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România în buletinul președintelui american: 1975
26 de zile din 1975 în care buletinul CIA pentru președintele SUA numește România: 28 de paragrafe, scanate și transcrise, cu pasajele încă secrete marcate.
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Vizita la Moscova a ministrului indonezian de externe Adam Malik a confirmat apropierea sovieto-indoneziană din ultimul an. România apare printre țările cu care Indonezia a semnat acorduri comerciale în 1974.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik's recent visit to Moscow produced no surprises but affirmed a year-long warming trend in Moscow-Jakarta relations.
Malik had a successful trip; he signed a general agreement on economic and technical cooperation and got a green light for a visit to Indonesia by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko this year. Malik's recent travel also took him to East Germany and Hungary, where he signed trade agreements to add to those reached earlier in 1974 with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. These moves result from a deliberate policy decision by President Suharto to improve ties with communist states. Suharto sees Soviet foreign policy toward the Western states as becoming more moderate, and the Indonesians want to balance growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia also wants to explore new sources of credit.
Brejnev a sosit la Budapesta pentru congresul partidului comunist ungar. Majoritatea țărilor est-europene ar urma să-și trimită liderii de partid, România și Iugoslavia doar reprezentanți de rang mai mic.
Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in Budapest yesterday for the opening of the Hungarian Communist Party Congress today.
It is Brezhnev's first trip abroad since his visit to Paris in early December. Most East European states are expected to be represented at the congress by their top party leaders. Romania and Yugoslavia, however, will send lesser ranking officials.
Tensiunile româno-sovietice au crescut. Un diplomat român de la Moscova spune că Bucureștiul se opune acum extinderii rolului de coordonare politică al Tratatului de la Varșovia, dorită de sovietici.
Tensions in Romanian-Soviet relations have recently increased.
A Romanian diplomat in Moscow says that in addition to differences over the European security talks, CEMA policies, and the proposed pan-European communist party conference, Bucharest is now resisting Soviet efforts to expand the political coordinating role of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets are reported to be pushing for the establishment of a permanent Pact committee of foreign ministers. Moscow apparently wants to set up a secretariat--similar to NATO's political organization--that would be headed by a Soviet secretary general. The Romanian diplomat speculates that once the European security conference is over, Moscow will increase its stress on ideological orthodoxy within the Pact--a move clearly intended to force Romania to identify more closely with Soviet policies and pronouncements.
Regele Hussein al Iordaniei duce o politică externă mai activă, cu legături mai strânse cu Siria și mai puțină ostilitate față de statele comuniste. Ceaușescu a fost primit cu fast.
King Husayn and his prime minister have recently been pursuing a more activist foreign policy highlighted by closer contacts with Syria and a less hostile attitude toward communist states.
Within the past six weeks Jordan has:
--Embarked on an unprecedented, close relationship with Syria, including wide-ranging economic and trade agreements and active military and political consultations.
--Advertised its intention of seeking Soviet air defense equipment from Syria if its requests for US equipment are not met quickly.
--Entertained several Soviet economic and political delegations and lavishly welcomed Romanian President Ceausescu.
--Approved bids for diplomatic representation by Yugoslavia, East Germany, and North Korea.
In another of his periodic rounds of major army units this month, the King stressed the threat of war, Jordan's military needs, and its solidarity with other Arab states in demanding that Israel return Jerusalem and the West Bank to Arab control. He has been unusually strident on the subject of Jerusalem, and made a point of raising it during the official reception for Ceausescu.
concern about the direction of Jordanian policy, fearing that the country will be drawn into costly entanglements abroad when it should be concentrating on internal development. if the King turns to Syria for air defense weapons, Syrian advisers might be stationed in Jordan. Jordan's increasing involvement with Syria could invite a war with Israel for which the army and air force are unprepared.
The King and Prime Minister Rifai are due in Washington at the end of this month for a discussion of Jordan's military and economic needs, and much of their recent activity is designed to focus US attention on their aid requests. But their efforts to diversify and strengthen Jordan's foreign ties reflect a genuine concern that the US can neither prevent another Middle East war by a new diplomatic initiative nor provide Jordan with the means it considers vital to its defense.
Majoritatea delegațiilor la conferința pentru securitate europeană cred că următoarele săptămâni de la Geneva vor fi decisive. Sovieticii s-au arătat flexibili în unele chestiuni, dar tergiversează în altele.
