Pax Silica
A declaration and cooperation framework for secure supply chains: minerals, energy, factories, chips and AI. It began with seven signatories, and the declaration is non-binding.
PAX-01 ↗ PAX-02 ↗Current explainer · 16 August 2026
The cold war under the chatbot
Models are the visible layer of the US-China competition. Underneath sit minerals, energy, factories, chips, data centres, rules and partners.
Editorial synthesis · based on documented policy, membership and industrial evidence
Pax Silica is a US initiative for supply chains and infrastructure. WAICO is an AI-cooperation organization launched in Shanghai, according to official sources. The guide below explains these names and their limits.
THE OBJECTONE SYSTEM · SEVEN LAYERS
The layer that looks like software rests on a supply chain with physical chokepoints. Governance touches every band.
00 / START HERE
In plain terms
What do these names mean?
They are not names for two armies. They describe projects and labels for how AI power is being organized.
WAICO
An intergovernmental organization for AI cooperation and governance, agreed by 29 countries and headquartered in Shanghai, according to official accounts.
WAICO-01 ↗ WAICO-02 ↗Pax Sinica
A phrase for an order more centred on China. It is not the name of a current AI organization and does not describe one official plan.
Read the term's limit ↗"The Chinese AI war" is a working phrase used by this page, not the official name of a Chinese programme.
91%China's share of rare-earth refining in 2024 STACK-01
29WAICO founding countries announced in July 2026 WAICO-01
7initial Pax Silica signatories in December 2025 PAX-01
945 TWhprojected data-centre electricity use in 2030, IEA base case STACK-02
01 / SHORT ANSWER
The competition is being built in layers.
Washington is organizing trusted access to the material and industrial stack. Beijing is combining domestic capacity, open cooperation, infrastructure reach and a bid to shape governance. Neither side owns the whole system.
What is real
Export controls, supply-chain policy, infrastructure diplomacy and rival AI plans are now linked parts of state strategy.
What is overstated
The idea of two sealed blocs. Kazakhstan appears in both Pax Silica and WAICO. The overlap is a fact. Full strategic alignment is an inference.
What remains open
The UN still convenes all states. Its AI process is a universal lane, even when it cannot settle the underlying rivalry.
02 / THE STACK
A guided cutaway
Move through the layers.
Select a band. The object stays put while the question changes.
FactINPUT · REFINING
Refining is a bargaining position.
In 2024, China accounted for 91% of global rare-earth refining output in the IEA's summary. The number describes refining, not every mineral, mine or AI component.
Why it matters: a supply-chain coalition can diversify mines faster than it can duplicate chemical processing, magnet production and qualified customers.
Limit: concentration is leverage. It is not proof of automatic control over another state's choices. STACK-01 ↗
ForecastINPUT · ELECTRICITY
Compute is an electricity project.
The IEA's base case puts global data-centre electricity demand at roughly 945 TWh in 2030, more than twice its 2024 level. AI-focused server power grows faster than the wider data-centre load.
Why it matters: grid connections, generation, cooling and permits can become as strategic as model quality.
Limit: this is a projection, not a guaranteed demand path. STACK-02 ↗
FactCONVERTER · SILICON
Chokepoints sit inside the chip.
ASML describes itself as the only maker of EUV lithography systems. TSMC reported that 7nm-and-below processes were 74% of its 2025 wafer revenue, with 2nm entering high-volume manufacturing in the fourth quarter.
Why it matters: an AI strategy can be constrained by tools, foundries, packaging and memory before a model reaches a user.
Limit: leading-edge concentration does not describe every chip or every manufacturing node. STACK-03 ↗ STACK-04 ↗
SynthesisCONVERTER · SCALE
Access is policy-shaped.
US export controls target advanced computing chips, manufacturing equipment and high-bandwidth memory. January 2026 guidance also created case-by-case review for some approved exports to China.
Why it matters: Washington is trying to reduce strategic dependence while managing a market that still has selective flows.
Limit: "managed interdependence" is an editorial synthesis. It describes the pattern, not an official doctrine. US-02 ↗ US-03 ↗
FactVISIBLE LAYER · MODELS
The model gap is narrow. The advantage is distributed.
Stanford's 2026 AI Index placed the leading US model only 2.7% ahead of the leading Chinese model in March 2026. The same report shows different advantages across private capital, data centres, publications, citations, patents and robots.
Why it matters: a single leaderboard cannot measure industrial capacity, diffusion or strategic resilience.
Limit: benchmark gaps are snapshots, and investment categories do not capture every public or state-directed resource. MODEL-01 ↗
ComparisonSIDE RAIL · GOVERNANCE
Governance touches every material layer.
Pax Silica's declaration links secure supply chains to economic and national security. China's Global AI Governance Action Plan links development, sovereignty, safety, open cooperation, infrastructure and UN channels. WAICO presents itself as a global cooperation organization.
