Desire / a field guide

What We Mean When We Say We Want

Desire is built from body, memory and other people. Research shows how a cue becomes tempting, why pleasure can lag behind wanting, and why the same person can want something in one context and refuse it in another.

Long-form atlas≈ 25 min core≈ 45 min with sourcesEvidence checked 14 Aug 2026

Scope. This is an educational guide, including an adult section on sexual desire. It is not personal, medical or therapeutic advice. Sexual health requires respect, safety, freedom from coercion, discrimination and violence; the WHO framing is part of the atlas, not a footnote.32

01 · wanting

Wanting can arrive before liking, and outlast it.

02 · context

The brakes are part of the experience: safety, attention and meaning change the field.

03 · history

A desire has a history. Repetition, culture and institutions teach a cue what it promises.

The short answer

A desire is a prediction with a body attached.

It begins with a state, meets a cue, imagines an outcome, assigns value and prepares movement. The result can be approach, avoidance, delay, fantasy, repetition or a deliberate refusal. “Want” names the felt pressure of that process; it does not identify one single substance in the brain.

The same architecture can carry very different contents. Hunger can make a smell vivid. A message can promise belonging. A difficult question can pull attention toward an answer. A familiar screen can offer relief before anything on it has happened. Erotic desire can combine bodily arousal, attraction, imagination, relationship, identity and a sense of safety. The loop is shared; the meanings are not.

That is why “what turns people on?” has no universal list of objects. A stimulus becomes attractive through the relation among body, learning, attention, social meaning, timing and permission. The scientifically useful question is often more specific: what changed in the field around this person, at this moment, for this cue?

editorial synthesisindividual differences are large
The signature mechanism

Watch one loop change its costume.

Select a desire. The six steps stay recognisable while the body state, cue, promise and social consequences change. This is a teaching model assembled from reward, motivation, learning and relationship research, not a diagnostic instrument.

Body → cue → prediction → value → action → learning

01Bodyneed, energy, arousal or strain
02Cueobject, person, place, image or memory
03Predictionwhat the cue seems to promise
04Valuepleasure, relief, status, meaning or contact
05Actionapproach, avoid, imagine, delay or refuse
06Learningthe next encounter inherits a history

Food

Hunger changes the body; smell or packaging becomes a cue; the mind predicts satiety and pleasure; eating can bring both reward and relief. Satiation changes the value of the next bite. The cue can later work before hunger returns.

Wanting the food, liking the taste and learning the cue are related events. They are not the same event.Berridge, Robinson & Aldridge; Schultz
01 · reward science

Wanting, liking and learning travel together until they do not.

One of the most useful corrections to everyday language came from separating the components of reward. A cue can produce approach and attention, an outcome can feel pleasurable, and the nervous system can learn the route. The three signals influence one another without collapsing into one thing.13

wanting · incentive salience

“Go toward it.”

Wanting is the motivational pull that makes a cue attention-grabbing and an action worth effort. Dopamine is important to this machinery, especially in cue-driven pursuit; calling it the brain’s pleasure chemical loses the distinction.1

study + model
liking · hedonic impact

“This feels good.”

Liking is the experienced pleasure of an outcome. It can be supported by partly distinct systems, including hedonic hotspots. A person can continue to want an outcome whose pleasure has flattened, or enjoy something without pursuing more of it.4

study + model
learning · update the map

“Remember the route.”

Prediction error updates what a cue means: better than expected, as expected or worse than expected. Cues can become potent even when the reward is delayed, changed or absent. Learning gives tomorrow’s desire a memory.2

model supported by studies
02 · interoception and allostasis

The body writes the first draft.

Desire is partly a reading of internal conditions: hunger, thirst, sleep, heat, pain, hormonal change, illness, stress and available energy. Interoception is the sensing and interpretation of those conditions, not a magical inner truth. The brain is constantly estimating what the body needs and what an action will cost.567

This makes desire state-dependent. The same meal can be invitation, nuisance or emergency depending on satiety and stress. The same conversation can feel nourishing after isolation and demanding after overload. A body under strain can value immediate relief more heavily because effort, uncertainty and future planning have become expensive.