Most delegations at the European security conference believe that the next few weeks in Geneva will be crucial. The pace of the conference has increased perceptibly, some issues have been settled, and a working group has begun planning for a final summit-level meeting. Nevertheless, if the conference is to conclude this summer--as the Soviet and virtually all other delegations hope--many issues will have to be resolved in a relatively short time.
While Soviet negotiators recently have shown flexibility on some matters, they have stalled on others and even reopened debate on several issues considered settled months ago. Basically, the Soviets apparently are counting on the Western participants to give in and stop trying to wring concessions. The West European delegations are having difficulty matching the determination and resolve of the Soviet Union.
The Soviets recently accepted a French compromise proposal that ended a long deadlock concerning the declaration of principles that the conference has been formulating as a guide to international relations. The conference has yet to reach agreement, however, on the wording of a "saving clause" implying that the rights and responsibilities of the US, UK, France, and the USSR in Germany and Berlin are not affected by the conference's decisions. Many of the neutral delegations read the present draft as an affirmation of the "Brezhnev doctrine" on intervention in Eastern Europe.
Soviet negotiators have also shown some flexibility on one of the major military-related "confidence-building measures," but only after the Western and neutral delegations made an important concession to Moscow. The Soviets said that they could accept the Western idea of providing advance notice about national and multinational military maneuvers, if the notification were voluntary.
The Soviets have continued to stall on matters concerned with the freer movement of people and ideas. Western negotiators now intend to present a single text covering all such topics. They argue that such an initiative now would put maximum pressure on the Soviets to come to reasonable terms. The Soviets' attitude on this subject, however, is such that they may well continue to stall.
The question of follow-on machinery to the conference also remains to be resolved. The Soviet side says it wants a post-conference consultative committee with a broad mandate to discuss issues affecting security and cooperation in Europe. The committee would have a permanent secretariat, one of the more objectionable features of the proposal as far as the West is concerned. There is some reason to believe that the Soviets--perhaps worried by the great opportunity a standing mechanism would give to the Romanians and other bloc members to needle Moscow--eventually will settle for something less permanent.
The Western delegations formally support a Danish proposal that calls for senior officials to meet three years after the conference ends to assess the results and decide whether further meetings are needed. The West Europeans, however, are sharply split on the issue. The Dutch, Belgians, and French advocate as little follow-on activity as possible, while the British and now even the Danes are prepared to accept relatively frequent meetings of experts and senior officials. Other NATO members continue to support the formal Danish proposal. On this issue, as on many others, the NATO allies are hoping that the US will take the lead.
Ministrul de externe Macovescu i-a spus în particular ambasadorului SUA că Bucureștiul înțelege decizia americană de a recupera nava Mayaguez și echipajul ei de la cambodgieni.
Romania's Foreign Minister Macovescu Thursday privately expressed Bucharest's understanding of the US decision to retrieve the Mayaguez and its crew from the Cambodians.
Macovescu told the US ambassador of his "great admiration" for Washington's conduct of its affairs in Indochina in recent weeks. Macovescu's comments, while probably sincere, were also intended to counterbalance Bucharest's lip-service to Warsaw Pact solidarity earlier this week.
Românii încep săptămâna aceasta discuții pentru cumpărarea a cinci avioane lung-curier Boeing 707. România are deja trei, singurele aparate americane deținute de o țară din Tratatul de la Varșovia.
The Romanians may be interested in buying additional long-range Boeing 707s.
They will begin talks this week on the purchase of five aircraft. Romania already has three 707s, the only US-made aircraft owned by a Warsaw Pact country. Bucharest may be expanding its airline because of its success with long-range charters to New York. The Romanians' interest may also reflect their belief that a purchase now would influence Congressional consideration of the US-Romanian trade agreement.
Phenianul pare să fi reluat campania pentru discuții directe cu SUA despre chestiunile militare din Coreea. Două scrisori nord-coreene către Congresul american, din 1973 și 1974, au fost transmise prin români.
Pyongyang has apparently reopened its campaign to secure direct talks with the US on Korean military issues.
In two very unusual contacts last week, North Korean officials asked American diplomats at the UN and in Kinshasa bold questions about US plans for the post-Vietnam era in Asia and made the standard demand for withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.
There was a round of similar "diplomatic" approaches last fall. North Korea had earlier tried to engage the US government in bilateral dealings by sending letters addressed to the US Congress, one in 1973 and another in 1974--both delivered via the Romanians. Pyongyang has also taken occasional soundings of Romanian and Indonesian willingness to act as intermediaries in secret talks.
