Finance · sanctions · infrastructure
A7: how Russia rebuilt payment routes under sanctions
A7 gives Russian companies two main ways to get money abroad: foreign payment companies with bank access and A7A5 linked to dollar stablecoins. Both routes depend on infrastructure outside Russia, and operators have already replaced services disrupted by sanctions or law enforcement.
Inside A7
Much of the system still runs through banks.
OSC’s June 2026 investigation, based on more than 30,000 internal records and messages, found that A7 relies heavily on foreign payment companies and correspondent banks to move Russian payments into international finance.
A7 can route a Russian company’s payment through a foreign payment company before the money enters international correspondent banking.
The records include ledgers, invoices, contracts, SWIFT messages and code. They document foreign payment vehicles, altered invoices and remote bank access; A7A5 also appears in liquidity, internal accounting and payments involving counterparties that cannot readily use banks.
Read the OSC investigation ↗
Follow one invoice
One bill, two payment routes.
A Russian importer owes an overseas supplier. The diagram shows two documented ways A7 can move value across the border. Switch routes to compare them.
JavaScript is off; both rails are shown in full.
Bank route: through foreign accounts
OSC describes this as A7’s main route: a financial instrument in Russia, a payment company abroad, then correspondent banking.
Russian importer
Owes money to an overseas supplier. Sanctions make a direct cross-border payment harder.
A7 / PSB
A7 takes the roubles and undertakes to settle the supplier’s bill using a bill of exchange. Sanctioned defence-sector bank PSB co-owns A7.
Foreign payment company
A Moscow-controlled company holds accounts and liquidity outside Russia while presenting itself as local. OSC identified nodes in Kyrgyzstan, the UAE, Hong Kong, Hungary and Mongolia.
Correspondent banks
Altered trade documents and remote account access can hide Russian links. The payment then passes through international banks in major currencies.
Overseas supplier
Receives money from the foreign payment company. OSC found supplier payments reaching more than 80 jurisdictions.
Crypto route: from roubles to dollar stablecoins
A7A5 turns rouble value into a blockchain token. Its usefulness abroad rises when it can be exchanged for widely used dollar stablecoins.
Roubles / A7 infrastructure
The client begins inside a rouble-denominated ecosystem tied to sanctioned PSB.
Old Vector → A7A5
Kyrgyzstan-based Old Vector issues A7A5. The issuer says each token is backed 1:1 by rouble deposits; Reuters identifies PSB as the reserve bank.
Exchange
Grinex became a main early trading venue after Garantex was disrupted. Later sanctions widened to other exchanges and service providers.
Instant Swapper
Chainalysis says the service converts A7A5 into major dollar-pegged stablecoins with little or no meaningful KYC; more than $2.2bn has moved through it.
Overseas counterparty
Receives a dollar stablecoin that is easier to transfer or trade internationally than A7A5.
Test the network
Cut a node. What still works?
Previous sanctions show that losing one service can push activity toward another. Choose interventions below; observed cases are labelled separately from analytical scenarios.
Choose interventions
Combine interventions if you want. The pressure meter is qualitative and does not predict how A7 would adapt.
What changes
Observed history is labelled; the remaining effects are cautious inferences from the documented network.
No intervention selected. The network remains open across both routes.
The highest meter level means several hard-to-replace dependencies are under pressure at once. It does not predict collapse; costs, spillovers and adaptation remain uncertain.
Garantex
Treasury says that after the 6 March 2025 action, Garantex operators created Grinex infrastructure and migrated deposits, using A7A5 to restore equivalent balances.
A7A5 + issuer
US and UK designations and the EU transaction ban raised pressure. The wider A7 network continued operating.
Correspondent banking
OSC describes correspondent banking as central to the bank route. Losing it would constrain large-scale supplier payments more directly than losing a single blockchain address.
Comparing the figures
The $140bn figure needs context.
These figures cover different dates and scopes. $93.3bn and $119.7bn refer to A7A5; TRM’s >$166bn covers a broader A7-linked cluster; the ≈$140bn figure comes from PSB itself.
Volume landmarks
$9.3bnJune 2025 · FT
A7A5 movements to/from Grinex-linked wallets in the first four months.
A7A5 movements to/from Grinex-linked wallets in the first four months.
$93.3bn2025 · Chainalysis
A7A5 volume in roughly ten months.
A7A5 volume in roughly ten months.
$119.7bn24 Apr 2026 · Chainalysis
updated estimate of A7A5 volume to that date.
updated estimate of A7A5 volume to that date.
>$166bn12 Jun 2026 · TRM
A7-associated on-chain volume — a broader metric than A7A5 alone. OSC says ≈$35bn appears to be circular transfers.
A7-associated on-chain volume — a broader metric than A7A5 alone. OSC says ≈$35bn appears to be circular transfers.
≈$140bn10 Aug 2026 · PSB
declared A7A5 turnover. Company figure without a public independent audit.
declared A7A5 turnover. Company figure without a public independent audit.
Timeline
Sanctions, replacement nodes, rising volume.
