CIA · President's Daily Brief · declasificat în 2015 și 2016
România în buletinul președintelui american: 1973
34 de zile din 1973 în care buletinul CIA pentru președintele SUA numește România: 39 de paragrafe, scanate și transcrise, cu pasajele încă secrete marcate.
amintită în textîn parte încă secret
Warsaw Pact:
Miniștrii de externe ai Tratatului de la Varșovia se vor întâlni la Moscova. Românii, neinvitați la discuțiile despre reducerea forțelor, fac demersuri în capitalele occidentale ca să fie incluși.
foreign ministers of the pact states will meet in Moscow over the weekend to deal with the resumption next week of the multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the West's invitation to begin talks on force reductions on 31 January. The Romanians, who were not invited to participate in the latter meetings, are lobbying in Western capitals for their inclusion. We expect they will take up the matter in Moscow as well.
Potrivit ambasadorului francez, Brejnev i s-a plâns lui Pompidou de disputele sterile de la pregătirile conferinței de securitate. Cu președintele finlandez Kekkonen fusese mai direct și îi atacase pe români.
The French ambassador in Moscow briefed Ambassador Beam yesterday on the meetings last week between President Pompidou and party leader Brezhnev.
Brezhnev professed to be very unhappy over the inconclusive wrangling during the first round of the preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He complained that the big powers had not exerted their "moral authority," thus permitting those "with fewer reponsibilities" to try to take the lead.
Brezhnev was more pointed in his recent talks with Finnish President Kekkonen when he specifically blasted the Romanians and tried to get the Finnish chairman to control the talks more effectively.
Brezhnev did hint that the Soviets may propose confidence-building measures more attractive to the smaller countries. He remained insistent, however, that the conference be completed as soon as possible and that it end with a summit-level meeting.
Brezhnev reiterated Soviet interest in the strict separation of the CSCE from the forthcoming talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. Pompidou was noncommittal on Brezhnev's call for French participation in the force reduction talks.
Commenting on US-Soviet relations, Brezhnev said there had been "no basic change" since the May summit, although "progress had been more deliberate than at first thought." He said his visit to the US would be made at the "most appropriate time," and that the schedule would be influenced by the international situation, US-Soviet relations, and domestic demands on his time. Brezhnev told the French it is now possible to envisage a Vietnam agreement and stressed that the USSR strongly desires this result.
Brezhnev admitted to Pompidou that he had been ill last autumn and absent from his duties for about two months. He seems fully back in good health now. He was relaxed and showed plenty of stamina in long sessions with Pompidou.
URSS și aliații ei acceptă discuțiile despre reducerea forțelor în Europa, cerând să fie deschise și altor state europene interesate. Poziția ar trebui să mulțumească România, care vrea participare largă.
The USSR and its allies, in agreeing to take part in talks on force reductions in Europe, have added that the talks should be open to "other European states that indicate an appropriate interest." The Hungarian official who presented his government's note made it clear that this formulation does not exclude neutrals.
This position, reached during the Warsaw Pact meetings earlier this week, should meet Romania's desire for broad participation in the talks and places the burden on the West for excluding any interested European state.
The Warsaw Pact proposals on participation apply, as do the Western proposals, only to the forthcoming preparatory talks, not the actual negotiations planned to get under way next autumn.
The Pact countries proposed Vienna as the site for the preparatory talks whereas the West had put forward Geneva.
Most Western countries are not likely to object to Vienna, and some prefer it because other disarmament talks are being held in Geneva.
Țările Tratatului de la Varșovia vin la Viena, la discuțiile pregătitoare despre reducerea forțelor. Potrivit sovieticilor, România și Bulgaria vor fi doar observatori dacă zona de reducere nu le include.
Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have replied to NATO that they plan to send delegations to Vienna on 31 January for preparatory talks on mutual force reductions. The Pact reply proposes that the question of inviting other states to participate be decided at these discussions. The note specified, however, that actual reductions be negotiated only by states whose territory and forces are directly involved.
The Soviets added orally that Romania and Bulgaria would be coming to the preparatory talks but would revert to observer status if it is decided that the area for reduction should not include these two states. Moscow reiterated its view that neutrals who so desire should eventually be permitted to participate in some capacity.
The Pact proposal to include neutrals in the force reduction talks has had the unintended effect of increasing support among neutral and Western countries for dealing with broad military issues at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Most neutral states think that if there is to be a general discussion of force reduction issues, it might as well take place at the CSCE while actual troop cuts are negotiated in the other conference.
Dacă România și Bulgaria mai insistă la Viena să fie participanți deplini, țările NATO de pe „flancuri” vor cere din nou același statut. Delegații sovietici prevăd că românii vor ceda.
After an unstructured initial session, the delegations in Vienna are trying through informal contacts to work out procedures so that a formal plenary session can be held early next week. If the Romanian and Bulgarian delegations continue to insist on being full and equal participants, the NATO "flank" countries--Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey--will renew their campaign for full status. Soviet delegation members predict, however, that the Romanians will back off.
După o recoltă slabă, Chile vrea să importe circa 1,3 milioane de tone de grâu. România e una dintre cele șase țări cu care a contractat cam jumătate din necesar.
Because of a shortfall in its wheat production, Chile is seeking to boost this year's imports to some 1.3 million tons, 73 percent above the 1972 total. Santiago has signed contracts with Argentina, the USSR, Australia, South Africa, Romania, and Bulgaria for about half its needs, but has been unable to obtain any more from them. Chilean officials state that the US and Canada are the only possible sources for the balance of this year's requirements. The wheat from the USSR amounts to 100,000 tons and is part of the 1 million ton Soviet-Australian grain deal, concluded late last year.