North Korea is probably desires to probe US willingness to go over the heads of the South Koreans in dealing with the North. Direct Pyongyang-Washington talks, under most foreseeable circumstances, would be a psychological blow to a South Korea already shaken by events in Indochina.
Pyongyang probably also reasons that contact with the US--or even publicized attempts at contact--would enhance its carefully cultivated image of reasonableness prior to consideration of the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly this fall.
Kim Ir Sen, aflat în vizită la București, ar putea cere din nou României să-i mijlocească legătura cu Washingtonul. România este țara socialistă cea mai admirată de Coreea de Nord.
North Korean President Kim Il-song may try to reenlist Romania's good offices in communicating with Washington during his current visit to Bucharest.
The Romanians have in the past assisted Pyongyang's efforts to engage the US in direct discussion of Korean military issues. On a personal level, the visit will reinforce the special rapport between Kim and Ceausescu. Romania is the socialist country most admired by North Korea. Kim reportedly is scheduled to go on to Yugoslavia and Algeria, visits which will probably focus on promoting North Korea's relations with the Third World in anticipation of the nonaligned conference in Peru this summer and UN General Assembly consideration of the Korean question this fall.
Kim Ir Sen își continuă turneul prin capitale africane și est-europene, fără oprire la Moscova, potrivit unui oficial sovietic. România este una dintre țările unde a fost primit cu entuziasm.
North Korean President Kim Il-song continues to tour African and East European capitals, but a Soviet official has said that Moscow is not on Kim's current itinerary.
Since May 22, Kim has been welcomed enthusiastically in Romania, Algeria, and Mauritania. He may vist Bulgaria and Yugoslavia before heading home. Kim's main objective has been to strengthen political support for North Korea in anticipation of the nonaligned conference this summer and the UN General Assembly's consideration of the Korea question this fall. Moscow will probably be willing to receive Kim at a later date when it judges the timing to be more opportune.
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Luptele din nordul Angolei au fost pornite de Mișcarea Populară, înarmată tot mai mult de URSS. Sprijinul Chinei și, în mai mică măsură, al României pentru Frontul Național pare insuficient.
The fighting that broke out in northern Angola on May 28 was initiated by the Popular Movement in a coordinated offensive to drive the National Front out of areas where the Movement's ethnic support predominates and to disrupt the Front's supply routes to Luanda. The offensive apparently was timed to pre-empt a suspected similar operation planned by the National Front.
Reliable estimates of the troop strengths of the respective groups are difficult to obtain. The liberation groups inflate or deflate their own reports according to political necessity.
It would appear that at present each of the two major groups has about 8-10,000 troops in Angola, the bulk of which are in northern areas. In addition, the Popular Movement apparently has several thousand troops in Cabinda, where it has long been active. The other two groups have much smaller forces there. The Movement has demonstrated in the recent fighting that it can quickly mobilize large groups of well-armed irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct advantage there.
In recent months, the Popular Movement has been receiving increased supplies of arms and other material from the Soviet Union. The Soviet supplies are offloaded in Congo--long an important exile base for the Popular Movement--and forwarded to Angola
In addition to its troops in Angola, the National Front may have another 10,000 troops in Zaire being trained by Zairian military instructors. It is also recruiting former Portuguese army officers
The National Front's support from Zaire, on the other hand, has fallen off because of President Mobutu's financial difficulties. Support from China and to a lesser extent Romania has not made up the difference and appears insufficient to enable Front president Holden Roberto to achieve his goal of having 10,000 trained men ready to enter Angola in the next month or so.
The leaders of neighboring states have a major interest in seeing that civil war is avoided in Angola, but their ability to influence events there is limited. Both Zaire and Zambia rely heavily on rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their copper. Zambian President Kaunda is convinced that large-scale fighting and turmoil in Angola will hamper his efforts to promote a settlement in Rhodesia. He has been unable, however, to convince fellow African leaders to support an embargo on arms shipments to the liberation groups.
Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country suffered years of civil war, military revolts, and secessionist rebellions upon independence, is particularly sensitive to the prospect of similar turmoil in Angola. Mobutu remains adamantly opposed to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement gaining control of the government of Angola, but he can no longer provide the Front with the support it needs to attain military superiority.
The Cabinda Problem
The three liberation groups and the Portuguese regard the exclave of Cabinda, long administered as a district of Angola as an integral part of the territory despite its geographic separation. The Organization of African Unity supports this position.
Românii încearcă să zădărnicească eforturile Moscovei de a întări integrarea economică din CAER și conformismul ideologic din Europa de Est. Bucureștiul refuză să se alăture corului antichinez.