The body also prepares ahead of need. Allostatic accounts of motivation describe the nervous system as estimating future energy demand and the effort required to meet it. That estimate can produce a felt “I need to move” before a need is fully conscious. The experience is real; the interpretation can still be wrong.

Physiology and experience can diverge. In sexual-arousal research, a meta-analysis of 132 laboratory studies found stronger agreement between genital and self-reported measures in men than in women, with methods and timing affecting the result. The finding is about measurement, not permission: bodily response is never consent and never a complete report of desire.29

laboratory meta-analysismeasurement is not meaning
03 · the context field

The brakes are part of desire.

In the Dual Control Model of sexual response, excitation and inhibition interact. People vary in their proneness to both, and variation itself is ordinary. The model is most useful as a reminder that desire is not produced by “gas” alone: threat, evaluation, pain, fatigue, shame, conflict, privacy and time can change the same cue.2728

Safety

Can attention stay with the experience, or is the body scanning for consequences?

Attention

Is the cue vivid enough to compete with stress, screens, pain or performance monitoring?

Meaning

Does the moment promise pleasure, closeness, identity, relief, status or a role one does not want?

Permission

Is there genuine autonomy, mutuality and a live ability to stop? This is an ethical boundary, not a mood variable.

Change the field

No single condition explains desire. The field stays mixed until body, cue, meaning and consequences are read together.

opensnarrowschangesprotectscontext
is active
04 · erotic desire

There is no single script for sexual wanting.

Sexual motivation contains physical, emotional, goal-oriented and insecurity-related motives. Meston and Buss identified 237 expressed reasons for sex in one nomination study and organised ratings from 1,549 participants into four broad factors and 13 subfactors.24 A later Hungarian replication identified 197 reasons in free responses and described a similarly diverse motivational field.25

Desire can be spontaneous, arriving as an appetite; it can also be responsive, emerging after affectionate contact, attention, attraction or a sense that the context is becoming safe and rewarding. Rosemary Basson’s circular model made room for this second pattern. Later studies show that no single model describes everyone, including people without sexual difficulties; models are tools for fit, not tests of normality.26

Fantasies add another warning against moral shortcuts. In a population survey of 1,516 adults rating 55 fantasies, only two fantasies were statistically rare for women or men; many themes commonly labelled unusual were common in the sample. Content alone does not tell us whether a fantasy is distressing, consensual, enacted, wanted or harmful.30

In couples, desire is also dyadic. A 35-day diary and 12-month study of 229 same-sex/gender and mixed-sex/gender couples found that desire discrepancy predicted sexual distress at the next day and at 12 months; the result supports addressing the relationship and its negotiation, not assigning one person the role of defective desire.31

adult researchvariation is the findingconsent is non-negotiable
05 · learning and habit

A cue is a small promise with a long memory.

Repeatedly pairing a context with an outcome teaches the nervous system what to notice. Habits form when responses become associated with stable features of a situation; goals can create and maintain those repetitions, while a changed context can loosen the association.910

The cue does not have to look like the reward. A doorway can predict a conversation; a time of night can predict a screen; a vibration can predict social information; a particular room can predict relief. Uncertainty can make attention stickier, though the effect depends on what uncertainty does to expected value and reinforcement rate. “Variable reward” is a useful design concern, not a universal law of irresistible apps.

Digital environments compress cues, feedback and repetition. A 2025 preregistered study across problematic gaming, buying/shopping, pornography and social-network use found heightened cue reactivity in risky and pathological groups, including responses to generic start or log-in screens. The result supports cue-reactivity as one mechanism in problematic use; it does not show that every frequent user has an addiction or that one platform explains a person’s behaviour.40

When a pattern is costly, changing the field often beats arguing with the urge. Alter the cue, add a pause, make the intended action easier, change the stable context and observe what happens. A habit is history embedded in a situation; the situation is therefore part of the intervention.

longitudinal and preregistered evidencesmall environmental experiment
06 · time, scarcity and self-control

The nearer future can shout louder.