Disputa despre participarea Ungariei la discuțiile de reducere a forțelor a scos România din prim-plan. Potrivit unui diplomat român, Macovescu spune că SUA au păcălit România.
On Saturday, the Soviet delegation to the preparatory talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions stated as a "final" position that either Hungary should be excluded from direct participation in the negotiations or that Italy and Hungary should participate together. Chief Soviet delegate Khlestov noted that the Hungarian problem could have been avoided if the West had accepted Moscow's earlier proposal that all delegations have equal status when the talks begin.
NATO powers originally considered Hungary a full participant and thought they had Budapest's consent for this status. Subsequently, however, Soviet delegates announced that Hungary wished to be an observer. Italy does not wish to be a full participant.
One effect of the Soviet position could be to slow the talks. The Soviets are aware that the Benelux states tend to link their participation with that of Hungary, and that most NATO powers support Italy's wish. Moscow appears to be angling toward a quid pro quo that would include ultimate discussion of its forces in Hungary in return for discussion of US forces in Italy, and perhaps Spain. Whether intended or not, the question of Hungarian participation has driven Romania from center stage and puts the matter of Bucharest's full participation further in doubt.
A Romanian diplomat has reported that Foreign Minister Macovescu is saying that Romania has been duped by the US and that the superpowers have secretly agreed to prevent Romania's full participation in MBFR. The diplomat said these views appeared to be shared by officials at higher levels in Bucharest. The source added, however, that if all else fails, Romania is prepared to accept observer status.
România e prima țară din Tratatul de la Varșovia care cumpără avioane americane de pasageri: trei Boeing 707-320C, cu piese de schimb, pentru 45 de milioane de dolari.
Romania has become the first Warsaw Pact country to buy US passenger aircraft. A contract for the purchase of three Boeing 707-320C long-range jet airliners, spare parts, and spare engines, valued at $45 million was signed last week. One of the aircraft will be configured for VIP service.
În română
România a devenit prima țară din Tratatul de la Varșovia care cumpără avioane americane de pasageri. Săptămâna trecută a fost semnat un contract în valoare de 45 de milioane de dolari pentru trei avioane cu reacție Boeing 707-320C, de cursă lungă, cu piese și motoare de schimb. Unul dintre avioane va fi amenajat pentru transportul demnitarilor.
Ministrul sovietic al apărării, Greciko, a plecat din România după ce nu s-a înțeles cu gazdele asupra locului României în orbita sovietică. Restul nu a fost publicat.
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko left Romania yesterday after disagreeing with his hosts about Romania's place in the Soviet orbit.
Ceaușescu merge săptămâna viitoare în RFG, prima vizită a unui șef de stat român, pentru credite noi. La plenara partidului, soția lui a fost aleasă membru plin al comitetului executiv.
President Ceausescu will begin a four-day visit to West Germany next week. He will be seeking new German credits and increased economic ties across the board. On the political side, he will ask Chancellor Brandt to sign a joint declaration stressing the equality, independence, and territorial integrity of all states. Romania is pressing for broad acceptance of these principles as the cornerstone of future agreements on European security.
Ceausescu's trip, the first by a Romanian chief of state to West Germany, will be a high point in his continuing campaign to establish Romania's independence among European nations.
The momentum of this effort has grown recently. His visit to Italy last month boosted bilateral economic cooperation, and on June 4 Romania became the first Warsaw Pact member to be granted tariff preferences by the European Community. Moreover, the Romanians are encouraged by the prospects for early achievement of MFN status with the US.
These agreements, of course, have as much political as economic significance for the Romanians. They read them as Western votes of confidence in Romania's future.
* * *
The party plenum this week was Ceausescu's show. No other presidium member addressed the gathering, and his wife was elected a full member of the executive committee. Ceausescu tried to undercut any criticism of the move by stressing the need to increase the role of women in society and proposing enlargement of the executive committee to make room for three more.
La șantierul naval Mangalia se construiesc, se pare, zece canoniere de concepție chineză, primele arme ale României din afara Tratatului de la Varșovia după al Doilea Război Mondial.
what appear to be ten Chinese-designed motor gunboats being built at Romania's Mangalia shipyard. Construction of the gunboats began about a year ago. They will be Romania's first non-Warsaw Pact arms since World War II.
The gunboats probably are being built with Chinese assistance. The program is an important step in Bucharest's drive to diversify its sources of arms and to build up its domestic armaments industry. Romania is also engaged in a joint project with Yugoslavia to build fighter aircraft and possibly submarines.
The gunboats may be part of a $300-million package of credit assistance that Peking granted Romania in late 1970. High-level Sino-Romanian military exchanges have become commonplace since the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia five years ago. The Romanian chief of staff, General Ion Gheorghe, is currently visiting Peking.
President Ceausescu may have been trying to head off Soviet reaction to the gunboat project in a speech on May 30 when he said Romania intended to continue getting most of its arms from the USSR. Moscow will nevertheless almost certainly express its displeasure, even though the gunboats will not greatly improve the Romanian Navy's extremely limited capabilities.
Aliații URSS din Tratatul de la Varșovia, cu excepția vădită a României, își întăresc cooperarea, împinși de Moscova, între altele ca să reducă efectul purtării independente a Bucureștiului.
Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies--with the conspicuous exception of Romania--are strengthening their cooperation in a number of key areas. These endeavors are being pushed by Moscow. The main reasons are:
--concern over the potentially destabilizing effect of the current detente policy,
--the need to counter Peking's activist policy in Europe, and
--a desire to minimize the impact of Romania's independent behavior.