The Romanians are trying to frustrate Moscow's efforts to tighten both economic integration in the Soviet-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and ideological conformity in Eastern Europe. Ceausescu has ordered a propaganda campaign to try to undermine Moscow's strategy at the CEMA summit meeting late this month in Budapest. The Romanians, along with the Yugoslavs, oppose Moscow's efforts to dominate preparations for an all-European conference of communist parties.
Romanian representatives have vigorously challenged several Soviet formulations at the European security talks. Ceausescu believes Romanian views on national sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and prior notification of military maneuvers must become part of the Geneva proceedings if his country is to maintain some leverage against the Soviets.
Bucharest refuses to join the Soviet-inspired anti-Chinese chorus from Eastern Europe. Romania and China frequently exchange party, economic, and military delegations. Romania is the only Pact member to have bought Chinese arms; it has obtained patrol boats and Chinese-made IL-28 bombers.
Ceausescu has observed and learned from the experiences of Yugoslav President Tito. The revelations of Soviet meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs last year led to even closer relations between the two Balkan states.
Bucharest also shares Belgrade's interest in the nonaligned world. Romania is the only member of the Warsaw Pact to seek observer status at a conference of nonaligned foreign ministers that will be held later this year in Lima. Ceausescu's stops in Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico during the past week are part of his effort to cultivate the nonaligned.
Romania has the further distinction of being the only Pact state to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel and the major Arab nations.
Romanian-US Relations
Bucharest has shown considerable sensitivity to US policies. Ceausescu gave a warm reception to former President Nixon in Bucharest in July 1969 and has visited the US twice before.
The Romanians have made a considerable effort to meet US interest in easing emigration to the West. From May 6 to June 4 this year, Bucharest gave permission to 317 Romanians--a record number-- to emigrate to the US. During the same period, Bucharest also approved exit permits for 387 Jews to Israel, a sharp increase over the monthly rate during the first four months of the year. It approved another 200 applications for emigration to other parts of the world.
Ceausescu signed a trade agreement this spring with the US that links most-favored-nation treatment to emigration. The Romanians are anxious for Congressional approval of the agreement because of difficulties in their export markets and a growing need for long-term, low-interest credits. The agreement would also restore Export-Import Bank financing, which was suspended under the 1974 Trade Act.
Spurred by Export-Import Bank credits since 1971, US-Romanian trade increased until the first quarter of this year, when it dropped. Romanian imports from the US during that quarter rose only 3 percent over the same period in 1974, while Romanian exports to the US dropped 37 percent.
Problems in trade with the West may force the Romanians to re-evaluate their long-range economic goals and curtail their economic growth, which has averaged 9 percent a year since 1970. Imports of Western technology and equipment have played an important part in this growth. Bucharest already plans a cut in imports from the West because of high prices for raw materials, a slump in Western demand for some Romanian exports, and high debt-servicing payments.
Portugalia și România au semnat, în timpul vizitei președintelui Costa Gomes la București, primul tratat de prietenie dintre o țară NATO și una din Tratatul de la Varșovia.
Portugal and Romania signed the first friendship treaty between a NATO and a Warsaw Pact country during the recent visit of President Costa Gomes to Bucharest.
The treaty stresses similarities between policies of the signatories and the nonaligned world. The two countries, each somewhat alienated within its own bloc, apparently find some solace in their new bilateral relationship.
România vrea să convingă SUA că politica față de emigrarea evreilor justifică clauza națiunii celei mai favorizate. Rabinul Rosen spune că regimul îl presează să „găsească” evrei dispuși să plece.
Romania is trying hard to convince the US that its policy on Jewish emigration warrants passage of legislation granting it most-favored-nation status.
The titular leader of Romania's Jewish community, Rabbi Rosen, recently told US diplomats that he is under heavy pressure from the regime to "find" Jews willing to leave the country. Rosen quoted Ceausescu's adviser on security affairs as saying, "Give me 10,000 names, and I guarantee 9,000 passports." He accordingly issued instructions to all Jewish communities on June 20 to collect in three days the names of all Jews who want to leave. Rosen claims, however, that only a small portion of Romania's estimated 60,000 Jews want to depart. Whether or not this spate of activity will lead to an actual increase in the number of Jewish emmigrants, Bucharest wants to convey the impression that it is doing its best.
Finlandezii anunță că nu mai pot organiza la 28 iulie, la Helsinki, summitul final al conferinței pentru securitate europeană. România e printre statele ale căror obiecții întârzie acordul.