People often discount delayed rewards in a curved, hyperbolic way. A smaller reward available now can temporarily beat a larger reward later, especially when an immediate bodily state makes the future feel abstract.1112

That is why intentions made in a calm state can be revised by hunger, arousal, fatigue, anger, loneliness or fear. The “hot” state does not simply reveal a hidden true preference; it changes the weights in the decision. A future self becomes easier to protect when the environment carries the plan: a default, a calendar cue, a prepared meal, a blocked notification or a pre-committed conversation.

Scarcity changes the field before any individual choice. Experiments and farm-cycle data in a widely discussed Science paper found that thoughts about financial strain and moments of poverty could consume cognitive resources; later work also found that experimentally reduced bandwidth could lower reported enjoyment of consumption. The point is not that poverty creates bad choices. Material pressure changes attention, capacity and the value of immediate relief.1314

Implementation intentions help by converting a vague wish into a cue-linked plan: “If situation X occurs, I will do Y.” They are modest tools, not a substitute for changing a harmful environment or meeting a real need.15

07 · belonging, status and imitation

Other people are inside the object.

Many desires are relational in disguise. We may want an object because it grants entry, recognition, safety, independence, desirability or a story about who we are. The need to belong describes a recurring desire for frequent, non-aversive interaction within ongoing bonds; social reward research shows that reputation can recruit some of the same striatal machinery as money.1618

attachment

The person can be the reward.

Mutual attention, responsiveness and the expectation of continued contact can make approach feel safe. Exclusion can create an approach-avoidance conflict: connection is wanted while the social field feels dangerous.

status

The audience can be the reward.

Money, praise, rank and reputation can overlap in reward processing. The overlap helps explain why public recognition can be energising; it does not make social and monetary value interchangeable.18

mimesis

The model can be the cue.

Festinger’s social-comparison theory and Girard’s literary account of mediated desire point to a social fact: we often learn what to want by seeing what another person notices, owns, praises or pursues.19

Self-determination theory adds a different vocabulary: autonomy, competence and relatedness. Across domains, people tend to sustain motivation more easily when they can experience choice, effectiveness and connection. A 2022 meta-analysis of 144 studies and more than 79,000 students found that teacher autonomy support predicted need satisfaction and self-determined motivation, with competence the strongest predictor in that educational sample.17

These are not three universal buttons. Autonomy can mean independence in one setting and the ability to choose one’s obligations in another. Relatedness can be intimate, communal, spiritual or professional. The value of a desire is partly inherited from the relationships and institutions that make its outcome legible.

08 · culture, development and evolution

Culture gives the wish its accent.

Human desire has bodily constraints and learned meanings. Culture shapes the self that evaluates an outcome, the roles that make it respectable, the objects that signal membership and the futures that count as success. The self and its contexts then remake one another over time.2021

The first caution is sampling. Behavioural science has often generalised from Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic populations. Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan’s review argued that these samples can be outliers across perception, fairness, cooperation, reasoning, moral judgement, self-concepts and motivation. A study with a large sample is not automatically a study of “human nature.”20

The second caution is the difference between averages and persons. A 45-country, 14,399-person replication found robust average sex differences in some mate preferences while also finding cultural variation and a relationship between gender equality and age preferences. The authors did not show that biology or culture alone explains individual desire. Evolutionary and biosocial accounts can generate hypotheses; they cannot replace attention to a person’s history, situation, agency and structural options.2223

Desire also changes across the life course. The YSEX replication across 4,655 participants in different age groups found the same five top reasons across groups while preserving a wide taxonomy of motives. Continuity and change can coexist: the broad human capacity is stable while the cue, role, body and meaning move.25

cross-cultural researchdo not infer the individual from the mean
09 · emotions as instruments

People sometimes want the feeling that will help.