Why it matters: standards and export rules decide who can build, buy, train, deploy and audit.
Limit: official purpose statements are evidence of what governments say they are building. They do not prove future implementation. PAX-02 ↗ CHINA-01 ↗ WAICO-02 ↗
Static reading
Every layer remains available above without JavaScript. The controls change emphasis, not the evidence.
03 / THE INSTITUTIONS
Different instruments
Two programmes. Different shapes.
The comparison is institutional. It is not a ranking of technological power.
PAX SILICA
A trusted supply chain
A US-led strategic initiative that connects critical minerals, energy, manufacturing, semiconductors, AI infrastructure, logistics and policy coordination.
- Instrument
- Non-binding declaration and cooperation framework.
- Origin
- Seven initial signatories on 12 December 2025.
- Promise
- Secure, prosperous and innovation-driven technology supply chains.
- Open question
- Can coordination become durable investment, infrastructure and end-user rules?
Documented The initiative's form and initial declaration are official. Its future effectiveness remains unknown. PAX-01 ↗
WAICO
Global cooperation, hosted in Shanghai
The World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization was agreed by 29 countries in July 2026 as an independent intergovernmental organization for AI cooperation and governance.
- Instrument
- Intergovernmental organization, headquartered in Shanghai.
- Origin
- Agreement announced on 16 July 2026.
- Promise
- AI that is beneficial, safe, fair and available through cooperation.
- Open question
- Can a broad forum produce shared capacity and rules without becoming a closed sphere?
Documented The official Chinese description emphasizes global cooperation. Its wider geopolitical significance is an interpretation. WAICO-01 ↗ WAICO-02 ↗
Interpretive boundary
China does not have one public programme called "the Chinese AI war". The evidence shows a family of connected domestic, diplomatic and infrastructure initiatives. The page keeps their official identities separate while examining their combined strategic effect.
04 / THE PHYSICAL EDGE
Material constraints
The chokepoints are physical.
A model can be copied, compressed or improved. A refinery, grid connection or lithography tool takes longer.
91%China's 2024 share of rare-earth refining.IEA · Fact · STACK-01
86%Average share held by the top three refiners across key minerals in 2024.IEA · Fact · STACK-01
1Company making EUV lithography systems at commercial scale.ASML · Fact · STACK-03
74%TSMC 2025 wafer revenue from 7nm-and-below processes.TSMC · Fact · STACK-04
This is why the phrase "AI race" is too thin. The contested object includes chemical processing, power, equipment, packaging, memory, software, standards and the ability to move them across borders.
05 / THE CROSSING CASE
One country, two lanes
The overlap is evidence.
A membership can be real without becoming a complete strategic alignment.
Fact
Kazakhstan is documented in both institutional lanes.
Inference
The overlap supports a porous-alignment reading. It does not establish equivalence between Pax Silica and WAICO, or reveal Kazakhstan's full technology policy.
Unknown
Whether either institution will change Kazakhstan's long-term procurement, infrastructure or standards choices.
The rivalry has two strong poles, several movable partners and one universal table.
06 / ILLUSTRATION
Connected networks
Two networks, one bridge.
An original illustration for atmosphere. It does not represent data, borders or membership.
07 / SELECTIVE CONNECTIONS
Controls and dependencies
The connection can tighten and remain a connection.
Use the switch as a model. It is an explanatory scenario, not a forecast.
Scenario lens
Controls and dependencies can coexist. That is the current condition.
The control line
US restrictions target advanced computing, manufacturing tools and HBM, with end-user compliance attached.
US-02 ↗ US-03 ↗The market line
Minerals, foundries, equipment, customers and knowledge still move through a globally connected system.
STACK-01 ↗ STACK-04 ↗This is the difference between decoupling as a slogan and interdependence as an operating condition. Policy can narrow a route without making the underlying system disappear.
08 / DISTRIBUTED ADVANTAGE
What the model race misses
No single scoreboard survives contact with the stack.
The figures measure different capacities. They should not be collapsed into one national score.
| Measure | US signal | China signal | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top model, March 2026 | Leads by 2.7% | Close behind | Frontier performance is near parity. |
| Private AI investment, 2025 | $285.9B | $12.4B | Private capital favours the US; state funding is not fully visible here. |
| Data-centre footprint | 5,427 centres | Second largest ecosystem | Compute infrastructure remains unevenly distributed. |
| Research and deployment | More top-tier models and higher-impact patents | More publications, citations, patents and robot installations | Leadership depends on the measure. |
Fact with scope These are Stanford's categories and definitions. They are a snapshot of capability, investment and output, not a forecast of geopolitical power. MODEL-01 ↗
09 / ANALOGY TEST
Useful until it isn't
Does "Cold War" help?
Use the historical analogy to ask better questions. Do not use it as a prediction.