In an effort to counter the effects of increased contacts with the West, the regimes have concluded a number of "ideological agreements" with each other. No texts have been published but most seem to be umbrella accords committing the parties to a broad interchange of ideological, political, and propaganda activity. Romania's failure to participate suggests that the accords also have an anti-Chinese thrust. The output of anti-Chinese propaganda by most of the regimes has increased recently.
Liderii Tratatului de la Varșovia se reunesc probabil luni în Crimeea. România, care încearcă să păstreze legături echilibrate cu URSS și China, va fi luată la rost pentru asta.
The third annual Crimean conference of Warsaw Pact political leaders will probably begin on Monday and last one or two days. Brezhnev set the tone on some of this year's likely topics in a speech in Kiev on Thursday.
Brezhnev spoke with considerable warmth about detente with the West, particularly the US. He avoided mention of any world trouble spots, attacks on imperialism, or discussion of vigilance. Noting that "some circles abroad" continue to try to foster tension and increased military spending and that the contest between socialism and capitalism goes on, he concluded that the point is to keep the contest out of the military sphere.
Brezhnev also devoted considerable attention to the opportunities created by CSCE. His allies undoubtedly were delighted that he took pains to highlight the role of small states in an era of detente to reassure them that their interests would not be overridden by the big powers.
Although Brezhnev did not mention China in his speech, the issue of relations with Peking is almost certain to be discussed at the summit. Romania, which is trying to maintain balanced ties between the USSR and China, will be on the griddle on this account.
Ceausescu apparently calculates that Brezhnev's commitment to detente will mitigate the Soviet reaction to this first participation in such a gathering by a Warsaw Pact country.
Yesterday, Brezhnev arrived in the Crimea where he met with French Foreign Minister Jobert. A number of Communist leaders are already in the USSR and others are planning to arrive over the weekend.
Ceaușescu pare să aibă în vedere o nouă inițiativă de pace în Orientul Mijlociu. Consilierul prezidențial egiptean Hafiz Ismail vine vineri la București, se pare la invitația României.
Romanian President Ceausescu is apparently contemplating a new Middle East peace initiative. Sadat seems willing to discuss some new form of dialogue, possibly with Romanian mediation. Egyptian Presidential Adviser Hafiz Ismail is planning to visit Bucharest, apparently at Romania's invitation, to discuss settlement prospects. He will arrive Friday and probably will meet with President Ceausescu.
Romania, as the only East European state to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel and the principal Arab states, is in a good position to act as middleman. There has been no indication, however, that Israel has so far been contacted.
Sovieticii orchestrează o campanie antichineză care pare menită și să-i oblige pe est-europeni să-și arate loialitatea față de Moscova. Românii tac, dar au început să dea semne de neliniște.
The Soviets are orchestrating an anti-Chinese campaign that seems aimed as much at forcing the East Europeans to demonstrate their allegiance to Moscow as it is at condemning Peking's policies.
When East European party leaders gathered in the Crimea late last month, Moscow had to settle for a thin veneer of unity. To achieve this it had to forego any mention of China in the communiqué, lest the Romanians take exception. Over the past several days, however, the Soviets and their more submissive allies have taken the gloves off. They have denounced Peking harshly and stressed the need to close ranks against the Chinese apostasy.
Pravda led the way last week with a major editorial charging that the Chinese leadership represents a force hostile to the Socialist world. Taking their cue, Moscow's more loyal allies--the Poles and the Bulgarians--chimed in at once. The Czechs took the unusual step of reprinting the full text of the Pravda article, and pointed to its "exceptional significance."
Not surprisingly, the Romanians have remained silent, but they have begun to squirm.
The Romanians, of course, have good reason to be on their guard. They are only too well aware that the USSR is trying to use the China issue to forge more Soviet-style unity in Eastern Europe, and to assert Moscow's self-assumed right to define the limits of permissible behavior for Socialist states. As contacts increase between Eastern European countries and China on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other, Moscow will find it both more necessary and more difficult to impose conformity, and Romania will see that much more need to keep resisting.
Summitul din Crimeea a adâncit divergențele româno-sovietice, spune un oficial român. Bucureștiul cere să rămână posibilă schimbarea frontierelor prin acord, ca să-și păstreze deschisă pretenția asupra nordului Bucovinei și Basarabiei.
The "large gap" that separates Bucharest and Moscow on certain aspects of the European security talks was widened, according to a Romanian foreign office official, as a result of the recent Crimea summit and the subsequent Brezhnev-Ceausescu talks.
In discussing Soviet-Romanian differences with a US diplomat, the official concentrated on the issue of frontiers in the security talks. He stated that, while Moscow calls for the inviolability of existing frontiers, Romania favors a formulation that would rule out the use of force to change them but would leave open the possibility of future border adjustments by mutual consent.
This formulation is designed to protect Bucharest's interest in avoiding permanent foreclosure of its claim to northern Bukovina and Bessarabia which are now part of the USSR.
In speaking of the considerable disagreement between the Soviets and the Romanians over China, the official maintained that only Romania's presence at the meeting prevented condemnation of Peking in the final communiqué.
Romania is increasingly concerned about Soviet efforts to push for greater economic cooperation within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.
Bucharest's sensitivity to Soviet plans for closer coordination of the member states' economies is always near the surface and dates back to Khrushchev's plan for "supranational economic integration." Under the scheme, Romania's industrial development would have been virtually stopped, and Romania would have been forced to specialize in agriculture. Bucharest balked at the plan, recognizing that without a degree of freedom to develop "mutually advantageous economic relations" with all countries it would lack the base from which to move toward a more independent path in foreign affairs.