Hedonic accounts say we seek pleasant feelings and avoid unpleasant ones. Instrumental accounts add a second motive: an emotion can be desired because someone expects it to be useful. Across five studies, Tamir and colleagues found that making anger or anxiety seem useful increased people’s motivation to experience it and shaped emotion-consistent behaviour, including when the goal was activated outside awareness.34

This explains why someone can want fear in a horror film, grief in a song, anger before a negotiation, nervousness before a performance or sadness that keeps a bond vivid. “Pleasant” is one value signal among others: information, energy, coherence, identity and progress can matter too.

It also explains a paradox. Valuing happiness too intensely can make people monitor the gap between their actual mood and an ideal mood, reducing the very happiness they are trying to secure. The goal can become another source of pressure.35

The practical distinction is between what a feeling is doing and whether its cost is acceptable. An emotion can be functional in one moment and punishing when it becomes the only available route. Meaning, flexibility and consequences decide more than valence alone.

10 · when wanting and well-being split

A strong desire is not automatically a disorder.

Craving, compulsion, anhedonia, depression, medication effects, trauma, chronic stress and relationship conflict can change the loop. Incentive-sensitisation research describes a route in which cues become more powerful while pleasure fails to rise with wanting; cue-reactivity meta-analyses find partly overlapping networks across drug, gambling, food and sexual cues.138

Overlap is not equivalence. A brain region responding to a cue does not identify a diagnosis, and a repeated behaviour does not become an addiction simply because it is frequent. The clinically relevant questions are about loss of flexibility, persistent impairment, distress, safety, consent and consequences. Distress caused only by moral condemnation is not the same thing as a disorder.

WHO’s ICD-11 classifies compulsive sexual behaviour disorder within impulse-control disorders, while sexual-health researchers emphasise careful assessment and the risk of pathologising consensual, non-heteronormative or simply uncommon sexuality. There is no “normal desire level” that can be inferred from gender, orientation, fantasy or relationship status.3339

If desire changes sharply, causes suffering, interferes with life, involves coercion or feels impossible to control, a qualified clinician is the right next source of interpretation. This atlas can supply vocabulary; it cannot supply an assessment.

clinical reviewno diagnosis here
11 · a field guide for your own life

Make the desire more precise.

The aim is not to suppress wanting or obey every urge. It is to see which part of the loop is asking for attention, then change one condition and observe the result with less shame and more information.

01 · name the target

Object, action, state or relation?

“I want the phone” may mean information, relief, company, stimulation or a break from a task. Name the thing the action is trying to produce.

02 · split the signals

Wanting, liking, outcome.

Write three lines: what pulls me, what I expect to feel, and what happened last time. Desire becomes testable when prediction meets result.

03 · map the field

Body, cue, story, people, time.

Note sleep, hunger, pain, stress, place, audience, identity, friction and urgency. Context is data, not an excuse or a verdict.

04 · change one variable

Run a small experiment.

Move the cue, add a pause, make a desired action easier, ask for clearer reciprocity or test the desire in a different time and place.

05 · relationships

Negotiate the meaning.

Ask: do we want the same activity, the same feeling or the same reassurance? Keep refusal possible. Agreement is a condition, not an afterthought.

06 · review

What did the loop learn?

Record the immediate result and the next-day result. A successful experiment changes the map, not just the moment.

This is a reflective tool, not a treatment protocol. Use professional support for persistent distress, trauma, compulsive behaviour, medication effects, sexual pain, safety concerns or any situation involving coercion. The right response to a desire may be nourishment, a boundary, a conversation, a medical check, a new environment or permission to let the desire pass.

12 · what remains unsettled

The map is useful because it has blank areas.

Desire research can describe mechanisms without exhausting the felt experience. The open questions are not an embarrassment at the edge of the field; they are the field’s honest border.

measurement

What is the unit?