DimensionWhat the analogy seesStrength
Strategic technology rivalryAI, chips, infrastructure and rules are tied to national security.High
Technology denialExport controls and trusted supply chains make access conditional.High
Two sealed blocsKazakhstan's dual participation and the wider market keep the system porous.Low
Universal exclusionThe UN still convenes 193 states and stakeholders on AI governance.Low
Verdict · editorial inference
Cold War language describes the strategic technology rivalry. It misleads when it predicts two sealed blocs with no room for overlap, trade or universal institutions.
The term "Pax Sinica" is treated here as a contested analytical label for a Chinese-centred order. It is not the name of a current Chinese AI organization. COLD-01 ↗
10 / THE OPEN LANE
Universal forum
The UN remains in the picture.
A universal process is not the same as a settled agreement.
193states adopted the Global Digital Compact in 2024.UN-01 ↗
4themes frame the 2026 Global AI Dialogue: opportunity, divides, trustworthy AI and human rights.UN-02 ↗
The universal lane gives countries a place to negotiate across rival systems. It does not erase export controls, industrial policy or power asymmetry. It keeps the field from becoming a private contest between two capitals.
Documented institutional space · outcomes remain open.
11 / THE BOUNDARY
What the evidence can carry
The evidence stops where the sources stop.
Fact
Documents record declarations, memberships, plans, controls, company disclosures and institutional processes.
Inference
The stack is a useful unit for reading the rivalry. "Managed interdependence" and "porous alignment" are syntheses.
Unknown
Whether these institutions will deliver durable infrastructure, shared rules or lasting strategic alignment.
12 / SOURCE DESK
Primary documents first
Read the trail.
Checked 16 August 2026.
Source IDs sit beside claims so the fact and the interpretation can be audited separately. The ledger below is selective in the interface and broader in the project source file.
FactForecastInferenceUnknown
PAX-01 Pax Silica declaration and initial signatories
Australian Department of Industry, 12 December 2025. Official overview of the non-binding declaration and the initial seven signatories.
Open source ↗PAX-02 Signed Pax Silica Declaration
Australian Department of Industry, 12 December 2025. Primary text on secure supply chains, economic security, AI, energy, minerals, manufacturing and infrastructure.
Open source ↗PAX-03 Kazakhstan accession
Government of Kazakhstan, 25 June 2026. Official announcement of Kazakhstan joining Pax Silica and the AI Opportunity Partnership.
Open source ↗WAICO-01 29 countries establish WAICO
State Council Information Office of China, 17 July 2026. Official account of the founding agreement, Shanghai headquarters and example members including Kazakhstan.
Open source ↗WAICO-02 Chinese MFA on WAICO
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 17 July 2026. Official framing of WAICO as a global AI cooperation and governance organization.
Open source ↗CHINA-01 Global AI Governance Action Plan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 26 July 2025. Principles, infrastructure, standards, open-source cooperation, Global South capacity and UN channels.
Open source ↗CHINA-02 AI Plus policy
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 26 August 2025. State Council goals for AI adoption across industry, services, healthcare, education and governance.
Open source ↗US-01 American AI Technology Stack export programme
White House, July 2025. Executive order describing full-stack exports, end-user compliance and reduced dependence on adversary technology.
Open source ↗US-02 Advanced semiconductor export controls
US Bureau of Industry and Security, December 2024. Controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, HBM and Entity List additions.
Open source ↗US-03 Case-by-case semiconductor review
US Bureau of Industry and Security, 13 January 2026. Revised license-review policy for selected advanced chips exported to China.
Open source ↗STACK-01 Rare-earth and critical-mineral concentration
International Energy Agency, 2025. China's refining concentration and the global diversification problem.
Open source ↗STACK-02 Energy and AI
International Energy Agency, 2025. Base-case data-centre electricity projection and the physical energy demand of AI.
Open source ↗STACK-03 ASML 2025 annual report
ASML, 2026. Company disclosure describing ASML's position as the only EUV lithography-system maker.
Open source ↗STACK-04 TSMC 2025 annual report
TSMC, 2026. Advanced-node revenue mix and 2nm high-volume manufacturing disclosure.
Open source ↗MODEL-01 Stanford AI Index 2026
Stanford HAI, 2026. Model performance, investment, data centres, research, patents and robot-installation comparisons.
Open source ↗UN-01 Global Digital Compact
United Nations, adopted 2024. Universal commitments on digital divides, data governance and AI cooperation.
Open source ↗UN-02 Global AI Dialogue
United Nations, 2026. FAQ and process for the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, including the four themes used here.
Open source ↗COLD-01 New and Old Cold Wars
Global Studies Quarterly, Oxford Academic, 2025. Scholarly analysis of how technology-war narratives carry and distort Cold War comparisons.
Open source ↗Note
Checked 16 August 2026. Figures and institutional membership can change.