The Finns announced yesterday that they can no longer arrange a summit-level finale to the European security conference in Helsinki on July 28; they say they require a minimum of three weeks' notice.
Tentative agreement was reached over the weekend on most of the outstanding East-West issues, and a fragile compromise was worked out with the French that would allow follow-up meetings of senior officials and possibly a second conference. Agreement is now being held up by the demands of several smaller Western and neutral states that want further progress on other issues first. Turkey and Malta are the most firmly opposed, but the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Romania also have objections.
Turkish demands for exemption from certain confidence-building measures and for Turkish Cypriot representation at Helsinki remain the major obstacles. Demarches are being made by certain NATO states in Ankara in hopes of bringing about a change in Turkish policy when the cabinet meets tomorrow. Western delegates, believing that the key to the Turkish position is held by the military, are hoping also that the West Germans will have some success during the visit to Bonn of the chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, which began yesterday.
Debate in Geneva yesterday centered on a French proposal that the end of July be set as the target date for the summit and that the participants be given until July 12 to work out their differences. Should the deadline not be met, the participants would assume Finland's costs for preparations already made. If the EC political directors, who are meeting in Rome today, support the French proposal, the deadlock in Geneva might be broken.
Noul efort al României de a înlesni emigrarea evreilor, pentru a obține de la Congresul SUA clauza națiunii celei mai favorizate, e sprijinit la „cel mai înalt nivel”.
Romania's new effort to facilitate Jewish emigration in order to gain approval of the US Congress for most-favored-nation status has the backing of the "highest level."
During the first quarter of this year, about 150 Jews were allowed to leave Romania each month; 199 arrived in Israel in June, and between 250 and 300 are expected to arrive in July.
România ar putea cere în curând SUA ajutor de urgență după cele mai grave inundații din 1970 încoace, care par să fi făcut pagube mari în jurul Bucureștiului.
Romania may be on the verge of asking the US for emergency relief because of the most severe floods to hit the country since 1970.
Although the waters now appear to have crested, the flooding apparently did considerable damage in the area around Bucharest. Agricultural production, which was beginning to show promising signs after last year's drought, may have been seriously affected. In 1970, 268,000 people were left homeless by the floods, and 162 were killed. At that time, Romania requested emergency relief from the US and China.
Pentru București, vizita președintelui Ford vine la momentul cel mai bun. Ceaușescu speră, se pare, să-și sporească prestigiul și va cere cu siguranță credite avantajoase și ajutor după inundații.
The timing of President Ford's visit to Romania--in Bucharest's view--could scarcely be better. It closely follows US Congressional action opening the way for most-favored-nation tariff status for Romania, and President Ceausescu apparently hopes President Ford's visit will boost his prestige.
Romania needs an economic shot in the arm. During President Ford's talks with him, Ceausescu surely will press for concessionary credits, agricultural aid, and other assistance to facilitate his country's recovery from recent devastating floods.
Ceausescu is likely to stress the importance of a continued, active US involvement in European affairs in the post-CSCE summit period. With an eye to relations with the USSR, Romania has consistently described the summit as merely the first step in building a lasting peace in Europe.
Bucharest is unhappy with some aspects of the European security conference, such as its failure to provide for institutional follow-up to the summit, but Romanian commentaries are trying to put the best face on the meeting. In talking with President Ford, Ceausescu will emphasize economic non-discrimination and the prevention of the use of force to settle international disputes.
Ceausescu is pleased that Belgrade has been selected as the site of the 1977 meeting of senior government officials to review progress in implementing the European security agreement. The Romanians view the choice of the Yugoslav capital as focusing international attention on the Balkans and deterring Soviet meddling in the region.
Țările comuniste acoperă doar o mică parte din nevoile de petrol și gaze ale Occidentului. Producția de țiței a Europei de Est, importatoare netă, vine mai ales din România.
The Communist countries play only a small role in meeting the oil and gas needs of Western nations. Although oil exports to the West are likely to edge upward in the future, the Communist states will remain only a marginal source of supply.
Net Soviet exports of oil and natural gas to the West last year comprised less than 2 percent and 1 percent respectively of consumption in the West. China's supply of oil to Japan--Peking's principal market for oil among the industrialized nations--accounts for 3 percent of total Japanese consumption.
The Soviet Union--now the world's largest oil producer at 9.6 million barrels per day--is expected to boost output by 7 percent this year. Since domestic Soviet and East European consumption will also rise, net Soviet exports to the West are likely to increase only slightly, if at all. Although Soviet output has grown steadily in recent years, it is actually falling below the planned level of production because of lagging discovery and exploitation of new reserves and rapid depletion of older fields.