Soviet efforts to achieve increased integration among bloc countries may already be under way. Polish Premier Jaroszewicz and Warsaw's leading CEMA specialist, Deputy Premier Jagielski, went to Moscow on August 15 to discuss "basic trends" for "coordination and development of the national economies of the USSR and Poland" with Kosygin. Jaroszewicz' visit, following Hungarian Premier Fock's trip to Warsaw on August 9-11, suggests that the new cooperation proposals may also concern Hungary.
Sovieticii țin întâlniri la nivel înalt cu aliații ca să întărească cooperarea în CAER. Dintre membrii europeni, doar românii și cehoslovacii n-au trimis delegații economice la Moscova.
The Soviets have been holding a series of high-level meetings with their allies aimed at strengthening cooperation within CEMA, perhaps in preparation for closer contacts with the EC. The Polish Premier came to Moscow on August 14, followed two days later by the Hungarian Premier. Their East German counterpart was there on Monday, while the Bulgarian Premier also arrived that day.
The Soviet delegation was headed in each case by Premier Kosygin. Other officials in the delegation were people concerned with economic matters and CEMA. Official reports on the meetings indicate that the stress was on the integration of CEMA members' economies and coordination of the 1976-80 national economic development plans as a means to that end. Vital aspects of this problem, such as production specialization and Moscow's supply of raw materials to its partners, were also considered, according to a Moscow broadcast.
Only the Romanians and Czechs of the European CEMA members have not sent economic delegations to Moscow.
Recent Soviet expressions of readiness to begin a CEMA dialogue with the EC have apparently given new impetus to Moscow's effort to increase CEMA cohesion and perhaps make its structure at least superficially compatible with the EC. Moscow may be using this rationale to advance its campaign for greater bloc cohesion.
Bucureștiului i s-a spus, se pare, că nu va putea participa la summitul nealiniaților de la Alger. Românii doreau invitația mai ales ca să-și slăbească legăturile cu URSS.
Bucharest apparently has been told it will not be allowed to attend the nonaligned summit in Algiers next month. A recent Algerian commentary stresses that members of military blocs "cannot have the status of observers, nor of guests, at nonaligned meetings." The turn-down will disappoint the Romanians, who had tried hard for an invitation largely in order to loosen their ties to the USSR. The setback is not likely to deter them from further attempts to call attention to the similarities between Romania and the developing world.
Secretarul general al CAER a propus negocieri cu Comunitatea Europeană. România, care a obținut deja preferințe tarifare de la aceasta, împărtășește probabil rezervele polonezilor și pare dornică de înțelegeri proprii.
CEMA Secretary General Fadeyev yesterday proposed to Danish officials that CEMA and the EC appoint delegations to begin negotiations. The offer was made in Copenhagen because the Danes chair EC bodies for the remainder of the year. Danish Foreign Minister Noergaard told the press that the CEMA bid will be placed before the EC Council of Ministers at its meeting in Brussels on September 20-21. Noergaard emphasized that today's talks were "unofficial" and confined to a general exchange of opinions.
Fadeyev acknowledged that the decision to begin contacts with the EC was made at the CEMA ministerial meeting in June. The Poles are against an institutionalized closer relationship between CEMA and the EC. The remarks implied concern that such a development would lead to a tighter CEMA--that is, a CEMA even more dominated by the Soviets--and greater problems for Warsaw's bilateral contacts with the West.
Such feelings are probably shared by Romania, which in June became the first Soviet ally to be extended the EC's system of generalized tariff preferences. The initiative for this came from Bucharest, and the Romanians apparently are more than willing to reach their own accommodations with the EC outside the CEMA context. The Soviets have publicly said that CEMA-EC relations would not preclude bilateral agreements--those that are country-to-country rather than country-EC.
La negocierile CSCE de la Geneva, România va propune un acord de nerecurgere la forță și un organism permanent de securitate europeană. Probabil că Moscova nu le va agrea.
When the next round of CSCE talks begins in Geneva on September 18, Romania will present proposals for a non-use of force agreement and the establishment of a permanent European security organ.
In setting forth his government's views to a group of NATO chiefs of mission in Bucharest, a senior Foreign Ministry official said that the Romanian position calls for both disarmament and disengagement; the latter includes an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Bucharest intends to push for an extension of any disarmament measures adopted for central Europe to the Balkans.
The Romanians want to include three elements in the non-use of force document: notification of maneuvers, notification of large military movements, and provisions for foreign observers at maneuvers. None of them is likely to win favor in Moscow, which wants to keep the military content of CSCE at a minimum.
Romanian-Soviet differences extend into other aspects of the European security talks.
The Romanian proposal for a permanent CSCE organ appears designed to provide Bucharest with a forum for voicing its dissent from the Warsaw Pact. Publicly, however, Romania will probably argue that such a body is necessary to handle such matters as the dissemination of information on troop movements and maneuvers. For its part, Moscow was at one time a champion of a permanent CSCE organ, but recently has appeared to back off as Romania took the offensive. The Soviets now rarely mention the subject.
Mai multe semnale indică o campanie sovietică de pregătire a unei noi conferințe comuniste internaționale. Chiar convocarea ar dezbina, dată fiind opoziția inevitabilă a românilor, a iugoslavilor și a altora.
--the Soviet Politburo communiqué on the Crimea meeting of August 3 cited the need for a "collective analysis" of current issues, marking high-level interest in a new conference;
--a Pravda article on August 7 by "I. Aleksandrov" (a pseudonym associated in the past with major policy pronouncements on China) expressed Moscow's concern over communist unity and the need for broader policy coordination by communist states;
--Brezhnev, speaking on August 15 at a public rally at Alma-Ata, gave a gloomy assessment of Soviet relations with China; he echoed Aleksandrov and cited Peking's "subversive activity against the socialist countries" as the cause for current Sino-Soviet tensions;
--finally, a second Aleksandrov article in Pravda on August 26 invoked the three most recent communist conferences (1957, 1960, and 1969) and accused the Chinese leadership of inciting "individual communist parties...to assume a 'neutral' position with respect to the principal disagreements between the Maoist and the international communist movement."