Self-report, physiology, behaviour, neural activity and language each reveal a different slice. There is no objective desire meter.

translation

When does a model travel?

Animal reward models illuminate components; they do not automatically settle human meaning, consent, culture or autobiographical memory.

ecology

What do algorithms change?

Digital systems alter cue density, feedback speed, social comparison and available pauses. Long-term causal evidence is still catching up.

variation

What counts as difference?

Age, sex, gender, orientation, disability, medication, trauma, class and culture may change a loop without defining a person’s capacity for desire.

ethics

Who benefits from the desire?

Institutions can amplify wanting while shifting costs to the person. A desire may be genuine and still be cultivated by a market or norm.

agency

What does freedom mean?

Freedom is more than choosing among cues. It includes the ability to change a context, refuse a role and build a future that remains inhabitable.

Method and limits

Read the claims at their proper distance.

This atlas is an editorial synthesis, not a systematic review or a clinical guideline. It uses primary studies, reviews, models, official health guidance and published philosophical/cultural works. Links point to PubMed, DOI records, WHO or stable book texts where available.

What counts as evidence here?

Study means an empirical paper, meta-analysis or preregistered/cross-cultural dataset. Model means a theory used to organise findings. Synthesis marks a conclusion made by connecting sources. Caution marks a boundary, disagreement or measurement limit. Practice is a small reflective experiment, not a proven treatment.

What does “turn on” mean in this atlas?

It means that a cue, condition or meaning increases approach, attention, arousal, expected value or willingness to continue for some people in some contexts. It does not mean universal attraction, conscious endorsement, consent, safety or a promise of pleasure.

What does “turn off” mean?

It can mean inhibition, loss of attention, reduced expected value, pain, threat, satiation, boredom, learned avoidance, shame, conflict or an ethical refusal. A turn-off may protect a person from a situation that should not continue.

How current is the research?

The evidence search and health-guidance check were completed on 14 August 2026. The page favours durable sources, but digital-use research, diagnostic language and clinical guidance can change. Recheck current guidance before making a health decision.

A reading shelf

Studies, models and works to keep open.

The references are part of the object. Start with the first ten for the core mechanism, then follow the shelves into sex research, social motivation, culture, economics, digital environments and the long history of thinking about desire.

Filter the shelf. Every visible claim on this page points into it.

  1. 01 · model / reviewBerridge & Robinson (2016), “Liking, wanting, and the incentive-sensitization theory of addiction”

    Separates incentive salience from pleasure and explains why cue-driven wanting can outlast liking.

  2. 02 · study / neuroscienceSchultz, Dayan & Montague (1997), “A neural substrate of prediction and reward”

    Classic primate evidence for reward-prediction-error signalling in dopamine neurons.

  3. 03 · review / componentsBerridge, Robinson & Aldridge (2009), “Dissecting components of reward”

    A compact account of liking, wanting and learning as separable reward processes.

  4. 04 · review / pleasureBerridge & Kringelbach (2015), “Pleasure systems in the brain”

    Reviews hedonic hotspots and the neural architecture of pleasure.

  5. 05 · review / bodyCraig (2002), “How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body”

    Foundational account of interoception as a bodily sense.

  6. 06 · review / predictive bodyBarrett & Simmons (2015), “Interoceptive predictions in the brain”

    Predictive-processing account of how the brain models internal bodily states.

  7. 07 · review / allostasisTouroutoglou et al. (2020), “Motivation in the Service of Allostasis”

    Connects motivation, effort, interoception and the anterior mid-cingulate cortex.

  8. 08 · study / curiosityGruber, Gelman & Ranganath (2014), “States of curiosity modulate hippocampus-dependent learning”

    High curiosity improved memory for answers and incidental material while engaging dopaminergic circuitry.

  9. 09 · review / habitWood & Neal (2007), “A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface”

    Explains how stable contexts cue habits and how goals interact with, rather than erase, them.

  10. 10 · longitudinal study / habitLally et al. (2010), “How are habits formed?”