Soviet gas production, which amounts to about half that of the US, has increased this year, but it will fall below the 1975 target by about 10 percent. The enormous Soviet gas reserves--an estimated 700 trillion cubic feet--are located in remote areas, largely in the permafrost zone. Technical problems in exploiting the deposits and building pipelines have slowed development.
Eastern Europe is a net importer of both oil and gas. Most oil imports are from the Soviet Union. Crude production in Eastern Europe has remained fairly constant over the past several years and is chiefly in Romania.
In contrast to the tight petroleum situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe, China is rapidly boosting oil production and increasing exports to the West. Crude oil output last year was up 20 percent from 1973. So far in 1975, crude production has averaged 1.6 million barrels per day with exports running 200,000 barrels per day. Although China is rapidly increasing its own oil consumption--substituting oil for coal in some instances--production has risen even faster.
Communist oil exports to the West should reach 1.3 million barrels per day in 1980, compared with 1 million barrels per day in 1975. Growing production problems in the USSR, combined with rising Soviet and East European consumption, will gradually reduce oil exports from this area. Chinese exports, however, probably will more than offset the drop in net Soviet shipments. Chinese exports in 1980 could total 1 million barrels per day, five times the anticipated level for 1975.
Statele industrializate nu au o poziție comună privind materiile prime înaintea sesiunii speciale și așteaptă inițiativa SUA. Sovieticii și est-europenii vor sta în umbră, cu excepția României și a Iugoslaviei.
Since that time commodity prices have fallen sharply--they have recovered somewhat lately--and many states, both developed and developing, have come to realize that the industrialized states are equally important suppliers of raw materials, that all industrial states are not import-dependent, and that not all developing states are exporters of raw materials.
The industrialized states are not of one mind on development of raw materials policies. Nor have they all prepared for the Special Session to the same degree. Most agree on one point--which is also shared by most developing states--that it is up to the US to take the initiative. The Europeans and Japanese feel the US has consistently maintained the hardest line against the demands of the developing countries, and they have only reluctantly backed the US on economic issues in UN meetings. None, in fact, voted with the US at the meeting in Lima last April of the UN Industrial Development Organization. Nevertheless, some of the EC countries now appear worried that the US positions to be announced at the Special Session may be too "advanced" and will cause them embarrassment.
The EC Council agreed in late July to guidelines for a policy that would allow the community to "examine" individual commodity issues and to endorse a proposal to extend to all developing states, through the IMF, the EC's own plan for helping to stabilize the earnings of developing countries from exports of certain raw materials.
The OECD states agreed at a ministerial meeting last May to establish high-level groups to examine raw materials policies and overall relations with developing states. These groups, however, have done little to prepare for the Special Session, having focused instead on the long term. This means that the industrialized states will have to rely on ad hoc consultations during the session to coordinate policy.
Tokyo is especially sensitive to the problem of maintaining access to raw materials. Nevertheless, the thrust of Japanese policy has been to sympathize--and when possible to give the appearance of being more forthcoming than other industrialized nations--while avoiding costly concessions. Such attitudes have become transparent to most developing states and have only been successful in strengthening the arguments of those who argue that deliberate confrontation may be the only promising stance to take toward the industrialized world.
The Soviets and East Europeans--with the exception of Romania and Yugoslavia--will maintain a low profile at the Seventh Special Session, as they have at previous meetings dealing with these issues. They will express solidarity with the developing states but will also be careful to avoid costly economic commitments. The Chinese will support the developing countries' positions, but they will not assume a leadership position. Peking also certainly will use the session to continue its attacks on the Soviets.
Miniștrii agriculturii din România și Polonia vin luna aceasta la Washington. Românul Miculescu speră să semneze o declarație de cooperare agricolă și să obțină semințe și credite pentru bumbac.
The Romanian and Polish agricultural ministers will be in Washington this month to discuss bilateral cooperation with the US.
Romanian minister Miculescu, who also is deputy prime minister, hopes to sign a statement of agricultural cooperation when he returns to Washington this week from a Midwest tour. He also wants to establish cooperation on long-term agricultural research with several US universities, obtain seeds to replace those lost in the July floods, and receive additional US credits to buy cotton. Poland's agricultural minister Barcikowski will arrive on September 20 to discuss credits and purchases of US grain. Warsaw probably wants to import 3 to 4 million tons of grain this year to support an expansion of livestock production and to offset shortfalls in grain and drought-stricken fodder crops. Because of the USSR's poor grain harvest, any of these requirements will likely have to be met by purchases of US grain.