In addition to Moscow's own efforts against the Chinese, the Soviets have been orchestrating a similar movement by their staunchest allies in Eastern Europe.
Despite these indications of a preliminary campaign to call another international meeting, it does not appear that the Soviet leaders have really faced up to the serious problems such a conference would create for themselves.
Even the question whether to hold a conference would be divisive, given the inevitable opposition of the Romanians and the Yugoslavs, various West European Communists, and the North Vietnamese, and the reluctance of many others to stand up and be counted.
If history is a guide, any preliminary soundings with regard to an international meeting would be accompanied by letters to the Italian and French parties, for example, explaining the need for a conference. Until evidence such as this appears--and it would come promptly through penetrations in these parties--the current propaganda campaign must be considered more a threat than a decision by the Kremlin to call for another meeting.
O delegație română la nivel înalt, cu Emil Bodnăraș, merge în Coreea de Nord cu escală la Pekin. Numind escala „neoficială”, Bucureștiul evită un comunicat care ar putea irita Moscova.
Bucharest has dispatched a high-level delegation to the Far East, ostensibly to attend North Korean National Day celebrations on Saturday, but with a stopover in Peking billed as an "unofficial friendly visit."
The delegation includes Politburo member Emil Bodnaras, who has visited China four times since 1966--most recently in April 1972--and has met both Mao and Chou En-lai. Another member of the delegation, Cornel Burtica, is the party secretary responsible for propaganda, ideology, and information.
Among the topics to be discussed in Peking will certainly be the Soviet-inspired anti-Chinese propaganda campaign now emanating from Eastern European media. Bucharest has resisted Moscow's pressure to join in and last week effusively congratulated Mao on his re-election to head the Central Committee. Also probably on the agenda will be Bodnaras' concern that Moscow will attempt to convene an international Communist meeting to read China out of the world Communist movement.
By billing the Peking stopover as "unofficial," Bucharest avoids a final communiqué that might stimulate a hostile reaction from Moscow.
amintită în textîn parte încă secretcontinuă pe altă pagină
fără titlu
URSS a condamnat aspru lovitura de stat din Chile, aliații ei apropiați din Europa de Est au reacționat deocamdată reținut, iar Iugoslavia și România au venit cu condamnări ferme.
American countries have declared three days of official mourning for the death of Allende. Brazil and Uruguay, however, have recognized the new government. At the UN, the Cuban Ambassador has formally requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the attack on the Cuban Embassy in Santiago by the Chilean military.
The USSR has reacted by issuing a statement in the name of the Central Committee sharply denouncing the coup. The statement expresses "full solidarity" with leftist forces in Chile and "firm confidence" that they will continue the struggle. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets see much prospect that the military take-over will be reversed.
The reaction of Moscow's closest East European allies has been relatively restrained thus far. The two Balkan mavericks--Yugoslavia and Romania--have weighed in with strong condemnations of the coup.
Ambasadorii est-europeni încearcă, pe lângă oficialii danezi, să submineze propunerea Moscovei de contacte oficiale între CAER și Comunitatea Europeană. România și-a asigurat deja accesul la preferințele comerciale generalizate ale Comunității.
East European ambassadors have been calling on Danish officials in an attempt to undercut Moscow's recent overture to establish official contacts between CEMA and the EC. Late last month the Soviet Secretary General of CEMA approached the Danes, who chair EC bodies for the rest of the year, with a proposal that CEMA and the EC appoint delegates to begin negotiations. As soon as he left town the East Europeans began insisting that he had acted without their concurrence, and expressed their strong distaste for bloc-to-bloc dealings.
This unusual display of defiance behind Moscow's back shows how much danger the East Europeans see in the latest Soviet attempt to limit their freedom of maneuver. Their actions also reflect the value they place on developing bilateral ties with the EC.
Romania has already worked out arrangements that will enable it to benefit from the EC's generalized trade preference scheme.
Other East European countries share Bucharest's interest in expanding bilateral economic ties with the West, and they resent Moscow's own efforts to achieve this same objective while reining in the East Europeans. They clearly are no less eager than Moscow to pursue the economic advantages of detente--at times, as in their approaches to the Danes, at the risk of incurring Soviet wrath.
West European officials have reacted coolly to Moscow's proposal for CEMA-EC dialogue. Yesterday the EC Council decided to tell the USSR merely that the EC will study the suggestion, and that CEMA may contribute to the study if it wishes.
Moscova a suspendat relațiile diplomatice cu Chile, urmată imediat de RDG. Ceaușescu declarase deja că guvernul său nu va recunoaște junta.
Moscow yesterday suspended diplomatic relations with Chile, possibly in response to the junta's decision to ban all Marxist parties. East Germany immediately cut ties also; Romania's Ceausescu had already stated that his government would not recognize the junta. Soviet ships carrying badly needed wheat to Chile now will be diverted, and the East European allies probably will follow suit on their own grain contracts as well as on relations.
Trei firme americane au fost invitate în China pentru discuții despre vânzarea de tehnologie petrolieră. Până acum, Pekinul a cumpărat echipament petrolier mai ales din România și Japonia.