    Real-world repetition study that made habit formation look gradual and highly variable.

  11. 11 · theory / timeAinslie (1975), “Specious reward”

    Behavioral theory of impulsiveness and hyperbolic delay discounting.

  12. 12 · review / visceral statesLoewenstein (1996), “Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior”

    Shows how hot bodily states reshape valuation and self-prediction.

  13. 13 · study / scarcityMani et al. (2013), “Poverty impedes cognitive function”

    Experiments and farm-cycle data on financial concerns and cognitive bandwidth.

  14. 14 · study / scarcityShah, Mullainathan & Shafir (2012), “Some consequences of having too little”

    Scarcity can narrow attention toward the scarce resource and alter decision-making.

  15. 15 · review / planningGollwitzer (1999), “Implementation intentions”

    Shows how if-then plans link intentions to cues and action.

  16. 16 · review / belongingBaumeister & Leary (1995), “The need to belong”

    Argues that stable interpersonal attachment is a pervasive human motivation.

  17. 17 · theory / motivationRyan & Deci (2000), “Self-determination theory”

    Autonomy, competence and relatedness as basic psychological needs.

  18. 18 · fMRI study / social rewardIzuma, Saito & Sadato (2008), “Processing of social and monetary rewards”

    Reputation and money both activated reward-related striatal regions in a small fMRI study.

  19. 19 · social theoryFestinger (1954), “A theory of social comparison processes”

    Classic account of how people evaluate themselves through comparison with others.

  20. 20 · cross-cultural reviewHenrich, Heine & Norenzayan (2010), “The weirdest people in the world?”

    Warns against treating WEIRD samples as representative of humanity.

  21. 21 · review / self and cultureMarkus & Kitayama (1991), “Culture and the self”

    Independent and interdependent self-construals as culturally patterned motivational contexts.

  22. 22 · preregistered cross-cultural studyWalter et al. (2020), “Sex differences in mate preferences across 45 countries”

    Large replication testing evolutionary and biosocial perspectives with 14,399 participants.

  23. 23 · review / matingBuss & Schmitt (2019), “Mate preferences and their behavioral manifestations”

    Reviews context-specific mating strategies, similarities, differences and cultural variation.

  24. 24 · study / sexual motivesMeston & Buss (2007), “Why humans have sex”

    237 reasons; 1,549 ratings; four broad factors and 13 subfactors.

  25. 25 · replication / age groupsWyverkens et al. (2018), “YSEX? A replication study in different age groups”

    4,655 participants and a broad taxonomy of sexual motives across ages.

  26. 26 · model / sexual responseBasson (2000), “The female sexual response: a different model”

    Circular, context-sensitive account of responsive sexual desire.

  27. 27 · model review / sexual responseBancroft, Graham, Janssen & Sanders (2009), “The dual control model”

    Sexual excitation and inhibition as interacting, individually variable processes.

  28. 28 · scoping review / 152 papersJanssen & Bancroft (2023), “The Dual Control Model of Sexual Response”

    Maps applications of excitation and inhibition research from 2009 to 2022.

  29. 29 · meta-analysis / 132 studiesChivers et al. (2010), “Agreement of self-reported and genital measures of sexual arousal”

    Separates physiological measures from subjective reports and their methodological moderators.

  30. 30 · population survey / fantasiesJoyal, Cossette & Lapierre (2015), “What exactly is an unusual sexual fantasy?”

    1,516 adults rated 55 fantasies; statistical rarity and stigma are not the same.

  31. 31 · daily diary + longitudinal couples studyJodouin et al. (2021), “Discrepancy in dyadic sexual desire predicts sexual distress”

    229 couples; desire discrepancy predicted later sexual distress in both time horizons.

  32. 32 · official health guidanceWorld Health Organization, “Defining sexual health”

    Sexual health as well-being, safety, respect, pleasure and freedom from coercion.

  33. 33 · official classificationWHO, ICD-11 overview

    Context for compulsive sexual behaviour disorder as an impulse-control classification.

