weekend to extricate themselves from the talks with a communique stating they have "agreed" to resume discussions, "some time later." [withheld] b. Several East European countries, in commentaries so similar that Moscow's guidance seems apparent, have harshly criticized the Chinese. c. As expected, the party and government chiefs of the CEMA member states are to meet Wednesday in Moscow, for the first time since 1962. [withheld] Moscow has also announced an aid agreement for Yugoslavia and Khrushchev's plan to go there in August. [withheld] d. The CEMA meeting may discuss breaking economic relations with Peiping, and will surely deal with Rumania's recalcitrance. The Rumanian ambassador in Moscow told Kohler Saturday that this problem had been satisfactorily resolved. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996465 ### 8 August 1963 · C. RUMANIA-US: OUR EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST CONCLUDES THAT THE RUMANIANS HAVE SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY ALL JAMMING OF VOICE OF AMERICA AND RADIO FREE EUROPE BROADCASTS. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996495 ### 9 August 1963 · 5. Rumania-US a. Rumanian officials have been assiduous the past week or so in their protestations that they desire better economic relations with the US. b. Gheorghiu-Dej told Secretary Freeman that the proposals for supranational planning had been shelved at the last CEMA meeting. The Rumanian leader insisted that his country would proceed with its industrialization program, adding that "no one tries to prevent us from buying from the Americans." c. Rumania, he said, wants to buy US industrial installations and will find the means to pay for them. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996497 ### 12 August 1963 · D. Rumania-US The Rumanians want to send their Planning Commission chairman to the US for trade talks. They are interested in buying equipment for their chemical, oil, rubber, paper, and radio-TV industries. Their trade with the US amounted to only $1.5 million last year, but it has been growing rapidly with Western Europe. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996501 ### 12 September 1963 · D. Rumania-USSR Russian has been dropped as a mandatory language in Rumanian schools this year. Instead, it is now an elective along with French and English. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996554 ### 7 November 1963 · 8. Rumania-Yugoslavia a. The Yugoslavs report that Rumania party boss Gheorghiu-Dej will pay them a visit within the next ten days. b. The rumor in Belgrade is that he will sign an agreement on joint Rumanian-Yugoslav construction of a power and navigation project on the Danube. c. Rumania has heretofore been the most reluctant of the Soviet bloc states to improve relations with Yugoslavia though it has loosened up in other departments. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996651 ### 7 November 1963 · A. Rumania A Rumanian news agency official has pressed visiting Washington Post European Correspondent Walter Estabrook to establish a permanent news office in Bucharest. Estabrook told legation officials that the Post had been negotiating with the Soviet Government for some time on opening an office in Moscow. He said that if these talks continued to drag on he would recommend that his paper open a bureau in Bucharest. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996651 ### 18 November 1963 · D. RUMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA: PRESIDENT GHEORGHIU-DEJ'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA IS DEFINITELY ON FOR NOVEMBER 22-30. [withheld] RUMANIA HAS BEEN THE MOST RELUCTANT OF THE SOVIET BLOC STATES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH BELGRADE. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996669 ### 28 November 1963 · B. Rumania-US Rumanian officials are about to award a US firm, Ferguson and Company of Cleveland, Ohio, a $32 million contract to help build the huge Galati steel plant. The Rumanians are pressing ahead with this project in the face of Soviet efforts to discourage it in various ways, most importantly by refusing to underwrite the scheme to any substantial degree. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996691 ### 9 December 1963 · B. France - Eastern Europe Paris has decided to raise the level of its legations in Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria to embassies. This follows a similar move by London last week. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996711 ### 24 December 1963 · 4. Rumania - Communist China a. In yet another gesture of independence from the USSR, the Rumanians have agreed to supply aviation gas and jet fuel to the Chinese Communists next year. b. This will be the first time that Peiping has obtained these products from other than Soviet sources. c. The Soviets have so far been willing to continue supplying China's needs in this respect, but Peiping has been trying hard to diversify. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996737 ### 22 January 1964 · G. Hungary-US There has been some reduction in Hungarian jamming of VOA (and BBC) transmissions, and the foreign ministry in Budapest has indicated that it will be stopped completely in a short time. Rumania cut out jamming VOA last summer. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996788 ### 5 February 1964 · F. The Balkans The winter wheat harvest in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia may be reduced this year because of a drought during the fall planting season and a subsequent lack of adequate snow cover. These countries have planned large increases in agricultural production for 1964. Any setback to these plans may necessitate more purchases of Western wheat. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996816 ### 27 February 1964 · 4. Rumania - Communist China a. The Rumanians are taking on an extraordinary role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. b. At Peiping's invitation, they are sending a Politburo-level delegation to China next week to discuss party relations and problems of unity in the socialist camp. c. To date, the Chinese have shown no disposition to reach an accommodation with the Soviets, and at first blush this invitation looks like another attempt to chip away further at Moscow's support. We find it hard to imagine that the Soviets look upon this well-publicized maneuver with enthusiasm. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996858 ### 3 March 1964 · 2. Rumania - Sino-Soviet dispute a. The top-level Rumanian party delegation was greeted with great fanfare on arrival in Peiping yesterday. b. We still believe the Rumanians want to mediate between the USSR and China--incidentally reflecting glory on Bucharest as an independent power--but there are signs that the Soviets do not approve. [withheld] The Rumanians on their way to Peiping avoided Moscow, choosing instead a single refueling stop at Omsk. d. Whatever the Rumanians' intention, the Chinese obviously intend to play the visit as a break in the solid front of East European support for Moscow. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996867 ### 3 March 1964 · 4. Rumania - Sino-Soviet dispute: The Rumanian party delegation was greeted with great fanfare upon arrival in Peiping on 2 March. [withheld] Also the Rumanians on their way to Peiping avoided Moscow [withheld] We expect the Chinese will try to play the visit as a break in East European support for Moscow. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996869 ### 7 March 1964 · 3. Sino-Soviet Dispute a. Evidence is building up that the Soviets have finally decided to face up to a showdown with the Chinese and will call another world conference for the purpose. [withheld] c. We doubt that they will get any satisfaction from Peiping, which has already publicly belittled Moscow for failing to do anything despite earlier threats to deal the Chinese a "worthy rebuff." d. The Soviets are probably holding off to see the results of Rumanian talks with the Chinese. e. Most foreign parties, while basically backing Moscow, are most reluctant to face a showdown. Some are actively trying to restrain the Soviet party from calling a conference at present. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996877 ### 13 March 1964 · 2. Sino-Soviet Dispute: [withheld] a Moscow-sponsored meeting of Communist parties are still coming in. The Rumanian delegation's visit to Peiping--which was apparently intended to head off a Peiping-Moscow showdown--ended in a curt, non-committal communique. It appears now that nothing will change Soviet plan to hold the meeting, perhaps during Khrushchev's trip to Hungary late this month. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996890 ### 17 March 1964 · F. Algeria-USSR Rumors are about in Algiers that Ben Bella, fresh from visits to Bucharest and Paris, will spend May Day in Moscow. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996895 ### 18 March 1964 · 3. Rumania-USSR a. The USSR, reversing an earlier decision, has agreed to supply equipment for the giant metallurgical combine being built at Galati. b. Moscow previously infuriated the Rumanians by opposing construction of this complex on grounds that it was economically questionable. [withheld] relations among members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance will be conducted on a bilateral basis for a long time. Multilateral arrangements are impossible now [withheld] because of "differences" among council members. d. Moscow may have changed its mind about Galati in order to prevent Western interests, who hope to play a major role in the project, from making too much political capital with the Rumanians. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005996898 ### 30 March 1964 · F. POLAND: GOMULKA, ALREADY THE TARGET OF A VIOLENT ATTACK FOR HIS "UNORTHODOX" POLICY BY PARTY LEFTWINGERS, IS NOW BEING ROUNDLY CRITICIZED FOR BEING TOO MUCH A "LACKEY OF MOSCOW" BY THE MORE NATIONALISTICALLY INCLINED. THEY SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT GOMULKA HAS TRIED TO MEDIATE THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE RATHER THAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT FOR POLAND'S ADVANTAGE AS RUMANIA HAS DONE. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959061 ### 8 April 1964 · 3. USSR a. Khrushchev is having some trouble in his own back yard in lining up support for his new counter-offensive against Peiping and in particular for a new international conference of Communist parties. b. The more independent-minded East Europeans know they would lose their newly won maneuver room if they had to commit themselves definitively to Moscow in a showdown with the Chinese. c. The Hungarians have not yet specifically backed the conference proposal and are thought to prefer no action at all to the possible break with the Chinese that might follow from such a meeting. d. There are reports circulating in Budapest that Khrushchev is going to stay on there until 13 April, presumably in the hope of bringing Kadar around. e. The Rumanians are also dragging their feet. The Poles, who have said nothing publicly on the issue, are believed willing to attend a conference only if its purpose is to seek a means of reconciliation with Peiping. f. Khrushchev does seem to have the East Germans in his pocket, and the Bulgarians and Czechs are also on record as favoring a conference this year. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959080 ### 9 April 1964 · B. Rumania-Bloc [withheld] The Rumanians are desperately trying to head off Soviet moves toward a showdown meeting and, we understand from press reports, have called a special party meeting for next week. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959082 ### 28 April 1964 · G. Rumania The Rumanian party has issued a major statement of policy. On first reading it appears to be no less than a Rumanian "declaration of independence" from the USSR. While it represents a serious defeat for Khrushchev, it does not line Bucharest up with Peiping, but rather places it on the road of national Communism. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959139 ### 28 April 1964 · 13. Rumania: The Rumanian party has issued a major statement of policy. On first reading it appears to be no less than a Rumanian "declaration of independence" from the USSR. While it represents a serious defeat for Khrushchev, it does not line Bucharest up with Peiping, but rather places it on the road of national Communism. [withheld] President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959142 ### 2 May 1964 · B. Rumania-US A Rumanian Government industrial and commercial delegation hopes to begin talks in Washington next Friday. Included in its shopping list are rubber plants, chemical and synthetics factories, several oil industry plants, a nuclear power station, and a glass factory. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959150 ### 5 May 1964 · 9. Rumania-US: The Rumanian Government's industrial and commerical delegation hopes to begin talks in Washington next Friday. Included in its shopping list are rubber plants, chemical and synthetics factories, several oil industry plants, a nuclear power station, and a glass factory. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959156 ### 8 May 1964 · 11. Communist China - USSR: The Chinese appear confident that Khrushchev cannot muster the support he needs to call an international Communist meeting. Peiping's published letter of 7 May to the Soviet Communist Party takes note of the point made by the Italian, Rumanian, and other parties that if the Soviets rush into a meeting, Moscow will have to shoulder the blame for splitting the movement. The letter states that adequate preparation would take several years and adds that even a bilateral meeting could not be held in less than one year. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959164 ### 8 May 1964 · 14. Rumania-US: [withheld] the Rumanian industrial and commercial delegation expected [withheld] in Washington [withheld] on 15 May and discussions are to begin on the 18th. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959164 ### 19 May 1964 · 4. Rumania a. The Rumanian party has followed up last month's declaration of independence with an intensive indoctrination campaign which, by accounts reaching US officials in Bucharest, is taking on a pronounced anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev cast. b. At meetings throughout the country, the Soviets are being criticized for 20 years of economic exploitation and for infiltrating the Rumanian secret police. c. Khrushchev has been called a "thief" and a "corn and pig specialist" who lectures Rumanian farmers but does not know what he is talking about. d. The dominant theme, however, seems to be about the same as in the April party documents, that "Khrushchev and Mao can do what they want, Rumania will go its own way." President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959183 ### 19 May 1964 · 9. Rumania: The Rumanian party has followed up last month's declaration of independence with an intensive indoctrination campaign which, by accounts reaching US officials in Bucharest, is taking on a pronounced anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev cast. At meetings throughout the country, the Soviets are being criticized for 20 years of economic exploitation and for infiltrating the Rumanian secret police. Khrushchev has been called a "thief" and a "corn and pig specialist" who lectures Rumanian farmers but does not know what he is talking about. The dominant theme, however, seems to be about the same as in the April party documents, that "Khrushchev and Mao can do what they want, Rumania will go its own way." President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959185 ### 22 May 1964 · D. Rumania - The West A 24-man Rumanian mission, including the minister of heavy industry and the vice minister of planning, arrived in Brussels last week, probably to discuss the acquisition of Belgian industrial plants on credit. Belgium has already built several plants for the Rumanians. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959190 ### 28 May 1964 · 13. Rumania-USSR: Another problem is developing among the Eastern Europeans, arising out of Rumania's "independent" moves. [withheld] President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959204 ### 30 May 1964 · 3. RUMANIA: A. THE ROUND OF ANTI-KHRUSHCHEV, ANTI-SOVIET RALLIES IS HAVING AN EXTRAORDINARY IMPACT ON THE RUMANIAN MAN IN THE STREET. B. ACCORDING TO WHAT THE US LEGATION HEARS, THE RUMANIANS HAVE REACTED WITH "ELATION, INCREDULITY AND ADMIRATION" FOR THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT IS EXPRESSING ITS INDEPENDENCE. C. GRATIFYING AS THIS MUST BE, THE GOVERNMENT IS STILL A BIT DISTURBED SINCE THE RESPONSE IN SOME CASES HAS BEEN STRONGER THAN WAS DESIRED. D. THE LEGATION FEELS THAT THIS COULD LEAD THE AUTHORITIES TO BEAT A TACTICAL RETREAT TO TAKE SOME OF THE EDGE OFF. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL GO SO FAR AS TO ABANDON THEIR PROUD NEW INDEPENDENT COURSE. E. THAT COURSE IS ALREADY HAVING AN IMPACT IN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES. WE HEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT VOICES ARE BEING RAISED IN HIGH CZECH CIRCLES IN FAVOR OF SOME PUBLIC SHOW OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959207 ### 10 June 1964 · C. Rumania-Yugoslavia Bucharest is showing more signs of wanting to follow in Belgrade's footsteps. [withheld] two "urgent" invitations from Rumania recently for a visit by Tito sometime this summer. Khrushchev may have tried to head off such an entente during his talk with Tito on Monday in Leningrad. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959228 ### 12 June 1964 · 6. Rumania a. France may be about to insert itself into the delicate matter of a nuclear power station for Rumania. b. The head of France's atomic energy program is in Bucharest, where, we suspect, he will emphasize France's ability to fulfill Rumania's desires for such a plant. c. He joins a team from one of Britain's largest nuclear power outfits which is in Rumania discussing the sale of a uranium-fired reactor. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959232 ### 12 June 1964 · 8. Rumania: Rumania continues to show signs of independence. [withheld] Khrushchev may have tried to block a Rumanian-Yugoslav entente during his meeting with Tito in Leningrad last Monday. The Rumanians are still casting about for a nuclear power station. [withheld] President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959234 ### 16 June 1964 · 3. Rumania-USSR a. Relations are unmistakably getting worse. b. In the past week or so, Rumanian commentary of Soviet economic policies for the bloc has become increasingly acerbic. c. On 13 June, Rumania's leading economic journal accused Moscow of authoring regional economic proposals aimed at dismembering Rumania. The article in question hinted for the first time at Soviet economic reprisals. d. We expect the next round will bring public broadsides by leaders on both sides. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959239 ### 16 June 1964 · 7. Rumania-USSR: Relations are unmistakably getting worse. In the past week or so, Rumanian commentary on Soviet economic policies for the bloc has taken on a sharp edge. Bucharest's leading economic journal accused Moscow of authoring regional proposals aimed at dismembering Rumania. One article hinted for the first time at Soviet economic reprisals. We expect the next round will bring public broadsides by leaders on both sides. [withheld] President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959241 ### 22 June 1964 · 2. Yugoslavia a. In a conversation with Ambassador Elbrick at Brioni last week, Tito said he thought that the Rumanians were going much too far in attacking the Soviets. b. He expressed concern lest Western overtures designed to encourage the Rumanians provoke "dangerous" consequences for them. c. The Yugoslav leader will probably make much these same points when he meets with Gheorghiu-Dej at the border today. This meeting may have been arranged after Tito's Leningrad talks with Khrushchev. d. Tito told Elbrick that he had counseled Khrushchev against an international Communist conference on the dispute with Peiping. There will be no such meeting "for the time being," Tito added. e. According to Tito, the US and USSR should be able to get together on the Laotian situation, which Khrushchev finds every bit as "unpleasant" as the US does. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959252 ### 23 June 1964 · 3. Yugoslavia: Tito last week told Ambassador Elbrick that the Rumanians were going much too far in attacking the Soviets. The Yugoslav leader expressed concern lest Western encouragement provoke dangerous consequences for the Rumanians. Tito, who seems genuinely worried that the Rumanian stand undermines East European stability, probably made much the same points in his border talks with Gheorghiu-Dej. Tito also told Elbrick that he had counseled Khrushchev against an international Communist conference on the dispute with Peiping. There will be no such meeting "for the time being," Tito added. According to Tito, the US and USSR should be able to get together on the Laotian situation, which Khrushchev finds every bit as "unpleasant" as the US does. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959256 ### 26 June 1964 · D. Czechoslovakia President Novotny has made a personal gesture aimed at improving US-Czech relations. At an official ceremony in Prague on 23 June, he made a special point of singling out Ambassador Horsey for a long and agreeable discussion. Novotny--probably with the Rumanian example in mind--declared "we intend to be free and are not a satellite." President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959261 ### 30 June 1964 · C. France De Gaulle's next press conference is now scheduled for 23 July. There are signs that he will devote considerable attention to the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and to France's historic ties with this area. He may follow this up with an offer of aid, perhaps in the nuclear energy field,to Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer who calls a few days later. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959268 ### 7 July 1964 · 4. Rumania-USSR a. A high-ranking delegation from Bucharest led by number-two man Maurer showed up in Moscow yesterday. b. The Rumanians have been working fast to make their new independent outlook felt, especially in the West and to soothe ruffled feathers in the bloc. c. Moscow may be sounding out the possibilities for Rumanian attendance at an interparty conference. Such a conference, attended by selected Communist parties, is being discussed as a way to restore at least a facade of unity among Moscow's supporters in the Sino-Soviet dispute. d. Almost any deal Moscow might make with Rumania now, however, would be interpreted as implying acceptance of Rumania's independent position. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959282 ### 10 July 1964 · D. France-Rumania [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959289 ### 14 July 1964 · F. Rumania-USSR Premier Maurer's delegation got a good hand when it appeared at the opening session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 13 July. This is slim evidence, but it does suggest Rumanian-Soviet talks may be going reasonably well. We have had no other indications since the Rumanian delegation's first days in Moscow early last week. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959296 ### 15 July 1964 · 7. USSR a. We have no further word on why ambassadors Soldatov and Dobrynin dashed back to Moscow during last weekend. b. It appears that the Soviet ambassador to Rumania also returned hastily. c. While this sort of activity has in the past given us the first tip-off that the party central committee is about to meet, some of the other usual indications are lacking. Nor would these men normally be recalled for the Supreme Soviet session now in progress. d. The next important fixture on Khrushchev's ceremonial schedule is 22 July, in Warsaw, for the celebration of the Polish regime's 20th anniversary. He may be contemplating some new bombshell, and wished to get advice from his ambassadors in certain key capitals. e. Given the rumors in Moscow of high-level personnel changes, however, we cannot rule out completely that the central committee was in fact convened. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959299 ### 13 August 1964 · C. European Satellites East Germany, Poland,and Czechoslovakia had higher rates of industrial growth in the first half of 1964 than in 1963, the postwar low, largely because of the return of normal weather during the past winter. The southern satellites are doing much better. Bulgaria had a 10% growth rate and Rumania 16%. Hungary also had a 10% rate, but an incipient labor shortage threatens this. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959357 ### 25 August 1964 · A. Rumania-USSR [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959380 ### 7 September 1964 · A. Yugoslavia Tito's schedule is getting crowded. It now calls for talks before the month is out with Kadar, Gheorgiu-Dej, Ulbricht and Novotny. We incline to connect this flurry of activity with Khrushchev's call for a December meeting of 26 Communist parties and presume that Tito will be urging caution in dealing with the thorny China issue. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959406 ### 8 September 1964 · 10. Yugoslavia: Tito's schedule is getting crowded. It now calls for talks before the month is out with Kadar, Gheorgiu-Dej, Ulbricht and Novotny. We incline to connect this flurry of activity with Khrushchev's call for a December meeting of 26 Communist parties and presume that Tito will be urging caution in dealing with the scratchy China issue. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959410 ### 15 September 1964 · F. Yugoslavia-Rumania Tito is encouraging Rumania's opposition to Moscow's proposed 15 December conference of Communist parties. He probably fears the conference would reduce the freedom of maneuver his and other Communist parties now enjoy. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959423 ### 19 September 1964 · D. Rumania We have another symptom of Rumania's independence. A US historian has been asked to prepare studies on Rumanian history, including one intended to prove that the regime's policy has been "consistently anti-Soviet." President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959434 ### 21 September 1964 · 5. USSR a. Moscow has announced the end of Soviet, Rumanian, and Bulgarian joint maneuvers in Bulgaria. [withheld] b. The Soviets continue to watch the NATO exercise in the North Atlantic. [withheld] President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959436 ### 24 September 1964 · C. Soviet Bloc - Communist China Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer is going to Peiping's 1 October National Day celebrations, but he may be lonely. [withheld] a number of Soviet bloc leaders, including Khrushchev, suggested pointedly they might be "too busy" to attend. Sihanouk, however, is going, probably in search of some strong political guarantees. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959443 ### 28 September 1964 · 7. Communist China a. Sihanouk is in Peiping, exuding pro-Chinese sentiments. He appears to be the stellar attraction for the celebration of the Peiping regime's 15th anniversary on 1 October. b. As far as we know, the only other chiefs of state in attendance will be Massamba-Debat from the Congo (Brazzaville) and Modiba Keita of Mali. Rumania's Premier Maurer is also due to show. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959450 ### 29 September 1964 · 8. Communist China: Sihanouk is in Peiping, exuding pro-Chinese goodwill. He appears to be the stellar attraction for the celebrations Thursday of the Peiping regime's 15 anniversary. As far as we know the only other chiefs of state due to show will be Massamba-Debat from the Congo (Brazzaville) and Modiba Keita of Mali. Premier Maurer of Rumania leads the bloc delegations. He stopped in Moscow and may be once again trying to serve as a go-between in the Sino-Soviet dispute. President's Intelligence Review · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959454 ### 21 October 1964 · 2. Eastern Europe - USSR: a. East European leaders apparently still hope to remain semi-independent of Moscow and dampen the domestic effect of Khrushchev's ouster. b. None of them has given solid backing to Pravda's 17 October denigration of the former Soviet leader. Rumania has not published the article, and Hungary and Yugoslavia have printed only partial texts, omitting references to Khrushchev. c. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia praised him, and even East Germany mentioned his "merit." d. Nearly all of the East Europeans are singling out the new Moscow regime's avowed dedication to the policies approved at the 20th and 22nd Soviet party congresses. These included de-Stalinization and recognition of the sovereignty of each Communist party. e. Only Zhivkov of Bulgaria has made a strong pledge of loyalty to the new regime. He owes his job to Khrushchev, and opponents in his own party are in a position to threaten his control. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959497 ### 6 November 1964 · B. Czechoslovakia-USSR Novotny apparently intends to show his independence by skipping the 7 November Moscow meeting of bloc leaders. This puts him in the same category as Rumanian party first secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, also a stay-at-home. Prague still has not criticized Khrushchev, and Moscow has thanked all the East European leaders, except Novotny, for their congratulatory messages to Brezhnev and Kosygin. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005959527 ### 19 November 1964 · D. Rumania Our embassy reports that non-Communist French publications are now regularly available at newsstands in Bucharest. This is the first time Rumania's Communist regime has allowed the public to see the Western press on a regular basis. The embassy speculates that US newspapers may also become available soon. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967366 ### 25 November 1964 · 5. HUNGARY: A. PARTY BOSS KADAR,LIKE HIS COLLEAGUES IN RUMANIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SEEMS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE HIS MORE INDEPENDENT COURSE IN BLOC AFFAIRS. [withheld] C. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT KADAR HAS CHANGED HIS COURSE AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967384 ### 27 November 1964 · 11. Hungary: Party boss Kadar, like Dej in Rumania and Novotny in Czechoslovakia, apparently is determined to continue his more independent course in relations with the bloc. [withheld] Kadar does not appear to have altered his position as a result of his subsequent visit to Moscow. President's Intelligence Checklist · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967390 ### 25 February 1965 · 3. USSR Soviet leaders are apparently going ahead with the long-talked-of 1 March meeting of 26 Communist parties, originally scheduled for last December as preparatory to a world Communist conference. Foreign delegates are now arriving in Moscow, but seats for Peiping's supporters as well as the Rumanians will probably stay empty. So far there are no signs that anything substantial will emerge. It will serve, however, as another platform for condemnation of US policy in Vietnam. Peiping has consistently blasted this conclave and may now be calling its own meeting of Communist factions supporting the Chinese line. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967542 ### 4 March 1965 · 6. Eastern Europe The gradual loosening of the Soviet Union's iron grasp on Eastern Europe is encouraging a revival of long-dormant territorial and minority problems. So far, Rumania and Hungary have taken the lead in reviving nationalistic interest in lost lands. They are not likely to remain alone since every nation in the bloc has old claims on one or more regions of one or more of its neighbors. A discussion of some of the ramifications of the situation is at Annex. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967554 ### 4 March 1965 · Territorial Quarrels in Eastern Europe Hungary and Rumania have been at daggers drawn for some months now over the Transylvania problem. (See map.) Northern Transylvania, with its large Magyar population, has been a part of Rumania since 1918. Now the Hungarians are complaining over the oppression of the Magyar minority. One Hungarian official has gone so far as to term the treatment being accorded the Magyars, "genocide." Anti-Rumanian incidents in the area have been increasingly numerous. Hungarian flags have been raised. A pamphlet predicting the return of the area to Hungary has appeared. There has even been scattered violence. Bucharest, not surprisingly, suspects that Budapest is behind all this. The Rumanians also suspect that the Soviets have lent quiet encouragement to the agitation. Not to be outdone, the Rumanians have raised old claims on Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, now part of the USSR. This has been in a low key so far. For example, the Rumanian leaders have sent historians searching through old texts, where they have uncovered passages in which Marx strongly criticized Russia's seizure of Bessarabia. There are signs that the Rumanians, who have taken up the matter officially with the Soviets, may be prepared to carry their campaign a good deal further. Other states in the area may not be long in joining the outcry. Thus, Czecholsovakia has been making noises about the return of Ruthenia, now part of the USSR. Wary officials in Budapest have referred to the possible return of Kosice, now in Czechoslovakia. There is, however, a general recognition that everyone is vulnerable in this game, and this may help keep the lid on. So far irredentist claims have been seized upon essentially as tactical weapons rather than serious goals to be pursued at whatever cost. However, popular feelings on these matters are strong, as for example in Germany over the loss of German land to the Poles. If the forces of nationalism continue to grow, ambitious figures and strong factions may resort increasingly to the espousal of traditional territorial and ethnic claims as a means of broadening their appeal. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967554 ### 22 March 1965 · 6. Rumania Nicolae Ceausescu has been elected as the new party first secretary to succeed Gheorghiu-Dej. Ceausescu will probably follow the independent line of his predecessor in foreign affairs and may introduce some relaxation of hard-line policies at home. The rapidity of his selection suggests the top party leadership remains strongly unified. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967584 ### 14 April 1965 · 6. Bulgaria [withheld] an unsuccessful coup against the Zhivkov regime was staged some time between 6 and 12 April. According to the Rumanian military attaché in Sofia, the commandant of the Sofia garrison is missing, and a high-level party official has committed suicide. The Bulgarian party is faction ridden, and there is strong opposition to Zhivkov's slavishly pro-Moscow policies, but there is no solid evidence to support these rather tenuous reports of an attempted coup. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967625 ### 19 April 1965 · 6. Rumania The Rumanians have apparently concluded that little progress is possible just now in bilateral relations with the US. The collapse of the protracted negotiations with Firestone for a much-wanted synthetic rubber plant has added to Rumanian frustrations over delays in other commercial deals with US firms; President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967633 ### 27 May 1965 · 8. Rumania Soviet Marshal Grechko, commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, has again turned up in Bucharest, very likely to deal with difficulties between the Rumanians and the pact organization. There have been a number of reports of Rumanian dissatisfaction with the pact. [withheld] The nature of the disagreement is not known for sure, but probably grew out of Rumania's assertion of a greater measure of independence. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967700 ### 14 June 1965 · 5. Rumania The Rumanians are exploring ways to end their membership in the Warsaw Pact. The Rumanian ambassador in Paris has formally asked the French Foreign Office for precise information on how France proposes to "disassociate" itself from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization while maintaining its Western alliance. Bucharest, he says, wants to "get rid of the Warsaw Pact" while keeping its alliance with the Soviets. Rumania has been unhappy with the Pact for some time, but this is the first time they have indicated an interest in terminating this tie. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967730 ### 29 June 1965 · 4. Rumania Rumania has told the USSR that its armed forces are no longer considered directly subordinate to the Warsaw Pact command [withheld]. Marshal Grechko, Soviet Commander of the Warsaw Pact, visited Bucharest in mid-June to complain of Rumania's insubordination. Rumanian officials replied that decisions of the pact must be approved first by the Bucharest government before Rumanian armed forces can comply. The Rumanians also rebuffed Grechko's efforts to have them order more equipment from Moscow. He was told the Rumanian armed forces were adequately equipped and that local industry would take care of future needs as much as possible. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967756 ### 31 July 1965 · 4. Soviet Bloc A large Warsaw Pact air defense exercise got under way yesterday when about 150 medium bombers flew simulated air attacks over most of the European satellites. Large numbers of Soviet and East European fighters reacted to the raid. Surface-to-air missile sites were also involved. [withheld] It promises to be the largest in a series of exercises designed to improve readiness in Pact air defense forces. So far the Rumanians have been conspicuous in their failure to take part. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967812 ### 4 September 1965 · 3. France The French Foreign Ministry says that Polish Premier Cyrankiewiez will be given a "fine reception" by De Gaulle when he visits Paris next week. The show will exceed that given the Rumanian prime minister last year, since De Gaulle considers Poland more important. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967873 ### 15 September 1965 · 5. Soviet Bloc The Soviet leaders are in the midst of a new series of talks in Moscow with their East European counterparts. Top Rumanian and Czech delegations have recently returned home, and the East Germans are expected in town later in the week. In addition, Brezhnev made a quick trip to Poland over the weekend for a meeting with Gomulka. It is not clear what has prompted this round of activity. The timing of the consultations suggests that at least in part they have some connection with the Soviet Central Committee meeting at the end of the month. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967892 ### 23 September 1965 · 2. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967906 ### 18 October 1965 · 8. Yugoslavia President Tito, 73-years-old, is rumored to be seriously ill. Indian President Radhakrishnan, who talked to Tito two weeks ago, was his last reported visitor. A trip to Rumania, scheduled for late this month, has been cancelled, as has been a planned visit to Yugoslavia by Polish leader Gomulka. Day-to-day affairs can be carried on by Vice President Rankovic and the two top Communist Party secretaries. No other Yugoslav leader, however, has Tito's ability to curb the fractiousness of the country's minorities. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005967948 ### 10 February 1966 · 4. Albania In recent weeks the Albanians have been showing an uncharacteristic interest in mending their political fences with a number of nearby states, both Communist and non-Communist. The leaders in Tirana have recently responded warmly to overtures from Rumania and Poland and have made friendly approaches to the Hungarians. They have also taken steps to improve relations with Turkey, France, and Italy on the other side of the curtain. The most likely explanation of this unusual behavior is a growing Albanian dissatisfaction with the scope and timeliness of the economic support they have been getting from their ideological cohorts, the Chinese. Tirana still parrots without let up all the vitriol from Peking, but these latest maneuvers may signal a desire eventually to loosen ties with China. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968147 ### 2 March 1966 · 2. Communist China [withheld] Chou En-lai will visit Rumania in "mid-March," and there are indications he may also go to Albania. The Chinese may hope to demonstrate that they are not entirely isolated in the Soviet-led bloc, and the Rumanians could use the visit to demonstrate their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet hassle. The reported timing of the trip would permit Chou to show up in Moscow for the Soviet party congress scheduled to begin on 29 March. He led the Chinese delegation to the last congress in 1961--but stomped out when the Soviets attacked Albania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968182 ### 10 March 1966 · 3. Communist China Chief of State Liu Shao-Chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi are to arrive in Karachi later this month as official guests for the celebration of Pakistan Day. The two officials may also stop in Afghanistan. Peking may have in mind a rather broad diplomatic effort to try and regain some of the ground it has lost abroad in recent months. Premier Chou En-lai has scheduled a March trip which, at last report, includes Rumania and Albania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968196 ### 10 March 1966 · 10. France Foreign Minister Couve de Murville is set to visit Rumania and Bulgaria in late April. He may also go to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary sometime this summer. These trips could, of course, be the forerunner of a grand De Gaulle swing through Eastern Europe. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968196 ### 31 March 1966 · 6. Rumania Bucharest remains dissatisfied with the Warsaw Pact and may be trying to draw a parallel between its own position and the current French stand on NATO. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968233 ### 21 April 1966 · 5. Iran The Shah, who appears increasingly unhappy with the US, wants to know well before 26 May if he is going to be allowed to buy the military equipment he asked for some months ago. This deadline, he says, is to permit him to initiate procurement measures elsewhere, if necessary, before leaving on an official visit to Rumania. Reports of recent Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt or Iraq have probably heightened his determination to get more equipment somewhere, and he has the money to pay for it. He particularly wants to beef up defenses in southern Iran and along the Persian Gulf--areas he is convinced are threatened by Nasir. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968270 ### 6 May 1966 · 1. The President's Speech The official press in Eastern Europe has come up with mixed reactions to President Johnson's speech on Tuesday. At the same time, some Eastern European officials have offered favorable comments in private. The party daily in Prague noted that the speech represented a "somewhat revised" expression of US policy toward Eastern Europe. Other Czech papers said the speech was meant to exert "political pressure" on the unity of the socialist camp. This same line was put forth in the only comment so far from Hungary. All major Rumanian papers treated the speech in a favorable context, quoting the President's view that the new trade bill "will have the possibility of increasing trade" with Eastern Europe. A Rumanian official, who commented positively to an American official on the attitude of the executive branch toward improving trade relations, also expressed skepticism about the possibility of favorable congressional action. Bulgarian officials have reacted similarly. Warsaw has given the speech only brief factual coverage; the Bulgarians have not mentioned it. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968296 ### 10 May 1966 · 9. Rumania Brezhnev's arrival in Bucharest today suggests, in part, a Soviet effort to point out to the Rumanians their narrowing room for maneuver between Moscow and Peking. Press reports say Brezhnev is being accompanied by a Soviet specialist in relations with ruling Asian Communist parties. With a particular eye to Chou En-lai's impending trip to Rumania later this month, the Russians are sure to try to obtain greater Rumanian backing for their position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968303 ### 14 May 1966 · 2. North Vietnam The high-level Rumanian visitors to Hanoi seem to have accomplished little if anything. Reading between the lines of the joint communiqué issued on their departure leaves the impression of important areas of disagreement. The communiqué included the usual mutually gratifying language, but omitted the customary reference to a "complete identity of views." The Rumanians very likely tried to budge the North Vietnamese on the issue of negotiations and got nowhere. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968311 ### 14 May 1966 · 3. Rumania [withheld] Soviet leader Brezhnev's talks in Bucharest this week with Rumanian leaders suggest that differences between the two countries are indeed basic. These differences are illustrated by the highly nationalistic tone of a recent speech by Rumanian party chief Ceausescu, widely reported in this morning's press. Contrary to the press, however, we believe this speech was intended to make the Rumanian position clear before Brezhnev arrived, rather than being the cause of his visit. The trip was scheduled as early as April. More to the point, there is good evidence that the Russians have been concerned with Rumania's apparent independent efforts to widen its neutralist role in Asian affairs, both in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in seeking for the first time to establish a role for itself in the Vietnam situation. The other major issue between Moscow and Bucharest is probably Rumania's long efforts to reduce its role in Warsaw Pact affairs and perhaps [withheld] to disengage from the Pact coincident with France's decisions concerning NATO. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968311 ### 24 May 1966 · 5. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968327 ### 13 June 1966 · 4. Warsaw Pact Virtually the entire top command of the Soviet armed forces has gathered in East Berlin with counterparts from East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The purpose of this meeting has not been announced, but we believe that Moscow and these key "northern tier" countries of Eastern Europe are attempting to work out a more closely integrated military arrangement in the face of Rumania's desire for a decreased role in Warsaw Pact affairs. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968362 ### 16 June 1966 · 8. Communist China Chou En-lai arrived in Bucharest today after a much postponed visit. He will stop in Albania, and possibly Egypt, before returning to Peking. For the Rumanians his visit serves to demonstrate their independence. The Chinese, on the other hand, will try to use the visit to embarrass the Russians and to show that they have influence in Eastern Europe outside of Albania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968368 ### 25 June 1966 · 3. Rumania The embassy in Bucharest has a good source who has filled in some of the details of the bitter exchange between the Rumanian leaders and Chou En-lai over Vietnam on Thursday. The Rumanians are said to have argued cautiously but firmly that the Vietnamese crisis cannot be settled by armed force. They said the situation demands political maneuvering, not military force. Chou countered this by stressing that even if virtually all of Vietnam were destroyed and only a handful of people were left to triumph, it would be worth the price since the victors could build the "greatest civilization ever." When it became clear that his hosts would not buy this line, Chou blew up and called the Rumanian party chief a "revisionist worse than Tito because you are so hypocritical." The Rumanian, in turn, shouted that Chou was guilty of "shameful insolence" and stormed out of the discussions, slamming the door. Chou later apologized, but the joint communiqué showed that heavy strains remained in the Bucharest-Peking relationship. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968384 ### 27 June 1966 · 3. Soviet Union Kosygin's reason for cancelling his scheduled trip to Sweden in July is turning into a real riddle. The first announcement out of Moscow said that "unforeseen circumstances" had arisen. [withheld] Ambassador Kohler reports that the Czech Embassy in Moscow believes the Supreme Soviet session will be related somehow to the Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest early in July. It is difficult to conceive what might emerge from Bucharest that would require urgent action by the Russian parliament. In sum, we have a situation that is not at all clear, but one that we are watching. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968386 ### 23 August 1966 · ANNEX Communist Diplomatic Activity on Vietnam We doubt that Hanoi has given its blessing to recent Polish soundings on negotiations. Twice within the past week Polish officials have urged us to stop bombing North Vietnam and accept--"in principle"--Hanoi's oft-repeated four points. Such signs of faith by us, the Poles hint broadly, could produce a more cooperative North Vietnamese position. There is little doubt that the North Vietnamese would like to see the bombing end. However, there has been no sign of give in any public or private statements coming from Hanoi. Only yesterday, the North Vietnamese reiterated their uncompromising position in a foreign ministry statement condemning an Asian peace initiative proposed by the Thais. We believe the latest Polish proposals represent a unilateral effort to promote some US concessions which Warsaw hopes might bring Hanoi and Washington closer to the negotiating table. The current Polish effort is quite similar to that undertaken by the Rumanians last May--in fact, the price tag is identical. Both the Poles and the Rumanians seem convinced that the first move must come from Washington. As for the Soviets, there has been no sign from that quarter of any change in position nor of any effort to prod the North Vietnamese along. We believe it is likely that the recent Yalta meeting between top Soviet leaders and a very senior North Vietnamese delegation concerned itself with Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam--and not with bringing the war to a conference table. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968486 ### 27 September 1966 · 2. Rumania [withheld] Rumania's relations with the USSR and other Eastern European countries have sunk, despite recent outward signs of improvement. [withheld] Relations will not deteriorate completely, but are unlikely to improve in view of Bucharest's nationalistic position and its refusal even to mention the Sino-Soviet dispute, let alone side with Moscow. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968547 ### 13 October 1966 · 4. Soviet Union Moscow's public blasts against Peking became a step shriller today. Kosygin told a gathering in Sverdlovsk that Chinese leaders are going "further and further along the road of division and are causing serious damage to the struggle for socialism." This morning's Pravda carries an editorial on the "cultural revolution" calling it a "political purge" aimed at destroying the culture of the Chinese people. In recent weeks it has become increasingly clear that the Soviet leadership is encouraging foreign Communist parties to join in this concert of condemnation. It has published calls from two obscure parties for a world party conference on the Chinese problem. On this, however, Moscow can expect strong opposition from such Communist "neutrals" as Yugoslavia, Rumania, and North Korea. Whether the Soviets are any closer now than they were a month ago to some kind of joint and formal anti-Chinese action is unclear. It is a sure bet, however, that they are taking soundings and preparing for that possibility. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968574 ### 17 October 1966 · 3. Soviet Union Cuba's president and deputy premier arrived in Moscow today to join the meeting of East European Communist leaders. Rumania is also sending a high-level delegation, ending speculation that Bucharest might boycott the gathering because of differences with Moscow over treatment of the Chinese. The assembling Communist leaders were greeted by three separate articles in today's Pravda calling for "unanimous condemnation of the political course taken by the Chinese leadership." President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968580 ### 14 November 1966 · 2. Communist Bloc Bulgarian party first secretary Zhivkov has become the first bloc leader to endorse the proposal--originally advanced by minor nonbloc parties--to convene a world Communist meeting to "deal with the new problems facing the Communist movement," i.e., China. Zhivkov's statement at his party's congress does not bring such a meeting much closer, however, since Rumania, North Vietnam, North Korea, and others continue to oppose it. It does, however, indicate that the issue is still very much alive for some parts of the Communist world and will be a recurrent theme in future conclaves. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968629 ### 3 February 1967 · 4. East-West Europe Bonn's drive for better relations with Eastern Europe is becoming a divisive issue among Moscow's former satellites. On the one side is Rumania, the first to break solidarity on this issue. On the other is East Germany, angrily lobbying--without much effect--among its allies for a continued policy of treating Bonn as an outcast. Even the Poles, among the wariest recipients of initiatives from Bonn, are beginning to feel isolated on the issue. There are some signs that Warsaw has made its own tentative soundings in Bonn. Moscow is reacting cautiously to this confusion. There is not much the Soviets could do now, assuming they want to head off further moves toward East European - West German rapprochement. A Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting is apparently to convene in Berlin next week. It will surely discuss Bonn's initiatives, but any agreement on a common response is highly unlikely. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968767 ### 8 February 1967 · 6. Eastern Europe The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers are meeting in Warsaw, but only after strong Rumanian objections forced a change in site and agenda. [withheld] The Rumanians agreed to go to Warsaw only on condition that there be no criticism of their recognizing West Germany. Only a deputy foreign minister from Bucharest is attending and he will stage a walkout if this proviso is violated. Thus the Rumanians have bottled up discussion of the issue uppermost in the minds of most of the other East Europeans. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968775 ### 11 February 1967 · 3. Warsaw Pact By all accounts the meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, just concluded, failed to reach agreement on the implications of Rumania's establishing diplomatic relations with the West Germans. This can only mean that each of the other East European countries will continue to deal with Bonn essentially as it sees fit. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968781 ### 19 March 1967 · 5. Soviet Union Brezhnev personally put the screws on Hungarian party boss Kadar last month in an apparently futile effort to bring him into line on the question of West Germany. Rumania had already broken ranks by unconditionally recognizing Bonn, and now Hungary seemed inclined to follow suit. [withheld] This, of course, is only one facet in Moscow's effort to strengthen East European resistance to Bonn's recent diplomatic initiatives and to forestall East Germany's isolation. Kadar's apparent resistance to Brezhnev's arm-twisting reinforces our belief that Moscow's effort can only be a delaying operation. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005968844 ### 4 May 1967 · 4. Eastern Europe The most significant thing to emerge so far from last week's rather feeble conference of European Communist parties in Czechoslovakia has been the extent of Rumania's isolation from its erstwhile allies. Rumania has moved perceptibly closer to the position long held by Yugoslavia. [withheld] typically Yugoslav themes played by the Rumanian press during the conference, strongly suggests that the joint absence of the two parties was no coincidence. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973784 ### 19 June 1967 · 8. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973862 ### 20 June 1967 · 1. United Nations Preliminary reaction to President Johnson's speech yesterday has been generally favorable among UN representatives--other than the obvious exceptions. The speech is regarded by many delegates as conciliatory and moderate in tone, and a concise summary of US views. There has been considerable comment that Kosygin's speech made the President's sound even better. The Latin Americans were pleased that the speech gave first place to their area. The Rumanian representative said the President's position was not really very far from that of his own country. Several Arab delegates asked why the US had become involved in the dispute, believing the Israelis should speak for themselves. Israel's representative, however, characterized the speech as good and helpful. Indian and Saudi Arabian officials at the UN complained that the speech offered nothing new. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973864 ### 15 July 1967 · 5. Rumania - Soviet Union The Rumanians seem to be doing some independent snooping regarding the Soviet armed forces. [withheld] how many ships the Soviets keep in the Mediterranean. Rumania did not attend the last two Warsaw Pact military intelligence conferences. It may be that it has been cut off from normal pact sources on Soviet military deployment. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973908 ### 20 July 1967 · 4. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973916 ### 24 July 1967 · 6. Rumania Rumanian party boss Ceausescu has been getting a lot of advance billing for a speech he will give the Rumanian National Assembly today. He may not live up to some of the wilder rumors about what Rumania will do next to show its independence, but Moscow is clearly worried. Yesterday Pravda made it clear that in the Soviet view, the Rumanians have strayed too far already. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973922 ### 25 July 1967 · 2. Rumania Party boss Ceausescu's speech to the National Assembly yesterday was not the blockbuster rumor had predicted. He did, however, strongly reaffirm aspects of Rumania's foreign policy which run counter to Moscow's line, particularly on such issues as the Middle East and the Warsaw Pact. The most interesting aspect of the performance was the presence, by invitation, of a correspondent from Radio Free Europe--an unprecedented event in Eastern Europe. Bucharest probably hopes this reporter will be able to get some objective publicity on the Assembly session through to Eastern Europe, where Bloc propagandists normally describe Rumanian policies as disruptive. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973924 ### 24 August 1967 · 5. Rumania After a lot of foot-dragging, the Rumanians have apparently approved tabling the draft nonproliferation treaty in Geneva. This, however, is only the beginning. Rumanian leaders have not abandoned their reservations about the draft, which are very similar to those expressed by the Italians, West Germans, Swedes, and Japanese. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005973976 ### 27 September 1967 · 4. Rumania Premier Maurer is apparently en route to Hanoi again. This will make four trips there in four years. Bucharest probably considers this a good time for an exchange of views--a Rumanian has just been elected president of the UN General Assembly and Maurer himself has had talks recently with President Johnson and General De Gaulle. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974034 ### 7 October 1967 · Hanoi gets more aid agreements: East Germany has joined other Communist countries in outlining its support for North Vietnam. An aid agreement signed on 5 October provides for credits to cover East German goods and services to be delivered during 1968-1970. A trade agreement for next year calling for a substantial increase over 1967 also was signed. Under it East Germany will supply light industrial goods, trucks, medical and various consumer goods. North Vietnam also signed a 1968 trade agreement with Communist China on 5 October. Although details are not available, the trade pact undoubtedly recognizes North Vietnam's inability to sustain exports, but assures Hanoi that necessary goods will be supplied under the traditional trade protocol. These agreements further round out the efforts of the recent aid-seeking mission led by Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi, which also produced agreements with the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, Mongolia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Cuba. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974052 ### 20 October 1967 · Chinese Anti-Soviet Tirade Embarrasses Hanoi Leaders: Top North Vietnamese leaders were visibly embarrassed by a blatantly anti-Soviet speech delivered by the Chinese charge d'affaires during the Chinese National Day reception on 29 September. Premier Pham Van Dong was even seen to sink his head in his hands during the tirade. Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, and General Giap were also present. The Soviet representative and his East European friends walked out early in the speech, but not the Rumanian, who remained "smiling narrowly." [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974074 ### 21 October 1967 · Polish and Rumanian Views: Embassy Rome learns that Polish and Rumanian diplomats in the Italian capital have been saying recently that a suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam would serve no purpose. They also say they are unable to account for Hanoi's rigidity. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974076 ### 24 October 1967 · More Indonesian Accounts of Hanoi's Position: The US embassies in Djakarta and Vientiane both have passed along accounts of Hanoi's position on negotiations from the Indonesian ambassador in North Vietnam. Both reports confirm earlier indications that the Indonesian ambassador is often imprecise in his analysis of Hanoi's actual stand on important matters. In one cable to his home office which was shown our ambassador to Djakarta by the Indonesian foreign minister, the Indonesian ambassador reported that Rumanian Premier Maurer on his recent trip to Hanoi received no reply when he inquired as to whether a cessation of US bombing would result in a reciprocal gesture from Hanoi. Yet the Indonesian told Ambassador Sullivan that Maurer received "positive" assurances that talks would take place soon if the bombing stopped. In his 23 October conversation with US Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane, the Indonesian ambassador to Hanoi claimed that North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh had taken a hard line against negotiations with him in late September, but he veered back toward the standard Indonesian line that talks may yet be in the offing by telling Ambassador Sullivan that he saw some "nuances" in the Burchett article from Hanoi which he felt constituted "forward movement" on North Vietnam's part. The "nuances" he mentioned, however, turn out to be either misreadings of Burchett or insignificant semantic problems. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974080 ### 28 October 1967 · Maurer on His Trip to Hanoi: Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer in a 25 October conversation with the American ambassador in Bucharest gave a detailed account of the impressions he formed during his recent, secret trip to North Vietnam. Maurer's basic conclusion from his four days in Hanoi was that the North Vietnamese are now more flexible in their attitude toward negotiations and that there definitely would be talks if the US unilaterally and unconditionally stopped the bombings without demanding any form of reciprocity or prior guarantee of such talks. The Rumanian offered no evidence for his assertions that talks will follow a bombing cessation, and he does not appear to have been given any assurances in this regard by the North Vietnamese. Rather, his report, taken together with other recent information on his trip, suggests that Hanoi's current position on the war is the same now as it was when first outlined last January by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh--there could be talks with the US if the bombing is stopped unconditionally. Maurer's account of his visit was almost deliberately optimistic but showed in the last analysis that the North Vietnamese are taking their usual inflexible stand even in conversations with their allies. Maurer's testimony makes it clear that not only will there be no reciprocity on Hanoi's part for a bombing halt, but that the North Vietnamese intend to continue fighting in the south and to maintain their supply operations to their forces in South Vietnam during any talks. Maurer also spelled out in terms unusually frank for a Communist leader the fact that the Communists believe once talks begin, the pressures on the US for compromises leading to an end of the war will be irresistible. This, of course, is what Hanoi has in mind by insisting that the fighting in the south will continue while talks are being conducted. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974089 ### 20 November 1967 · 4. Soviet Union The facts are not all in yet, but it is clear that the US Army attaché and his British colleague were given some pretty rough treatment on Friday by Soviet goons in Kishinev, a town near the Rumanian border. They were forcibly detained in a hotel room and their notes and film seized--though nothing the attaché considers unusually incriminating. Both officers were roughed up, especially the Britisher. Our attaché thinks they may have been drugged. The Department of State knows of no incident here that might have triggered the action. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974129 ### 28 November 1967 · 4. Rumania Governor Harriman arrived in Bucharest yesterday in the midst of considerable ferment over the regime's domestic policies. Party boss Ceausescu intends to impose a series of economic and administrative changes at a special party conference next week. He has set aside the intervening time for "public debate" on the issues. [withheld] There are definite nationalistic ramifications in the proposed reforms; they will take Rumania further from the Soviet model. Ceausescu, who has already irritated the traditionalists by "de-Sovietizing" the constitution and other institutions, is obviously not afraid of continuing the process. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974143 ### 23 December 1967 · 6. Eastern Europe The Soviet bloc foreign ministers, winding up their meeting on the Middle East, have issued a communiqué based on the lowest common denominator. The statement claims complete unity of views among the participants, including the Rumanians. In order to achieve this consensus, however, the foreign ministers balanced a renewed call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory with the reaffirmation of Israel's right to exist. The absence of any pledge of military and economic aid to the Arabs also seems to represent a concession by Moscow to some of the East Europeans. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974187 ### 29 December 1967 · 5. Rumania Moscow is said to have "broken" a contract to purchase oil drilling equipment from Bucharest, and to be pressuring Prague to cancel a large order for Rumanian-made railroad cars. This probably stems from Soviet irritation over Rumania's "independent" stand on important international issues, and more such economic reprisals may be in the offing. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974196 ### 22 January 1968 · Rumanian Ambassador's Comments: The Rumanian ambassador to Paris, who is now leaving his post, commented during his farewell call at the US Embassy that the United States is really winning in Vietnam. The ambassador went on to say that Hanoi's delegation in Paris no longer tries to hide its concern over the pressure Peking has been exerting on Hanoi because of North Vietnam's alleged moves toward peace. The Rumanian's statement must be tempered by his inclination to be somewhat imaginative when he is expressing his views. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974236 ### 26 January 1968 · Rumanian Visitors: The high-level Rumanian delegation in Hanoi this week had been there on an earlier visit only about a month ago. [withheld] This may be part of Premier Maurer's attempt to bring the war to the negotiating table. Shortly after his own return from Hanoi last September, Maurer told Ambassador Davis that Rumania intended to try to push the two sides together. A further Rumanian effort along this line may emerge in high-level talks the Rumanians have scheduled this week with Pope Paul and Harold Wilson and with Soviet leaders. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974244 ### 13 February 1968 · 4. Rumania A still suspicious Rumania has decided to send a delegation to the Budapest meeting of Communist parties later this month. The Rumanians decided to show up only after extensive consultations with other parties, including the Chinese. Peking may regard the presence of a Rumanian delegation as a useful check on the Soviets. [withheld] the delegation will oppose criticism of any Communist party as well as attempts to conclude binding agreements. The Rumanians will also try to get a world conference of Communist parties (Moscow's ultimate aim) put off as long as possible. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974275 ### 24 February 1968 · 8. International Communism The "consultative meeting" of Communist parties opening in Budapest on Monday will be the biggest such affair since 1960, but is not likely to come to much. Moscow has had to water down its objectives in order to draw a halfway respectable turnout. Some sixty parties have been dragooned into sending representatives, but none are coming from the Far East. The Rumanians will go [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974295 ### 28 February 1968 · 7. Rumania Bucharest has asked for direct talks with the US this week on the nonproliferation treaty. This request is puzzling. We do know that the Soviets have tried and failed to satisfy Rumanian misgivings about the draft treaty and that the Rumanians have been pressing hard for guarantees against nuclear blackmail. It is hard to see how the Rumanians think the US could help them on this. On balance, this looks like an attempt to bolster the world image of an independent Rumania. It may also involve a little game of psychological warfare against the Soviets. Finally, there is an outside chance that Bucharest wants to use the treaty issue to screen talks with the US on some other topic, such as Vietnam. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974301 ### 2 March 1968 · 5. Budapest Conference The Soviets have adopted a stand at the conference that amounts almost to a demand that the parties present accept Moscow's position on the issues dividing the Communist movement or get out. The Rumanians chose to get out. The Soviets are ready to press their position knowing full well this will further alienate the Rumanians and others. Suslov, who heads the Soviet delegation, called for the creation of a temporary commission to prepare draft documents for a world conference next November or December. This is the first time Moscow has publicly committed itself to a specific time schedule since Khrushchev's abortive campaign four years ago. The sharpened split between the Soviets and Rumanians will raise more uncertainties in Eastern Europe and intensify factional differences in East European parties. Moscow's iron-jawed stand, in short, is tending to open, not heal, the sores besetting world Communism. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974307 ### 5 March 1968 · 4. Warsaw Pact Wednesday's meeting of pact leaders in Sofia seems likely to produce another collision between the Soviets and the Rumanians, this time over the draft nonproliferation treaty. The Soviets, whose delegation will be led by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Defense Minister Grechko, very badly want unanimous endorsement of the draft by pact countries. The Rumanians are still holding out. They criticize the draft's failure to place limitations on nuclear powers or to provide guarantees to non-nuclear countries. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974311 ### 6 March 1968 · 5. Warsaw Pact Top leaders of the pact countries sit down today in Sofia; Russian-Rumanian fireworks are expected. [withheld] he Rumanians intend to propose some major changes in the pact's command structure which would dilute Moscow's authority. The Rumanians [withheld] may even threaten to withdraw from the pact. We [withheld] doubt the Rumanians will go through with such action, but they will probably use the threat for tactical bargaining. The Rumanians and Russians also will be crossing swords on the nonproliferation treaty and on relations with West Germany. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974313 ### 6 March 1968 · 5. Warsaw Pact Top leaders of the pact countries sit down today in Sofia; Russian-Rumanian fireworks are expected. [withheld] the Rumanians intend to propose some major changes in the pact's command structure which would dilute Moscow's authority. The Rumanians [withheld] may even threaten to withdraw from the pact. We [withheld] doubt the Rumanians will go through with such action, but they will probably use the threat for tactical bargaining. The Rumanians and Russians also will be crossing swords on the nonproliferation treaty and on relations with West Germany. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/05947662 ### 8 March 1968 · 4. Warsaw Pact The two-day pact meeting ended in Sofia yesterday without any sign of a new Soviet-Rumanian confrontation. There are no reports yet on what was discussed, and a final communiqué has not been released. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974317 ### 9 March 1968 · 7. Warsaw Pact The meeting of the pact's Political Consultative Committee in Sofia failed, as expected, to agree on the draft nonproliferation treaty. Rumania was the holdout. This is the first time the committee has had to publicize a failure to reach agreement--a sign of the pact's dwindling effectiveness as a unifying force. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974319 ### 23 March 1968 · 4. Eastern Europe An unusually tight curtain of secrecy surrounds the East German city of Dresden as top Communist leaders from six countries gather for their weekend conclave. Even the fact that the meeting is taking place is unknown to the public. [withheld] The meeting was clearly arranged on short notice and on an urgent basis. Events in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as Rumania's recent defiance of bloc solidarity, are likely to be at the heart of the discussions. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974343 ### 23 March 1968 · 5. Rumania The government appears to be bracing for some kind of political or economic pressure from its Warsaw Pact allies. Its fears may be justified, and could explain the efforts it has been making in recent days to strengthen ties with Yugoslavia. This may also be behind the sudden call for Ambassador Bogdan to come home from Washington for consultations. Rumania is evidently the one pact member not represented in Dresden this weekend. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974343 ### 25 March 1968 · 3. Eastern Europe Brezhnev and Kosygin worked hard in Dresden over the weekend to head off further deterioration in bloc solidarity. It was hard going at times, and the results are sure to be less than they had hoped for. Difficulty in reaching a consensus, especially on economic matters, is evident in several portions of the communiqué where it says simply that "views were exchanged" on certain questions. [withheld] The communiqué does say that the participants agreed to take "immediate" measures to "consolidate the Warsaw Pact and its armed forces," and that agreement was reached to hold a top-level economic conference in the near future. What these plans may come to in a practical way remains to be seen. The Rumanians have already set the precedent that attendance is no longer mandatory at these meetings. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974345 ### 3 April 1968 · Two North Vietnamese Diplomats in Eastern Europe Have Left Their Posts, Perhaps for Home: US Embassy officers in Bucharest and Sofia reported on 1 April that North Vietnamese ambassadors in these cities are absent. In Rumania, the Polish ambassador reported that his North Vietnamese counterpart left for Hanoi "hurriedly last week" without the usual notification to his diplomatic colleagues. In Bulgaria, the local press reported that Hanoi's ambassador was not in the country. Both of these absences appear to predate President Johnson's 31 March speech. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974361 ### 5 April 1968 · 7. Rumania Large amounts of Soviet-made armor which the Israelis captured last summer have been bought by Rumania. Moscow has been reluctant to supply hardware to the unreliable Rumanians recently. That Bucharest has found a way around the problem is going to be especially irritating to the Russians. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974365 ### 16 April 1968 · 6. Rumania Bucharest's acceptance of a US invitation to send a high-level scientific delegation to Washington early next month is another sign of its strong desire to expand relations with the West. The delegation is to be headed by Alexandru Birladeanu, a deputy premier whose special job is the direction of scientific research. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974383 ### 24 April 1968 · 6. Communist Conference Some 70 party delegations convene today in Budapest to begin work on the agenda for the full-scale international conference late this year. Signs are that the Rumanians and Yugoslavs will be among the missing. The Czechs are reluctant, but at this delicate juncture in their relations with Moscow, they probably feel they have no real alternative but to go. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005974397 ### 9 May 1968 · 4. East Europe Party bosses from four East European countries suddenly converged on Moscow yesterday. Rumania and--more significantly--Czechoslovakia were excluded. This looks very much like an urgent conclave over what to do about Czechoslovakia. Moscow's patience has been wearing thin these past two days over the growing liberal and nationalist trends in Czechoslovakia. The men in the Kremlin have been especially shocked and angered by recent stories in the Czechoslovak press which flatly accuse Soviet agents of involvement in the Prague purges of the 1950s--and in the 1948 death of Jan Masaryk. Soviet sensitivity to these charges prompted an angry rebuttal in Pravda yesterday. Moscow clearly does not accept at face value Dubcek's assurances that he can control the pace and scope of democratization in the country. So far, the Czechoslovaks have faced up to Soviet pressures. We know [withheld], however, that the leaders in Prague were worried late last month that the Soviets may feel obliged to intervene more forcibly in Czechoslovakia. Yesterday's news of the gathering in Moscow will surely heighten these fears. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976138 ### 18 May 1968 · 4. France The domestic crisis is getting worse as student and labor disturbances spread outside Paris. Premier Pompidou's stern public warning on Thursday has been met only with defiance. The workers in a number of key factories have joined in the struggle, calling strikes of "unlimited duration" and in some cases seizing the plants. [withheld] has it on good authority that the regular army has been alerted to move in should the reinforced police and gendarmes be unable to handle the situation. Late press reports say De Gaulle has cut short his trip to Rumania by one day and will return to Paris today to take personal command. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976154 ### 22 May 1968 · 1. France In the face of growing protests throughout the country, De Gaulle is sticking to his guns. He apparently does not plan, at least for now, to replace those cabinet ministers who are being roundly criticized for their handling of student and labor unrest. Gaullist leaders in the National Assembly are confident that the Pompidou cabinet will survive the censure motion being voted on today or tomorrow. There is speculation that De Gaulle may be thinking of putting his money where his mouth is by calling a popular referendum. He would certainly think twice about this, however, given the demonstrated depth of opposition to his economic and social policies. [withheld] the government, confronted with the unforeseen events of recent weeks, is punchy and no longer acting as a government. All depends on De Gaulle. He can save the situation, but some believe that he is better at handling the generals' revolt, acting against American hegemony, and preaching nationalism in Bucharest than he is at proposing a new social contract to the nation's workers. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976160 ### 8 June 1968 · Bloc Arms: Bloc Arms: East European arms delivered to North Vietnam are showing up in South Vietnam. Rumanian and Bulgarian antitank bazookas, Bulgarian recoilless rifles, and Polish assault rifles are being captured by US forces. The bazookas and assault rifles captured were manufactured as recently as 1967. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976191 ### 10 June 1968 · Aid to Hanoi: Le Thanh Nghi, Hanoi's traveling economic emissary, continues his aid-seeking swing through Eastern Europe. Agreements on aid for 1969 now have been signed with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland. The pact with Poland, signed on 8 June, in addition to covering the usual manufactured goods and equipment, states that "installations for complete plants" will be supplied. This may refer to the Polish effort to provide miscellaneous small factories, a program which has been dormant during the bombing of areas in North Vietnam where industrialization was taking place. During the past two years, large numbers of North Vietnamese have continued to undergo technical training in Poland and other East European countries. After his stop in Poland, Nghi traveled on to Bucharest, where agreements similar to those reached with the other East European countries will probably be signed in the next few days. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976193 ### 14 June 1968 · East European Aid: Nghi's aid-seeking mission has moved on from Rumania to Czechoslovakia. In addition to standard pacts on supplementary "nonrefundable" aid for 1968 and "nonrefundable" aid for 1969, Rumania announced it had cancelled payments of "certain sums" due under previous credits extended to North Vietnam. Bucharest is the first Communist capital to cancel debts, although none of Hanoi's aid suppliers expects to be paid. Since 1967 most Communist countries have described their aid as "nonrefundable." Nghi has now concluded agreements for East European assistance in the coming year with Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania. A Czech transport delegation signed an agreement in Hanoi on 12 June to help restore North Vietnam's transport network free of charge. The Czechs will supply rails and "framework"--presumably iron and steel structures--for rail and highway bridges. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976201 ### 17 July 1968 · 4. Czechoslovakia [withheld] members of the Soviet party's Central Committee have been summoned to Moscow for a meeting today. The apparent haste in calling the gathering suggests that exceptionally important matters are to be considered. At the least, Brezhnev would have the opportunity to report on last weekend's Warsaw meeting and to obtain a committee resolution that could serve as another element of pressure on the Czechs. Prague meanwhile is standing its ground. In an outspoken press conference on 15 July, Dubcek's man in charge of security and defense pointedly suggested that changes be made in the Warsaw Pact organization in order to emphasize the equality of Pact members. The Czech party leadership met yesterday to prepare a reply to the still unpublished letter sent to them by the five Warsaw conferees. A top Czech party spokesman has said that the French and Italian Communist parties have urged the Soviets not to intervene in Czech affairs. The British and Belgian parties apparently have taken a similar line. The Yugoslavs and Rumanians are continuing to give vocal support to the Czechs. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976255 ### 18 July 1968 · 1. Czechoslovakia The split among European Communists over Czechoslovakia is sharper than ever. The French Communist Party, badly shaken over the prospect of heavier Soviet intervention, is now calling for a European Communist conference to take up the Czech problem. Several parties have already responded favorably. There are reports that Tito will arrive in Prague today to give his support to Dubcek. Rumania's Ceausescu may arrive at about the same time. The letter sent to the Czechs by the participants of the Soviet-sponsored meeting in Warsaw has now been published. It demands that the Czechs get their party back into orthodox line, but there is still no mention of what action will be taken if this is not done. The meeting of the Soviet central committee yesterday was evidently called essentially to endorse the Warsaw letter. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976257 ### 19 July 1968 · 1. Czechoslovakia - Soviet Union Prague is sticking to its guns. The Czechs, in Dubcek's TV address yesterday and in a statement earlier in the day from the party presidium, made it clear in calm, measured tones that they do not plan to yield on any of the important points at issue. This stand presumably will get the endorsement of the party's central committee at its meeting today. The regime has already received a flood of protestations of support from around the country. Tito, Rumanian party chief Ceausescu, and representatives of the French and Italian Communist parties will be arriving in Prague today, according to the Czech press agency. Moscow has not yet had time to react to the latest statements from Prague, and we do not expect a considered reply until after the Czech central committee makes known its position today. [withheld] Meanwhile, Soviet media are keeping up the flow of critical propaganda. There still has been no substantial change in the Soviet military posture in and around Czechoslovakia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976259 ### 6 August 1968 · Liberation Front Sending Out More Representatives: Hanoi's international service announced in English on Sunday that the Liberation Front had named envoys to Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania, and had accredited its man in Moscow to Mongolia. With these appointments, the Front has a quasi-diplomatic representative accredited to every Communist country. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976289 ### 13 August 1968 · 1. Czechoslovakia - East Germany Ulbricht made yesterday's trip to Czechoslovakia as short as possible, but much of it must have been painful to him even so. He ventured only as far as a Czech spa 12 miles from his East German sanctuary. His plane was met by a small, silent crowd. ("One person forgot himself and clapped," noted a US Embassy officer.) The people in town followed him with cries of "Long live Dubcek!" Dubcek and his lieutenants went out of their way to make sure Ulbricht was aware of the enthusiastic support the Czechs have been giving their leaders. The East German and Czech delegations talked for seven hours yesterday, but we cannot conceive that they have anything useful to say to each other. Ulbricht goes home today. A more congenial guest, Rumania's Ceausescu, is due in Prague on Thursday. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976301 ### 23 August 1968 · 2. Rumania - Soviet Union Rumanian Embassy officials in Bonn and Washington have expressed fears of a possible Soviet invasion of their country. Ceausescu is reported to have announced yesterday that "we are now in a state of full mobilization." The previous day he announced the establishment of "armed guards of workers, peasants, and intellectuals" to defend national independence. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976319 ### 24 August 1968 · 2. Rumania The Rumanians are deeply concerned over the possibility of a Soviet invasion. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976321 ### 26 August 1968 · 2. Yugoslavia-Rumania Relations between Eastern Europe's independent-minded and orthodox Communist regimes have been severely damaged by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito told Ambassador Elbrick on 23 August that Yugoslav-Soviet relations from now on would be devoid of the trust and confidence that had been slowly building up. Rumanian leader Ceausescu has for the first time been attacked by name by the Soviet and Hungarian press. Mostly low-level Soviet bloc types showed up for Rumanian National Day celebrations at various diplomatic posts last Friday. Tito and Ceausescu met Saturday at a Yugoslav border town, presumably to coordinate contingency plans concerning the Czech crisis. They will probably not risk provoking the Soviets by overdramatizing their position. Rumanian Premier Maurer does not see any "immediate" danger of Soviet armed intervention. There is, in fact, still no hard evidence that the Soviets intend to carry their intervention in Eastern Europe beyond Czechoslovakia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976323 ### 28 August 1968 · 2. Rumania The atmosphere in Bucharest is more relaxed than over the weekend, when Rumanian armed forces appeared to be in an initial state of alert. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976327 ### 29 August 1968 · 3. Bulgaria-Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976329 ### 31 August 1968 · 1. Rumania (As of 5:00 AM EDT) [withheld] the movement of some Soviet forces toward the Rumanian border. It is too early to say whether this is meant as a pressure tactic or in fact indicates an intent to move into the country. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976333 ### 2 September 1968 · 2. Rumania The situation remains unchanged with no abnormal Soviet or Bulgarian military moves [withheld] Bucharest is calm. Yesterday Associated Press carried a story alleging that Ceausescu had proposed a series of concessions to the Soviets including a formal declaration of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and increased trade with Eastern Europe. [withheld] We have seen nothing as yet to confirm it. Moscow has not reacted publicly to the President's statement. The Polish party paper, however, said yesterday any suggestion that further intervention in Eastern Europe might be contemplated was "completely fabricated." President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976335 ### 3 September 1968 · 3. Rumania The situation is quiet. [withheld] have not been able to find any evidence of troop concentrations near the Rumanian border. Military activity in northeast Bulgaria is limited to a training exercise. The Rumanians, with their most recent careful commentary on Czechoslovakia, seem to be trying to avoid provoking the Soviets. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976337 ### 4 September 1968 · 1. Czechoslovakia - Soviet Union Tensions in Czechoslovakia continue to subside slowly. The press reports that some Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops have left for home. Soviet soldiers have withdrawn from some important buildings in Prague. Deputy Premier Sik, a liberal who has long been anathema to Moscow, resigned yesterday shortly after being vilified in Izvestia. Izvestia also criticized Foreign Minister Hajek in terms which suggest it expects him to follow suit. There is still no indication that the Soviets or their associates are getting ready to move against Rumania or Yugoslavia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976339 ### 6 September 1968 · 3. Rumania The nine-day truce in Soviet press attacks on Rumania was broken Wednesday when Pravda let it be known Moscow is still displeased with Bucharest's criticism. There are no new military developments relating to Rumania, however. The Bulgarians continue a military exercise; Yugoslav and Rumanian troops remain on alert. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976343 ### 9 September 1968 · 4. Rumania During a recent talk with Ambassador Davis, Foreign Minister Manescu said the "danger is not entirely over," but his remarks and manner suggested a calmer view of the situation. Manescu stressed the point that Rumania's leaders considered President Johnson's 30 August statement as having had a "cooling" effect on a dangerous trend. The Bulgarian military exercise near the Rumanian border ended last Friday. Rumania and Yugoslavia, however, apparently have not reduced the alert status of their armed forces. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976347 ### 21 September 1968 · 1. Soviet Union - Eastern Europe The Warsaw Pact commander, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky, arrived in Sofia Thursday ostensibly to discuss the strengthening of the pact with Bulgarian officials. The visit will probably cause nail-biting in Rumania, Yugoslavia, and even in Austria, but there is no evidence that the Soviets are about to take any military action. The Rumanians may, however, come under greater pressure in the near future to fulfill their obligations under the Warsaw Pact, perhaps even to permit joint maneuvers to take place on their territory. Meanwhile, the Soviet propaganda machine keeps grinding away at Berlin and West Germany. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976369 ### 23 September 1968 · 1. Soviet Union - Rumania Satellite photography of mid-September shows that an army in the Odessa Military District, near the Rumanian border, has been mobilized. At least one of the army's three divisions has been brought to full combat strength and deployed to a training area near its home garrison. Signs of mobilization were also apparent at other places in the district. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976371 ### 23 September 1968 · 4. Austria - Eastern Europe Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim has told Ambassador MacArthur that he and his cabinet strongly disagree with certain "alarmist views of some of the Austrian military establishment" that Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Austria will probably be invaded by the Soviets in the next few weeks. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976371 ### 24 September 1968 · 3. Rumania The Rumanians may be learning to live with the Soviet forces mobilized near their border. [withheld] Sharp anti-Soviet polemics issued from Bucharest immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but having gotten on record, the Rumanians have since refrained from criticism of the Warsaw Five. Some Rumanian officials have remarked that as each day passed they were becoming less apprehensive. At the same time, Rumanian leaders periodically put out explicit reminders that the threat from Moscow still exists. This obviously is true, but Bucharest would not be above emphasizing the threat as a way of using the crisis in the Communist world to advance its own interests. The Rumanians may in fact believe that focusing world attention on the danger of Soviet intervention is a good way of keeping the Soviets from moving in. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976373 ### 28 September 1968 · 1. Czechoslovakia - Soviet Union Marshal Yakubovsky, the chief of the Warsaw Pact forces who has been making the rounds of Eastern Europe in recent days, finished his tour yesterday with quick visits to Prague and Bucharest. In Prague he may have discussed terms for the withdrawal of some of the occupying forces and perhaps the outline of a status-of-forces agreement as well. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976381 ### 11 October 1968 · 5. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976403 ### 16 October 1968 · The Front is Being Built Up Internationally: The Vietnamese Communists are steadily building their case for presenting the National Liberation Front as a functioning political entity with some of the trappings of a legitimate government. Growing Communist claims about the extent of the Front's "governing" role in South Vietnam have been accompanied by an accelerated effort to expand the Front's diplomatic representation. In the past two months the Communists have implemented or moved to implement virtually all the agreements they have been able to obtain for setting up permanent Front missions abroad. Last August, Front missions were set up almost simultaneously in Albania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Rumania--the only Communist countries where Front offices had not been established previously. Last week two representatives arrived in Paris to head up a new Front office there, and this week two other officials arrived in Stockholm to open a similar mission in Sweden. [withheld] The Communists appear to be marshaling all the assets they can to enhance the status of the Front and to be ready to put it forward as a principal party to negotiations involving South Vietnam. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976411 ### 25 October 1968 · 3. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976427 ### 30 October 1968 · 2. Rumania - Warsaw Pact Rumanian authorities have evidently accepted in principle a Soviet proposal to hold joint maneuvers in Rumania sometime next year. Bucharest is obviously worried about this kind of involvement and says it will demand a formal government-to-government accord spelling out the number of Soviet troops and when they will enter and leave. This is hardly adequate insurance. The Rumanians and the Soviets continue to cooperate on some military matters. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976435 ### 31 October 1968 · 2. Warsaw Pact Defense ministers from all the Warsaw Pact states, including Czechoslovakia and Rumania, met in Moscow on Tuesday and Wednesday. We do not know what they discussed, but their press release says they achieved an "identity of views." Whatever the substance of the talks, the Soviets doubtless regard this show of unity as a political plus. We do not at the moment have any good sign of a link between the military caucus and a meeting of the Soviet party Central Committee which was also in progress in Moscow yesterday. The party people were said to be talking mainly about Soviet agricultural policy and, while this may be true, there was bound to be discussion of the Czechoslovak problem as well. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976437 ### 21 November 1968 · 7. Rumania [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976474 ### 22 November 1968 · 1. Rumania Rumania appears to be coming under renewed pressure from Moscow to permit early Warsaw Pact military exercises on its soil. The Rumanians themselves have denied this, though they acknowledged that Warsaw Pact staff officers have been meeting in Rumania to plan a "future" exercise. Intensive efforts by the US and NATO intelligence apparatuses have been focused on the matter, producing fragmentary indications of unusual military activity by various Warsaw Pact forces, but nothing like what we would expect to see if major joint exercises--or an outright invasion of Rumania--were imminent. A special Watch Committee meeting of the United States Intelligence Board last night reviewed the evidence then available and concluded that: --An invasion is unlikely, though the necessary military deployments could be carried out without our observing them. --A Warsaw Pact exercise with Rumanian participation is equally unlikely, since there have been no preparations by Rumania for such an exercise. --Warsaw Pact exercises in areas adjacent to Rumania look like the best explanation of what has been seen so far. The purpose of such activity might be to coerce the Rumanians into scheduling a major joint exercise in Rumania in the near future and, possibly, into agreeing to the establishment of a long-term Soviet military presence there. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976475 ### 23 November 1968 · 1. Rumania The leadership in Bucharest continues a "business-as-usual" appearance; no alarming military moves have been noted in or around Rumania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976477 ### 25 November 1968 · 3. Balkans The political and military situation remains quiet. [withheld] report no evidence of unusual military moves in Hungary and Bulgaria; [withheld] no unusual activity in areas next to Rumania. Yesterday a confused British correspondent triggered concern with a London Observer story stating Yugoslav troops had gone on emergency alert because of an impending showdown with the Russians. Yugoslav troops are not on alert. The correspondent apparently was mixed up over public discussion of a proposed national defense law. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976479 ### 26 November 1968 · 6. Rumania Bucharest's newspapers and radio-broadcasts this morning announced the opening "according to plan" of a Warsaw Pact staff officers' conference in the city under the direction of pact commander Yakubovsky. Though billed as an annual consultation on "problems related to combat training," the conference underscores Rumania's obligations to the pact. The military situation on Rumania's borders remains normal. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976481 ### 30 November 1968 · 4. Rumania Ceausescu has struck back publicly against the pressures Moscow and the Warsaw Pact powers have been putting on Rumania. Even as senior Pact officers were meeting in Bucharest, Ceausescu in two published speeches stoutly defended Rumania's political and economic rights against the "supra-national" concepts of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. In almost belligerent terms, he spelled out Rumania's interpretation of its responsibilities and rights under the Warsaw Pact, refused to go along with any tightening of East European economic integration, and implicitly rejected the Soviet-proclaimed right of intervention to preserve the status quo in socialist states. Meanwhile, Rumanian officials are being wrung through the rumor mill, and some of the wilder reports they have heard suggest that Moscow's disinformation specialists are doing the cranking. Among their genuine concerns is the possibility that Soviet troops will remain in their country after the projected joint exercises, and they are doing their best to determine the circumstances under which this might occur. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976489 ### 7 December 1968 · 2. Rumania - Warsaw Pact A Pact summit meeting is planned to settle details of military exercises to be held in Rumania next year. The Rumanian first deputy foreign minister who passed on this information said Pact staff officers reached no decisions on maneuvers when they met recently in Bucharest. No firm date has been set for the summit, although it may be soon. The Rumanians have been sticky about the whole subject of maneuvers on their territory, and, while their leverage is not great, this may explain why the question has to be handled by chiefs of state. We anticipate the Pact leaders would also use this meeting as a forum from which to answer recent NATO statements on Eastern Europe. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976501 ### 10 December 1968 · 6. Rumania - East Germany All the states in Eastern Europe still want to get along with each other, notwithstanding the differences which crystallized after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In a classic example of this instinct, the Rumanian foreign minister turned up yesterday in East Germany on a fence-mending official visit. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976505 ### 14 December 1968 · International Conference on Vietnam Off to Slow Start in Sweden: Press reports from Stockholm indicate the international conference, "Vietnam 1969--International Mobilization," sponsored by the Swedish Vietnam Committee and scheduled to run from 13-15 December, has attracted only about half the 300 delegates originally expected. Principal figures at the kickoff press conference on 12 December, at which nothing of significance developed, were the North Vietnamese Minister of Culture and the National Liberation Front representative in Rumania. The Swedish press has tended to ignore the meeting thus far. One of the major problems faced by the conference organizers is the continuing disagreement on tactics among various radical left and Vietnam peace groups in Stockholm. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976513 ### 21 December 1968 · 3. Peru [withheld] The junta in Peru has recently established relations with Rumania and has announced its intention to open diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. Lima has commercial relations with Czechoslovakia and has proposed reopening diplomatic contacts with Prague and Warsaw. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976525 ### 3 January 1969 · 6. Peru - Soviet Union [withheld] Lima and Moscow have agreed to open diplomatic relations. Since the military government took over in October, it has established diplomatic ties with Rumania and Yugoslavia and has signed trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976543 ### 10 January 1969 · 3. Warsaw Pact - CEMA The Rumanians are expected to come under heavy Soviet pressure at a Warsaw Pact summit meeting to be held in the Polish capital later this month. One of the agenda items probably will be discussion of plans for a pact exercise in Rumania this year. The signs are that the pact's leaders will at the same time put on their economic hats and convene the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) to press Rumania to de-emphasize national development in favor of "united action." President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976555 ### 15 January 1969 · Soviet Military Pressure on Rumania and Yugoslavia Annex The President's Daily Brief Soviet Military Pressure on Rumania and Yugoslavia 15 January 1969 Top Secret President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976563 ### 15 January 1969 · III. ANNEX SOVIET MILITARY PRESSURES ON RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA SIGNIFICANCE: Uncertainty about Soviet military intentions is likely to rise again in Eastern Europe in 1969 when the military forces of the Warsaw Pact conduct a combined exercise in Rumania, something Bucharest had been able to fend off since 1962. The Soviets are using the Warsaw Pact as a lever to exact greater cooperation from the Rumanians and, indirectly, from non-Pact member Yugoslavia. The Rumanians and the Yugoslavs no longer fear, however, that the Soviets are prepared to go as far as outright military intervention. They are probably right. Even so, the anxieties aroused in Eastern Europe will be felt in Western Europe, and there will be renewed concern in NATO about the security of its southern flank. * * * Soviet Military Pressures In the wake of its decision to stamp out reformism in Czechoslovakia, Moscow has set out to force the Rumanians to reduce their awkward defiance of Soviet authority. The Soviets also hope to insulate Eastern Europe from the insidious influence of Yugoslav "revisionism." As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania is more susceptible to Soviet pressures applied through that organization than is Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, with its demonstration of Soviet readiness to use military force for political purposes in Eastern Europe, and Moscow's declaration concerning the limitations on the sovereignty of members of the "socialist commonwealth," Soviet pressures on Rumania will be felt keenly in Yugoslavia. Rumanian Participation in the Warsaw Pact In recent years Rumania has reduced its participation in Pact affairs, coming last spring very nearly to the point of having a "vacant chair" at Pact gatherings. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, their own discretion and, no doubt, a good measure of "comradely persuasion" from Moscow have recommended a more accommodating policy to the Rumanians. Top-ranking Rumanian and Soviet military officers have exchanged visits, among these a visit to Bucharest by the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. It was not by chance that Bucharest was the site of the annual meeting of the chiefs-of-staff of the Pact countries convened late last year. [withheld] In the offing early this year is a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, which will be, in effect, a summit meeting of the party, government and military chiefs of the seven member states. It can be expected that pressure will mount at that time on Rumania to make concessions--potentially damaging to Rumania's claims to national sovereignty--in the name of strengthening the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis NATO. The Soviets might revert,for example, to earlier demands that Rumania expand its own armed forces or agree to increased standardization of military equipment within the Pact. The Rumanians are also apprehensive about a possible attempt to give the Pact command tighter control over national forces. The Rumanian Response The Rumanian position is delicate. Bucharest will have to give some ground--as it already has in agreeing to combined exercises--but will struggle hard against being drawn more tightly into the Warsaw Pact net. In negotiating with the Russians on the timing and scope of the exercises, the Rumanians will seek to obtain hard-and-fast assurances that foreign forces will withdraw at a specific time. [withheld] Soviet Intentions There is no reason to think that Moscow considers either Rumania or Yugoslavia a real and present danger to its security position. The chances of extreme military action against either are not great. But even while applying lesser pressures, Moscow will arouse sharp new anxieties in Bucharest and Belgrade. If the Pact forces are slow to withdraw from Rumanian soil, as they may be, the atmosphere of tension that prevailed last summer will begin to settle again over Eastern Europe. If the Russians were to go a step further and leave their forces in Rumania for a protracted period, there would be real concern within NATO that the Soviets had set out to fasten their hold on all of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav request for economic and military assistance from NATO countries would be sure to follow. The US would be pressed, on the one hand, to issue warnings to Moscow and, on the other, to avoid taking a stance which might seem to challenge the USSR. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976563 ### 28 January 1969 · EASTERN EUROPE: BUDGETED MILITARY EXPENDITURES COUNTRY (and currency) | 1968 Planned (in millions) | 1969 Planned (in millions) | 1969 Percentage Change from 1968 | Military Expenditures as Percentage of Total Budget 1968 | 1969 ALBANIA (Leks) 304 420 +38.2 7.6 9.1 BULGARIA (Leva) 264 306 +15.9 6.0 6.0 CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Crowns) 12,900 14,200 +10.1 8.9 9.1 EAST GERMANY (DM) 5,800 6,300 + 8.6 8.7 9.7 HUNGARY (Forints) 6,400 8,029 +25.5 4.6 5.1 POLAND (Zlotys) 29,096 33,853 +16.3 9.5 9.7 RUMANIA (Lei) 5,200 6,400 +23.1 3.7 4.2 YUGOSLAVIA (New Dinars) 6,030 6,860 +13.8* 56.6 60.4 *In December 1968, Yugoslavia announced a supplementary defense expenditure which brought actual military spending up to 6,425 million new dinars. The increase of planned defense expenditure in 1969 over actual expenditures in 1968 is only 6.8 percent. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976587 ### 28 January 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS All the Eastern European countries have announced increased military budgets for 1969, most of them for the fourth consecutive year. The increases, however, are generally larger than in the past few years, ranging from a low of nine percent for East Germany to more than 20 percent for Rumania and Hungary, and almost 40 percent for Albania. The military budgets in all countries account for an equal or larger percentage of their total budgets than in 1968. There is no evidence that the increases in military spending are because of large-scale military buildups. It is probable that the Warsaw Pact members are responding to Soviet pressures to bring their military capabilities up to previously planned levels. With the introduction of economic reform and more realistic budget planning, the understatement of military expenses may be coming to an end. Other factors also may include higher real costs from the use of more sophisticated equipment, the effects of inflation, and the budgetary and price reforms. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976587 ### 29 January 1969 · Soviet Affairs Our Annex today deals with Soviet military pressures on Rumania and Yugoslavia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976589 ### 29 January 1969 · SOVIET MILITARY PRESSURES ON RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA SIGNIFICANCE: Uncertainty about Soviet military intentions is likely to rise again in Eastern Europe in 1969 when the military forces of the Warsaw Pact conduct a combined exercise in Rumania, something Bucharest had been able to fend off since 1962. The Soviets are using the Warsaw Pact as a lever to exact greater cooperation from the Rumanians and, indirectly, from non-Pact member Yugoslavia. The Rumanians and the Yugoslavs no longer fear, however, that the Soviets are prepared to go as far as outright military intervention. They are probably right. Even so, the anxieties aroused in Eastern Europe will be felt in Western Europe, and there will be renewed concern in NATO about the security of its southern flank. * * * Soviet Military Pressures In the wake of its decision to stamp out reformism in Czechoslovakia, Moscow has set out to force the Rumanians to reduce their awkward defiance of Soviet authority. The Soviets also hope to insulate Eastern Europe from the insidious influence of Yugoslav "revisionism." As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania is more susceptible to Soviet pressures applied through that organization than is Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, with its demonstration of Soviet readiness to use military force for political purposes in Eastern Europe, and Moscow's declaration concerning the limitations on the sovereignty of members of the "socialist commonwealth," Soviet pressures on Rumania will be felt keenly in Yugoslavia. Rumanian Participation in the Warsaw Pact In recent years Rumania has reduced its participation in Pact affairs, coming last spring very nearly to the point of having a "vacant chair" at Pact gatherings. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, their own discretion and, no doubt, a good measure of "comradely persuasion" from Moscow have recommended a more accommodating policy to the Rumanians. Top-ranking Rumanian and Soviet military officers have exchanged visits, among these a visit to Bucharest by the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. It was not by chance that Bucharest was the site of the annual meeting of the chiefs-of-staff of the Pact countries convened late last year. Last month Bucharest in a very limited way rejoined the Warsaw Pact communications intelligence intercept network from which it had withdrawn in December 1966. In the offing early this year is a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, which will be, in effect, a summit meeting of the party, government and military chiefs of the seven member states. It can be expected that pressure will mount at that time on Rumania to make concessions--potentially damaging to Rumania's claims to national sovereignty--in the name of strengthening the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis NATO. The Soviets might revert, for example, to earlier demands that Rumania expand its own armed forces or agree to increased standardization of military equipment within the Pact. The Rumanians are particularly apprehensive about a possible attempt to give the Pact command tighter control over national forces. The Rumanian Response The Rumanian position is delicate. Bucharest will have to give some ground--as it already has in agreeing to combined exercises--but will struggle hard against being drawn more tightly into the Warsaw Pact net. In negotiating with the Russians on the timing and scope of the exercises, the Rumanians will seek to obtain hard-and-fast assurances that foreign forces will withdraw at a specific time. If [withheld] the Soviets seek to hold the exercises in the region bordering Yugoslavia, Rumania will surely argue for a less provocative locale. [withheld] Soviet Intentions There is no reason to think that Moscow considers either Rumania or Yugoslavia a real and present danger to its security position. The chances of extreme military action against either are not great. But even while applying lesser pressures, Moscow will arouse sharp new anxieties in Bucharest and Belgrade. If the Pact forces are slow to withdraw from Rumanian soil, as they may be, the atmosphere of tension that prevailed last summer will begin to settle again over Eastern Europe. If the Russians were to go a step further and leave their forces in Rumania for a protracted period, there would be real concern within NATO that the Soviets had set out to fasten their hold on all of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav request for economic and military assistance from NATO countries would be sure to follow. The US would be pressed, on the one hand, to issue warnings to Moscow and, on the other, to avoid taking a stance which might seem to challenge the USSR. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976589 ### 30 January 1969 · Soviet Affairs The Soviet Union and its allies have reacted quickly in response to Peru's overtures for closer contacts. Diplomatic relations will be established between Moscow and Lima in the next day or two. Since the military took over in Peru last October, they have established diplomatic ties with Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Hungary is now pressing to join the list. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976591 ### 3 February 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS Tito's well-publicized visit to Rumania over the weekend indicates that neither he nor Rumania's Ceausescu have been entirely intimidated by the latest round of pressures from Moscow. We do not yet know much about what was discussed, and the communiqué issued by the two leaders is longer on atmospherics than on substance. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976597 ### 10 February 1969 · untitled [withheld] * * * The US Ambassador in Belgrade has been told by a high-level Yugoslav Foreign Office official that Rumania is no longer under pressure from Moscow to hold Warsaw Pact maneuvers this spring because of continuing Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest is said to have told his Yugoslav colleague that no maneuvers would be held in Rumania until the end of the year. The Rumanians also told the Yugoslavs that they believe developments in Czechoslovakia will cause the Moscow Conference of World Communist Parties, scheduled for this spring, to be postponed. If and when the conference is held, the Rumanians will attend but the Yugoslavs will not. * * * The arrival in East Berlin yesterday of Soviet Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, supreme commander of the Warsaw President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976610 ### 13 February 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS The Soviets and East Germans have confirmed that Marshal Yakubovsky, supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact, has been chairing a meeting in East Germany of the organization's chiefs of staff and deputy defense ministers. Yesterday's announcements did not give the precise location of the meeting, but it may have been at a training area west of Berlin where artillery and tactical air exercises have been noted. The Rumanian chief of staff was listed among the participants. Although the announcements of the meeting avoided any hint of its purpose, this is the time of year and the right level of military representation for planning 1969 maneuvers. (FBIS 39, 43, 13 Feb 69) President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976616 ### 14 March 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS There will be a major Warsaw Pact meeting next Monday and Tuesday in Budapest. The roster of the Soviet delegation includes Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Defense Minister Grechko. The Warsaw Pact Commander, Marshal Yakubovsky and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces are also traveling to Budapest. It is expected that the other Pact members, including Rumania, will send delegations of similar rank. The participants are expected to discuss European security and the "high command" of the Pact. Other likely topics include Pact maneuvers and transit of Pact forces through the territories of member countries. Also on Monday, representatives of at least sixty Communist parties are scheduled to meet in Moscow to draw up final plans for the "World Communist Conference" which the Soviets hope to stage in May. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976669 ### 17 March 1969 · Soviet Affairs The story behind the 120-minute Warsaw Pact summit conference in Budapest yesterday has not yet unfolded. The main point in the final communiqué merely states that the participants approved "new regulations on combined armed forces and combined commands." This suggests that the discussions--at least nominally--succeeded in drawing the member states into closer military cooperation. Rumania's readiness to subscribe to the new arrangements, however, may well mean that little has changed. The Rumanians have long resisted Russian efforts to obtain control over Rumania's armed forces. A Washington Post story this morning alleges that the Rumanians vetoed a major Soviet effort to "integrate" Rumania's forces under the Pact. The New York Times claims that disagreement emerged at the meeting over a Soviet attempt to get a resolution condemning the Chinese as "aggressors." There is nothing substantial at this point to back either of these claims. The Soviet leaders are already en route back to Moscow by train. The Rumanians, East Germans, and probably others have also left. This means that there was little or no time for bilateral talks after the formal meeting adjourned. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976673 ### 4 April 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS According to members of the Czechoslovak military mission in West Berlin, Warsaw Pact leaders have "confirmed" that there would be a reorganization of the Pact to provide for increased command responsibilities for personnel from member states. They said that East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman, who is the logical choice for a high position because of his age and experience, has been in Moscow preparing for his new duties. The Soviets presumably also consider Hoffman to be a logical candidate for any new job because he is likely to be more amenable to their direction than any of the other defense ministers. The continuing absence from public view of Bulgarian Defense Minister Dzhurov has led to speculation that he too may be in line for a new job, possibly as Hoffman's deputy. In recent years, the Eastern European members of the Pact--particularly the Rumanians--have been pressing the Soviets for a share in the Pact's command structure. All the members will probably welcome any institutional change, but many of them probably will have doubts that any practical effects will flow from the appointment of such hard-line dogmatists as Hoffmann and Dzhurov. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976706 ### 7 April 1969 · RUMANIA - COMMUNIST CHINA The Rumanians are keeping firmly to their long-standing policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The press has not mentioned the Sino-Soviet border problem since 4 March; last week it published a relatively warm message from the Rumanian party central committee addressed to the Chinese party congress and its chairman "Comrade Mao Tse-tung." President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976710 ### 14 April 1969 · Soviet Affairs The Soviets are increasing pressure on the Italian Communist Party to fall into line as 5 June, the date for the Conference of World Communist Parties, approaches. The Italians have been serving as unofficial leaders of the dissidents in the international Communist movement. A number of smaller parties, including the Australians and British, backed the Italians and Rumanians in their opposition to Moscow's dominance at last month's preparatory meeting for the June conference. The Rumanians, however, disagreed with Italian tactics, [withheld] The French, who had earlier backed the Italians, this time caved in to the Soviets. Moscow has already threatened to cut its annual subsidy to the Italian party, reputed to be in the neighborhood of 6.5 million dollars. To counter this, the Rumanians have agreed to trade deals which would net the party in Rome $800,000 over a one to two year period. Yugoslavia is said to be considering a similar arrangement. Soviet irritation with the Italian position came through clearly in a Pravda article yesterday which criticized the Italians' stand on Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border dispute and reminded them not to forget "the principles of proletarian internationalism." [withheld] pressure from Moscow may bring latent conflicts within the leadership to the surface, [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976722 ### 22 April 1969 · The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) CEMA was formed in 1949, during the period when Moscow--in the Stalinist pattern--was forcing heavy industrialization on all the East European countries. Parallel development of this sort, without any adaptation to market forces, fostered inefficient, competitive economies, rather than a complex of complementary trading partners. The proper role of CEMA has long been a subject of dispute--at times acrimonious--among the member countries. For political reasons, the Soviet Union and Poland believe that the organization should promote greater economic cohesiveness. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary are interested in increased cooperation, but are apprehensive lest Soviet domination increase. Rumania, at the other end of the scale, is extremely sensitive to any move that impinges on its sovereignty. Thus, it is not surprising that CEMA has been most effective in technical areas of cooperation among its members--such as the railway freight car pool and the integrated electric power network--where conflicts of national interest are minimal. All the countries rely and will continue to rely on bilateral barter trade with one another--a major factor in the inefficiency of their economies. In their bilateral trade negotiations, the countries run head on into gross price distortions that result from artificially set prices which do not reflect costs or scarcity. There is no multilateral medium of exchange to settle trade imbalances. The CEMA International Bank for Economic Cooperation provides only a limited clearing service for trade imbalances which must still be settled by bilateral negotiations. The Soviets have recently engaged in a series of bilateral talks with the East European countries on development of the five-year trade plans for 1971-75. These plans will also be considered at length in CEMA committees. In its day-to-day work, CEMA has evolved into a service-type organization, currently housed in a new headquarters building in Moscow and employing personnel from all member states. It is a clearing house for administrative, technical, and financial guidance to its members in their bilateral trading arrangements with each other. The members have also not been averse to having CEMA's technical staff wrestle with such problems as pricing of items, joint investment projects, and problems of currency convertibility. CEMA also explores means of achieving the benefits of large-scale production through cooperation, economies that are not possible within a single country. It is obvious, however, that no CEMA member, including the USSR, will surrender control over the development of its economy to an international authority. Areas where a start toward integration can be made are indeed limited. They might include more cooperation in research and development, selected industrial specialization, and increased enterprise-to-enterprise contacts. Multilateral planning probably will continue to be limited largely to coordination of trade requirements President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976736 ### 23 May 1969 · Soviet Affairs The Soviets are working hard to narrow areas of difference with other Communist parties as 5 June, the day the world conference of Communist parties is supposed to begin, approaches. Representatives from some 70 parties are now gathering in Moscow for a final preparatory session. Several parties--most notably the Rumanian--still have strong reservations about some of the documents which are to be approved at the June meeting. Nevertheless, differences among the parties will probably be papered over enough to permit the conference to open on schedule. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976789 ### 24 May 1969 · Soviet Affairs The Rumanian party central committee held a one-day meeting Wednesday at which party boss Ceausescu was chosen to head the delegation to the 5 June international Communist conference. He received a "mandate" to work toward improving the language of the conference document--that is to get approval for insertion of changes he unsuccessfully sponsored in recent visits to Moscow and Warsaw. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976791 ### 2 June 1969 · Soviet Affairs At a Czechoslovak party plenum on 29-30 May Husak and his colleagues began a housecleaning of the party membership in order to consolidate their own position and to convince the Soviets that they are speeding the process of "normalization." The leadership reprimanded or expelled a number of unreconstructed reformists and initiated investigations into the activities of others. Husak indicated that these measures were just the beginning and that the party would take action in the future against dissidents in other sectors of society--for example, the trade unions, intellectuals and students. Punitive actions, however, will probably be confined to expulsion from the party and possibly dismissal from jobs. Arrests are apparently not contemplated. Pro-Soviet conservatives, who have been making a concerted bid for power, failed to make significant gains at the plenum and are probably only partly satisfied with the results. Husak has made it clear that he will not tolerate hardliners who want to return to the repressive practices of former party boss Novotny. The expected removal of a liberal from the party secretariat, however, appears to have given the conservatives a slight majority on that body. * * * The communiqué issued at the end of the preparatory meeting of Communist parties in Moscow indicates that differences over the text of the main document--on imperialism--remain unresolved and that the chief dissidents, the Rumanian and Italian parties, are still unappeased. Although the communiqué does not specifically state 5 June will be the opening date of the conference, there is no positive evidence of further postponement. Soviet prestige has been bolstered by the announcement that the hitherto recalcitrant Cuban party will send a delegation of high-level observers to the conference. The Yugoslav party has officially announced that it will not attend. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976805 ### 7 June 1969 · Soviet Affairs In a move clearly timed to undercut Moscow's position in the world Communist conference, Peking yesterday rebutted recent Soviet charges of border provocations by issuing lengthy allegations of its own. The Soviets will feel compelled to respond in full, although they obviously would prefer not to become involved in full-scale acrimony during the sensitive proceedings of the conference. A preliminary foreign ministry statement yesterday maintained that the frontier is "absolutely quiet." Moscow's sensitivity to this sort of friction, however, is evident from the high level of Soviet military activity along the border since early May. In addition, the Soviets appear to be preparing for a large-scale combined forces exercise, perhaps to emphasize their military superiority in the area. * * * There already has been discord in the Communist conference over the Chinese question. Two speakers--Poland's Gomulka and the Paraguayan delegate--lashed out at Peking. It can be taken for granted that they had the Russians' blessing. The Rumanians, who had been given to understand that this would not happen, lodged an immediate protest. On past form, the Rumanians should walk out if the issue is pressed too hard. By sticking together, however, they and such others as the Italian and British party delegates could yet succeed in getting the Russians to back down. Brezhnev's speech, scheduled for this morning, should point the way. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976815 ### 9 June 1969 · Soviet Affairs Moscow's decision to bring the China issue to the floor of the international Communist conference has made it clear that the meeting will be remembered primarily for its display of disunity. Brezhnev, on Saturday, accused the Chinese leaders of preparing their people for war against the USSR, of supporting splinter groups in foreign Communist parties, and of thwarting "anti-imperialist" unity. Those parties which support Moscow's line can be expected to endorse these remarks in their conference speeches. This will give the Soviets a condemnation of China for the record even if it does not appear in the formal document. By raising the issue in such stark terms, however, Brezhnev is challenging those parties which have sought to avoid condemnation of China, and some of these--particularly the Rumanian and Italian parties--will feel called upon to reply. Some of the parties may actually walk out of the conference after giving their address. Others may remain but withhold their signature from the conference document, which reportedly is not yet fully agreed upon. Still others may follow the Australian party's lead and take the offensive on the Czechoslovakian invasion or other divisive issues in the Communist community. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976817 ### 12 June 1969 · Soviet Affairs The international Communist conference continues to bump shakily along with dissident parties challenging Moscow's position on China, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and points in the conference document. The speech by the Italian party representative yesterday was particularly critical of the invasion and anti-Chinese statements on the floor. He said his delegation was not willing to sign the document in its present form. Czech party chief Husak rebuked the Italians later in the session. The speech of Rumanian party boss Ceausescu on Monday was moderate by comparison with the Italians. He did insist on Rumania's right to dissent and to be independent of Moscow. He hinted that he might not be able to sign the final document but said his delegation would not walk out. Many delegations are said to be critical of the vague and haphazard methods of the meeting, and much work still must be done on the wording of the basic document. No decision has yet been reached as to whether the parties must approve the document in toto or will be allowed to abstain on some sections. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976823 ### 18 June 1969 · Soviet Affairs The international Communist conference ended yesterday with adoption of a much worked-over basic document on the extent of the "imperialist threat" and the "unity" of the Communist world. The communiqué acknowledged that five of the 75 attending parties--including the Italian--did not sign all or part of the document. There are reports that seven other parties expressed reservations about some portion of it. Several of them--including the Romanian--will probably find ways of dissociating themselves from objectionable sections. The document has just been made public this morning and will be reported further when analysis has been completed. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976833 ### 7 July 1969 · Soviet Affairs One result of the President's plans to visit Romania has apparently been the cancellation or at least postponement of a projected visit to Bucharest by Soviet leaders. Lower-level officials in Moscow now are saying that Brezhnev and company will not go to Romania this month to sign a new friendship treaty, and a Soviet Embassy counselor in Bucharest hinted that the Romanians might have to travel to Moscow for the signing. Romanian First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu, who had hinted earlier that the Soviet visit was still scheduled, said Friday that nothing had been decided. Further Soviet countermoves to the Presidential trip are probably still under review in Moscow. The Soviet ambassador to Romania failed to return to Bucharest last week as expected, and the lack of direct editorial comment on the trip in the Soviet press will probably continue until a decision on further moves is reached. Meanwhile, the Romanian party daily published a long editorial yesterday--clearly with top-level approval--pledging Romania to continue to develop relations with all states regardless of their politics. This would appear to be a defense of Bucharest's invitation to the President, although his name was not specifically mentioned, and is the government's first official reference to state visits since the President announced he was making the trip. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976865 ### 8 July 1969 · Soviet Affairs A small Soviet naval squadron--two submarines, three guided-missile ships, and two support vessels--are en route to Cuba to represent the USSR at Cuban holiday observances on 26 July. This is the first time Soviet warships have visited Cuba, an event probably intended to point up the improvement in Cuban-Soviet relations. [withheld] the Cubans are not planning any formal celebrations this year, however. Thus the impact of the Soviet gesture may be less than anticipated. The voyage also reflects Moscow's increased interest in expanding its area of naval operations, which, from the Soviet point of view, may be more important than flattering the Cubans. The squadron has been under way since mid-June, and there is no indication the Soviets planned the visit in response to President Nixon's upcoming trip to Romania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976867 ### 10 July 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS Rumors are being circulated in Eastern Europe, [withheld] that a Warsaw Pact exercise in mid-August will bring massive forces (32 to 40 divisions) to the borders of West Germany, Austria, and Yugoslavia; this would, of course, also put them close to Romania. Such an exercise cannot be completely ruled out but seems improbable. The rumors, [withheld] bear the marks of a scare operation. They may be intended to intimidate Romania and Yugoslavia. They could also have a chilling effect in Western Europe, especially in Bonn. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976871 ### 11 July 1969 · SOVIET AFFAIRS Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet yesterday combined warnings to China with a conciliatory line toward the US and the West. According to a TASS summary, Gromyko indicated that Moscow is ready for early talks with the US on strategic arms limitation. Seeming to swallow any displeasure over President Nixon's planned visit to Bucharest, Gromyko went back several months to refer approvingly to the President's statement favoring a "well prepared" summit conference. He took a moderate stance on West European affairs and, according to press reports, made a carefully hedged expression of willingness to discuss Berlin with the three Western powers with a view to preventing future crises there. The Soviet foreign minister gave the first public indication that the Sino-Soviet border navigation talks in Khabarovsk are not going well. His references to "certain statements" by Chinese representatives and the "recent new provocation" on the Amur River suggest that the USSR anticipates a breakdown of the negotiations. Gromyko reiterated the idea of a collective security system for Asia, which Brezhnev broached in June, but TASS mentioned no clarification. In recent weeks, Soviet diplomats have touted this vague scheme but have provided no details. Gromyko had nothing new to offer on the Middle East. While decrying the dangers to peace in that area, he made it clear that Moscow still considers Israeli withdrawal from occupied areas as a prerequisite for a settlement, along with recognition of Israel's right to exist. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976873 ### 12 July 1969 · Soviet Affairs The Romanian ambassador in Paris announced yesterday at a press conference that top Soviet leaders have indeed postponed their scheduled visit to Bucharest this month, presumably to sign a revised friendship treaty, until fall. The reason given was "urgent and unforeseen duties" on the part of the Moscow entourage. The semiofficial statement is President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976875 ### 12 July 1969 · Soviet [withheld] probably intended to minimize Moscow's embarrassment over reports that Soviet-Romanian relations had worsened since the President's trip to Bucharest was announced. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976875 ### 15 July 1969 · Soviet Affairs In anticipation of the President's upcoming visit, Bucharest has made a few friendly moves, particularly in the cultural field, to prepare the way. USIA Director Shakespeare was received with unusual courtesy during his recent unofficial visit and due notice was paid to his presence in the press. In contrast, former director Marks got only perfunctory treatment and no publicity during a visit in 1967. Shakespeare was treated as a VIP by the Foreign Office, even though the trip was unofficial, as well as by the State Committees for Art and Radio and Television. He was guest at several social functions and was invited back for an official visit by the First Deputy Foreign Minister. In talks with Shakespeare, the Romanians seemed ready to reach agreement on the questions of establishing a US library in Romania and exchanging magazines. Both of these issues have been under negotiation for some time, and Bucharest would probably like to formalize agreements on them during the President's visit. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976879 ### 19 July 1969 · Soviet Affairs The increase noted in Warsaw Pact military activity this week is probably in preparation for normal seasonal training exercises. Naval craft assembling off the East German and Polish coasts are expected to conduct an amphibious exercise. [withheld] Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian air and air defense units conducted a small exercise on Thursday. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976887 ### 6 August 1969 · Soviet Affairs Moscow has used the propaganda journal, New Times, to make its sharpest comment yet on the President's visit to Romania. The fact that New Times is not an authoritative party organ suggests that the Soviets are not ready to commit themselves to a specific position. Nevertheless, a deputy editor of the journal called the article to the attention of the US Embassy last week, indicating it was probably meant to be an "unofficial" statement of Soviet policy. In the article, "American ideologists" were charged with advocating extension of "suitable trade agreements" and license contracts to promote East European nationalism. The journal warned that machinations against socialism would "inevitably" evoke resistance from the USSR. Although no names were mentioned, the article clearly applied to Romania and the President's trip. [withheld] Soviet officials have implied that Moscow will oppose any subsequent steps to strengthen US-Romanian ties. Soviet displeasure with Romania has been shown by the protocol snub of sending a relatively low-ranking party secretary to head the delegation to the party congress beginning in Bucharest today. Brezhnev headed the delegation to the last such affair in 1965. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976919 ### 9 August 1969 · untitled At the Romanian party congress now under way in Bucharest, both Ceausescu and the Soviet chief delegate, Katushev, have restated their respective regimes' disparate views, but they have avoided an open clash. In his opening address, the Romanian party leader spoke of a system of sovereign Communist states but reiterated his opposition to the concept of blocs. His definition of imperialism could be applied to both Moscow and Washington. While vowing to preserve Romania's independence, he also took a conciliatory line toward the USSR. Katushev, for his part, condemned "the perfidious practice of bridge-building"--an indirect reference to the President's visit. He also reminded all present that the Kremlin considers itself entitled to act against dissidents who threaten the socialist system. His speech met with strong opposition from the Yugoslav, Italian, and Spanish parties. In Moscow yesterday, Izvestia published an article containing the first direct and authoritative Soviet statement linking criticism of the "bridge-building" concept with the President's trip. Moscow probably still plans to avoid an open break with Bucharest, however, as indicated by Pravda's publication of a lengthy summary of Ceausescu's congress speech. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976925 ### 11 August 1969 · untitled The Soviet chief delegate to the Romanian party congress, Katushev, visited a machine tool factory on Friday. While he repeated several major points of his generally critical address to the congress, he spoke in a friendly vein and ended with the declaration "long live the unshakeable friendship between Romania and the Soviet Union." The entire text of his remarks were carried by the Romanian party daily Scinteia on Saturday. The declaration of friendship was absent in Katushev's address to the congress and may reflect Moscow's desire to soften the impact of his critical remarks at the congress. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976927 ### 14 August 1969 · Soviet Affairs Ceausescu demonstrated his unchallenged leadership over the Romanian Communist Party at the congress which ended on Tuesday. Seventy foreign parties sent delegations to the meeting. Ceausescu advanced numerous "second generation" Communists to national-level party positions by deftly manipulating the composition of top-level bodies to ensure a membership tipped more to his favor. By electing representatives of the military and security forces, the intelligentsia and ethnic minorities, the congress advanced the image of national unity. At the same time the few "old guardists" still in top-level posts, although downgraded, were not displaced. Romanian speakers at the congress reaffirmed Bucharest's independent course in foreign affairs. Ceausescu, in his opening speech, left little doubt about Romania's determination to resist any attack by "imperialists," which he defined in a way that could equally apply to both the US and the USSR. Aware that the President's visit was still fresh in the mind of the Romanian people, Ceausescu tried to redress the balance. He labored to put the best face possible on Romanian-Soviet relations. He paid lip-service to Bucharest's attachment to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. He also spent some time discussing the Soviet army's role in "liberating" Romania and predictably criticized the US four times in his speech. Now that the congress is ended, Bucharest is prolonging its festive atmosphere until 23 August, when the country will celebrate the 25th anniversary of its "liberation." It seems doubtful at this point that the Soviets and their allies will send high-level delegations to this event. Some Romanian leaders are expected, however, to meet their allies on the highest-level on 9 September, in Sofia, when Bulgaria celebrates its 25th "liberation" anniversary. Unidentified diplomats in Bucharest have claimed that Moscow may take the Romanians to task at the Sofia meeting. The Romanians can be expected to hold their ground. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976932 ### 9 September 1969 · untitled Delegations from East European and several Afro-Asian countries are en route to Hanoi for Ho's funeral. Except for the Romanians, the contingents from eastern Europe are traveling aboard Soviet aircraft flying the southern route that skirts China. The Romanians are flying via Peking. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005976977 ### 7 October 1969 · East Germany: Brezhnev and leaders of all the Warsaw Pact states (save Romania, which sent a lower level representative commensurate with East Germany's treatment of its own recent festivities) are gathered in East Berlin, but it does not appear that a summit conference is in progress. The activities of the visitors and the strenuous schedules of the East German leaders tend to indicate that the primary purpose of this turnout is to demonstrate solidarity with Pankow on the occasion of its 20th anniversary. East German party boss Ulbricht was looking fit and natty for his 76 years; apparently he is fully recovered from his indisposition of July and August. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977025 ### 20 October 1969 · BOLIVIA Bolivians generally are overjoyed at their government's decision to nationalize Gulf--so much so that editorialists and political leaders are calling for the nationalization of other US-owned industries. A wave of anti-American sentiment has swept the country, accentuated by some attacks on official US installations. Army guards have been provided to prevent further damage. The government is already seeking aid to operate the Gulf facilities. Diplomatic relations were established with Romania within hours of the expropriation, and we have reports that agreements for technical aid were signed almost immediately. Ovando is the kind of leader who finds out where the parade is going and then gets in front of it. In spite of his previously expressed reluctance to nationalize Gulf, he could not resist pressure from the militant leftists in the government. Now that Ovando has taken his first step, the leftists, under the leadership of anti-American Minister of Mines Quiroga, can push him along faster and farther than he wants to to. Quiroga wants to be president, and [withheld] the leftists have a scheme to take over altogether if Ovando resists being their front man. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977047 ### 28 November 1969 · WARSAW PACT - MIDDLE EAST The Warsaw Pact powers yesterday issued a new statement on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The declaration contained nothing really new, repeating the now familiar attacks on Israel and its "imperialist sponsors," and reaffirming support for the Arabs. Romania, which has consistently been at odds with its allies' pro-Arab policy, was not associated with the statement. The Soviets probably intended the declaration as a backdrop to the resumption of four-power talks, now scheduled for 2 December. Moscow has for some time appeared to be writing off the chances for progress through bilateral talks with the US. Egypt has already indicated it considers the latest US proposals unacceptable, and Moscow can be expected to follow Cairo's lead. The Russians may accompany their talks with the US, UK, and France with renewed efforts to enlist UN support for a settlement in line with the Security Council resolution of November 1967, calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. Moscow probably believes that both forums offer better opportunities for gaining an agreement favorable to the Arabs than the two-power discussions. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006146488 ### 28 November 1969 · USSR-ROMANIA A Romanian official has told our embassy in Bucharest that the Soviets are putting unremitting pressure on Romania to admit publicly that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was justified. The Romanian leadership, according to the source, is meeting to consider a response to the Soviets, and will make a decision soon. The Romanian position on this issue has clearly weakened now that Moscow has forced the Czechoslovaks to acknowledge the validity of the invasion and has persuaded Belgrade to drop the subject. Romania has been silent on Czechoslovakia since early this year but has not renounced its condemnation. We are inclined to doubt that Bucharest would agree that the invasion was justified. To do so would imply renunciation of Romania's basic policy against interference in the affairs of other states, which could in turn open the way to additional Soviet pressure. Still, some softening of Romanian adamancy on the Czechoslovak issue is possible. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006146488 ### 2 December 1969 · Albania-USSR: Whatever hope there may have been for a reconciliation between Albania and the USSR was destroyed last Friday by party chief Enver Hoxha. In a speech marking the 25th anniversary of Albania's "liberation," Hoxha excoriated the Soviet leadership, denounced the occupation of Czechoslovakia as "the starting point for even bigger adventures" against Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, and decried "armed provocations" against Communist China. Thus far, the USSR has taken no public notice of Hoxha's remarks. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977173 ### 2 December 1969 · Romania - Warsaw Pact: Foreign Minister Manescu told Ambassador Meeker yesterday that he and Ceausescu would be leaving for Moscow today for the Warsaw Pact meeting. Although the meeting was ostensibly called to deal with the broad question of European security, Manescu thought it actually would be centered more narrowly on Brandt's eastern policy. Manescu also called to Meeker's attention Romania's refusal to participate in the recent Warsaw Pact statement on the Middle East, commenting that he saw no utility in condemning Israel. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977173 ### 19 December 1969 · BOLIVIA-ROMANIA [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977203 ### 17 April 1970 · Romania - Warsaw Pact: [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977407 ### 22 April 1970 · USSR The opening of the Soviet celebration of Lenin's centennial yesterday was the first time in more than four months that all the members of the Soviet Politburo appeared together. Brezhnev again held the spotlight, delivering his fourth major televised speech in the past ten days. Brezhnev chose to deliver an assessment of the USSR's current situation rather than a theoretical discourse on Leninism. He noted that the Soviet party's 24th Congress "is at hand" and revealed that the long-awaited five-year plan is "nearing completion." He attacked the economic planners, however, injecting a partisan note into the festivities. He also offered a routine warning about the danger of "bourgeois ideology," and commented that the task of improving living conditions cannot be accomplished "at one go." Brezhnev also promised that the military's needs will not be shortchanged, but he gave no indication that the USSR is about to accelerate military development. Brezhnev broke no new ground on foreign policy. Speaking to the present condition of world Communism, he warned of the growing dangers posed by nationalism and by "right and left opportunism." Proponents of these deviations came in for firm criticism. On other world issues, Brezhnev's remarks were stale and uninspired. Except in Yugoslavia, East European observances were held earlier so that the leaders could journey to Moscow. All of them are there except Tito, who sent a substitute as a mark of his disapproval of present Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. Like Tito, Romania's Ceausescu, prior to going to the USSR, vigorously excoriated the "Brezhnev doctrine," objecting by implication to Moscow's "great power chauvinism and hegemonistic tendencies." Hungary's Kadar was considerably milder, but quoted Lenin to the effect that blind imitation of Soviet models could lead to errors. Celebrations were low key in other places, although in East Germany the ceremonies took on a special character because party chief Ulbricht is the only surviving Communist leader who knew Lenin personally. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977415 ### 19 May 1970 · ROMANIA-USSR Party chief Ceausescu departed unexpectedly for Moscow yesterday, presumably for further argument with the Soviets over basic policy differences. The announcement of his departure at the head of a ranking delegation stated only that the Romanian and Soviet leaderships had agreed to hold "talks," suggesting that the trip was at Moscow's behest. Judging from the composition of the group, the Romanians are prepared to discuss ideology, economics, and military affairs. According to the announcement, the delegation was seen off by most national leaders and "many Bucharest citizens." A sendoff of these dimensions indicates that Ceausescu expects to have difficult talks with the Soviets, and that he intends to give little ground. Romanian actions in recent months have done little to improve the normally cool relations between Bucharest and Moscow. --Earlier this year Romania tabled proposals of its own on European security and disarmament which were deliberately at cross purposes with Soviet policy. --More recently, Bucharest followed China's lead in recognizing Sihanouk's government-in-exile rather than playing the USSR's wait-and-see game. --Last week at the CEMA meeting in Warsaw, Romania did not join the new CEMA investment bank, presumably because the bank would tie the Romanians too closely to the Communist states and would inhibit Bucharest from expanding ties with the West. The central issue in Moscow's view is Romania's "obstructionism" within the Warsaw Pact, including its continuing resistance to holding Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian territory. Other politically touchy subjects to be discussed are Romania's good relations with both of Moscow's main antagonists, the US and Communist China. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977462 ### 22 May 1970 · Recent Floods Causing Extensive Damage in ROMANIA General area of major flooding [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977468 ### 22 May 1970 · Romania: Nearly one-half of Romania has suffered serious flood damage, and rains are continuing in many parts of the country. The death toll is over 100, with approximately 120,000 homeless and over a million acres of farm land under water. Flood waters have subsided slightly in the north, but southern Romania is in grave danger from the Danube and its tributaries. East Germany and Yugoslavia are the only Communist countries to offer relief thus far. The USSR, which is also affected by the floods, has not offered to help, although the Soviets had ample opportunity during President Ceausescu's visit to Moscow early this week. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977468 ### 13 June 1970 · USSR-ROMANIA After long delay, the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty will be renewed early next month. TASS has announced that Brezhnev will head a party-government delegation to Bucharest to sign the treaty. The new accord will replace the 20-year mutual assistance pact which expired in 1968, but which nonetheless remains in effect under an automatic five-year renewal clause. Though the new treaty was initialed in 1968, its formal signing was twice postponed--first as a result of the Czechoslovak crisis, then as a consequence of Soviet irritation over President Nixon's visit to Bucharest last year. Final agreement to sign the treaty was probably reached during the visit of Romanian party leader Ceausescu to Moscow on 18-19 May. [withheld] This represents a victory of sorts for Bucharest. The Romanians have almost certainly resisted Soviet pressures for closer ties and obligations to Moscow. The true measure of the Romanian "victory," however, depends on the concessions that Bucharest has made. For instance, the Soviets probably demanded and received Romanian agreement to closer economic and military cooperation. The Soviets may have insisted on holding Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian territory, something Bucharest has resisted since 1962. Nevertheless, the Romanians can be counted on to pursue their own independent course. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977508 ### 5 July 1970 · USSR-ROMANIA A "CATARRHAL AILMENT," AS ANNOUNCED BY TASS YESTERDAY, MAY BE ONE OF THE REASONS WHY BREZHNEV IS NOT GOING TO BUDAPEST TO SIGN THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY, BUT THERE ARE OTHERS. THE ROMANIANS' OF COURSE BELIEVE--NOT WITHOUT GOOD REASON-- THAT MOSCOW HAS DOWNGRADED ITS REPRESENTATION. KOSYGIN WILL GO IN BREZHNEV'S PLACE--A DELIBERATE SNUB TO CEAUSESCU, WHO OF LATE HAS BEEN TALKING UP ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE WITH RENEWED VIGOR. ALSO, BREZHNEV IS NOW INVOLVED IN THE NASIR TALKS, WHICH MAY HAVE DRAGGED ON LONGER THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. BREZHNEV MAY ALSO WANT TO BE IN MOSCOW WHILE THE REGIME ASSESSES PRESIDENT NIXON'S REPORT ON INDOCHINA AND HIS TELEVISION INTERVIEW. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977549 ### 8 July 1970 · ROMANIA-USSR Studious efforts on both sides to maintain a facade of cordiality fell apart at the end of Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Romania for the signing of a new treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. TASS promptly published a summary of the treaty's contents, including a provision obliging each side to come to the assistance of the other, if it is attacked by any enemy. If this is a true rendering, then Romania's mutual defense commitments to the Soviets have been extended beyond Europe. There was no hint, however, that the Romanians accepted inclusion of the Brezhnev doctrine in the agreement. The Romanians vigorously protested publication of the Soviet version, angered by what apparently was a violation of a previous agreement to publish the texts simultaneously in Moscow and Bucharest today. TASS has rescinded its summary. It is possible that TASS made a mistake, but it is equally likely that a deliberate affront to the Romanians was intended, just as Brezhnev's last-minute boycott of the treaty signing appears to have been. Although the treaty is designed as the basis for correct relations between the two, the circumstances of the signing may leave Romanian-Soviet relations less friendly than before. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977555 ### 13 July 1970 · Romania-USSR: In the eyes of Romanian party chief Ceausescu, the friendship treaty signed with the Soviets last week does not compromise his country's independent course (see The President's Daily Brief, dated 8 July 1970). Ceausescu does not intend that Romania be dragged by the treaty into any Soviet military conflict with Communist China. Instead, Ceausescu looks to the leaders of the two Communist giants to resolve their quarrel. He said Romania would be preoccupied with working toward this goal and asked the Soviets and the Chinese to accept diversity within the movement as a basis for relations among all Communists. Ceausescu's remarks on the subject were made to Romanian party leaders on 9 July and were later summarized in public pronouncements. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977563 ### 15 August 1970 · COMMUNIST CHINA Chou En-lai's acceptance in principle of an invitation to visit Southern Yemen underlines the movement of Chinese diplomacy into a more active phase and emphasizes Peking's interest in the Middle East. This area has received increasing Chinese attention in recent weeks, largely in hopes of countering Soviet influence in the region. The visit--which would be Chou's first to a non-Communist country since the cultural revolution--will almost certainly not take place before the conclusion of the upcoming National People's Congress and the celebration of National Day on 1 October. Chou may combine visits to other countries, such as Pakistan, Nepal, and Romania, with this trip. The last Chinese leader to make a swing of several countries outside the Communist world was former head of state Liu Shao-chi in 1966, before the infamous cultural revolution. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977626 ### 23 September 1970 · Warsaw Pact: Combined Warsaw Pact military maneuvers are expected to begin next week in East Germany. They may be the first to involve participants from all of the Pact countries. Hungary and Bulgaria have announced that units of their armed forces will take part and, according to the Romanian military attaché in Sofia, Romania will send staff elements but no troops. The "southern tier" countries have not previously participated in maneuvers in East Germany. Observers are expected from Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977696 ### 21 October 1970 · Romania: Ceausescu's address to the UN General Assembly Monday was a typical Romanian performance of measured criticism directed at East and West. While he did not hesitate to call on the United States by name in connection with the war in Vietnam, his repeated references to the rights of small nations were an obvious allusion to Romania's struggles against Soviet hegemony. His remark that a "people can be truly free" only to the extent that it has a powerful economic and scientific foundation seems aimed primarily at preparing the United States for talks on closer economic ties. This topic, along with Romania's championship of Communist China's cause, is likely to be on Ceausescu's mind when he talks with President Nixon next Monday. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977752 ### 28 November 1970 · WARSAW PACT The Poles have suddenly postponed a visit of the Austrian foreign minister, and East Germany's Ulbricht has postponed a visit to Romania. Both visits had been scheduled for 2 December. The Austrians were told that Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski had to leave the country to attend a meeting that was not called at Polish initiative. A Romanian Embassy official in Washington says that the Ulbricht visit was postponed because a Warsaw Pact summit meeting will be held in East Berlin from 2 to 4 December. Such a meeting could have been arranged by Eastern European Communist leaders who were gathered in Budapest this week for the Hungarian party congress. Ulbricht did not attend the Hungarian affair but he could have been informed of a decision to assemble Pact members by Gromyko, who made a quick trip to East Berlin on 25 November. Speeches made at the Hungarian congress reflected the differences between East Germany and its allies over the proper response to West Germany's Ostpolitik, and one purpose of a conference would involve an attempt to work out a common front. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005977823 ### 5 January 1971 · COMMUNIST CHINA - ROMANIA The Romanian ambassador in Washington says that the long-term, interest-free credit extended Bucharest by Peking last November amounts to $100 million in convertible currency. [withheld] A $100-million cash loan would be the largest China has ever extended. It comes at an appropriate time for the Romanians, who face substantial repayment commitments to a number of countries over the next several years. The Soviets will take further umbrage at this latest instance of Romanian independence, but Bucharest believes the economic benefits outweigh the credit's political risks. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992405 ### 12 May 1971 · ROMANIA-USSR Ceausescu has strongly reasserted his country's independent foreign policy. At the Romanian party's 50th anniversary celebrations last week, the party leader flatly rejected the idea that the Communist world movement should be directed from Moscow, and insisted that there is no contradiction between Romania's pursuit of national interests and the preservation of international socialist unity. Ceausescu also implicitly reaffirmed his criticism of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Ceausescu disputed recent Western press allegations that Romania is backing away from its nationalistic stance. To quell doubts on this score, he asserted that the principles of independence are as essential to Romania as air is to life. Ceausescu's revival of contentious issues that have been dormant in past months and his frequent praise of the Chinese Communists are sure to irritate Moscow. In addition to his downgrading of the USSR's contribution to the building of socialism in Romania--the theme of Moscow's sparse commentary on the anniversary--his reference to the necessity for strengthening party unity suggests that he still fears the Soviets might try to cultivate ultraconservative elements in the Romanian party. Although Ceausescu is known to prefer regular consultations to iron out problems with the Soviet leaders, the two sides have not met in recent months. Brezhnev did not hold private discussions with Ceausescu during the Soviet party congress. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992651 ### 18 May 1971 · Romania: Reports [withheld] leave little doubt that President Ceausescu intends to tour Peking, Pyongyang, and Hanoi, most likely in June. Despite Moscow's inevitable objections, Ceausescu presumably for some time has been considering a visit to his Chinese benefactors, who only recently granted Romania a sizable long-term loan. In the Romanians' view such a prestigious trip is called for because of the steadily improving political and economic relations with Peking, and would help to balance Ceausescu's private tour of the US last fall. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992641 ### 21 May 1971 · Egypt-Romania: [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992635 ### 4 June 1971 · Communist China: Politburo member Kang Sheng appeared yesterday at a reception for visiting Romanian Party chief Ceausescu after being politically sidelined for over six months. The listing of Kang in his customary place among the regime's top leaders indicates that he retains his position on the elite politburo standing committee. The regime's failure to account for Kang's temporary eclipse and its curious handling of the status of several other politburo members strongly suggest that China's leadership remains beset by major differences on a wide range of policy and personnel issues. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992679 ### 5 June 1971 · ROMANIA-USSR [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992681 ### 18 June 1971 · ROMANIA-USSR [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992703 ### 25 June 1971 · ROMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA-USSR [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992717 ### 9 July 1971 · COMMUNIST CHINA Kang Sheng, who appeared on 3 June at a reception for visiting Romanian party chief Ceausescu after being politically sidelined for over six months, "no longer occupies a post," according to Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu. In a conversation with the US ambassador, the Romanian described Kang as a sick man who had left the hospital only to greet the delegation as a courtesy. Kang's principal "illness" is almost certainly political. Removal of a leader of his stature--he ranked fifth on the elite politburo standing committee--for health reasons does not accord with past Chinese Communist practice. Kang's brief reappearance indicates that the influence of leftist forces with which he has been associated has not waned completely. The continued fluidity in Peking's leadership was further underscored last week by the extraordinary fact that none of China's top officials put in a public appearance during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Communist Party. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992741 ### 10 July 1971 · ROMANIA-USSR The Communist Party's call on Wednesday for intensification of ideological and cultural orthodoxy appears to stem from uncertainty over relations with Moscow following Ceausescu's recent Asian tour. The new directive comes down particularly hard on Romanian youth, some of whom are termed "parasites." The statement is more dogmatic and regressive than a similar directive issued last February, when on the surface at least Bucharest's relations with Moscow appeared to be moving toward an acceptable modus vivendi. Since neither youth nor intellectuals represent a threat to Romania's internal stability, the new directive seems designed to remove grounds for any Soviet questioning of Ceausescu's commitment to Communism. The Bucharest press continues to publish endorsements of the tour in a manner intended to demonstrate firm Romanian popular support of Ceausescu. More expressions of solidarity can be expected as Bucharest holds out against participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in Bulgaria later this summer. A desire to avoid saying anything that might even indirectly further disturb Moscow may account also for the reluctance of Romanian officials to discuss details of Ceausescu's travels with Western diplomats. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992743 ### 21 July 1971 · USSR-ROMANIA [withheld] top Soviet leaders criticized Ceausescu for the "anti-Soviet" tone of his Peking visit when the Romanian leader stopped over in Moscow on 24 June [withheld] The Soviets feel that the Chinese-Romanian final communiqué accepted the Chinese thesis that the socialist bloc is divided into large and small states with conflicting interests. That communiqué was also a major matter of controversy during Ceausescu's later stop in Mongolia. [withheld] Ceausescu, while in Mongolia, questioned the rationale for participation in the Warsaw Pact because "there is no threat from imperialism." Ceausescu's remark reflects both his general disapproval of all military blocs and Romanian reluctance to join Pact exercises. Other reports confirm that Ceausescu's visit to Mongolia, which always echoes Moscow, was marked by ideological disputes that prevented agreement on more than an innocuous communiqué and bland speeches. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992763 ### 27 July 1971 · ROMANIA-CEMA Romanian leader Ceausescu will continue to oppose Moscow's version of economic integration at the annual session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) that opens today in Bucharest. Divergent interests at the three-day meeting are likely to generate some low-caliber fireworks, especially between Romania and the Soviet Union, over the draft program for developing socialist economic integration. Ceausescu has reaffirmed his opposition to economic integration in several recent speeches. Last Friday, for example, he stated that "interdependence in production must in no way infringe on national sovereignty." He added that "the times of the policy of domination and diktat are gone forever." Nevertheless, he may be forced to give a little at the meeting and agree to some limited aspects of integration, perhaps as a sop to the Soviets. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992773 ### 3 August 1971 · USSR - EASTERN EUROPE Yesterday's meeting of Brezhnev and two other top Soviet leaders with counterparts from all of the USSR's East European allies save Romania was meant to highlight Bucharest's isolation and to put pressure on it to conform to Soviet foreign policy. The communiqué's formulations are generally routine, but the broad range of topics covered, from economic integration in CEMA to Vietnam and the Middle East, formalizes the seemingly informal vacation gathering in the Crimea and underscores Romania's deviant status. In view of frequent bilateral meetings of Soviet and East European leaders in the past month capped by a CEMA summit in Bucharest last week, there was scant substantive reason for consultations, except for Romanian recalcitrance. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the meeting was called quite abruptly. East Germany's Honecker had been on vacation but was reported in yesterday's press as having met, presumably on 1 August, with the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin. Romania has irritated Moscow in recent years by not siding with the Warsaw Pact positions on the Middle East war and Soviet disarmament proposals. Romania also has resisted Soviet plans to integrate CEMA, and did not suppress its delight that this goal, as defined at the CEMA summit last week, will take 15 to 20 years to implement. Perhaps Ceausescu's greatest present sin, however, is to insist upon neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to cultivate good relations with Peking, and to welcome the thaw in Sino-US relations. The USSR is gravely worried about a possible rapprochement between Peking and Washington, and it suspects that Romania has assisted in nourishing these contacts. Unable to stop the Chinese, Moscow is determined at least to force the Romanians back into line. The Romanians, judging by their recent behavior, have not been expecting a sharp squeeze from the Soviets. Earlier this summer, the Romanians were apprehensive that Moscow would try to force them to take part in a joint military exercise in Bulgaria or, alternatively, to permit Soviet troops bound for the exercise to cross Romanian territory. Such reports have died out and there are no indications that the Soviets have reopened the matter of Romanian participation. The exercise is scheduled to start in mid-August. Having carried their dispute with Romania into the open in this fashion, however, the Soviets are not likely to let the matter rest. If Romania does not cease its misbehavior, Moscow may step up economic pressures, and insist on closer adherence to the Warsaw Pact's foreign policy goals. Ceausescu will be reluctant to appear to give ground under attack, but he may well decide to pull in his horns for a time. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992785 ### 7 August 1971 · HUNGARY-USSR-ROMANIA On Wednesday, two days after signing the Crimean summit communiqué, Kadar convened an unusual joint meeting of the party's central committee, the government's council of ministers, and popular front leaders. The meeting produced a communiqué which included an uncharacteristically harsh foreign policy line. Between the lines of the communiqué we read a serious concern over Budapest's relations with Moscow as well as a warning that this is not the time for independent flings. Kadar, in most respects one of Moscow's staunchest supporters, has been tacitly pushing for a more forthcoming attitude toward China for several months. [withheld] Kadar resisted a Soviet attempt in June to stir up old animosities between Romania and Hungary. On 30 July Brezhnev and Podgorny talked with Kadar in Moscow, and we believe they criticized him for not sufficiently supporting the USSR's Romanian policy as well as for his initiatives regarding China. If the Soviets are adopting an increasingly tough attitude on the Romanian issue, they would almost certainly make a special effort to get Kadar in line early rather than risk a repetition of the moderating tack he took in 1968 on Czechoslovakia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992793 ### 12 August 1971 · USSR-ROMANIA The Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta yesterday reprinted an article from the Polish party daily of 30 July, which indirectly but clearly criticized Bucharest's policies. Claiming that China views the USSR as its chief enemy, the article commented that "all nods of approval for Peking's splittist policy cannot be considered as anything but harmful to the unity of the socialist community." This was followed by a warning that there can be no "neutral stand" on this issue and that "the attitude toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU is a gauge of the attitude toward the fundamental interests of the socialist community." Romania shows no sign of backing off from its independent stance. An article yesterday in the party daily Scinteia reaffirmed Bucharest's desire to strengthen links with "all socialist countries" (read China included). The Romanian article also condemned "imperialism" for using tactics such as "domination and...economic and political pressure,...the installment of puppet regimes...and even overt military intervention." While the imperialists were not specifically named, the Soviets will see the article as still another infuriating example of Romania's following a pro-Peking line. If the scheduled visit of a Chinese military delegation to Romania actually takes place later this month, the Soviets will not be made any happier. Should Moscow want to increase the pressure on Romania, a Warsaw Pact exercise tentatively scheduled in Bulgaria in late August would offer opportunities for intimidating posturings. Although such moves would clearly worry the Romanians, it is doubtful that they would have any basic effect on Bucharest's determination to maintain its independent stance. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992801 ### 14 August 1971 · USSR-CHINA-BALKANS Moscow is responding more vigorously to Peking's efforts to erode Soviet influence in the Balkans. Romania has now been linked with the Balkan heretics--Albania and Yugoslavia--in a Soviet-inspired warning to recalcitrants who continue to cultivate relations with the Chinese. Yesterday a Hungarian newspaper, clearly at Soviet behest, reported that Chou En-lai planned to visit Tirana, Belgrade, and Bucharest this fall. (There is no confirmation of this, although there have been other reports to this effect.) The article warned that if this should result in an "anti-Soviet axis," an "extremely dangerous situation" would be created. The Hungarians are particularly vulnerable to Soviet pressure on this score because they too have been attempting to improve relations with China. The Soviets recently forced Hungarian Premier Fock to cancel a trip he had been planning to make to Peking. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992805 ### 20 August 1971 · ROMANIA-USSR Ceausescu convened a highly unusual meeting yesterday of all leading party and government bodies. The meeting was called to hear and endorse unanimously a report by Premier Maurer on last month's CEMA meeting at Bucharest and a discourse by Ceausescu on his Asian tour. The meeting apparently is intended to provide a clear demonstration of internal solidarity in the face of criticism by Bucharest's allies of its obstructionist tactics in CEMA and of Ceausescu's independent stance in foreign affairs, especially his trip to Peking. Since the Crimean summit conference (discussed in The President's Daily Brief of 3 August), criticism of the trip has spread from Hungary--where it appeared first at the behest of Moscow--to the media of other East European capitals. Yesterday's meeting occurred one day after Soviet Ambassador Drozdenko called on Ceausescu. Romanian media have described their talk as "comradely," a term that implies disagreement. If Drozdenko adopted a menacing approach, yesterday's unusual meeting may have been intended as a defiant reaction. Ceausescu has in the past been willing to compromise without sacrificing national interests, although since late June he has been particularly assertive. There continues to be no evidence of any overt military pressure being directed against Romania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992815 ### 24 August 1971 · Warsaw Pact: A long-rumored joint Warsaw Pact exercise in Bulgaria apparently is not going to occur this month; instead, preparations for a Bulgarian national exercise are now under way. Numerous bloc-instigated reports of the planned exercise may only have been intended to generate pressure on Romania. The relative calm displayed by Bucharest in the face of this war of nerves suggests that it had a good reading on the intent of these reports all along. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992821 ### 25 August 1971 · USSR-ROMANIA [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992823 ### 25 August 1971 · YUGOSLAVIA-USSR The Yugoslavs believe that, because the visit of Brezhnev to Yugoslavia on 22-24 September is Moscow-initiated, Belgrade has a tactical edge in seeking important concessions. Tito's negotiating position centers on a demand that any communiqué include a renewal of the Soviet declarations of 1955 and 1956 guaranteeing Yugoslavia's sovereignty and the right of all Communist parties to pursue "different roads to socialism." Belgrade is also demanding that Moscow clamp down on the activities of Yugoslav émigres in the USSR. Tito's demands are likely to be more than Moscow can accept, thus casting doubt on whether the visit will take place on schedule. Tito, however, appears determined to hold his ground. On 19 July Belgrade publicly denied Soviet-inspired reports circulating in Eastern Europe alleging the formation by Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania of a pro-Chinese "axis" and accused Moscow of dictating the foreign policy of its allies. This accusation clearly indicates Yugoslav willingness to fuel latent anti-Soviet sentiment throughout the area. Brezhnev probably wants to assess the new Yugoslav governmental apparatus and to make known his views on Belgrade's policies before Tito's visit to the US in October. He may also be seeking ways to weaken Yugoslav-Romanian solidarity, to block growing Chinese influence in the Balkans, and to enlist Belgrade's support for new peace initiatives. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992823 ### 26 August 1971 · USSR: USSR: [withheld] an unusually large number of Soviet ships are involved in a naval exercise in the Black Sea. At least 18 warships, including both of the navy's antisubmarine helicopter carriers, have been noted active in the western area of the Black Sea; naval aviation also was active. Other Soviet military activities in eastern Europe are at seasonal levels [withheld] Although apparently not aimed directly at the Romanians, this activity will reinforce Soviet psychological pressures on Bucharest. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992825 ### 28 August 1971 · Warsaw Pact: Warsaw Pact: Satellite photography through [withheld] strengthens the conclusion that there is no military activity in western USSR that could be construed as an imminent threat to Romania. The photography shows no signs of troop concentrations or alerts. At military installations, there was no massing of civilian trucks indicative of a mobilization, nor were there any concentrations of military transport aircraft similar to those photographed prior to the Czech invasion of 1968. Photography [withheld] showed preparations then under way for the exercises now taking place in Bulgaria, but there was nothing unusual near the Bulgarian-Romanian border, and military activity appeared normal elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including Romania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992829 ### 3 September 1971 · USSR-ROMANIA [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992841 ### 20 October 1971 · COMMUNIST CHINA [withheld] a controversy over heir-designate Lin Piao's political position may be at the root of the unsettled leadership situation in Peking. --The latest issue of China Pictorial--which features Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao together on its front cover is unavailable in the capital. --The display at Peking airport of the recently published set of colored photographs of Mao does not include those showing him with Lin, although the full set is on display at several other locations in the capital. --The guidance provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protocol department concerning toasts addressed to Chinese leaders at a recent Romanian banquet in Peking omitted any reference to Lin. Similar guidance apparently was also provided a visiting Turkish delegation and appears to follow a decision taken approximately two weeks ago to halt the customary New China News Agency reporting of toasts to Mao and Lin by foreign visitors. These alterations in Peking's hagiology, together with the absence of incantations to Lin's political rectitude in domestic propaganda over the past two weeks, point to an effort to downplay Lin that goes beyond what would be required if his problem were purely physical. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005992928 ### 12 January 1972 · WARSAW PACT The Warsaw Pact summit meeting to be held in Prague later this month is expected to deal with issues related to European security. The Soviets have convened such Pact meetings at key intervals in their push toward detente. Besides calling for ratification of the Polish and Soviet treaties with West Germany, Moscow may also seek to use the meeting to keep the East Germans in step. Pankow has been conducting a sharply worded anti - West German press campaign, which reflects its concern over the destabilizing impact of the current detente atmosphere on the East German internal situation. The Soviets also are likely to use the summit to give another push to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The summit may reiterate last month's call by the Pact's foreign ministers for the start of multilateral preparatory talks for the conference. Moscow continues to propose convocation of the conference itself in 1972, but probably is willing to settle for preparatory steps this year. Another important agenda item may be the implications for bloc solidarity of President Nixon's trip to Peking. Moscow would like to obtain a strong condemnation of Peking's opening to Washington. In the face of Romanian ties with Peking, however, the Kremlin probably will have to be satisfied with a boilerplate call for continued unity against imperialist intrigues. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993077 ### 25 January 1972 · WARSAW PACT On the eve of today's political summit meeting in Prague, several East European states have intensified their propaganda attacks on China. Soviet criticism of the Chinese has, of course, been running at a high level since the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the UN General Assembly session. Polish and East German articles in the past week specifically attack Peking's "splitting activities" in the socialist world and its "diplomatic maneuvers" in the Balkans. Warsaw and Pankow seem to be fronting for Moscow on this issue, and Bucharest is the unspecified but obvious target. The Romanians, who have been subjected to this kind of performance before, will strongly resist any efforts to push through a resolution condemning Peking and will seek to confine the meeting to questions of European security. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993101 ### 16 February 1972 · SUDAN-LIBYA-EGYPT One of the more unlikely proposals made in recent weeks has been Sudanese President Numayri's idea that the US enlist Libyan President Qadhafi's support for Egyptian-Israeli proximity talks. Qadhafi has rarely given even lip service to the idea of negotiating the unfinished Arab-Israeli war, and Numayri's suggestion seemed to be his own brainstorm rather than a product of his discussions with Qadhafi. However, a re-examination of Qadhafi's recent statements and published Libyan views suggests that his and Numayri's distrust of Soviet influence in Egypt may be leading both of them to revise their priorities. Numayri told Ambassador Bush on 5 February that he believed the US should use Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to persuade President Sadat to take Egypt into the interim agreement talks. Sadat cannot make the decision on his own, Numayri said, but could be given the necessary push if these three countries--the aid givers--indicated their support of proximity talks. Numayri offered Sudan's own support for any US initiative that did not embarrass or weaken Egypt and urged an immediate US contact with Qadhafi. The Sudanese suggestion to Ambassador Bush came only a few days after Qadhafi's talks with Sadat and Numayri. The Sudanese minister of information, who had attended the Numayri-Qadhafi talks, later told Bush that Qadhafi was so worried about massive Soviet influence in Egypt that he would probably be willing to weigh in with Sadat. While there may be considerable exaggeration in these Sudanese allegations about Qadhafi's views, they can be fitted into the trend of his recent statements. Addressing Egyptian troops at Aswan last month, Qadhafi repeated his customary line that the "battle" with Israel was inevitable but went on to insist that the timing must be left to the "political leadership." This argument, which supports Sadat's position, has been repeated in Libya's armed forces journal, which sometimes serves as Qadhafi's personal mouthpiece. Other themes he has struck in recent months include the inability of the Arab armies to defeat Israel now and the folly of starting hostilities without adequate planning and training. Over the same period, he has expressed concern about the spread of Soviet "imperialism" in the Middle East in several widely publicized speeches and interviews. (continued) If Qadhafi now views the confrontation with Israel as a protracted struggle which needs careful preparation, he may also see some utility in proceeding with talks for an interim agreement. He may have come to believe that an Israeli withdrawal from the canal would permit the Egyptians to scale down considerably the Soviet personnel manning SAM sites in the canal sector, something Sadat has said he is anxious to do. Qadhafi appreciates Egypt's long-term need for Soviet military aid, but he may hope that the breathing space provided by an interim agreement would at least enable the Egyptians gradually to displace the sizable contingent of Soviet military advisers. Apart from this, Ambassador Bush's conversation with Numayri tells a good deal about current Sudanese thinking on the war. Numayri is clearly anxious for rapid progress toward a settlement. He claims that the closure of the Suez Canal has imposed an economic burden on Sudan in the range of $65-75 million annually. The Sudanese President's interest in achieving an interim agreement and in involving the US in that effort also reflects his own concern about the Soviet presence in Egypt. Since the pro-Communist coup attempt last July, Numayri has been extremely suspicious of Soviet motives and is attempting to replace Moscow's military aid and technical assistance programs by developing contacts with the West, China, Yugoslavia, and Romania. He is well aware that any reduction of the Soviet presence in the Middle East hinges on a political solution of the Middle East conflict. Egypt's successful pressure on Sudan in the past few weeks to accept a Soviet ambassador--the latest reminder of the weight that the Soviets carry in Cairo--is likely to make Numayri even more resentful. Neither Sadat nor Qadhafi has been heard from directly since their meetings before and after Sadat's trip to Moscow. Nevertheless, [withheld] if he could now count on Qadhafi and Numayri to protect his rear from radical Arab critics and Soviet disapproval, he might find it politically easier to take another step with the United States and Israel in search of an interim agreement. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993143 ### 28 March 1972 · ROMANIA - WARSAW PACT [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993215 ### 3 April 1972 · ROMANIA - WARSAW PACT [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993225 ### 5 April 1972 · Romania-Egypt: Presidents Ceausescu and Sadat talked past one another during an exchange of toasts in Cairo on Sunday, holding to their disparate views on the Middle East. By stressing the "integrity and sovereignty of all states," which by implication includes Israel, Ceausescu showed an unwillingness to curry favor with his Arab host. In his reply, Sadat scarcely mentioned Romania, referred flatteringly to the USSR as the "leader of the socialist states," and dwelt almost entirely on Egypt's view of the Middle East situation. Nevertheless, simply by being received in Cairo after a long tour of Africa, Ceausescu succeeded in underlining Romania's independent stance. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993230 ### 3 May 1972 · Cuba: In his May Day speech Fidel Castro announced that this week he will begin a two-month tour to Guinea, Algeria, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and, finally, the Soviet Union. He both praised Soviet support for Cuba and condemned US "international diplomacy"--suggesting that the idea of a secret US-Soviet deal on Cuba still haunts him. Castro warned that any interference with Cuban warships operating against exile vessels on the high seas could bring reprisals against Guantanamo. A US-Cuban rapprochement is not possible under present circumstances, he concluded. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993279 ### 26 May 1972 · ROMANIA President Ceausescu has suddenly postponed trips to Japan and West Germany that were scheduled for next month. Domestic politics appear to have been the reason for the postponement. Recent high-level personnel shifts that have received little public explanation have caused uneasiness--and perhaps opposition--among party members, who seem to fear that more extensive changes may be made at a party conference in July. Ceausescu's recent trip to eight African and Arab countries also has caused some criticism at home, particularly his promise of aid to developing nations, given at a time when Romania is struggling with a large foreign debt. None of these problems, either singly or collectively, constitutes a threat to Ceausescu's leadership at the moment. Given his autocratic nature, however, Ceausescu will not overlook even a minor challenge. Apparently he has decided to take the initiative against internal grumblings by staying at home, defending his policies, and personally overseeing preparations for the party conference in July. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993320 ### 29 May 1972 · Cuba: Fidel Castro is still wending his way through Eastern Europe prior to his planned arrival in Moscow in mid- to late June. His nine days in Bulgaria, most of it spent sightseeing, were evidently somewhat of a strain on his hosts. Castro, now in Rumania for four days, is expected to move on to Hungary on Tuesday. He then visits East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia before finally arriving in the USSR. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993325 ### 5 June 1972 · Romania: The only Warsaw Pact government to be represented at the Stockholm conference on the environment opening today will be Romania. Bucharest announced it would attend on Thursday, after it had become clear that the USSR and its other Eastern European allies would boycott the meeting in protest against the exclusion of East Germany. Although they may have preferred not to go it alone, the Romanians presumably believed their participation would provide a relatively innocuous demonstration of their independence. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993337 ### 19 July 1972 · Romania: A national party conference, the second since Nicolae Ceausescu became party chief in 1965, opens today in Bucharest. We expect the conference to be a relatively low-keyed affair, with discussion focused on the economy and educational reform. As in the case of the last conference in 1967, we expect some high-level personnel shifts in party and state agencies but Ceausescu will remain in firm control. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993419 ### 27 September 1972 · USSR: Prospects for the Soviet grain harvest continue to deteriorate with the onset of freezing temperatures in much of the New Lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan. Recent reports of negotiations for wheat from West Germany and Romania may reflect a reassessment of Soviet needs. Confirmed Soviet purchases of grain for delivery by mid-1973 now stand at almost 27 million tons, of which about 18 million tons is wheat. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993541 ### 28 September 1972 · ROMANIA - WARSAW PACT [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993543 ### 20 October 1972 · ROMANIA Corneliu Manescu has been replaced as foreign minister by his first deputy, George Macovescu. We expect Manescu, after more than a decade as foreign minister, to retain an important advisory role in Bucharest. President Ceausescu may well name him a member of the Council of State. Macovescu, a leading expert on European security matters, has promoted the coming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in his frequent foreign travels. He will bring new verve to the post, but the change does not mean a shift in Romanian foreign policy. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993582 ### 23 November 1972 · ROMANIA President Ceausescu has publicly taken positions on European security and force reductions which mean that Romania has again broken ranks with the Warsaw Pact. On Tuesday he declared his opposition to separate talks on these two major issues, expressing fear that talks on force reduction without participation of all European states would result in the division of the continent into Soviet and US spheres of influence. In Ceausescu's view such a step would mean Romania's domination again by the Soviets. In addition, Ceausescu called for a European detente to include withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other states, the closing of all foreign military bases, the creation of regional nuclear-free zones, an end to military maneuvers, and lower military budgets. Most of these Romanian policy goals are contrary to those of the USSR. Ceausescu does not expect to achieve them, but he calculates that, if Romania remains silent on such issues during this period of negotiations, its independence will be eroded. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993641 ### 28 November 1972 · Romania: The large Romanian delegation at the talks in Helsinki preparing for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making a strenuous effort to establish itself as an equal participant, independent of the Soviets. In order to stay independent, the Romanian delegation is fighting hard, chiefly against the USSR and its allies, on procedural matters. The Romanians tell us that one of their motives is to block any joint consideration of conference matters by the Warsaw Pact states as a bloc. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993649 ### 4 December 1972 · USSR-Hungary: General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Hungary last week appears to have gone according to expectations with no signs of significant differences. With a bow to Hungary's special approach to some economic matters, such as its departures from centralized planning, the communiqué asserted the need for continued "reciprocal study and sharing of experiences." The absence of the discord that surfaced earlier in the year undoubtedly reflected Moscow's wish to avoid tensions in Eastern Europe when broader European negotiations are beginning. Romania is already asserting its independent role in the Helsinki talks. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993659 ### 8 December 1972 · ROMANIA - EASTERN EUROPE Romania's strenuous efforts at Helsinki to establish itself as an independent participant in preparations for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have provoked sharp criticism from its allies. Warsaw considers that Bucharest's breaking of ranks is unnecessary, and fears that Moscow now may try to tighten Pact discipline. Party leader Gierek, who has considerably improved relations with Romania in his two years in power, has shown his displeasure by suddenly canceling a trip to Romania scheduled to begin on Sunday. [withheld] Despite these reactions, the Romanians will continue pressing their own line in order to preserve and hopefully increase their room for maneuver as Europe moves toward detente. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993667 ### 8 December 1972 · USSR-MBFR: [withheld] Moscow will soon respond favorably to the West's invitation to open discussions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions early in the new year. General Secretary Brezhnev acknowledged during a speech in Hungary last week that consultations were already under way on the matter among Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies. These may culminate in a formal Pact meeting later this month. Romania's insistence that it attend all stages of the MBFR talks has [withheld] caused some complications for Moscow. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993667 ### 18 December 1972 · Romania: Warsaw Pact members are censuring Romania for its attitude during the preparatory talks leading to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the past week criticism of Romania's position has appeared in a number of East European newspapers and Polish party chief Gierek canceled a visit to Bucharest. At the same time, pact diplomats have been boycotting official Romanian functions. Last Friday, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister kept his appointment for an official visit to Bucharest, but he minced no words in criticizing the Romanians for breaking ranks with the Warsaw Pact during the Helsinki talks. There is no sign that the Romanians intend to modify their positions and we expect the pact states to increase political pressure on the Ceausescu government. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993683 ### 20 December 1972 · SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A NEW SHRILLNESS The intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute has increased considerably over the past two months. The Chinese, who have been on the diplomatic and propaganda offensive throughout the period, have used a variety of means to press their case--hard-hitting speeches in the UN, authoritative People's Daily commentaries, comments to visiting delegations, stopover visits by Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in London, Paris, and Bucharest, and an economic mission to Eastern Europe. The immediate goals have been to impede any further movement toward detente between Moscow and the nations of Western Europe, to nip in the bud any improvement in relations between Moscow and Tokyo, and in general to project the image of Peking as a rational and moderate player in the global arena. The Soviets, clearly on the defensive, are worried by the scope and vehemence of Chinese attacks and have responded with propaganda counterattacks. The most authoritative of these was a speech by General Secretary Brezhnev on 30 November in which he was more outspoken in condemning Peking than he has been since the border talks began more than three years ago. Europe In Europe Peking has warned of the dangers of both a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and negotiations on military reductions. The Chinese see these as Soviet ploys aimed at reducing pressure in the West in order to free Soviet military and diplomatic energy for use against China. They have missed no occasion to sow seeds of doubt about Soviet intentions by underlining Moscow's past use of military force and insisting that Moscow simply cannot be trusted. Chinese spokesmen have also argued that a mutual reduction of US and Soviet forces would give Moscow a strategic edge because US forces could not return to Europe quickly enough to meet a Soviet conventional attack. They have even made it known that they approve of Europe's continued reliance on the US nuclear umbrella and favor a strong NATO. Moscow is clearly concerned over these Chinese attempts to frustrate their initiatives in Western Europe. The Soviets were obviously annoyed at Chiao's European junket. The USSR lashed out at the UK following British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home's visit to Peking and published a barrage of propaganda attacks refuting Chinese allegations about Moscow's motives in pushing its detente schemes. Japan [withheld] the Chinese have warned that Moscow is the primary threat to security in Asia. Peking has gone out of its way to say that neither Tokyo's close military ties to Washington nor the continued development of the Japanese self-defense force are obstacles to further improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. China has offered support for a permanent UN Security Council seat for Japan and endorsed Japan's territorial claims to the Soviet-held islands northeast of Hokkaido. Most importantly, Peking has moved toward economic policies which will help expand the already substantial Sino-Japanese trade. Although the USSR is a far more attractive trading partner for Japan, at least in the short run, Peking is making a concerted effort to compete by indicating a willingness to accept long-term credits to finance the import of new technology from Japan, as well as to enter into long-term contracts to supply Japan with raw materials, including petroleum. Support for elevating Japan's UN status poses no problem for Moscow, but Peking's open support for Japanese claims to the northern islands complicates that difficulty for the USSR. The Japanese have made return of the islands the first condition for improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, and the Soviets have been acutely sensitive to any intimation that the Japanese might try to use improved relations with Peking to nudge the USSR into becoming more accommodating on the territorial issue. Moscow is increasingly unhappy with the slow pace of negotiations on Japanese participation in joint projects to exploit natural resources in Siberia. There is evidence that the Soviets suspect China may be partly responsible for Tokyo's reluctance. [withheld] Chinese Chances China may not expect any spectacular gains from these maneuvers, but it is intent on frustrating Moscow's diplomacy as much as possible. Prospects are brighter in Asia than in Europe. Soviet-Japanese exchanges have not gone well, whereas President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993687 ### 28 December 1972 · WARSAW PACT - MBFR The Warsaw Pact countries, who have yet to respond to the West's invitation to begin force reduction talks, may confer in January before doing so. Warsaw Pact leaders did not meet as a group in Moscow during the week of the Soviet Union's 50th anniversary celebration as some Soviet officials had suggested they would. Instead they conferred separately with General Secretary Brezhnev. Their delay in replying to the West may result from differences between the Soviet Union and Romania over the latter's desire for full participation in the MBFR talks. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993699 ### 11 January 1973 · Warsaw Pact: [withheld] foreign ministers of the pact states will meet in Moscow over the weekend to deal with the resumption next week of the multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the West's invitation to begin talks on force reductions on 31 January. The Romanians, who were not invited to participate in the latter meetings, are lobbying in Western capitals for their inclusion. We expect they will take up the matter in Moscow as well. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993713 ### 16 January 1973 · USSR-FRANCE The French ambassador in Moscow briefed Ambassador Beam yesterday on the meetings last week between President Pompidou and party leader Brezhnev. Brezhnev professed to be very unhappy over the inconclusive wrangling during the first round of the preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He complained that the big powers had not exerted their "moral authority," thus permitting those "with fewer reponsibilities" to try to take the lead. Brezhnev was more pointed in his recent talks with Finnish President Kekkonen when he specifically blasted the Romanians and tried to get the Finnish chairman to control the talks more effectively. Brezhnev did hint that the Soviets may propose confidence-building measures more attractive to the smaller countries. He remained insistent, however, that the conference be completed as soon as possible and that it end with a summit-level meeting. Brezhnev reiterated Soviet interest in the strict separation of the CSCE from the forthcoming talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. Pompidou was noncommittal on Brezhnev's call for French participation in the force reduction talks. Commenting on US-Soviet relations, Brezhnev said there had been "no basic change" since the May summit, although "progress had been more deliberate than at first thought." He said his visit to the US would be made at the "most appropriate time," and that the schedule would be influenced by the international situation, US-Soviet relations, and domestic demands on his time. Brezhnev told the French it is now possible to envisage a Vietnam agreement and stressed that the USSR strongly desires this result. Brezhnev admitted to Pompidou that he had been ill last autumn and absent from his duties for about two months. He seems fully back in good health now. He was relaxed and showed plenty of stamina in long sessions with Pompidou. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993717 ### 19 January 1973 · USSR The USSR and its allies, in agreeing to take part in talks on force reductions in Europe, have added that the talks should be open to "other European states that indicate an appropriate interest." The Hungarian official who presented his government's note made it clear that this formulation does not exclude neutrals. This position, reached during the Warsaw Pact meetings earlier this week, should meet Romania's desire for broad participation in the talks and places the burden on the West for excluding any interested European state. [withheld] The Warsaw Pact proposals on participation apply, as do the Western proposals, only to the forthcoming preparatory talks, not the actual negotiations planned to get under way next autumn. The Pact countries proposed Vienna as the site for the preparatory talks whereas the West had put forward Geneva. Most Western countries are not likely to object to Vienna, and some prefer it because other disarmament talks are being held in Geneva. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993720 ### 29 January 1973 · FORCE REDUCTION TALKS Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have replied to NATO that they plan to send delegations to Vienna on 31 January for preparatory talks on mutual force reductions. The Pact reply proposes that the question of inviting other states to participate be decided at these discussions. The note specified, however, that actual reductions be negotiated only by states whose territory and forces are directly involved. The Soviets added orally that Romania and Bulgaria would be coming to the preparatory talks but would revert to observer status if it is decided that the area for reduction should not include these two states. Moscow reiterated its view that neutrals who so desire should eventually be permitted to participate in some capacity. The Pact proposal to include neutrals in the force reduction talks has had the unintended effect of increasing support among neutral and Western countries for dealing with broad military issues at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Most neutral states think that if there is to be a general discussion of force reduction issues, it might as well take place at the CSCE while actual troop cuts are negotiated in the other conference. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993728 ### 2 February 1973 · Force Reduction Talks: After an unstructured initial session, the delegations in Vienna are trying through informal contacts to work out procedures so that a formal plenary session can be held early next week. If the Romanian and Bulgarian delegations continue to insist on being full and equal participants, the NATO "flank" countries--Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey--will renew their campaign for full status. Soviet delegation members predict, however, that the Romanians will back off. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993732 ### 9 February 1973 · Chile: Because of a shortfall in its wheat production, Chile is seeking to boost this year's imports to some 1.3 million tons, 73 percent above the 1972 total. Santiago has signed contracts with Argentina, the USSR, Australia, South Africa, Romania, and Bulgaria for about half its needs, but has been unable to obtain any more from them. Chilean officials state that the US and Canada are the only possible sources for the balance of this year's requirements. The wheat from the USSR amounts to 100,000 tons and is part of the 1 million ton Soviet-Australian grain deal, concluded late last year. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993739 ### 12 February 1973 · MBFR On Saturday, the Soviet delegation to the preparatory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions stated as a "final" position that either Hungary should be excluded from direct participation in the negotiations or that Italy and Hungary should participate together. Chief Soviet delegate Khlestov noted that the Hungarian problem could have been avoided if the West had accepted Moscow's earlier proposal that all delegations have equal status when the talks begin. NATO powers originally considered Hungary a full participant and thought they had Budapest's consent for this status. Subsequently, however, Soviet delegates announced that Hungary wished to be an observer. Italy does not wish to be a full participant. One effect of the Soviet position could be to slow the talks. The Soviets are aware that the Benelux states tend to link their participation with that of Hungary, and that most NATO powers support Italy's wish. Moscow appears to be angling toward a quid pro quo that would include ultimate discussion of its forces in Hungary in return for discussion of US forces in Italy, and perhaps Spain. Whether intended or not, the question of Hungarian participation has driven Romania from center stage and puts the matter of Bucharest's full participation further in doubt. A Romanian diplomat has reported that Foreign Minister Macovescu is saying that Romania has been duped by the US and that the superpowers have secretly agreed to prevent Romania's full participation in MBFR. The diplomat said these views appeared to be shared by officials at higher levels in Bucharest. The source added, however, that if all else fails, Romania is prepared to accept observer status. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993742 ### 6 March 1973 · Romania: Romania has become the first Warsaw Pact country to buy US passenger aircraft. A contract for the purchase of three Boeing 707-320C long-range jet airliners, spare parts, and spare engines, valued at $45 million was signed last week. One of the aircraft will be configured for VIP service. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993764 ### 25 April 1973 · Romania-USSR: Soviet Defense Minister Grechko left Romania yesterday after disagreeing with his hosts about Romania's place in the Soviet orbit. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993806 ### 22 June 1973 · ROMANIA President Ceausescu will begin a four-day visit to West Germany next week. He will be seeking new German credits and increased economic ties across the board. On the political side, he will ask Chancellor Brandt to sign a joint declaration stressing the equality, independence, and territorial integrity of all states. Romania is pressing for broad acceptance of these principles as the cornerstone of future agreements on European security. Ceausescu's trip, the first by a Romanian chief of state to West Germany, will be a high point in his continuing campaign to establish Romania's independence among European nations. The momentum of this effort has grown recently. His visit to Italy last month boosted bilateral economic cooperation, and on June 4 Romania became the first Warsaw Pact member to be granted tariff preferences by the European Community. Moreover, the Romanians are encouraged by the prospects for early achievement of MFN status with the US. These agreements, of course, have as much political as economic significance for the Romanians. They read them as Western votes of confidence in Romania's future. * * * The party plenum this week was Ceausescu's show. No other presidium member addressed the gathering, and his wife was elected a full member of the executive committee. Ceausescu tried to undercut any criticism of the move by stressing the need to increase the role of women in society and proposing enlargement of the executive committee to make room for three more. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993856 ### 26 June 1973 · ROMANIA-CHINA [withheld] what appear to be ten Chinese-designed motor gunboats being built at Romania's Mangalia shipyard. Construction of the gunboats began about a year ago. They will be Romania's first non-Warsaw Pact arms since World War II. The gunboats probably are being built with Chinese assistance. The program is an important step in Bucharest's drive to diversify its sources of arms and to build up its domestic armaments industry. Romania is also engaged in a joint project with Yugoslavia to build fighter aircraft and possibly submarines. The gunboats may be part of a $300-million package of credit assistance that Peking granted Romania in late 1970. High-level Sino-Romanian military exchanges have become commonplace since the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia five years ago. The Romanian chief of staff, General Ion Gheorghe, is currently visiting Peking. President Ceausescu may have been trying to head off Soviet reaction to the gunboat project in a speech on May 30 when he said Romania intended to continue getting most of its arms from the USSR. Moscow will nevertheless almost certainly express its displeasure, even though the gunboats will not greatly improve the Romanian Navy's extremely limited capabilities. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993859 ### 4 July 1973 · EASTERN EUROPE Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies--with the conspicuous exception of Romania--are strengthening their cooperation in a number of key areas. These endeavors are being pushed by Moscow. The main reasons are: --concern over the potentially destabilizing effect of the current detente policy, --the need to counter Peking's activist policy in Europe, and --a desire to minimize the impact of Romania's independent behavior. In an effort to counter the effects of increased contacts with the West, the regimes have concluded a number of "ideological agreements" with each other. No texts have been published but most seem to be umbrella accords committing the parties to a broad interchange of ideological, political, and propaganda activity. Romania's failure to participate suggests that the accords also have an anti-Chinese thrust. The output of anti-Chinese propaganda by most of the regimes has increased recently. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993866 ### 28 July 1973 · USSR The third annual Crimean conference of Warsaw Pact political leaders will probably begin on Monday and last one or two days. Brezhnev set the tone on some of this year's likely topics in a speech in Kiev on Thursday. Brezhnev spoke with considerable warmth about detente with the West, particularly the US. He avoided mention of any world trouble spots, attacks on imperialism, or discussion of vigilance. Noting that "some circles abroad" continue to try to foster tension and increased military spending and that the contest between socialism and capitalism goes on, he concluded that the point is to keep the contest out of the military sphere. Brezhnev also devoted considerable attention to the opportunities created by CSCE. His allies undoubtedly were delighted that he took pains to highlight the role of small states in an era of detente to reassure them that their interests would not be overridden by the big powers. Although Brezhnev did not mention China in his speech, the issue of relations with Peking is almost certain to be discussed at the summit. Romania, which is trying to maintain balanced ties between the USSR and China, will be on the griddle on this account. [withheld] Ceausescu apparently calculates that Brezhnev's commitment to detente will mitigate the Soviet reaction to this first participation in such a gathering by a Warsaw Pact country. Yesterday, Brezhnev arrived in the Crimea where he met with French Foreign Minister Jobert. A number of Communist leaders are already in the USSR and others are planning to arrive over the weekend. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993887 ### 2 August 1973 · EGYPT-ROMANIA Romanian President Ceausescu is apparently contemplating a new Middle East peace initiative. [withheld] Sadat [withheld] seems willing to discuss some new form of dialogue, possibly with Romanian mediation. Egyptian Presidential Adviser Hafiz Ismail is planning to visit Bucharest, apparently at Romania's invitation, to discuss settlement prospects. He will arrive Friday and probably will meet with President Ceausescu. Romania, as the only East European state to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel and the principal Arab states, is in a good position to act as middleman. There has been no indication, however, that Israel has so far been contacted. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993891 ### 10 August 1973 · ROMANIA [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993899 ### 15 August 1973 · USSR - CHINA - EASTERN EUROPE The Soviets are orchestrating an anti-Chinese campaign that seems aimed as much at forcing the East Europeans to demonstrate their allegiance to Moscow as it is at condemning Peking's policies. When East European party leaders gathered in the Crimea late last month, Moscow had to settle for a thin veneer of unity. To achieve this it had to forego any mention of China in the communiqué, lest the Romanians take exception. Over the past several days, however, the Soviets and their more submissive allies have taken the gloves off. They have denounced Peking harshly and stressed the need to close ranks against the Chinese apostasy. Pravda led the way last week with a major editorial charging that the Chinese leadership represents a force hostile to the Socialist world. Taking their cue, Moscow's more loyal allies--the Poles and the Bulgarians--chimed in at once. The Czechs took the unusual step of reprinting the full text of the Pravda article, and pointed to its "exceptional significance." Not surprisingly, the Romanians have remained silent, but they have begun to squirm. [withheld] The Romanians, of course, have good reason to be on their guard. They are only too well aware that the USSR is trying to use the China issue to forge more Soviet-style unity in Eastern Europe, and to assert Moscow's self-assumed right to define the limits of permissible behavior for Socialist states. As contacts increase between Eastern European countries and China on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other, Moscow will find it both more necessary and more difficult to impose conformity, and Romania will see that much more need to keep resisting. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993903 ### 17 August 1973 · EASTERN EUROPE - USSR The "large gap" that separates Bucharest and Moscow on certain aspects of the European security talks was widened, according to a Romanian foreign office official, as a result of the recent Crimea summit and the subsequent Brezhnev-Ceausescu talks. In discussing Soviet-Romanian differences with a US diplomat, the official concentrated on the issue of frontiers in the security talks. He stated that, while Moscow calls for the inviolability of existing frontiers, Romania favors a formulation that would rule out the use of force to change them but would leave open the possibility of future border adjustments by mutual consent. This formulation is designed to protect Bucharest's interest in avoiding permanent foreclosure of its claim to northern Bukovina and Bessarabia which are now part of the USSR. In speaking of the considerable disagreement between the Soviets and the Romanians over China, the official maintained that only Romania's presence at the meeting prevented condemnation of Peking in the final communiqué. [withheld] Romania is increasingly concerned about Soviet efforts to push for greater economic cooperation within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. Bucharest's sensitivity to Soviet plans for closer coordination of the member states' economies is always near the surface and dates back to Khrushchev's plan for "supranational economic integration." Under the scheme, Romania's industrial development would have been virtually stopped, and Romania would have been forced to specialize in agriculture. Bucharest balked at the plan, recognizing that without a degree of freedom to develop "mutually advantageous economic relations" with all countries it would lack the base from which to move toward a more independent path in foreign affairs. Soviet efforts to achieve increased integration among bloc countries may already be under way. Polish Premier Jaroszewicz and Warsaw's leading CEMA specialist, Deputy Premier Jagielski, went to Moscow on August 15 to discuss "basic trends" for "coordination and development of the national economies of the USSR and Poland" with Kosygin. Jaroszewicz' visit, following Hungarian Premier Fock's trip to Warsaw on August 9-11, suggests that the new cooperation proposals may also concern Hungary. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993905 ### 20 August 1973 · ROMANIA-USSR [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993907 ### 23 August 1973 · USSR - EASTERN EUROPE The Soviets have been holding a series of high-level meetings with their allies aimed at strengthening cooperation within CEMA, perhaps in preparation for closer contacts with the EC. The Polish Premier came to Moscow on August 14, followed two days later by the Hungarian Premier. Their East German counterpart was there on Monday, while the Bulgarian Premier also arrived that day. The Soviet delegation was headed in each case by Premier Kosygin. Other officials in the delegation were people concerned with economic matters and CEMA. Official reports on the meetings indicate that the stress was on the integration of CEMA members' economies and coordination of the 1976-80 national economic development plans as a means to that end. Vital aspects of this problem, such as production specialization and Moscow's supply of raw materials to its partners, were also considered, according to a Moscow broadcast. Only the Romanians and Czechs of the European CEMA members have not sent economic delegations to Moscow. [withheld] Recent Soviet expressions of readiness to begin a CEMA dialogue with the EC have apparently given new impetus to Moscow's effort to increase CEMA cohesion and perhaps make its structure at least superficially compatible with the EC. Moscow may be using this rationale to advance its campaign for greater bloc cohesion. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993910 ### 23 August 1973 · Romania: Bucharest apparently has been told it will not be allowed to attend the nonaligned summit in Algiers next month. A recent Algerian commentary stresses that members of military blocs "cannot have the status of observers, nor of guests, at nonaligned meetings." The turn-down will disappoint the Romanians, who had tried hard for an invitation largely in order to loosen their ties to the USSR. The setback is not likely to deter them from further attempts to call attention to the similarities between Romania and the developing world. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993910 ### 28 August 1973 · CEMA-EC CEMA Secretary General Fadeyev yesterday proposed to Danish officials that CEMA and the EC appoint delegations to begin negotiations. The offer was made in Copenhagen because the Danes chair EC bodies for the remainder of the year. Danish Foreign Minister Noergaard told the press that the CEMA bid will be placed before the EC Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on September 20-21. Noergaard emphasized that today's talks were "unofficial" and confined to a general exchange of opinions. Fadeyev acknowledged that the decision to begin contacts with the EC was made at the CEMA ministerial meeting in June. [withheld] The Poles [withheld] are against an institutionalized closer relationship between CEMA and the EC. The remarks implied concern that such a development would lead to a tighter CEMA--that is, a CEMA even more dominated by the Soviets--and greater problems for Warsaw's bilateral contacts with the West. Such feelings are probably shared by Romania, which in June became the first Soviet ally to be extended the EC's system of generalized tariff preferences. The initiative for this came from Bucharest, and the Romanians apparently are more than willing to reach their own accommodations with the EC outside the CEMA context. The Soviets have publicly said that CEMA-EC relations would not preclude bilateral agreements--those that are country-to-country rather than country-EC. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993915 ### 28 August 1973 · ROMANIA-CSCE When the next round of CSCE talks begins in Geneva on September 18, Romania will present proposals for a non-use of force agreement and the establishment of a permanent European security organ. In setting forth his government's views to a group of NATO chiefs of mission in Bucharest, a senior Foreign Ministry official said that the Romanian position calls for both disarmament and disengagement; the latter includes an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Bucharest intends to push for an extension of any disarmament measures adopted for central Europe to the Balkans. The Romanians want to include three elements in the non-use of force document: notification of maneuvers, notification of large military movements, and provisions for foreign observers at maneuvers. None of them is likely to win favor in Moscow, which wants to keep the military content of CSCE at a minimum. Romanian-Soviet differences extend into other aspects of the European security talks. [withheld] The Romanian proposal for a permanent CSCE organ appears designed to provide Bucharest with a forum for voicing its dissent from the Warsaw Pact. Publicly, however, Romania will probably argue that such a body is necessary to handle such matters as the dissemination of information on troop movements and maneuvers. For its part, Moscow was at one time a champion of a permanent CSCE organ, but recently has appeared to back off as Romania took the offensive. The Soviets now rarely mention the subject. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993915 ### 30 August 1973 · USSR-CHINA [withheld] --the Soviet Politburo communiqué on the Crimea meeting of August 3 cited the need for a "collective analysis" of current issues, marking high-level interest in a new conference; --a Pravda article on August 7 by "I. Aleksandrov" (a pseudonym associated in the past with major policy pronouncements on China) expressed Moscow's concern over communist unity and the need for broader policy coordination by communist states; --Brezhnev, speaking on August 15 at a public rally at Alma-Ata, gave a gloomy assessment of Soviet relations with China; he echoed Aleksandrov and cited Peking's "subversive activity against the socialist countries" as the cause for current Sino-Soviet tensions; --finally, a second Aleksandrov article in Pravda on August 26 invoked the three most recent communist conferences (1957, 1960, and 1969) and accused the Chinese leadership of inciting "individual communist parties...to assume a 'neutral' position with respect to the principal disagreements between the Maoist and the international communist movement." In addition to Moscow's own efforts against the Chinese, the Soviets have been orchestrating a similar movement by their staunchest allies in Eastern Europe. Despite these indications of a preliminary campaign to call another international meeting, it does not appear that the Soviet leaders have really faced up to the serious problems such a conference would create for themselves. Even the question whether to hold a conference would be divisive, given the inevitable opposition of the Romanians and the Yugoslavs, various West European Communists, and the North Vietnamese, and the reluctance of many others to stand up and be counted. If history is a guide, any preliminary soundings with regard to an international meeting would be accompanied by letters to the Italian and French parties, for example, explaining the need for a conference. Until evidence such as this appears--and it would come promptly through penetrations in these parties--the current propaganda campaign must be considered more a threat than a decision by the Kremlin to call for another meeting. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993917 ### 6 September 1973 · ROMANIA Bucharest has dispatched a high-level delegation to the Far East, ostensibly to attend North Korean National Day celebrations on Saturday, but with a stopover in Peking billed as an "unofficial friendly visit." The delegation includes Politburo member Emil Bodnaras, who has visited China four times since 1966--most recently in April 1972--and has met both Mao and Chou En-lai. [withheld] Another member of the delegation, Cornel Burtica, is the party secretary responsible for propaganda, ideology, and information. Among the topics to be discussed in Peking will certainly be the Soviet-inspired anti-Chinese propaganda campaign now emanating from Eastern European media. Bucharest has resisted Moscow's pressure to join in and last week effusively congratulated Mao on his re-election to head the Central Committee. Also probably on the agenda will be Bodnaras' concern that Moscow will attempt to convene an international Communist meeting to read China out of the world Communist movement. By billing the Peking stopover as "unofficial," Bucharest avoids a final communiqué that might stimulate a hostile reaction from Moscow. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993924 ### 14 September 1973 · untitled American countries have declared three days of official mourning for the death of Allende. Brazil and Uruguay, however, have recognized the new government. At the UN, the Cuban Ambassador has formally requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the attack on the Cuban Embassy in Santiago by the Chilean military. The USSR has reacted by issuing a statement in the name of the Central Committee sharply denouncing the coup. The statement expresses "full solidarity" with leftist forces in Chile and "firm confidence" that they will continue the struggle. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets see much prospect that the military take-over will be reversed. [withheld] The reaction of Moscow's closest East European allies has been relatively restrained thus far. The two Balkan mavericks--Yugoslavia and Romania--have weighed in with strong condemnations of the coup. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993931 ### 21 September 1973 · EASTERN EUROPE - EC East European ambassadors have been calling on Danish officials in an attempt to undercut Moscow's recent overture to establish official contacts between CEMA and the EC. Late last month the Soviet Secretary General of CEMA approached the Danes, who chair EC bodies for the rest of the year, with a proposal that CEMA and the EC appoint delegates to begin negotiations. As soon as he left town the East Europeans began insisting that he had acted without their concurrence, and expressed their strong distaste for bloc-to-bloc dealings. This unusual display of defiance behind Moscow's back shows how much danger the East Europeans see in the latest Soviet attempt to limit their freedom of maneuver. Their actions also reflect the value they place on developing bilateral ties with the EC. Romania has already worked out arrangements that will enable it to benefit from the EC's generalized trade preference scheme. [withheld] Other East European countries share Bucharest's interest in expanding bilateral economic ties with the West, and they resent Moscow's own efforts to achieve this same objective while reining in the East Europeans. They clearly are no less eager than Moscow to pursue the economic advantages of detente--at times, as in their approaches to the Danes, at the risk of incurring Soviet wrath. West European officials have reacted coolly to Moscow's proposal for CEMA-EC dialogue. Yesterday the EC Council decided to tell the USSR merely that the EC will study the suggestion, and that CEMA may contribute to the study if it wishes. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993937 ### 22 September 1973 · YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA-USSR [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993938 ### 22 September 1973 · USSR-Chile: Moscow yesterday suspended diplomatic relations with Chile, possibly in response to the junta's decision to ban all Marxist parties. East Germany immediately cut ties also; Romania's Ceausescu had already stated that his government would not recognize the junta. Soviet ships carrying badly needed wheat to Chile now will be diverted, and the East European allies probably will follow suit on their own grain contracts as well as on relations. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993938 ### 20 October 1973 · China-US: Three US equipment firms have been invited to China for follow-up discussions about sales of oil recovery technology and drill bits. Several other US oil firms have been invited to attend the Canton Fair. Peking's purchases of oilfield equipment in the past have been restricted largely to Romania and Japan. Recent currency revaluations, however, have made US goods more competitive. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993962 ### 3 November 1973 · ARAB STATES - ISRAEL [withheld] Some UN observers believe that the Egyptians are bolstering their military position rather than reinforcing the cease-fire. [withheld] On the diplomatic front, President Sadat earlier this week made a whirlwind trip to Kuwait, where he conferred with Syrian President Asad and Kuwait's Shaykh Sabah. He then flew to Riyadh for a meeting with King Faysal. The results of Foreign Minister Fahmi's talks in Washington and coordination of plans for next week's discussions with Secretary Kissinger were the main items on the agenda. Upon his return, Sadat also met with Algerian President Boumediene. Details on the meeting have not been released, but the Algerian leader--unhappy with Egypt's acceptance of the cease-fire--may have tried to persuade Sadat to take a hard position on Israeli withdrawal, and perhaps even to initiate new hostilities. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov winds up his intensive talks with Egyptian leaders today and will head for Damascus. The Soviets continue to express concern about Egypt's Third Army. The deputy director of TASS in Cairo told a US diplomat that Sadat is under considerable pressure from middle-grade and junior officers to approve a major effort to break through Israeli lines toward the army, possibly before Secretary Kissinger's visit. The TASS representative also said that the Egyptians had pressed Kuznetsov hard for more arms even though, the Soviet official claimed, they have already received enough equipment to replace their losses. Meanwhile, preparations for negotiations seem to be under way in Romania. Ambassador Keating was informed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry yesterday that Minister Eban has accepted an "urgent invitation" of the Romanian Government to visit Bucharest for "high-level consultations" with representatives of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria. Eban plans to leave on Sunday after conferring with Prime Minister Meir, who is returning from the US on the same day. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993976 ### 6 November 1973 · ROMANIA-ISRAEL-USSR Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's three-day visit to Romania, at Bucharest's invitation, for "urgent talks" will add new strains to already taut relations between Moscow and Bucharest. Throughout the current Middle East crisis, Romania has resisted Soviet, Arab, and Yugoslav pressures to abandon its "balanced foreign policy" and break relations with Israel. More recently Bucharest has collided with Moscow over possible Romanian participation in a UN Middle East peace-keeping force. According to Foreign Minister Macovescu, the Soviets specifically told Bucharest to stay out of peace-keeping activities, and the Security Council's agreement of November 2 on the make-up of the UNEF excludes Romania. The Eban visit appears to be another move by Romania to maintain a high profile as a peacemaker in the Middle East. Last month Bucharest proposed a peace plan that called for a cease-fire in place without emphasizing UN Resolution 242. Eban has acknowledged that his government accepted Romania's invitation partly as a gesture of appreciation for Bucharest's policy of standing up to the Soviets. It is unlikely that he will be receptive to urgings that Israel be more flexible about a peace settlement, possibly along the lines of Romania's proposal in October. Although the Romanian invitation had asserted that senior Arab officials would also come to Bucharest, there is no evidence that any Arab state has responded to Bucharest's invitation. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993978 ### 7 November 1973 · EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE After more than six weeks, the Geneva Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has still not moved beyond general discussions. The committees and subcommittees have proceeded so slowly that many observers now doubt that the conference can wind up its business in early 1974. The Soviets, who desire an early end to the conference, have been pushing a draft on "principles of security" that emphasizes the "inviolability of frontiers." The West Germans, in particular, oppose the Soviet draft. They wish to link the principle of inviolability of frontiers with the nonuse of force in order to hold open the possibility of an eventual peaceful reunification of the two Germanys. Several drafts have been considered and sharply criticized by one side or the other. A Yugoslav draft may provide the basis for an eventual compromise. A near-stalemate has developed on the controversial question of freer movement of people and ideas between the two blocs. The Soviets insist that specific measures must await agreement on certain general principles. These principles--sovereignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for international laws and customs--would, if the Soviets had their way, be included in a preamble and would have the effect of emasculating the specific measures designed to bring about freer movement. The other main topic--economic cooperation--is also at a virtual standstill. The West thought the Eastern representatives would be making demands in this area, but thus far they have not done so. What has happened is that the members of the European Community, although claiming special competence in the economic cooperation area, have not been able to agree on a common position of their own. The neutral participants as well as Warsaw Pact maverick Romania have been pressing hard for a link between the security conference and the force reduction talks which began last week in Vienna. The Soviets oppose any such linkage, but have been humoring the neutrals by suggesting that all European states could participate in the force reduction talks. Several of the Eastern representatives at Vienna also mentioned, in their opening statements, the possibility of widening their forum. The NATO allies have consistently opposed such moves. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993979 ### 23 November 1973 · YUGOSLAVIA-USSR-ROMANIA President Tito's exceptionally friendly talks with Brezhnev in Kiev last week appear to have been a major step toward a new rapprochement with the Soviets. The warm language of the communiqué published after the meetings significantly exceeds anything produced earlier. Moreover, this time, the communiqué failed to list long-standing Yugoslav requirements on the right of socialist states to differ and on the obligations of the USSR to respect Yugoslav sovereignty. The document twice referred to "trust" and mutual understanding. Although Tito has said privately that he trusts Brezhnev, he has never before used the word in a formal document. It is quite likely that the "trust" between the two is based in large part on Tito's militant support of the Arabs and his solid support for Soviet policy in the Middle East. From the Soviet standpoint, Tito's position has also had the welcome effect of estranging Belgrade from Washington. Part of the "trust" must also result from Yugoslav pressure on the Romanians to support Moscow's policy in the Middle East and to abandon their attempts to play an independent role in the area. [withheld] Tito's new closeness to the USSR has provoked criticism and concern at home. Public uncertainty is such that rumors alleging a US-Soviet agreement to partition Yugoslavia have been officially denied and blamed on the US and its allies. So far, however, no public explanations of Tito's turn back to the East have been made. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993993 ### 26 November 1973 · Romania-Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav Government, after refusing to receive Romania's Foreign Minister Macovescu early this month, has announced that Macovescu will visit Belgrade today and tomorrow. Macovescu's visit comes at a troubled juncture in relations, as the Yugoslavs appear to be turning from close ties with Romania to a new rapprochement with the USSR. The next meeting in a long series between Presidents Tito and Ceausescu is scheduled for the end of the year. Before it can take place, Macovescu must assess the meaning for Romania of Tito's new relationship with Brezhnev. He must also find out why the Yugoslavs have pressured the Romanians to give up their independent Middle East policy, and why Belgrade's Communist Party is moving toward neutrality in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, rather than backing Romania's position that China has a right to be different. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005993995 ### 3 December 1973 · ROMANIA President Ceausescu arrives in Washington at a time when his country is uncomfortably prominent in international affairs. Bucharest's initiatives during the Mideast war were designed to gain for itself and other small powers at least some role in any settlement and to display independence. But they also brought pressures from the Kremlin to take a more pro-Arab stance. [withheld] While in the US, he will seek --reassurances that US-Soviet cooperation will not undercut Romanian independence, and --expanded economic ties that will further reduce his dependence on Moscow and give the West a greater stake in Romania's future. Although his country is a member of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, Ceausescu has carefully built, and expanded, a form of independence that is unique in the Soviet alliance system. --He has consistently refused to permit Warsaw Pact forces to maneuver on Romanian territory; --He maintains a stubborn neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute; --His representatives persistently lobby in the name of small and medium sized powers, and against superpower domination, at MBFR, CSCE and in the UN. --His is the only Warsaw Pact country that maintains relations with Israel as well as with the Arab states. That Ceausescu has been able to get away with such defiance of Moscow is primarily due to his ability to sense the limits of Soviet tolerance. On those rare occasions when he has miscalculated, he has been quick to restore the balance. His fear is that Moscow will slap him down and then keep him on a short tether. Ceausescu has not yet made major concessions to atone for siding against the Soviets during the October war, and he may feel that none are necessary. Romania did succumb to Soviet pressure to withdraw its offer of troops to the UNEF, and he may believe that this was enough. The Soviets, for their part, may feel that no further pressure is needed. Romanian initiatives were irritating, but they were ineffective. The Mideast experience has nevertheless left Ceausescu [withheld] perhaps suffering from a sense of isolation. He particularly resents that Tito, his fellow maverick, committed Yugoslavia so heavily to the Arab, and thus to the Soviet, side. Also, Tito's recent talks with Brezhnev in Kiev have caused him to worry that he can no longer look to Belgrade for support in time of trouble with Moscow. [withheld] Ceausescu hopes his visit to Washington will serve as a counterweight to growing Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007612 ### 4 December 1973 · YUGOSLAVIA-USSR If any single factor has motivated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search for policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation toward the West and of his strivings to make nonalignment a viable world force. He currently sees more to gain from Moscow than from the West. [withheld] At Annex, we review Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the outcome of the talks at Kiev, and the effects of the shift in the Belgrade-Moscow relationship on Yugoslavia's relations with Romania and other Communist countries, the third world, and the West. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007613 ### 4 December 1973 · YUGOSLAV - SOVIET RELATIONS Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union are now closer than at any time since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. The gradual warming trend that began in 1971 suddenly went into high gear during the Middle East war and culminated in the exceptionally friendly talks between Tito and Brezhnev in Kiev in mid-November. At the beginning of the 1970s Belgrade's foreign policy was still deeply influenced by what happened to Prague in 1968 and by attendant fears of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. Relations with Moscow and its loyal East European allies had gone sour and Belgrade's fervor for nonalignment had waned. In the communist movement, the Yugoslav party was cultivating its ties with China and Romania, who were prominent in their defiance of the CPSU. Relations with Western Europe and the US on the other hand, had prospered, both in reaction to the Soviet threat and in the hope that ties to the West would bring economic improvements at home. By 1971, however, Tito had come to perceive that there could be serious drawbacks in leaning too far to the West. Premature attempts to establish democratic institutions precipitated a crisis of nationalism in Croatia. Economic ties to the West created large debts to Western creditors without ensuring adequate development of the Yugoslav industrial base. Moreover, the strategic advantages of the Westward tilt began to erode as the mood of European politics shifted toward detente. As Brezhnev increasingly touted his friendly ties with the rest of Europe and the United States, Tito saw less reason to maintain his anti-Soviet line. Washington's role as the supporter of Yugoslav security began to fade. More important, perhaps, the new atmosphere gave Tito an opportunity to repair an old breach with the Kremlin in time to win Moscow's good graces for his successors. His meeting with Brezhnev in Belgrade in September 1971 set in train a series of political contacts and expanding economic ties that have become the core of the new relationship. The Middle East war in October provided the final push toward Kiev. Tito immediately proclaimed full support for the Arabs--his principal partners in nonalignment--placing Yugoslavia squarely on the Soviet side in a major international crisis. Belgrade granted over-flight rights for the Soviet airlift, and the regime's presses began to crank out anti-Israeli propaganda. [withheld] What Tito Received at Kiev After issuing the warmly worded communiqué at the end of the visit, Yugoslav and Soviet officials have maintained a discreet silence about Kiev. [withheld] In the realm of political cooperation, however, Belgrade has decided to back away from its long-standing support of China out of deference to the Kremlin's sensitivities. The Yugoslavs may also begin to mute their differences with the Soviets on international issues, such as MBFR, in which Belgrade has an interest but no real influence. From Belgrade's point of view, the prospects of long-term economic cooperation were probably the most important matter discussed. Moscow had extended a $540-million credit to Belgrade in 1972, and this October promised to build a gas pipeline to northern Yugoslavia. The Kiev discussions indicate, at a minimum, the Kremlin's continuing willingness to make solid investments in Yugoslavia. The Soviets will probably make good on whatever economic promises Brezhnev made to Tito. They know that as long as the money pours in, Tito will not risk siding against the Kremlin on any of the more important international issues. There is also good reason to believe that Tito requested [withheld] modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces with Soviet weapons. [withheld] Soviet arms shipments to Yugoslavia would go far toward allaying any residual fears Tito may have of a Soviet invasion. For his own part, Tito may well have decided to seek arms in the only market open to him. Effects of Kiev Belgrade must be prepared to pay some penalties for whatever it stands to gain from the new relationship with Moscow. This changed attitude toward the Soviet Union will generally be detrimental to Yugoslavia's traditional role in the world communist movement and in the international community. The most immediate effect, and perhaps one of the most telling, will be a downturn in relations with Romania. President Ceausescu, who has long regarded Tito as both a friend and a fellow maverick in the communist movement, is already angry. During the Middle East war the Yugoslavs attempted to pressure Romania into adopting a more pro-Arab stance. At the UN, the Yugoslavs were instrumental in dismissing Romania's offer of troops to the UNEF. The Yugoslav shift on the Sino-Soviet dispute will add to Ceausescu's anger. In the long run, differences between Belgrade and Bucharest over the shared basic principles that have shaped their relations with Moscow could prove most damaging. Ceausescu is deeply worried over the possible growth of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. If he becomes unsure of Belgrade's support for his cocky independent stance, he may feel forced to revise his relationship with Belgrade and, perhaps, review his entire foreign policy. Belgrade can also expect to hear from those Communist parties that have been active in opposing Moscow's attempts to dominate the movement. Certainly, Peking will register its displeasure, as will the Albanians and the Italian Communists. As the results of Kiev become known, differences that are normally aired only in private could well break into open polemics with the Yugoslavs. Belgrade's generally good relations with Western Europe have not yet been affected, though some deterioration is possible. Tito will, however, be careful not to rock the boat, because he wants Yugoslavia to play a full role in European detente and because his country is heavily dependent on Western trade and credits. Relations with Washington, which have already dipped to a new low, are evidently in for some more rough sledding. Tito's decision to side with the radicals in the nonaligned movement dictates that in his eyes the United States has become the ogre in international relations. [withheld] Independence versus Collaboration If there is any single factor that has motivated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search for those policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation toward the West and of his strivings to make nonalignment a viable world force. In essence, he currently sees more to gain from Moscow than from the West. There are limits on the degree to which he will cooperate with the Soviets, however. He will not, for example, permit any kind of formal ties that would even appear to undermine his independence. He will also avoid restrictive relationships with CEMA that would preclude Belgrade's continued--and lucrative--relationship with the Common Market. At least for the foreseeable future, Tito will work more closely with Moscow, but within the framework of detente, and only so long as he believes the Kremlin's avowals that it is dedicated to the peaceful settlement of major European problems. Should Moscow undertake any action that seems to threaten detente, the Yugoslavs will immediately back-pedal toward neutralism or toward the West. Similarly, if Moscow becomes overly confident of its influence and begins to meddle in Yugoslav internal affairs, it will discover that the honeymoon with Tito was very short indeed. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007613 ### 8 December 1973 · YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007617 ### 8 December 1973 · USSR - Communist Parties: All of the major European Communist parties evidently have now agreed to meet next year, thereby giving Moscow an opportunity to coordinate their activities and to line them up behind Brezhnev's detente policy. The willingness of the Romanian and Yugoslav parties to attend suggests that Moscow has agreed to play down the China issue. The Soviets may be willing to give ground on this question in order to ensure a successful European session, which in turn could pave the way for a world party congress later. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007617 ### 25 January 1974 · USSR: Soviet officials have warned US firms seeking to expand trade with Bloc countries that business ventures in Romania could jeopardize the firms' trade relations with the USSR. Moscow apparently does not want Romania to appear to be benefiting economically from an independent foreign policy because of the possible impact on other East European states. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007656 ### 2 February 1974 · ROMANIA The Romanians are planning to introduce substantial amendments to the Warsaw Pact's proposals at the force reduction talks in Vienna next week. [withheld] Bucharest will try to broaden Moscow's concept of notification and verification and will call for expanding both the geographic limits and the scope of military disengagement. The Romanian delegation has already circulated a draft to the Warsaw Pact allies, including the Soviets. The Soviets have indicated that the Romanian proposals will not be accepted. This will come as no surprise to Bucharest. The Romanians' main purpose is to get their views about European security before the widest possible audience. Bucharest's proposal is a shortened version of the ten points that Ceausescu believes should govern the conduct of international relations. The draft's call for broadened verification and notification is intended to protect Bucharest from its Pact allies. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007663 ### 13 February 1974 · ROMANIA - MIDDLE EAST President Ceausescu is on a tour of the Middle East in an effort to get the Arabs to accept his neutralist policy toward the area and to head off Arab plans to boycott Romanian exports. Romania suffered an Arab boycott after the Middle East war in 1967. A recommendation for new economic sanctions to be imposed against Romania because of its neutral position during the October war awaits action by the Arab League. Ceausescu arrived in Tripoli yesterday and will later visit Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. The Romanian press suggests that Ceausescu will offer limited political and economic concessions, such as support for a Palestinian state and oil-extraction equipment. He will not bow to Arab demands that Bucharest break diplomatic relations with Israel. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007673 ### 26 February 1974 · Libya - Eastern Europe: Libya has concluded agreements with Eastern Europe which could raise its direct oil exports to that area to 140,000 barrels per day this year--double the amount shipped in 1973. Poland and Romania signed long-term agreements with Libya this month--and Czechoslovakia reached a five-year agreement--to secure oil on a barter basis. Hungary and Bulgaria arranged last month for relatively small amounts of oil to be delivered this year. These shipments would represent less than 10 percent of Libya's probable oil exports for 1974. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007684 ### 26 February 1974 · Romania: Romania has decided to cut back industrial growth--now the highest in Eastern Europe--in favor of consumer production and agriculture in its five-year plan for 1976 to 1980, now apparently being drafted. President Ceausescu, who announced this radical change from present policy in a recent interview, obviously sees a political need to improve the lot of the consumer. An economic rationale may be anticipated balance-of-payments problems caused by large imports of machinery and equipment. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007684 ### 27 March 1974 · Romania: Personnel shifts announced at the Central Committee plenum yesterday are in line with Ceausescu's frequent shifting of party and state leaders to maintain a balance of loyalty and expertise. They do not indicate major changes in foreign or domestic policy. Premier Maurer has been replaced by Manea Manescu, a leading economist of proven loyalty, in a move that tightens Ceausescu's control of the bureaucracy. Others promoted were younger and better-educated than their predecessors and demonstrably loyal to Ceausescu; their past experience suggests an emphasis on increased efficiency in the domestic economy and in foreign trade. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007708 ### 4 May 1974 · CANADA Canada is becoming a significant exporter of nuclear power reactors. It has sold two of its CANDU nuclear reactors to India, one to Argentina, and one to Pakistan. A second one will probably be sold to Argentina. South Korea has signed a letter of intent to purchase the reactor with an option to buy a second. Romania, Denmark, Iran, Taiwan, and the UK have also indicated an interest in the system. The CANDU reactor differs from those of US design in using natural rather than enriched uranium as fuel, and in employing "heavy" rather than "light" or ordinary water. The capital cost of a CANDU reactor is slightly higher than a similar sized light water reactor, but over its lifetime the reduced cost of using natural uranium is expected to make up this difference. The CANDU reactors will be even more competitive as the price of enriched uranium increases. A major problem at this time is the shortage of heavy water for these reactors. The CANDU system proved itself in 1973 with the performance of Canada's Pickering nuclear station. The four reactors at this plant, each with a capacity of 540 megawatts of electricity, operated at about 85 percent of their possible capacity, producing a total of 14 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. The main reason for this high productivity is that the CANDU system can be refueled while still producing electricity. US reactors must be shut down during this operation. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007948 ### 6 June 1974 · USSR: The Warsaw Pact exercise, which began this week in Bulgaria, will continue until June 14. Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian units are participating, with Romania playing only a limited role. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007976 ### 10 June 1974 · Egypt-Romania: President Anwar Sadat is expected to visit Romania late this month, according to Cairo's Al Ahram. The visit will take place against a background of improving relations. There have been a number of high-level exchanges between the two countries since the October war, and the Romanian media have taken an extremely favorable line toward Egypt. Ceausescu apparently believes support for Cairo will have the effect of diluting Arab resentment over Romania's continued diplomatic relations with Israel. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007979 ### 17 June 1974 · Egypt-USSR: Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi reportedly has postponed his announced visit to Moscow to arrange an Egyptian-Soviet Summit. Akhbar al-Yawm editor Ali Amin, a leading Cairo columnist, reported on June 15 that the trip would be postponed at least a month because Fahmi intends to visit West Germany, Romania, and the US during July. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007985 ### 6 July 1974 · Egypt-Bulgaria-Romania: President Sadat's visit to Bulgaria and Romania from June 27 to July 2 was his first to any of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies. Bulgaria granted Egypt a $100-million loan for industrial and agricultural projects. In Bucharest, Sadat's party held exploratory talks on Romania's supply of items ranging from small arms to ambulances. Romanian President Ceausescu was particularly pleased to receive Sadat. He regarded the visit as an opportunity to undo some of the bad publicity Romania has received in the Middle East for continuing diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006004757 ### 12 July 1974 · Romania: Factory workers set at least one industrial fire in Romania recently, the first confirmed case in some time of serious worker-instigated sabotage. Further incidents could mean that Ceausescu faces some of the most serious popular discontent in his nearly ten years of rule. The regime's main response has been to tighten security at industrial facilities. Ceausescu's emphasis on developing heavy industry at the expense of improved living conditions and the production of consumer goods is an important factor in worker dissatisfaction. Romania's living standard is the lowest in Eastern Europe, except for Albania. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007763 ### 22 August 1974 · Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk arrived unexpectedly in Bucharest on August 20 to attend Romania's 30th Anniversary celebrations of its liberation in World War II. An official delegation from Lon Nol's government, in Bucharest for the World Population Conference, includes former prime minister Hang Tun Hak, who in the past has tried unsuccessfully to open channels to Sihanouk. There is no evidence that Sihanouk plans any contacts with Phnom Penh officials, but the Romanians have expressed interest in acting as intermediaries between the two Khmer belligerents and may try to arrange a meeting. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007798 ### 28 August 1974 · Cambodia: There is no evidence that Prince Sihanouk and former Cambodian prime minister Hang Thun Hak were in contact with each other last week when they were both in Bucharest. Official statements on Sihanouk's arrival and departure gave no hint of any unusual development, and Sihanouk's interview with New York Times correspondent Malcolm Browne did not change his position on negotiations. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007803 ### 5 September 1974 · Iran-Romania: [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007809 ### 16 October 1974 · European Communism: Delegates convene in Warsaw today for a three-day meeting to make plans for a European conference of Communist parties to be held late this year or early next. The Yugoslavs are attending, thus ending their boycott of such gatherings, where they often have come under fire. They will join the Romanians and some West Europeans in opposing any attacks against the Chinese. The preliminary meeting will try to draw up an agenda for the formal conference, which probably will focus on European security, economic integration, and cooperation. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007843 ### 21 October 1974 · MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS Moscow tolerated considerable diversity of view at the meeting last week in Warsaw in order to promote movement toward a more formal conference of European communist parties next year. In the communiqué, the Warsaw participants expressed the desire that such a conference be held in East Germany before mid-1975. There will be at least one additional preparatory meeting in December or January. As expected, several key parties--the Italian, Romanian, and Yugoslav, in particular--used the Warsaw meeting to demonstrate that the days of unquestioning subservience and cominformist unity are over. They hammered home the necessity for equality among parties, no matter how small--or big; they also heaped scorn upon the old notion that there is one established center of communist authority. Several of the delegates stressed that each party has a right to voice its position and to have its views taken into account at any multilateral gathering. The Soviet delegate held his peace, with hardly a grimace. He also avoided criticizing the Chinese, in deference to the several parties that had insisted that absent parties not be attacked. The Soviets seem to consider the Warsaw meeting a success, if only because it produced some semblance of unity among European communist parties. All but three were represented. Moscow will probably be satisfied if efforts to convene a more formal conference next year go as smoothly. Even if such a conference merely endorses Soviet detente policy toward the West, it will, in Soviet eyes, have been worth the effort. The Kremlin leaders, to be sure, still nurture the hope that regional meetings will culminate in another international communist conference, but formidable hurdles remain in the way. In any case, the Warsaw meeting makes it clear that if Moscow wants progress toward a world gathering, it will have to put up with the disruptive behavior of maverick parties and softpedal differences with China. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007847 ### 25 November 1974 · Romania: Bucharest's maverick style of communism will be endorsed as enduring national policy at Romania's 11th Communist Party Congress, which opens today. The congress will be President Ceausescu's show all the way. By the time the congress is over, one third of the members of all party bodies, including the Central Committee, will probably be newcomers to their posts. This is an effort by Ceausescu to break up regional fiefdoms, inject new blood, and stimulate renewed interest in party activity by the rank-and-file members. The recent Cominformist affair in Yugoslavia probably has increased Ceausescu's desire to ensure a loyal following. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007877 ### 6 December 1974 · ROMANIA [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007887 ### 30 December 1974 · Romania: The Romanians, who maintain only minimum military involvement in Warsaw Pact activities, now are trying to pare down even that participation. No Warsaw Pact exercises have been held on Romanian soil in over a decade, and only small ground and air staffs have participated in pact exercises elsewhere. Romania's principal involvement lies in naval cooperation in the Black Sea. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007905 ### 11 January 1975 · untitled Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik's recent visit to Moscow produced no surprises but affirmed a year-long warming trend in Moscow-Jakarta relations. Malik had a successful trip; he signed a general agreement on economic and technical cooperation and got a green light for a visit to Indonesia by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko this year. Malik's recent travel also took him to East Germany and Hungary, where he signed trade agreements to add to those reached earlier in 1974 with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. These moves result from a deliberate policy decision by President Suharto to improve ties with communist states. Suharto sees Soviet foreign policy toward the Western states as becoming more moderate, and the Indonesians want to balance growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia also wants to explore new sources of credit. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006007915 ### 17 March 1975 · untitled Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in Budapest yesterday for the opening of the Hungarian Communist Party Congress today. It is Brezhnev's first trip abroad since his visit to Paris in early December. Most East European states are expected to be represented at the congress by their top party leaders. Romania and Yugoslavia, however, will send lesser ranking officials. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014747 ### 16 April 1975 · untitled Tensions in Romanian-Soviet relations have recently increased. A Romanian diplomat in Moscow says that in addition to differences over the European security talks, CEMA policies, and the proposed pan-European communist party conference, Bucharest is now resisting Soviet efforts to expand the political coordinating role of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets are reported to be pushing for the establishment of a permanent Pact committee of foreign ministers. Moscow apparently wants to set up a secretariat--similar to NATO's political organization--that would be headed by a Soviet secretary general. The Romanian diplomat speculates that once the European security conference is over, Moscow will increase its stress on ideological orthodoxy within the Pact--a move clearly intended to force Romania to identify more closely with Soviet policies and pronouncements. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014773 ### 19 April 1975 · JORDAN King Husayn and his prime minister have recently been pursuing a more activist foreign policy highlighted by closer contacts with Syria and a less hostile attitude toward communist states. Within the past six weeks Jordan has: --Embarked on an unprecedented, close relationship with Syria, including wide-ranging economic and trade agreements and active military and political consultations. --Advertised its intention of seeking Soviet air defense equipment from Syria if its requests for US equipment are not met quickly. --Entertained several Soviet economic and political delegations and lavishly welcomed Romanian President Ceausescu. --Approved bids for diplomatic representation by Yugoslavia, East Germany, and North Korea. In another of his periodic rounds of major army units this month, the King stressed the threat of war, Jordan's military needs, and its solidarity with other Arab states in demanding that Israel return Jerusalem and the West Bank to Arab control. He has been unusually strident on the subject of Jerusalem, and made a point of raising it during the official reception for Ceausescu. [withheld] concern about the direction of Jordanian policy, fearing that the country will be drawn into costly entanglements abroad when it should be concentrating on internal development. [withheld] if the King turns to Syria for air defense weapons, Syrian advisers might be stationed in Jordan. [withheld] Jordan's increasing involvement with Syria could invite a war with Israel for which the army and air force are unprepared. The King and Prime Minister Rifai are due in Washington at the end of this month for a discussion of Jordan's military and economic needs, and much of their recent activity is designed to focus US attention on their aid requests. But their efforts to diversify and strengthen Jordan's foreign ties reflect a genuine concern that the US can neither prevent another Middle East war by a new diplomatic initiative nor provide Jordan with the means it considers vital to its defense. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014776 ### 15 May 1975 · CSCE Most delegations at the European security conference believe that the next few weeks in Geneva will be crucial. The pace of the conference has increased perceptibly, some issues have been settled, and a working group has begun planning for a final summit-level meeting. Nevertheless, if the conference is to conclude this summer--as the Soviet and virtually all other delegations hope--many issues will have to be resolved in a relatively short time. While Soviet negotiators recently have shown flexibility on some matters, they have stalled on others and even reopened debate on several issues considered settled months ago. Basically, the Soviets apparently are counting on the Western participants to give in and stop trying to wring concessions. The West European delegations are having difficulty matching the determination and resolve of the Soviet Union. The Soviets recently accepted a French compromise proposal that ended a long deadlock concerning the declaration of principles that the conference has been formulating as a guide to international relations. The conference has yet to reach agreement, however, on the wording of a "saving clause" implying that the rights and responsibilities of the US, UK, France, and the USSR in Germany and Berlin are not affected by the conference's decisions. Many of the neutral delegations read the present draft as an affirmation of the "Brezhnev doctrine" on intervention in Eastern Europe. Soviet negotiators have also shown some flexibility on one of the major military-related "confidence-building measures," but only after the Western and neutral delegations made an important concession to Moscow. The Soviets said that they could accept the Western idea of providing advance notice about national and multinational military maneuvers, if the notification were voluntary. The Soviets have continued to stall on matters concerned with the freer movement of people and ideas. Western negotiators now intend to present a single text covering all such topics. They argue that such an initiative now would put maximum pressure on the Soviets to come to reasonable terms. The Soviets' attitude on this subject, however, is such that they may well continue to stall. The question of follow-on machinery to the conference also remains to be resolved. The Soviet side says it wants a post-conference consultative committee with a broad mandate to discuss issues affecting security and cooperation in Europe. The committee would have a permanent secretariat, one of the more objectionable features of the proposal as far as the West is concerned. There is some reason to believe that the Soviets--perhaps worried by the great opportunity a standing mechanism would give to the Romanians and other bloc members to needle Moscow--eventually will settle for something less permanent. The Western delegations formally support a Danish proposal that calls for senior officials to meet three years after the conference ends to assess the results and decide whether further meetings are needed. The West Europeans, however, are sharply split on the issue. The Dutch, Belgians, and French advocate as little follow-on activity as possible, while the British and now even the Danes are prepared to accept relatively frequent meetings of experts and senior officials. Other NATO members continue to support the formal Danish proposal. On this issue, as on many others, the NATO allies are hoping that the US will take the lead. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014798 ### 17 May 1975 · untitled Romania's Foreign Minister Macovescu Thursday privately expressed Bucharest's understanding of the US decision to retrieve the Mayaguez and its crew from the Cambodians. Macovescu told the US ambassador of his "great admiration" for Washington's conduct of its affairs in Indochina in recent weeks. Macovescu's comments, while probably sincere, were also intended to counterbalance Bucharest's lip-service to Warsaw Pact solidarity earlier this week. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014800 ### 19 May 1975 · untitled The Romanians may be interested in buying additional long-range Boeing 707s. They will begin talks this week on the purchase of five aircraft. Romania already has three 707s, the only US-made aircraft owned by a Warsaw Pact country. Bucharest may be expanding its airline because of its success with long-range charters to New York. The Romanians' interest may also reflect their belief that a purchase now would influence Congressional consideration of the US-Romanian trade agreement. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014801 ### 20 May 1975 · NORTH KOREA Pyongyang has apparently reopened its campaign to secure direct talks with the US on Korean military issues. In two very unusual contacts last week, North Korean officials asked American diplomats at the UN and in Kinshasa bold questions about US plans for the post-Vietnam era in Asia and made the standard demand for withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. There was a round of similar "diplomatic" approaches last fall. North Korea had earlier tried to engage the US government in bilateral dealings by sending letters addressed to the US Congress, one in 1973 and another in 1974--both delivered via the Romanians. Pyongyang has also taken occasional soundings of Romanian and Indonesian willingness to act as intermediaries in secret talks. North Korea is probably desires to probe US willingness to go over the heads of the South Koreans in dealing with the North. Direct Pyongyang-Washington talks, under most foreseeable circumstances, would be a psychological blow to a South Korea already shaken by events in Indochina. Pyongyang probably also reasons that contact with the US--or even publicized attempts at contact--would enhance its carefully cultivated image of reasonableness prior to consideration of the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly this fall. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014802 ### 22 May 1975 · untitled North Korean President Kim Il-song may try to reenlist Romania's good offices in communicating with Washington during his current visit to Bucharest. The Romanians have in the past assisted Pyongyang's efforts to engage the US in direct discussion of Korean military issues. On a personal level, the visit will reinforce the special rapport between Kim and Ceausescu. Romania is the socialist country most admired by North Korea. Kim reportedly is scheduled to go on to Yugoslavia and Algeria, visits which will probably focus on promoting North Korea's relations with the Third World in anticipation of the nonaligned conference in Peru this summer and UN General Assembly consideration of the Korean question this fall. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014804 ### 2 June 1975 · untitled North Korean President Kim Il-song continues to tour African and East European capitals, but a Soviet official has said that Moscow is not on Kim's current itinerary. Since May 22, Kim has been welcomed enthusiastically in Romania, Algeria, and Mauritania. He may vist Bulgaria and Yugoslavia before heading home. Kim's main objective has been to strengthen political support for North Korea in anticipation of the nonaligned conference this summer and the UN General Assembly's consideration of the Korea question this fall. Moscow will probably be willing to receive Kim at a later date when it judges the timing to be more opportune. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014813 ### 10 June 1975 · untitled The fighting that broke out in northern Angola on May 28 was initiated by the Popular Movement in a coordinated offensive to drive the National Front out of areas where the Movement's ethnic support predominates and to disrupt the Front's supply routes to Luanda. The offensive apparently was timed to pre-empt a suspected similar operation planned by the National Front. Reliable estimates of the troop strengths of the respective groups are difficult to obtain. The liberation groups inflate or deflate their own reports according to political necessity. [withheld] It would appear that at present each of the two major groups has about 8-10,000 troops in Angola, the bulk of which are in northern areas. In addition, the Popular Movement apparently has several thousand troops in Cabinda, where it has long been active. The other two groups have much smaller forces there. The Movement has demonstrated in the recent fighting that it can quickly mobilize large groups of well-armed irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct advantage there. In recent months, the Popular Movement has been receiving increased supplies of arms and other material from the Soviet Union. The Soviet supplies are offloaded in Congo--long an important exile base for the Popular Movement--and forwarded to Angola [withheld] In addition to its troops in Angola, the National Front may have another 10,000 troops in Zaire being trained by [withheld] Zairian military instructors. It is also recruiting former Portuguese army officers [withheld] The National Front's support from Zaire, on the other hand, has fallen off because of President Mobutu's financial difficulties. Support from China and to a lesser extent Romania has not made up the difference and appears insufficient to enable Front president Holden Roberto to achieve his goal of having 10,000 trained men ready to enter Angola in the next month or so. [withheld] The leaders of neighboring states have a major interest in seeing that civil war is avoided in Angola, but their ability to influence events there is limited. Both Zaire and Zambia rely heavily on rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their copper. Zambian President Kaunda is convinced that large-scale fighting and turmoil in Angola will hamper his efforts to promote a settlement in Rhodesia. He has been unable, however, to convince fellow African leaders to support an embargo on arms shipments to the liberation groups. Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country suffered years of civil war, military revolts, and secessionist rebellions upon independence, is particularly sensitive to the prospect of similar turmoil in Angola. Mobutu remains adamantly opposed to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement gaining control of the government of Angola, but he can no longer provide the Front with the support it needs to attain military superiority. The Cabinda Problem The three liberation groups and the Portuguese regard the exclave of Cabinda, long administered as a district of Angola as an integral part of the territory despite its geographic separation. The Organization of African Unity supports this position. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014820 ### 11 June 1975 · ROMANIA [withheld] The Romanians are trying to frustrate Moscow's efforts to tighten both economic integration in the Soviet-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and ideological conformity in Eastern Europe. Ceausescu has ordered a propaganda campaign to try to undermine Moscow's strategy at the CEMA summit meeting late this month in Budapest. The Romanians, along with the Yugoslavs, oppose Moscow's efforts to dominate preparations for an all-European conference of communist parties. Romanian representatives have vigorously challenged several Soviet formulations at the European security talks. Ceausescu believes Romanian views on national sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and prior notification of military maneuvers must become part of the Geneva proceedings if his country is to maintain some leverage against the Soviets. Bucharest refuses to join the Soviet-inspired anti-Chinese chorus from Eastern Europe. Romania and China frequently exchange party, economic, and military delegations. Romania is the only Pact member to have bought Chinese arms; it has obtained patrol boats and Chinese-made IL-28 bombers. Ceausescu has observed and learned from the experiences of Yugoslav President Tito. The revelations of Soviet meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs last year led to even closer relations between the two Balkan states. Bucharest also shares Belgrade's interest in the nonaligned world. Romania is the only member of the Warsaw Pact to seek observer status at a conference of nonaligned foreign ministers that will be held later this year in Lima. Ceausescu's stops in Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico during the past week are part of his effort to cultivate the nonaligned. Romania has the further distinction of being the only Pact state to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel and the major Arab nations. Romanian-US Relations Bucharest has shown considerable sensitivity to US policies. Ceausescu gave a warm reception to former President Nixon in Bucharest in July 1969 and has visited the US twice before. The Romanians have made a considerable effort to meet US interest in easing emigration to the West. From May 6 to June 4 this year, Bucharest gave permission to 317 Romanians--a record number-- to emigrate to the US. During the same period, Bucharest also approved exit permits for 387 Jews to Israel, a sharp increase over the monthly rate during the first four months of the year. It approved another 200 applications for emigration to other parts of the world. Ceausescu signed a trade agreement this spring with the US that links most-favored-nation treatment to emigration. The Romanians are anxious for Congressional approval of the agreement because of difficulties in their export markets and a growing need for long-term, low-interest credits. The agreement would also restore Export-Import Bank financing, which was suspended under the 1974 Trade Act. Spurred by Export-Import Bank credits since 1971, US-Romanian trade increased until the first quarter of this year, when it dropped. Romanian imports from the US during that quarter rose only 3 percent over the same period in 1974, while Romanian exports to the US dropped 37 percent. Problems in trade with the West may force the Romanians to re-evaluate their long-range economic goals and curtail their economic growth, which has averaged 9 percent a year since 1970. Imports of Western technology and equipment have played an important part in this growth. Bucharest already plans a cut in imports from the West because of high prices for raw materials, a slump in Western demand for some Romanian exports, and high debt-servicing payments. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014821 ### 18 June 1975 · untitled Portugal and Romania signed the first friendship treaty between a NATO and a Warsaw Pact country during the recent visit of President Costa Gomes to Bucharest. The treaty stresses similarities between policies of the signatories and the nonaligned world. The two countries, each somewhat alienated within its own bloc, apparently find some solace in their new bilateral relationship. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014827 ### 25 June 1975 · untitled Romania is trying hard to convince the US that its policy on Jewish emigration warrants passage of legislation granting it most-favored-nation status. The titular leader of Romania's Jewish community, Rabbi Rosen, recently told US diplomats that he is under heavy pressure from the regime to "find" Jews willing to leave the country. Rosen quoted Ceausescu's adviser on security affairs as saying, "Give me 10,000 names, and I guarantee 9,000 passports." He accordingly issued instructions to all Jewish communities on June 20 to collect in three days the names of all Jews who want to leave. Rosen claims, however, that only a small portion of Romania's estimated 60,000 Jews want to depart. Whether or not this spate of activity will lead to an actual increase in the number of Jewish emmigrants, Bucharest wants to convey the impression that it is doing its best. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014833 ### 8 July 1975 · CSCE The Finns announced yesterday that they can no longer arrange a summit-level finale to the European security conference in Helsinki on July 28; they say they require a minimum of three weeks' notice. Tentative agreement was reached over the weekend on most of the outstanding East-West issues, and a fragile compromise was worked out with the French that would allow follow-up meetings of senior officials and possibly a second conference. Agreement is now being held up by the demands of several smaller Western and neutral states that want further progress on other issues first. Turkey and Malta are the most firmly opposed, but the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Romania also have objections. Turkish demands for exemption from certain confidence-building measures and for Turkish Cypriot representation at Helsinki remain the major obstacles. Demarches are being made by certain NATO states in Ankara in hopes of bringing about a change in Turkish policy when the cabinet meets tomorrow. Western delegates, believing that the key to the Turkish position is held by the military, are hoping also that the West Germans will have some success during the visit to Bonn of the chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, which began yesterday. Debate in Geneva yesterday centered on a French proposal that the end of July be set as the target date for the summit and that the participants be given until July 12 to work out their differences. Should the deadline not be met, the participants would assume Finland's costs for preparations already made. If the EC political directors, who are meeting in Rome today, support the French proposal, the deadlock in Geneva might be broken. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014843 ### 8 July 1975 · untitled Romania's new effort to facilitate Jewish emigration in order to gain approval of the US Congress for most-favored-nation status has the backing of the "highest level." [withheld] During the first quarter of this year, about 150 Jews were allowed to leave Romania each month; 199 arrived in Israel in June, and between 250 and 300 are expected to arrive in July. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014843 ### 8 July 1975 · untitled Romania may be on the verge of asking the US for emergency relief because of the most severe floods to hit the country since 1970. Although the waters now appear to have crested, the flooding apparently did considerable damage in the area around Bucharest. Agricultural production, which was beginning to show promising signs after last year's drought, may have been seriously affected. In 1970, 268,000 people were left homeless by the floods, and 162 were killed. At that time, Romania requested emergency relief from the US and China. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014843 ### 1 August 1975 · ROMANIA The timing of President Ford's visit to Romania--in Bucharest's view--could scarcely be better. It closely follows US Congressional action opening the way for most-favored-nation tariff status for Romania, and President Ceausescu apparently hopes President Ford's visit will boost his prestige. Romania needs an economic shot in the arm. During President Ford's talks with him, Ceausescu surely will press for concessionary credits, agricultural aid, and other assistance to facilitate his country's recovery from recent devastating floods. [withheld] Ceausescu is likely to stress the importance of a continued, active US involvement in European affairs in the post-CSCE summit period. With an eye to relations with the USSR, Romania has consistently described the summit as merely the first step in building a lasting peace in Europe. Bucharest is unhappy with some aspects of the European security conference, such as its failure to provide for institutional follow-up to the summit, but Romanian commentaries are trying to put the best face on the meeting. In talking with President Ford, Ceausescu will emphasize economic non-discrimination and the prevention of the use of force to settle international disputes. Ceausescu is pleased that Belgrade has been selected as the site of the 1977 meeting of senior government officials to review progress in implementing the European security agreement. The Romanians view the choice of the Yugoslav capital as focusing international attention on the Balkans and deterring Soviet meddling in the region. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014864 ### 7 August 1975 · OIL The Communist countries play only a small role in meeting the oil and gas needs of Western nations. Although oil exports to the West are likely to edge upward in the future, the Communist states will remain only a marginal source of supply. Net Soviet exports of oil and natural gas to the West last year comprised less than 2 percent and 1 percent respectively of consumption in the West. China's supply of oil to Japan--Peking's principal market for oil among the industrialized nations--accounts for 3 percent of total Japanese consumption. The Soviet Union--now the world's largest oil producer at 9.6 million barrels per day--is expected to boost output by 7 percent this year. Since domestic Soviet and East European consumption will also rise, net Soviet exports to the West are likely to increase only slightly, if at all. Although Soviet output has grown steadily in recent years, it is actually falling below the planned level of production because of lagging discovery and exploitation of new reserves and rapid depletion of older fields. Soviet gas production, which amounts to about half that of the US, has increased this year, but it will fall below the 1975 target by about 10 percent. The enormous Soviet gas reserves--an estimated 700 trillion cubic feet--are located in remote areas, largely in the permafrost zone. Technical problems in exploiting the deposits and building pipelines have slowed development. Eastern Europe is a net importer of both oil and gas. Most oil imports are from the Soviet Union. Crude production in Eastern Europe has remained fairly constant over the past several years and is chiefly in Romania. In contrast to the tight petroleum situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe, China is rapidly boosting oil production and increasing exports to the West. Crude oil output last year was up 20 percent from 1973. So far in 1975, crude production has averaged 1.6 million barrels per day with exports running 200,000 barrels per day. Although China is rapidly increasing its own oil consumption--substituting oil for coal in some instances--production has risen even faster. Communist oil exports to the West should reach 1.3 million barrels per day in 1980, compared with 1 million barrels per day in 1975. Growing production problems in the USSR, combined with rising Soviet and East European consumption, will gradually reduce oil exports from this area. Chinese exports, however, probably will more than offset the drop in net Soviet shipments. Chinese exports in 1980 could total 1 million barrels per day, five times the anticipated level for 1975. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014869 ### 1 September 1975 · untitled Since that time commodity prices have fallen sharply--they have recovered somewhat lately--and many states, both developed and developing, have come to realize that the industrialized states are equally important suppliers of raw materials, that all industrial states are not import-dependent, and that not all developing states are exporters of raw materials. The industrialized states are not of one mind on development of raw materials policies. Nor have they all prepared for the Special Session to the same degree. Most agree on one point--which is also shared by most developing states--that it is up to the US to take the initiative. The Europeans and Japanese feel the US has consistently maintained the hardest line against the demands of the developing countries, and they have only reluctantly backed the US on economic issues in UN meetings. None, in fact, voted with the US at the meeting in Lima last April of the UN Industrial Development Organization. Nevertheless, some of the EC countries now appear worried that the US positions to be announced at the Special Session may be too "advanced" and will cause them embarrassment. The EC Council agreed in late July to guidelines for a policy that would allow the community to "examine" individual commodity issues and to endorse a proposal to extend to all developing states, through the IMF, the EC's own plan for helping to stabilize the earnings of developing countries from exports of certain raw materials. The OECD states agreed at a ministerial meeting last May to establish high-level groups to examine raw materials policies and overall relations with developing states. These groups, however, have done little to prepare for the Special Session, having focused instead on the long term. This means that the industrialized states will have to rely on ad hoc consultations during the session to coordinate policy. Tokyo is especially sensitive to the problem of maintaining access to raw materials. Nevertheless, the thrust of Japanese policy has been to sympathize--and when possible to give the appearance of being more forthcoming than other industrialized nations--while avoiding costly concessions. Such attitudes have become transparent to most developing states and have only been successful in strengthening the arguments of those who argue that deliberate confrontation may be the only promising stance to take toward the industrialized world. The Soviets and East Europeans--with the exception of Romania and Yugoslavia--will maintain a low profile at the Seventh Special Session, as they have at previous meetings dealing with these issues. They will express solidarity with the developing states but will also be careful to avoid costly economic commitments. The Chinese will support the developing countries' positions, but they will not assume a leadership position. Peking also certainly will use the session to continue its attacks on the Soviets. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014890 ### 9 September 1975 · NOTE [withheld] The Romanian and Polish agricultural ministers will be in Washington this month to discuss bilateral cooperation with the US. Romanian minister Miculescu, who also is deputy prime minister, hopes to sign a statement of agricultural cooperation when he returns to Washington this week from a Midwest tour. He also wants to establish cooperation on long-term agricultural research with several US universities, obtain seeds to replace those lost in the July floods, and receive additional US credits to buy cotton. Poland's agricultural minister Barcikowski will arrive on September 20 to discuss credits and purchases of US grain. Warsaw probably wants to import 3 to 4 million tons of grain this year to support an expansion of livestock production and to offset shortfalls in grain and drought-stricken fodder crops. Because of the USSR's poor grain harvest, any of these requirements will likely have to be met by purchases of US grain. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014897 ### 10 September 1975 · NOTES Romanian President Ceausescu [withheld] suffered a bruised ego [withheld] at the Helsinki summit [withheld] Ceausescu-- [withheld] was upset because he was not in the spotlight at Helsinki. He was annoyed by the Romanian Foreign Ministry's failure to line up more talks for him with other chiefs of state. [withheld] the East European leaders tended to ignore him and treated him like an outsider. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014898 ### 7 October 1975 · untitled Yugoslav Premier Bijedic's visit to China began on a sour note yesterday when Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov led a walkout at the official reception. All envoys of the East European Communist countries except the Romanian ambassador left after Chinese First Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping said, "...the most dangerous source of war is the superpower that is most zealous in preaching peace." The walkout yesterday was significant because Teng's anti-Soviet statement did not go beyond language he had used at the recent reception for North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan; Tolstikov did not leave on that occasion. The Soviet's action probably was intended as a demonstration of pique with the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, who have been flaunting their ties with Peking. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014921 ### 12 November 1975 · ANGOLA The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola yesterday named its leader, Agostinho Neto, president of the "People's Republic of Angola." The Neto government was quickly recognized by the USSR, Romania, Cuba, and several African states with long ties to the Popular Movement. A number of other East European states have expressed "readiness" to establish diplomatic relations with the new People's Republic. The Popular Movement's rivals--the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola--marked Angolan independence and the inauguration of their joint provisional government in ceremonies at Nova Lisboa, the National Union's headquarters, and at Ambriz, the Front's headquarters. The seat of the provisional government will be at Nova Lisboa, renamed Huambo. After the independence ceremonies, the two rival "governments" quickly resumed military activities. The Popular Movement dispatched a column of troops and tanks southward to meet an advancing National Front - National Union force advancing on Luanda. That force, however, is still approximately 350 miles from the capital. At Quifangando, the National Front has still not been able to break through Popular Movement defenses after almost three weeks of combat. The Front and the Union still hope to force the Popular Movement to compromise. The Popular Movement will probably not be inclined to consider a political accommodation with its rivals, however, now that it has been recognized by Cuba and the USSR and continues to receive military aid from them. [withheld] In Cabinda, [withheld] heavy fighting is taking place between the Popular Movement and Cabindan liberation forces, which are probably augmented by Zairian troops. The inability of the Cabindan liberation forces to secure a quick victory, in what was supposed to have been a surprise attack, suggests that the Popular Movement may hold the upper hand at the present time. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014952 ### 25 November 1975 · The Communist Party The Communist Party is the strongest and best organized force in the Spanish opposition. It has an estimated 5,000 active members in Spain and at least twice that many abroad, mostly in France. Outlawed since the end of the Civil War, the party has been harshly repressed by the Spanish government--in contrast to the official toleration given many other opposition parties--and its leaders rarely venture into Spain. Santiago Carrillo Solares, now 60 years old, has been secretary general since 1960. The principal source of Communist strength lies in its dominance over most of the Workers Commissions--illegal labor groups that appeared in the 1960s. Communist organization, discipline, and financial backing have helped make the commissions the most effective protest mechanism available to the Spanish worker. They will provide an important means of exerting pressure on Franco's successors, particularly if Juan Carlos does not establish other avenues to express worker grievances to management. The Communist Party also has at its disposal a well-oiled propaganda machine in Radio Espana Independiente, which broadcasts from Romania. The party has support in the universities and is said to have good connections in the media. Communist efforts to infiltrate the military have apparently met with little success. The military forces have been a prime target for many years, but there is no evidence of significant penetration. The basic Communist aim is to assure the neutrality of the military during the post-Franco evolution of Spain's political system. The Communists have not been spared internal dissension. A serious rift reportedly exists between the Madrid Central Committee and the exiled senior leadership in Paris over present party tactics. [withheld] The party is said to be losing "considerable numbers" of young workers and university students to more extremist groups. On international issues, Spanish Communist attitudes and positions are close to those of the Italian Communist Party. Carrillo's relations with Moscow have been strained ever since he denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like the Italians, Carrillo makes a point of stressing his party's independence from Moscow and has criticized Portuguese Communists for their hard-line, revolutionary tactics. Carrillo professes to favor a more gradual approach in bringing about change. He recently claimed, for example, that he cannot object to the US military bases in Spain as long as the Soviets keep troops in Czechoslovakia. Rival Coalition The Platform of Democratic Convergence was formed last summer as a counter to the Communist-controlled Junta. Dominated by Socialists and Christian Democrats, the Platform is composed of some 15 opposition parties, organizations, and trade unions. Their program calls for the eventual drafting of a new democratic constitution setting up a federal state that would grant autonomy to the component regions. Most of the groups in the Platform would accept a gradual evolution toward Western style democracy, although there is considerable squabbling over how gradual the evolution can be. The dominant force in the Platform coalition is the Spanish Socialist Workers Party--the major Socialist faction in Spain. The Party and its affiliated illegal trade union, the General Union of Workers, will provide the principal competition to the Communist Party during the transition period. Although clearly smaller and less well organized than the Communists, the Socialists are believed to enjoy widespread popular support. Four Christian Democratic factions have joined the Platform, and a fifth is expected to join soon. Two Christian Democratic leaders claim that the various factions are collaborating closely. Effective unification, however, appears unlikely. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014963 ### 10 December 1975 · CHINA-ANGOLA The Chinese are maintaining a policy of strict neutrality toward conflicting forces in Angola. Peking's approach--for the short term at least--is once of opposition to the USSR's support for the Popular Movement. There is no evidence of any significant resumption of covert Chinese assistance to the National Front and National Union. As long as other outside powers continue to shoulder the burden of military assistance to the opponents of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, China can be expected to maintain a low profile with its former clients. Although evidence is lacking, Peking may have reached agreement [withheld] to divert to Angola certain types of equipment [withheld] as long as Peking is left with a plausible case for denying any direct role of its own. [withheld] The prospect that the Organization of African Unity may reverse its policy of neutrality toward the civil conflict in Angola or that OAU members may decide to go separate ways on the subject must concern the Chinese. Peking is already on the opposite side of the fence from Tanzania, Mozambique, Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea as well as a number of other states that have followed Moscow's lead in extending formal recognition to the Popular Movement. A decision by the OAU to waffle on Angola would almost certainly lead to wider African and Third World recognition for the Movement. The Popular Movement, for its part, has carefully avoided closing the door to future ties with Peking by avoiding direct attacks on the Chinese. The Movement's second in command has specifically stated that his group has resisted Soviet pressures to take sides in the broader Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. There are no signs, however, that Peking is seriously considering switching its political support. On the contrary, the expanded Soviet and Cuban role can only have darkened Chinese views of the Movement. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014975 ### 27 December 1975 · untitled Two visits this week, by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic to Romania and by Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Patan to Yugoslavia, should help to end rumors that problems between Bucharest and Belgrade forced the cancellation of President Ceausescu's trip to Yugoslavia in October. The visits came on the heels of President Ceausescu's forceful reassertion on December 18 of Romania's independent foreign policy. Ceausescu underscored the similarities between Belgrade and Bucharest on a variety of issues, including their determination to resist Soviet claims to leadership of the international communist movement. Minic probably briefed the Romanians on his recent trip to Moscow, where he discussed Soviet meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs. While in Belgrade, Patan signed a trade agreement covering the period 1976-80 and a commodity trade protocol for the coming year. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006014989 ### 10 January 1976 · USSR-CHINA Moscow probably anticipates no early change in China's policy toward the Soviet Union as a result of Premier Chou En-lai's death. The Soviets respected Chou's skills in promoting China's interests in the international arena, frequently at the expense of the USSR, but they also saw him as a force for moderation in China's dealings with Moscow. In this sense, his death is a setback to the prospect of less hostile Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets do not think well of Chou's successor, Teng Hsiao-ping. They well remember that it was he who violently attacked Khrushchev at the international Communist conference in 1960, who oversaw the bitter polemics between the two sides in the early 1960s, and who traded nasty words with Brezhnev at the Romanian party congress in 1965. The Soviets are also aware that one of the factors that allegedly persuaded Mao to rehabilitate Teng in 1973 was his negative attitude toward the USSR. They have consistently deprecated Teng's capacities as a leader over the past year and have, to foreigners as well as among themselves, portrayed him as a transitional figure. Despite their misgivings about Teng and the oft-expressed belief that there will be no fundamental change in China's policy toward the USSR until well after Mao is dead, Moscow will want to make fresh soundings about the possibility of change in the wake of Chou's death. This is especially true since the release of the Soviet helicopter crew may cause uncertainty in Moscow about where China now stands vis-a-vis the USSR. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015000 ### 28 April 1976 · untitled Romanian President Ceausescu used exceptionally strong language in a speech on Monday to charge Moscow with twisting Marxist-Leninist doctrine to advance Soviet hegemony in the world Communist movement. The Yugoslavs immediately rebroadcast Ceausescu's speech, describing it as the "official opening of a polemic" against advocates of limited sovereignty--a euphemism for the "Brezhnev Doctrine." Ceausescu's speech, which will not be ignored by the Kremlin, suggests that Bucharest feels itself under pressure from Moscow. His charges and the Yugoslav commentary clearly reflect the apprehensions of Bucharest and Belgrade both over the greater Soviet emphasis on ideological conformity since the 25th Soviet party congress and Moscow's intentions in the Balkans in the post-Tito period. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015094 ### 20 May 1976 · ROMANIA-USSR: There are rumors in Bucharest that Romania is calling up reservists because of a fear of Soviet intervention. There is no evidence that a general mobilization of Romanian forces is in progress, but some reservists may have been called up to participate in regular spring field training exercises. There has been no indication of any unusual Soviet military activity along the Romanian border. [withheld] President Ceausescu, when faced with increased pressure from Moscow in the past, has used the tactic of pointing to a magnified Soviet menace in order to strengthen his country's resolve and show national unity. The current spate of rumors has caused some panic buying by Romanian citizens. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015114 ### 22 May 1976 · untitled It is now clear that the recent call-ups of civilian reservists in Romania were part of an unannounced but planned mobilization and alert exercise. An officer of the Romanian foreign liaison office has confirmed to a Western military colleague that a "normal" alert began several days ago. Panic buying has subsided considerably in Bucharest. We continue to have no indications of any Soviet troop movements or exercises along the Romanian border that might have sparked the alert. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015116 ### 11 June 1976 · untitled Romanian party secretary for foreign affairs Stefan Andrei, who will arrive in the US on Sunday for a visit of about ten days, has told US diplomats that President Ceausescu wants him to seek your views on "one or two issues of major interest." Andrei almost certainly will want to talk about Soviet-Romanian relations, including what the Romanians consider to be a Soviet ideological-historical attack that questions--and thereby threatens--the legitimacy of the Romanian nation and its rights to its present territory. Since some Romanians fear that Moscow will try to sabotage the Helsinki follow-on conference scheduled for Belgrade next year, Andrei may outline Romania's plans to press for guarantees safeguarding its independence and sovereignty. Andrei, age 45, is the youngest member of the party's Political Executive Committee and is second only to Ceausescu in the formulation of Romania's delicately balanced foreign policy. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015133 ### 12 June 1976 · untitled Romanian party secretary Stefan Andrei has postponed his arrival in the US until June 15 [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015134 ### 17 June 1976 · untitled The first major shuffle in Romania's Council of Ministers since 1974 reflects President Ceausescu's increasing concern over possible consumer dissatisfaction and economic inefficiency. Ceausescu's grip on the reins of power is strong, but he apparently recognizes that the economy is his greatest vulnerability. He has now moved trusted supporters with proven administrative abilities into key positions in the consumer welfare sector in order to upgrade the performance of the economy. Changes also were made in the military sector. The new defense minister, Colonel General Ion Coman, reportedly is favorably disposed toward the US. His highly successful trip to this country last summer was the first visit by the chief of staff of a Warsaw Pact army. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015138 ### 23 June 1976 · untitled Romanian President Ceausescu recently instructed the press not to raise controversial questions on the "history of Soviet-Romanian relations," [withheld] Ceausescu apparently intends to tone down his regime's polemics with the Soviets over "falsifications" of Romanian history. In a speech on June 2, he flatly said that Romania has no territorial or other problems with the USSR. Ceausescu, however, has given no indication that Romania will waver from its national communist course. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015144 ### 29 June 1976 · USSR-EUROPE: Most signs point to little or no controversy at the conference of European communist parties in East Berlin today and tomorrow. General Secretary Brezhnev and President Tito will join representatives of all European communist parties except those of Iceland and Albania. To assure the attendance of independent-minded parties like the Italian, Romanian, Yugoslav, and French ones, the Soviets apparently granted extensive concessions. [withheld] the conference document will focus on such non-divisive issues as peace, security, cooperation and social progress in Europe. [withheld] the proceedings and the document will strictly observe the full independence and autonomy of the participating parties and call for sharply expanded cooperation among communist parties and all "progressive" forces in Europe, including the Social and Christian Democrats. [withheld] President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015150 ### 1 July 1976 · EUROPE-USSR: Yugoslav President Tito and Romanian President Ceausescu delivered, as anticipated, the two most independent speeches by ruling party leaders heard at the European communist party conference. Tito stressed that Yugoslavia opposes any form of interference in the internal affairs of other parties. In a thinly veiled reference to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, he asserted that the failure of Yugoslavia's neighbors to recognize national minorities and their rights is directly contrary to both basic human rights and Marxism, and undermines lasting peace and cooperation in Europe. Ceausescu defended "socialist patriotism" and the role of the nation in international affairs. He called for effective safeguards against interference in Romania's domestic matters, and declared that the inevitable differences among parties--read, among others, the Soviets and Chinese--should be solved in a "principled spirit" via private, bilateral sessions. Polish party chief Gierek took a cautious stance and placed more stress on the solidarity of the communist movement than on Poland's role. Warsaw is billing as more important a speech Gierek is to give tomorrow in Katowice, a key Polish industrial city. Among Moscow's allies, Bulgarian leader Zhivkov declared that a party's attitude toward the USSR and the Soviet party represented the "most reliable criterion of loyalty" to the communist ideal. In condemning anti-Sovietism and Maoism, Zhivkov stressed that when inevitable differences between parties emerge, they should be resolved in a spirit of "proletarian internationalism," thereby asserting that the Soviet party is the first among equals. Czechoslovakia's Husak, East Germany's Honecker, and Hungary's Kadar, although supportive of Moscow, did not go as far as Zhivkov. Speeches by the major West European leaders reasserted their independence from Moscow in no-nonsense terms. Italian party chief Berlinguer said the development of Marxism had not kept pace with the reality of the world today. He also restated his party's intention to pursue an autonomous line without foreign interference and "within the framework" of Italy's international alliances--a reference to the party's acceptance of Italian membership in NATO and the EC. French party leader Marchais emphasized his party's adoption of a more independent stance by noting that it recently had discarded the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In addition, he came down hard on those parties in power which, in the name of peaceful coexistence, cooperate with governments in the West to the detriment of the local communist party. The French Communists have long believed that Moscow's relations with Paris have worked against their own interests. In the most strongly worded speech, Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo underscored his party's independence from Moscow with a demand that diversity be accepted, and a warning that failure to do so would result in a schism. With an eye toward his party's current struggle for legalization in Spain, Carrillo asserted that full democracy is essential for all "socialist states" and pointedly observed that socialism in Western countries would be brought about by pluralism rather than dictatorship. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006015152 ### 5 August 1976 · untitled President Ceausescu seems to be using his current stay in the Crimea to put the best possible face on relations between Romania and the USSR. Ceausescu met General Secretary Brezhnev on Tuesday for "cordial and friendly" talks on a wide range of subjects, including an "exchange of opinions" on the future course of communism in Europe. According to the Romanian news agency, they affirmed their support of the cohesion of the socialist countries in terms usually adopted by Moscow to connote Soviet leadership of the movement. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466732 ### 31 August 1976 · We cannot confirm a London Evening News story that Soviet Premier Kosygin was saved from drowning after suffering a stroke. We cannot confirm a London Evening News story that Soviet Premier Kosygin was saved from drowning after suffering a stroke. Kosygin's most recent publicly announced activity was on July 22, when he received the Algerian minister of agriculture. There has been no information on his activities since July 30. This is the second time we have picked up such a story. In mid-August, the Romanian ambassador to Moscow, probably passing on second- or third-hand gossip, told Canadian Ambassador Ford that Kosygin had an accident while on vacation near Pitsunda. He thought that the accident occurred on a pleasure craft on the Black Sea. The London Evening News version may be a variant of this story and cannot be regarded as confirmation of it. According to a Japanese news agency, a Japanese business delegation visiting Moscow was told on August 10 that Kosygin would not be able to receive them because he was "recuperating" from a "slight cold." President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466840 ### 14 September 1976 · YUGOSLAVIA: The government's announcement yesterday that President Tito will not be able to see Denmark's Queen Margrethe in late September seems intended, at least in part, to squelch speculation that his current indisposition is a diplomatic one. Tito contributed to such an interpretation by appearing several times with Romania's Ceausescu on Friday--after Paris had been informed that President Giscard's visit to Belgrade would have to be postponed because of Tito's illness. Some observers concluded that the postponement stemmed from differences between the two countries that had arisen at the Sri Lanka summit last month. Official French responses have discounted this kind of speculation. The Belgrade announcement said that Tito would need several weeks of "indispensable rest." Tito's medical history includes one serious bout with a liver ailment and a gall bladder operation years ago. [withheld] If Tito's doctors did detect a liver problem during recent medical examinations, hepatitis could be the problem. [withheld] Yugoslavia's anti-US commentaries on the hijacking by Croat emigres last Friday are indicative of the government's concern that terrorist activity could erupt in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Intemperate allegations and diplomatic demarches are regular features of Yugoslav reactions to any increase in the activities of emigres. The virulence of the current campaign may also reflect a fear that the hijacking was triggered by Belgrade's announcement on Friday that Tito is ailing. At the same time, the Yugoslavs are not unmindful that these condemnations of the US might deflect Western criticism of Belgrade's own recent treatment of the international terrorist, "Carlos," who was not detained during his stay in Belgrade last week. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466845 ### 30 September 1976 · North Korea North Korea may be considering some kind of "peace initiative." In a recent conversation with the head of the Romanian UN mission, the North Koreans reiterated their interest in opening talks with the US. A Hungarian diplomat at the UN passed to US officials on September 22 a report that the North Koreans were "studying" the US proposal for a four-power conference on Korea while awaiting Peking's agreement before indicating a willingness to participate. Any diplomatic initiative probably would involve primarily a repackaging of earlier proposals. But the North Koreans may display greater flexibility than before in their effort to draw the US into the long-proposed bilateral talks on a "peace agreement" to replace the 1953 armistice agreement. As part of this effort Pyongyang might downplay its demands for the immediate dissolution of the UN Command and the withdrawal of US forces and attempt instead to convey an impression that a phased disengagement of the US military presence would be acceptable. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466859 ### 28 October 1976 · Yugoslavia Yugoslavia has rescheduled a state visit by French President Giscard for early December. Planning for a visit by Soviet party leader Brezhnev is also apparently under way. The Giscard visit was originally postponed in September apparently because of Tito's poor health. Since then, the 84-year-old Yugoslav President has made only infrequent public appearances and has received no foreign guests. The Soviets would like to arrange a meeting between Tito and Brezhnev in conjunction with a trip by the Soviet leader to neighboring Romania in late November. Belgrade will make much of Giscard's visit as a counter to those who would see Tito's meeting with Brezhnev as a Yugoslav "drift" eastward. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466883 ### 22 November 1976 · USSR-ROMANIA: Soviet party chief Brezhnev's arrival in Romania today for three days of talks will cap five months of efforts by the Soviets and Romanians to improve bilateral relations. This is Brezhnev's first official visit to Romania during his 12 years as General Secretary. The talks in Bucharest will take place just before the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meets there on Thursday and Friday, the first such meeting to be held in Romania in 10 years. Brezhnev and Ceausescu will probably seek common ground on issues that the Pact gathering is likely to discuss, in addition to their review of Soviet-Romanian relations. Romania is said to be dissatisfied with its share of the USSR's foreign trade in the 1976-1980 planning period, and Ceausescu may be trying to coax the Soviets into expanding their economic assistance. He will probably press for the specifics of Moscow's reported agreement "in principle" to provide Bucharest with some crude oil and additional raw materials. Ceausescu will want the language of the joint communique after the meetings to follow the same line as that issued after the Tito-Brezhnev talks in Yugoslavia--recognition of national sovereignty and voluntary cooperation among equal communist parties that freely choose their own national communist courses. The Soviets will strive for Romanian recognition of the merits of greater integration within the communist community and also of Moscow's seniority in the communist movement. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466904 ### 26 November 1976 · USSR-ROMANIA: Talks in Bucharest this week between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ceausescu and the joint declaration they signed indicate efforts to promote an appearance of improved relations without making any fundamental concessions. During the course of the talks, Brezhnev said no "important unresolved problems" exist between Moscow and Bucharest, but then touched on such subjects as the need to perfect the division of labor among socialist states and the necessity for "cohesion of socialist countries." Ceausescu said that differences of opinion on "non-essential problems should not affect bilateral cooperation." He then enumerated almost all points of contention between the two countries. He mentioned Romania's status as both a socialist and developing country, came close to equating the nonaligned world with socialist countries, and made only passing references to the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance The Romanian party daily, Scinteia, covered in its Tuesday issue the visits of both Brezhnev and Secretary of Commerce Richardson to Bucharest and of a Romanian deputy defense minister to China. Brezhnev and Ceausescu ended their discussions on the eve of the meeting in Bucharest of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. The committee presumably will consider issues to be discussed at next year's follow-on conference to the Helsinki accords. Romania seems likely to continue to differ with the USSR as to what these issues should be. The consultative committee may also surface a new initiative urging the West to agree to concrete measures on disarmament. Brezhnev said Wednesday that he hopes to see rapid movement on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks when the new US administration takes office. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466907 ### 16 December 1976 · EC EC foreign ministers meeting this week in Brussels approved tough measures sharply reducing the catch third-country fishermen will be allowed to take in EC waters next year. The Community will establish a 200-nautical mile fishing zone in the North Atlantic and North Sea on January 1. Those states that have not negotiated a reciprocal fishing agreement with the Community--the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland--will be allowed to continue fishing EC waters for three months, but at substantially reduced levels. Bulgaria and Romania, which only recently began to fish in EC waters, will be excluded totally on January 1. States that desire to continue fishing within the EC's 200-nautical mile zone after April 1 must negotiate new agreements with the EC Commission. The Soviets and the East Europeans will be most seriously affected by the EC measures; the Soviet catch would be reduced by almost 60 percent under the new regulations. The EC is prepared to negotiate an agreement that would allow the Soviets an annual catch of about 60,000 tons--the amount EC trawlers now take in the Barents Sea. The Soviets and the East Europeans, however, refuse to recognize the EC's authority to negotiate for the Nine. President's Daily Brief · https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0006466924 ## How the briefs were counted and read ### Where the briefs come from The collection is published by the CIA in its Electronic Reading Room, in two series: 1961–1969 and 1969–1977. The CIA's site does not answer automated requests for documents, so the pages were read from the copy at the Internet Archive, which keeps the CIA's PDFs under their document numbers. After duplicates are removed the copy holds 5,034 documents from 4,885 days, between 17 June 1961 and 20 January 1977. Every paragraph above links to its document on the CIA's site. ### How the days with Romania were found The PDFs are photographs of pages, with no text. Two independent machine transcriptions were used: the one made by the Internet Archive and the one published by Carson, Min and Van Nuys, who divided all the briefs into paragraphs for a different study. Each was searched for “Rumania”, “Romania”, “Bucharest”, “Ceausescu”, “Gheorghiu-Dej”, “Maurer” and a few other names. The first transcription found 397 documents, the second 380; 372 are common to both. All 405 documents found by at least one transcription were then read page by page, on the image. In 385 of them there is indeed a paragraph that names Romania. In the other 20 the word was only a label on a map. The first transcription had missed eight of the confirmed documents, the second five. A document missed by both could not have been found; given how rarely each one failed, such cases should be very few, but the number of days on this page remains a lower bound. The eight briefs said here not to name Romania (21, 22, 27 and 30 August 1968; 1, 2, 4 and 5 August 1969) were read whole, page by page, on the image. ### Transcriptions and translations The text of each paragraph was transcribed from the scan, not taken from the machine transcriptions: capitals, the spelling “Rumania” and typing errors were kept, and each white box is marked where it stands. Words divided at a line end were joined. The quotations in the chapters above are checked automatically, word for word, against these transcriptions. ### Scînteia The issues of Scînteia were read in the scans of the Hunedoara-Deva County Library in Romania: 17 issues for August–September 1968 (21–31 August and 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9 September) and seven for the other moments. Whether a president read a given page cannot be known from the briefs; this page says only what was written for him. Front-page headlines were read on the image. Quotations from inner pages, and statements that a subject is absent, rest on the scan's machine-read text, searched for several words; a report printed in other words could have been missed. The brief and the newspaper are compared on the same calendar date. In summer Bucharest was then six hours ahead of Washington, so the Romanian paper reached its readers a few hours before the brief reached the president. ### What already exists A few of these pages have been cited before: the briefs of 23 and 24 August 1968 in a 2019 study of the American reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Carson, Min and Van Nuys counted every country in the briefs for research on the CIA's language. On the day of publication, 4 October 2026, searches in Romanian and English found no other page that follows Romania through the whole collection, day by day. ## Sources - [CIA Electronic Reading Room: collection “President's Daily Brief 1961–1969” (released 16 September 2015)](https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/presidents-daily-brief-1961-1969) - [CIA Electronic Reading Room: collection “President's Daily Brief 1969–1977” (released 24 August 2016)](https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/presidents-daily-brief-1969-1977) - [Internet Archive, “ciareadingroom” collection: a copy of the CIA's PDFs, one item per document, with machine-read text](https://archive.org/details/ciareadingroom) - [Austin Carson, Eric Min and Maya Van Nuys, replication data for “Racial Tropes in the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy” (International Organization, 2024), file pdbEntries, CC0](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EVKPL3) - [Carson, Min and Van Nuys, “Racial Tropes in the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy: A Computational Text Analysis”, International Organization, 2024](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818324000146) - [Executive Order 13526 (2009), section 3.3, and 32 CFR 2001.26: markings for exemption from automatic declassification](https://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-eo.html) - [CIA, “The President's Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to Kennedy and Johnson” (2015)](https://www.cia.gov/static/Presidents-Daily-Brief-Delivering-Intelligence-to-Kennedy-and-Johnson.pdf) - [Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe (Department of State, 1996)](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17) - [Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29) - [Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, China, 1969–1972](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17) - [Lyndon B. Johnson, remarks in San Antonio, 30 August 1968 (The American Presidency Project)](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-san-antonio-the-annual-convention-milk-producers-inc) - [“Ovid Densusianu” County Library, Hunedoara-Deva, Romania: digitised run of the newspaper Scînteia](https://www.bibliotecadeva.ro/periodice/scanteia.html) - [Christopher Riehl, “Ideology in American Cold War Foreign Policy: The Prague Spring Case Study”, Vanderbilt Historical Review, 2019 (cites the briefs of 23 and 24 August 1968)](https://www.vanderbilthistoricalreview.com/_files/ugd/478634_379a5f143a534817a5250840eb3bee6c.pdf) - [CIA, “CIA Releases Roughly 2,500 Declassified President's Daily Briefs” (24 August 2016)](https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/cia-releases-roughly-2500-declassified-presidents-daily-briefs) - [FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 87: Rusk–Dobrynin conversation, 23 August 1968](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d87) - [FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 93: National Security Council meeting, 4 September 1968](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d93) - [FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 164: “Contingency Planning on Romania”, 24 August 1968](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d164) - [FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 165: Rusk–Dobrynin conversation, 30 August 1968, 9 p.m.](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d165) - [FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 166: Leddy–Bogdan conversation, 31 August 1968](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d166) - [FRUS 1964–1968, XVII, doc. 167: Rostow's telegram to Johnson, 1 September 1968](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d167) - [FRUS 1969–1976, XXIX, doc. 183: Nixon–Ceaușescu conversation, Bucharest, 2 August 1969](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d183) - [FRUS 1969–1976, XXIX, doc. 194: “Disaster Relief for Romania”, 20 May 1970](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d194) - [FRUS 1969–1976, XXIX, doc. 196: “Additional Romanian Flood Relief”, 20 June 1970](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d196) - [FRUS 1969–1976, XVII (China), doc. 102: Kissinger–Bogdan conversation, 11 January 1971](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d102) ## Further reading - [Romania in China's People's Daily: eighty years of Romania–China relations](https://mariuscomper.uk/romania-china/en/): The same years read from Beijing: every People's Daily article that names Romania. - [How independent of Moscow was Romania? What 70 years of UN votes show](https://mariuscomper.uk/romania-la-onu/en/): The independence the briefs write about, measured in General Assembly votes. - [Roumania, Rumania, Romania: how English spelled one country's name, year by year](https://mariuscomper.uk/roumania-rumania-romania/en/): The CIA's brief moves from “Rumania” to “Romania” in June 1969; here is the whole history of the spelling. The briefs are works of the United States government and are in the public domain. The transcriptions on this page may be reused freely.