Three US equipment firms have been invited to China for follow-up discussions about sales of oil recovery technology and drill bits. Several other US oil firms have been invited to attend the Canton Fair. Peking's purchases of oilfield equipment in the past have been restricted largely to Romania and Japan. Recent currency revaluations, however, have made US goods more competitive.
În România par să se pregătească negocieri arabo-israeliene: potrivit Ministerului israelian de Externe, ministrul Eban a acceptat o „invitație urgentă” la București, pentru consultări cu reprezentanți ai șase state arabe.
Some UN observers believe that the Egyptians are bolstering their military position rather than reinforcing the cease-fire.
On the diplomatic front, President Sadat earlier this week made a whirlwind trip to Kuwait, where he conferred with Syrian President Asad and Kuwait's Shaykh Sabah. He then flew to Riyadh for a meeting with King Faysal. The results of Foreign Minister Fahmi's talks in Washington and coordination of plans for next week's discussions with Secretary Kissinger were the main items on the agenda.
Upon his return, Sadat also met with Algerian President Boumediene. Details on the meeting have not been released, but the Algerian leader--unhappy with Egypt's acceptance of the cease-fire--may have tried to persuade Sadat to take a hard position on Israeli withdrawal, and perhaps even to initiate new hostilities.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov winds up his intensive talks with Egyptian leaders today and will head for Damascus. The Soviets continue to express concern about Egypt's Third Army. The deputy director of TASS in Cairo told a US diplomat that Sadat is under considerable pressure from middle-grade and junior officers to approve a major effort to break through Israeli lines toward the army, possibly before Secretary Kissinger's visit. The TASS representative also said that the Egyptians had pressed Kuznetsov hard for more arms even though, the Soviet official claimed, they have already received enough equipment to replace their losses.
Meanwhile, preparations for negotiations seem to be under way in Romania. Ambassador Keating was informed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry yesterday that Minister Eban has accepted an "urgent invitation" of the Romanian Government to visit Bucharest for "high-level consultations" with representatives of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria. Eban plans to leave on Sunday after conferring with Prime Minister Meir, who is returning from the US on the same day.
Vizita ministrului israelian de externe Eban în România va tensiona și mai mult relațiile dintre București și Moscova. Nu există dovezi că vreun stat arab a răspuns invitației românești.
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's three-day visit to Romania, at Bucharest's invitation, for "urgent talks" will add new strains to already taut relations between Moscow and Bucharest. Throughout the current Middle East crisis, Romania has resisted Soviet, Arab, and Yugoslav pressures to abandon its "balanced foreign policy" and break relations with Israel. More recently Bucharest has collided with Moscow over possible Romanian participation in a UN Middle East peace-keeping force. According to Foreign Minister Macovescu, the Soviets specifically told Bucharest to stay out of peace-keeping activities, and the Security Council's agreement of November 2 on the make-up of the UNEF excludes Romania.
The Eban visit appears to be another move by Romania to maintain a high profile as a peacemaker in the Middle East. Last month Bucharest proposed a peace plan that called for a cease-fire in place without emphasizing UN Resolution 242.
Eban has acknowledged that his government accepted Romania's invitation partly as a gesture of appreciation for Bucharest's policy of standing up to the Soviets. It is unlikely that he will be receptive to urgings that Israel be more flexible about a peace settlement, possibly along the lines of Romania's proposal in October.
Although the Romanian invitation had asserted that senior Arab officials would also come to Bucharest, there is no evidence that any Arab state has responded to Bucharest's invitation.
Conferința de securitate de la Geneva n-a depășit, după peste șase săptămâni, discuțiile generale. Țările neutre și România cer insistent legarea ei de negocierile de la Viena privind reducerea forțelor.
After more than six weeks, the Geneva Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has still not moved beyond general discussions. The committees and subcommittees have proceeded so slowly that many observers now doubt that the conference can wind up its business in early 1974.
The Soviets, who desire an early end to the conference, have been pushing a draft on "principles of security" that emphasizes the "inviolability of frontiers." The West Germans, in particular, oppose the Soviet draft. They wish to link the principle of inviolability of frontiers with the nonuse of force in order to hold open the possibility of an eventual peaceful reunification of the two Germanys. Several drafts have been considered and sharply criticized by one side or the other. A Yugoslav draft may provide the basis for an eventual compromise.
A near-stalemate has developed on the controversial question of freer movement of people and ideas between the two blocs. The Soviets insist that specific measures must await agreement on certain general principles. These principles--sovereignty, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for international laws and customs--would, if the Soviets had their way, be included in a preamble and would have the effect of emasculating the specific measures designed to bring about freer movement.
The other main topic--economic cooperation--is also at a virtual standstill. The West thought the Eastern representatives would be making demands in this area, but thus far they have not done so. What has happened is that the members of the European Community, although claiming special competence in the economic cooperation area, have not been able to agree on a common position of their own.
The neutral participants as well as Warsaw Pact maverick Romania have been pressing hard for a link between the security conference and the force reduction talks which began last week in Vienna. The Soviets oppose any such linkage, but have been humoring the neutrals by suggesting that all European states could participate in the force reduction talks. Several of the Eastern representatives at Vienna also mentioned, in their opening statements, the possibility of widening their forum. The NATO allies have consistently opposed such moves.
Întâlnirea dintre Tito și Brejnev de la Kiev pare un pas mare spre o nouă apropiere, sprijinită probabil și pe presiunile Belgradului ca românii să susțină politica Moscovei în Orientul Mijlociu.
President Tito's exceptionally friendly talks with Brezhnev in Kiev last week appear to have been a major step toward a new rapprochement with the Soviets. The warm language of the communiqué published after the meetings significantly exceeds anything produced earlier. Moreover, this time, the communiqué failed to list long-standing Yugoslav requirements on the right of socialist states to differ and on the obligations of the USSR to respect Yugoslav sovereignty.