  34. 34 · five studies / emotion goalsTamir et al. (2015), “An expectancy-value model of emotion regulation”

    Expected usefulness can make people want anger or anxiety and act in emotion-consistent ways.

  35. 35 · emotion studyMauss et al. (2011), “Can seeking happiness make people unhappy?”

    Valuing happiness too intensely can create monitoring pressure and reduce well-being.

  36. 36 · fMRI / purchase anticipationKnutson et al. (2007), “Neural predictors of purchases”

    Anticipated gain, price and purchase decisions recruit distinguishable signals.

  37. 37 · meta-analysis / cue reactivityNoori et al. (2016), “Largely overlapping neuronal substrates of reactivity to drug, gambling, food and sexual cues”

    176 studies and 5,573 individuals; overlapping cue-reactivity networks with modality-specific differences.

  38. 38 · behavioral addiction modelBrand et al. (2019), “The I-PACE model”

    Person, affect, cognition and execution as interacting processes in problematic behaviours.

  39. 39 · clinical reviewAssessment and treatment of compulsive sexual behavior disorder (2024)

    Clinical cautions around diagnosis, misdiagnosis, stigma and sexual medicine expertise.

  40. 40 · preregistered cue-reactivity studyAntons et al. (2025), “Cue reactivity towards distal cues in problematic internet use”

    Generic log-in screens can function as cues in diagnostically validated problematic-use groups.

  41. 41 · meta-analysis / rewardsDeci, Koestner & Ryan (1999), “A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards”

    Important debate about how external rewards can alter intrinsic motivation.

  42. 42 · motivational theoryHiggins (1997), “Beyond pleasure and pain”

    Regulatory focus: promotion and prevention organise different kinds of wanting.

  43. 43 · motivated cognitionKunda (1990), “The case for motivated reasoning”

    Desire can shape which reasons feel available and persuasive.

  44. 44 · literary theoryRené Girard (1961), Deceit, Desire and the Novel

    Mediated or mimetic desire: the model can organise the object’s value.

  45. 45 · social theoryThorstein Veblen (1899), The Theory of the Leisure Class

    Conspicuous consumption and status display as social communication.

  46. 46 · sociologyPierre Bourdieu (1979), Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste

    Taste as classed practice, learned distinction and social positioning.

  47. 47 · cultural theorySara Ahmed (2004), The Cultural Politics of Emotion

    How feelings circulate through bodies, signs, histories and institutions.

  48. 48 · cultural theoryLauren Berlant (2011), Cruel Optimism

    When an attachment to a desired object makes flourishing harder to reach.

  49. 49 · philosophy of agencyHarry Frankfurt (1971), “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”

    First-order desires, second-order volitions and the question of what it means to identify with a desire.

  50. 50 · philosophyBaruch Spinoza, Ethics

    Desire as the striving by which a being persists and becomes intelligible through its powers.

  51. 51 · philosophyAristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

    Appetite, deliberation, habituation and the practical formation of character.

  52. 52 · psychoanalysisSigmund Freud (1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle

    A historical attempt to think about repetition, compulsion and the limits of pleasure as a master principle.

  53. 53 · social learningAlbert Bandura (1977), Social Learning Theory

    Models, observation, imitation and self-efficacy as routes by which desire and action are learned.

  54. 54 · persuasionRobert Cialdini (1984), Influence

    Social proof, scarcity, authority, reciprocity and commitment as recurring influence principles.

  55. 55 · sociology of intimacyEva Illouz (2007), Cold Intimacies

    How markets and emotional life can become entangled in modern relationships.

  56. 56 · technology and marketsShoshana Zuboff (2019), The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

    A critical account of behavioural prediction, extraction and the commercial shaping of action.

The philosophical and cultural works are not empirical proof for the behavioural claims. They are lenses: ways of asking what a laboratory measure leaves out, who benefits from a norm, and how a private feeling becomes a public economy.