The sequence puts enforcement actions beside the infrastructure that appeared after them and the volume estimates that followed.
A7A5 launches. The rouble-denominated token enters the A7 ecosystem.
infrastructureGarantex is disrupted by an international operation. Treasury later says employees created Grinex, customer deposits were migrated and A7A5 was used to restore equivalent balances.
enforcementFT already measures $9.3bn of Grinex-linked A7A5 movement in four months.
measurementUS sanctions A7, Grinex and Old Vector. OFAC explicitly describes A7 as a cross-border settlement platform used for sanctions evasion.
USUK targets Grinex, Meer and Old Vector. The British government describes A7A5 as circumvention infrastructure.
UKEU prohibits transactions involving A7A5. Key entities around the token are also targeted.
EUChainalysis: $119.7bn A7A5. In parallel, enforcement moves toward third-country crypto service providers.
measurementUK broadens sanctions to more exchanges and providers. The measures add services tied to A7’s liquidity and exchange infrastructure.
UKOSC + TRM publish “The Big Shor”. The investigation documents foreign payment companies, altered invoices and dependence on correspondent banks.
investigationWSJ reports shell companies, fabricated trade documents and international expansion. These are journalistic findings and are kept separate from government sanctions findings.
pressPSB claims ≈$140bn A7A5 turnover. The same claim puts A7 at 15,000 regular business customers and up to 2,000 payments a day; all three figures are self-reported.
PSB claimThe Moldova connection
Ilan Shor co-owns A7 with PSB.
That places a sanctioned Moldovan oligarch inside infrastructure used for Russian cross-border payments.
Ownership and state backing
U.S. Treasury says A7 and its subsidiaries are owned by sanctioned Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and Promsvyazbank (PSB), the sanctioned Russian bank serving the defence sector. OSC documents Russian state backing and participation in the project.
OSC found A7 supplier payments reaching more than 80 jurisdictions; Treasury identifies Shor as one of A7’s owners.
Source discipline
Every claim says where it comes from.
Official sanctions findings, independent blockchain estimates, company figures and editorial inference stay separate throughout the page.
Governments have sanctioned A7 as sanctions-evasion infrastructure
Treasury, the UK and the EU have designated network entities and described A7/A7A5’s role in sanctions evasion.
Independent estimates show very large on-chain volume
Chainalysis and TRM use different scopes and methods; both find volumes in the tens or hundreds of billions.
PSB says ≈$140bn, 15,000 clients, 2,000 payments/day
All three figures come from PSB’s CEO. No public independent audit is available, and “turnover” can count the same value repeatedly.
Bank access and liquidity recur as pressure points
The Garantex→Grinex migration and OSC’s investigation point to replacement exchanges, foreign payment companies and correspondent-bank access as recurring enforcement targets.
Sources
Evidence behind each claim.
Each source below is linked to the claim it supports. PSB and A7 figures stay labelled as operator claims.
Reuters
Rouble-backed A7A5 stablecoin turnover nears $140 billion… ↗PSB figures on turnover, clients, payments/day and geographic distribution.
Wall Street Journal
Russia's Hottest Startup Is a State-Backed Sanctions Evasion Network ↗Shell companies, AI-assisted fake invoices, expansion and A7 scale claims. Treated as journalistic findings.
Open Source Centre
The Big Shor: A7 and the Illusion of Russian Financial Innovation ↗Core investigation on the fiat rail, front companies, invoices, SWIFT, TKKR, 80+ jurisdictions and circular transfers.
TRM Labs
The A7 Leaks: On-Chain Analysis ↗A7-associated on-chain volume and crypto’s distinct roles in liquidity and internal accounting.
UK FCDO
UK cracks down on backdoor Russian sanctions evasion ↗Expansion of enforcement toward exchanges and financial infrastructure around A7.
Chainalysis
EU’s 20th Russia Sanctions Package… ↗Updated $119.7bn A7A5 estimate and enforcement focus on third-country VASPs.
Chainalysis
Crypto Crime in 2025… ↗$93.3bn in 2025, weekday/weekend pattern, Instant Swapper >$2.2bn, Garantex/Grinex continuity.
Council of the EU
19th package of sanctions against Russia ↗A7A5 transaction prohibition and sanctions on key entities.
UK FCDO
UK targets sanctions circumvention and crypto networks ↗Designations of Grinex, Meer and Old Vector.
U.S. Treasury
Treasury Sanctions Cryptocurrency Exchange and Network… ↗A7 ownership, A7A5 issuer, Garantex→Grinex migration and use of A7A5 after disruption.
Financial Times
Crypto coin for Russian shadow payments moves $9bn ↗Early independent measurement and description of the A7A5→USDT bridge.
A7A5 / Old Vector
A7A5 documentation ↗Used only to describe the token’s stated design and 1:1 backing, not as independent validation.
Method and limits. This project combines official sanctions documents, investigations based on leaked records, blockchain analysis, journalism and operator statements. Wallet addresses, access routes and practical usage steps are omitted. Turnover is kept separate from trade value; simulator outcomes are labelled as observed or analytical. Version 1.1 · 10 August 2026.