The document twice referred to "trust" and mutual understanding. Although Tito has said privately that he trusts Brezhnev, he has never before used the word in a formal document.
It is quite likely that the "trust" between the two is based in large part on Tito's militant support of the Arabs and his solid support for Soviet policy in the Middle East. From the Soviet standpoint, Tito's position has also had the welcome effect of estranging Belgrade from Washington.
Part of the "trust" must also result from Yugoslav pressure on the Romanians to support Moscow's policy in the Middle East and to abandon their attempts to play an independent role in the area.
Tito's new closeness to the USSR has provoked criticism and concern at home. Public uncertainty is such that rumors alleging a US-Soviet agreement to partition Yugoslavia have been officially denied and blamed on the US and its allies. So far, however, no public explanations of Tito's turn back to the East have been made.
După ce a refuzat la începutul lunii să-l primească, guvernul iugoslav anunță vizita lui Macovescu la Belgrad, într-un moment tulbure al relațiilor: iugoslavii par să se apropie de URSS.
The Yugoslav Government, after refusing to receive Romania's Foreign Minister Macovescu early this month, has announced that Macovescu will visit Belgrade today and tomorrow. Macovescu's visit comes at a troubled juncture in relations, as the Yugoslavs appear to be turning from close ties with Romania to a new rapprochement with the USSR. The next meeting in a long series between Presidents Tito and Ceausescu is scheduled for the end of the year. Before it can take place, Macovescu must assess the meaning for Romania of Tito's new relationship with Brezhnev. He must also find out why the Yugoslavs have pressured the Romanians to give up their independent Middle East policy, and why Belgrade's Communist Party is moving toward neutrality in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, rather than backing Romania's position that China has a right to be different.
Ceaușescu sosește la Washington când România e incomod de vizibilă pe plan internațional. Va cere legături economice mai largi și asigurări că cooperarea sovieto-americană nu va submina independența României.
President Ceausescu arrives in Washington at a time when his country is uncomfortably prominent in international affairs. Bucharest's initiatives during the Mideast war were designed to gain for itself and other small powers at least some role in any settlement and to display independence. But they also brought pressures from the Kremlin to take a more pro-Arab stance.
While in the US, he will seek
--reassurances that US-Soviet cooperation will not undercut Romanian independence, and
--expanded economic ties that will further reduce his dependence on Moscow and give the West a greater stake in Romania's future.
Although his country is a member of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, Ceausescu has carefully built, and expanded, a form of independence that is unique in the Soviet alliance system.
--He has consistently refused to permit Warsaw Pact forces to maneuver on Romanian territory;
--He maintains a stubborn neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute;
--His representatives persistently lobby in the name of small and medium sized powers, and against superpower domination, at MBFR, CSCE and in the UN.
--His is the only Warsaw Pact country that maintains relations with Israel as well as with the Arab states.
That Ceausescu has been able to get away with such defiance of Moscow is primarily due to his ability to sense the limits of Soviet tolerance. On those rare occasions when he has miscalculated, he has been quick to restore the balance. His fear is that Moscow will slap him down and then keep him on a short tether.
Ceausescu has not yet made major concessions to atone for siding against the Soviets during the October war, and he may feel that none are necessary. Romania did succumb to Soviet pressure to withdraw its offer of troops to the UNEF, and he may believe that this was enough. The Soviets, for their part, may feel that no further pressure is needed. Romanian initiatives were irritating, but they were ineffective.
The Mideast experience has nevertheless left Ceausescu perhaps suffering from a sense of isolation. He particularly resents that Tito, his fellow maverick, committed Yugoslavia so heavily to the Arab, and thus to the Soviet, side. Also, Tito's recent talks with Brezhnev in Kiev have caused him to worry that he can no longer look to Belgrade for support in time of trouble with Moscow. Ceausescu hopes his visit to Washington will serve as a counterweight to growing Soviet influence in Yugoslavia.
Apropierea lui Tito de Moscova vine mai ales din căutarea unor politici care să asigure independența Iugoslaviei după plecarea lui. O anexă analizează și efectele asupra relațiilor Iugoslaviei cu România.
If any single factor has motivated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search for policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation toward the West and of his strivings to make nonalignment a viable world force. He currently sees more to gain from Moscow than from the West.
At Annex, we review Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the outcome of the talks at Kiev, and the effects of the shift in the Belgrade-Moscow relationship on Yugoslavia's relations with Romania and other Communist countries, the third world, and the West.
Relațiile iugoslavo-sovietice sunt mai strânse ca oricând după ruptura din 1948 dintre Tito și Stalin. La începutul anilor 1970, partidul iugoslav cultiva legăturile cu China și România, care sfidau PCUS.
Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union are now closer than at any time since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. The gradual warming trend that began in 1971 suddenly went into high gear during the Middle East war and culminated in the exceptionally friendly talks between Tito and Brezhnev in Kiev in mid-November.
At the beginning of the 1970s Belgrade's foreign policy was still deeply influenced by what happened to Prague in 1968 and by attendant fears of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. Relations with Moscow and its loyal East European allies had gone sour and Belgrade's fervor for nonalignment had waned. In the communist movement, the Yugoslav party was cultivating its ties with China and Romania, who were prominent in their defiance of the CPSU. Relations with Western Europe and the US on the other hand, had prospered, both in reaction to the Soviet threat and in the hope that ties to the West would bring economic improvements at home.