Ceaușescu a fost rănit în orgoliu la Helsinki: nu s-a aflat în centrul atenției, iar liderii est-europeni l-au tratat ca pe un străin. Pasaje din text nu au fost publicate.
Romanian President Ceausescu suffered a bruised ego at the Helsinki summit Ceausescu-- was upset because he was not in the spotlight at Helsinki. He was annoyed by the Romanian Foreign Ministry's failure to line up more talks for him with other chiefs of state. the East European leaders tended to ignore him and treated him like an outsider.
În română
Președintele român Ceaușescu a fost rănit în orgoliu la reuniunea la vârf de la Helsinki Ceaușescu a fost supărat că nu s-a aflat în centrul atenției la Helsinki. L-a iritat faptul că Ministerul român de Externe nu i-a aranjat mai multe convorbiri cu alți șefi de stat. liderii est-europeni au avut tendința să-l ignore și l-au tratat ca pe un străin.
La recepția pentru premierul iugoslav Bijedić în China, ambasadorul sovietic a părăsit sala după o frază antisovietică a lui Deng Xiaoping. L-au urmat ambasadorii est-europeni, în afară de cel român.
Yugoslav Premier Bijedic's visit to China began on a sour note yesterday when Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov led a walkout at the official reception.
All envoys of the East European Communist countries except the Romanian ambassador left after Chinese First Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping said, "...the most dangerous source of war is the superpower that is most zealous in preaching peace." The walkout yesterday was significant because Teng's anti-Soviet statement did not go beyond language he had used at the recent reception for North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan; Tolstikov did not leave on that occasion. The Soviet's action probably was intended as a demonstration of pique with the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, who have been flaunting their ties with Peking.
Mișcarea Populară, sprijinită de sovietici, l-a numit pe Agostinho Neto președinte al „Republicii Populare Angola”. Guvernul lui a fost recunoscut repede de URSS, România, Cuba și câteva state africane.
The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola yesterday named its leader, Agostinho Neto, president of the "People's Republic of Angola."
The Neto government was quickly recognized by the USSR, Romania, Cuba, and several African states with long ties to the Popular Movement. A number of other East European states have expressed "readiness" to establish diplomatic relations with the new People's Republic.
The Popular Movement's rivals--the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola--marked Angolan independence and the inauguration of their joint provisional government in ceremonies at Nova Lisboa, the National Union's headquarters, and at Ambriz, the Front's headquarters. The seat of the provisional government will be at Nova Lisboa, renamed Huambo.
After the independence ceremonies, the two rival "governments" quickly resumed military activities. The Popular Movement dispatched a column of troops and tanks southward to meet an advancing National Front - National Union force advancing on Luanda. That force, however, is still approximately 350 miles from the capital.
At Quifangando, the National Front has still not been able to break through Popular Movement defenses after almost three weeks of combat.
The Front and the Union still hope to force the Popular Movement to compromise. The Popular Movement will probably not be inclined to consider a political accommodation with its rivals, however, now that it has been recognized by Cuba and the USSR and continues to receive military aid from them.
In Cabinda, heavy fighting is taking place between the Popular Movement and Cabindan liberation forces, which are probably augmented by Zairian troops. The inability of the Cabindan liberation forces to secure a quick victory, in what was supposed to have been a surprise attack, suggests that the Popular Movement may hold the upper hand at the present time.
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The Communist Party
Partidul Comunist este forța cea mai puternică și mai bine organizată a opoziției spaniole. Are un aparat de propagandă bine pus la punct, Radio España Independiente, care emite din România.
The Communist Party is the strongest and best organized force in the Spanish opposition. It has an estimated 5,000 active members in Spain and at least twice that many abroad, mostly in France. Outlawed since the end of the Civil War, the party has been harshly repressed by the Spanish government--in contrast to the official toleration given many other opposition parties--and its leaders rarely venture into Spain. Santiago Carrillo Solares, now 60 years old, has been secretary general since 1960.
The principal source of Communist strength lies in its dominance over most of the Workers Commissions--illegal labor groups that appeared in the 1960s. Communist organization, discipline, and financial backing have helped make the commissions the most effective protest mechanism available to the Spanish worker. They will provide an important means of exerting pressure on Franco's successors, particularly if Juan Carlos does not establish other avenues to express worker grievances to management.