By 1971, however, Tito had come to perceive that there could be serious drawbacks in leaning too far to the West. Premature attempts to establish democratic institutions precipitated a crisis of nationalism in Croatia. Economic ties to the West created large debts to Western creditors without ensuring adequate development of the Yugoslav industrial base.
Moreover, the strategic advantages of the Westward tilt began to erode as the mood of European politics shifted toward detente. As Brezhnev increasingly touted his friendly ties with the rest of Europe and the United States, Tito saw less reason to maintain his anti-Soviet line. Washington's role as the supporter of Yugoslav security began to fade. More important, perhaps, the new atmosphere gave Tito an opportunity to repair an old breach with the Kremlin in time to win Moscow's good graces for his successors. His meeting with Brezhnev in Belgrade in September 1971 set in train a series of political contacts and expanding economic ties that have become the core of the new relationship.
The Middle East war in October provided the final push toward Kiev. Tito immediately proclaimed full support for the Arabs--his principal partners in nonalignment--placing Yugoslavia squarely on the Soviet side in a major international crisis. Belgrade granted over-flight rights for the Soviet airlift, and the regime's presses began to crank out anti-Israeli propaganda.
What Tito Received at Kiev
After issuing the warmly worded communiqué at the end of the visit, Yugoslav and Soviet officials have maintained a discreet silence about Kiev.
In the realm of political cooperation, however, Belgrade has decided to back away from its long-standing support of China out of deference to the Kremlin's sensitivities. The Yugoslavs may also begin to mute their differences with the Soviets on international issues, such as MBFR, in which Belgrade has an interest but no real influence.
From Belgrade's point of view, the prospects of long-term economic cooperation were probably the most important matter discussed. Moscow had extended a $540-million credit to Belgrade in 1972, and this October promised to build a gas pipeline to northern Yugoslavia. The Kiev discussions indicate, at a minimum, the Kremlin's continuing willingness to make solid investments in Yugoslavia.
The Soviets will probably make good on whatever economic promises Brezhnev made to Tito. They know that as long as the money pours in, Tito will not risk siding against the Kremlin on any of the more important international issues.
There is also good reason to believe that Tito requested modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces with Soviet weapons.
Soviet arms shipments to Yugoslavia would go far toward allaying any residual fears Tito may have of a Soviet invasion. For his own part, Tito may well have decided to seek arms in the only market open to him.
Effects of Kiev
Belgrade must be prepared to pay some penalties for whatever it stands to gain from the new relationship with Moscow. This changed attitude toward the Soviet Union will generally be detrimental to Yugoslavia's traditional role in the world communist movement and in the international community.
The most immediate effect, and perhaps one of the most telling, will be a downturn in relations with Romania. President Ceausescu, who has long regarded Tito as both a friend and a fellow maverick in the communist movement, is already angry. During the Middle East war the Yugoslavs attempted to pressure Romania into adopting a more pro-Arab stance. At the UN, the Yugoslavs were instrumental in dismissing Romania's offer of troops to the UNEF. The Yugoslav shift on the Sino-Soviet dispute will add to Ceausescu's anger.
In the long run, differences between Belgrade and Bucharest over the shared basic principles that have shaped their relations with Moscow could prove most damaging. Ceausescu is deeply worried over the possible growth of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. If he becomes unsure of Belgrade's support for his cocky independent stance, he may feel forced to revise his relationship with Belgrade and, perhaps, review his entire foreign policy.
Belgrade can also expect to hear from those Communist parties that have been active in opposing Moscow's attempts to dominate the movement. Certainly, Peking will register its displeasure, as will the Albanians and the Italian Communists. As the results of Kiev become known, differences that are normally aired only in private could well break into open polemics with the Yugoslavs.
Belgrade's generally good relations with Western Europe have not yet been affected, though some deterioration is possible. Tito will, however, be careful not to rock the boat, because he wants Yugoslavia to play a full role in European detente and because his country is heavily dependent on Western trade and credits.
Relations with Washington, which have already dipped to a new low, are evidently in for some more rough sledding. Tito's decision to side with the radicals in the nonaligned movement dictates that in his eyes the United States has become the ogre in international relations.
Independence versus Collaboration
If there is any single factor that has motivated Tito's swing toward Moscow, it is his constant search for those policies that will ensure Yugoslavia's independence after he is gone. This was true of his earlier orientation toward the West and of his strivings to make nonalignment a viable world force. In essence, he currently sees more to gain from Moscow than from the West.
There are limits on the degree to which he will cooperate with the Soviets, however. He will not, for example, permit any kind of formal ties that would even appear to undermine his independence. He will also avoid restrictive relationships with CEMA that would preclude Belgrade's continued--and lucrative--relationship with the Common Market.
At least for the foreseeable future, Tito will work more closely with Moscow, but within the framework of detente, and only so long as he believes the Kremlin's avowals that it is dedicated to the peaceful settlement of major European problems. Should Moscow undertake any action that seems to threaten detente, the Yugoslavs will immediately back-pedal toward neutralism or toward the West. Similarly, if Moscow becomes overly confident of its influence and begins to meddle in Yugoslav internal affairs, it will discover that the honeymoon with Tito was very short indeed.
Toate marile partide comuniste europene au convenit, se pare, să se reunească anul viitor. Acordul partidelor român și iugoslav sugerează că Moscova a acceptat să lase în umbră problema Chinei.
All of the major European Communist parties evidently have now agreed to meet next year, thereby giving Moscow an opportunity to coordinate their activities and to line them up behind Brezhnev's detente policy. The willingness of the Romanian and Yugoslav parties to attend suggests that Moscow has agreed to play down the China issue. The Soviets may be willing to give ground on this question in order to ensure a successful European session, which in turn could pave the way for a world party congress later.