The Communist Party also has at its disposal a well-oiled propaganda machine in Radio Espana Independiente, which broadcasts from Romania. The party has support in the universities and is said to have good connections in the media.
Communist efforts to infiltrate the military have apparently met with little success. The military forces have been a prime target for many years, but there is no evidence of significant penetration. The basic Communist aim is to assure the neutrality of the military during the post-Franco evolution of Spain's political system.
The Communists have not been spared internal dissension. A serious rift reportedly exists between the Madrid Central Committee and the exiled senior leadership in Paris over present party tactics. The party is said to be losing "considerable numbers" of young workers and university students to more extremist groups.
On international issues, Spanish Communist attitudes and positions are close to those of the Italian Communist Party. Carrillo's relations with Moscow have been strained ever since he denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like the Italians, Carrillo makes a point of stressing his party's independence from Moscow and has criticized Portuguese Communists for their hard-line, revolutionary tactics.
Carrillo professes to favor a more gradual approach in bringing about change. He recently claimed, for example, that he cannot object to the US military bases in Spain as long as the Soviets keep troops in Czechoslovakia.
Rival Coalition
The Platform of Democratic Convergence was formed last summer as a counter to the Communist-controlled Junta. Dominated by Socialists and Christian Democrats, the Platform is composed of some 15 opposition parties, organizations, and trade unions.
Their program calls for the eventual drafting of a new democratic constitution setting up a federal state that would grant autonomy to the component regions. Most of the groups in the Platform would accept a gradual evolution toward Western style democracy, although there is considerable squabbling over how gradual the evolution can be.
The dominant force in the Platform coalition is the Spanish Socialist Workers Party--the major Socialist faction in Spain. The Party and its affiliated illegal trade union, the General Union of Workers, will provide the principal competition to the Communist Party during the transition period. Although clearly smaller and less well organized than the Communists, the Socialists are believed to enjoy widespread popular support.
Four Christian Democratic factions have joined the Platform, and a fifth is expected to join soon. Two Christian Democratic leaders claim that the various factions are collaborating closely. Effective unification, however, appears unlikely.
China păstrează o neutralitate strictă în conflictul din Angola. Pekinul e deja în tabăra opusă României și altor state care, urmând Moscova, au recunoscut oficial Mișcarea Populară.
The Chinese are maintaining a policy of strict neutrality toward conflicting forces in Angola. Peking's approach--for the short term at least--is once of opposition to the USSR's support for the Popular Movement. There is no evidence of any significant resumption of covert Chinese assistance to the National Front and National Union.
As long as other outside powers continue to shoulder the burden of military assistance to the opponents of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, China can be expected to maintain a low profile with its former clients.
Although evidence is lacking, Peking may have reached agreement to divert to Angola certain types of equipment as long as Peking is left with a plausible case for denying any direct role of its own.
The prospect that the Organization of African Unity may reverse its policy of neutrality toward the civil conflict in Angola or that OAU members may decide to go separate ways on the subject must concern the Chinese. Peking is already on the opposite side of the fence from Tanzania, Mozambique, Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea as well as a number of other states that have followed Moscow's lead in extending formal recognition to the Popular Movement. A decision by the OAU to waffle on Angola would almost certainly lead to wider African and Third World recognition for the Movement.
The Popular Movement, for its part, has carefully avoided closing the door to future ties with Peking by avoiding direct attacks on the Chinese. The Movement's second in command has specifically stated that his group has resisted Soviet pressures to take sides in the broader Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. There are no signs, however, that Peking is seriously considering switching its political support. On the contrary, the expanded Soviet and Cuban role can only have darkened Chinese views of the Movement.
Două vizite, a ministrului iugoslav de externe în România și a ministrului român al comerțului exterior în Iugoslavia, ar trebui să stingă zvonurile despre neînțelegeri între București și Belgrad.
Two visits this week, by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic to Romania and by Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Patan to Yugoslavia, should help to end rumors that problems between Bucharest and Belgrade forced the cancellation of President Ceausescu's trip to Yugoslavia in October.
The visits came on the heels of President Ceausescu's forceful reassertion on December 18 of Romania's independent foreign policy. Ceausescu underscored the similarities between Belgrade and Bucharest on a variety of issues, including their determination to resist Soviet claims to leadership of the international communist movement. Minic probably briefed the Romanians on his recent trip to Moscow, where he discussed Soviet meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs.
While in Belgrade, Patan signed a trade agreement covering the period 1976-80 and a commodity trade protocol for the coming year.
