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România în buletinul președintelui american: 1969
39 de zile din 1969 în care buletinul CIA pentru președintele SUA numește România: 45 de paragrafe, scanate și transcrise, cu pasajele încă secrete marcate.
amintită în textîn parte încă secret
6. Peru - Soviet Union
Lima și Moscova au convenit să stabilească relații diplomatice. Guvernul militar peruan, venit la putere în octombrie, a stabilit între timp asemenea relații cu România și Iugoslavia.
Lima and Moscow have agreed to open diplomatic relations. Since the military government took over in October, it has established diplomatic ties with Rumania and Yugoslavia and has signed trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
Se așteaptă presiuni sovietice puternice asupra românilor la reuniunea la vârf a Tratatului de la Varșovia de luna aceasta, unde se va discuta probabil un exercițiu al Tratatului în România.
The Rumanians are expected to come under heavy Soviet pressure at a Warsaw Pact summit meeting to be held in the Polish capital later this month. One of the agenda items probably will be discussion of plans for a pact exercise in Rumania this year.
The signs are that the pact's leaders will at the same time put on their economic hats and convene the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) to press Rumania to de-emphasize national development in favor of "united action."
III. ANNEX SOVIET MILITARY PRESSURES ON RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
Moscova folosește Tratatul de la Varșovia ca pârghie asupra României, unde în 1969 e prevăzut un exercițiu comun. Românii și iugoslavii nu se mai tem de o intervenție militară directă.
SIGNIFICANCE: Uncertainty about Soviet military intentions is likely to rise again in Eastern Europe in 1969 when the military forces of the Warsaw Pact conduct a combined exercise in Rumania, something Bucharest had been able to fend off since 1962. The Soviets are using the Warsaw Pact as a lever to exact greater cooperation from the Rumanians and, indirectly, from non-Pact member Yugoslavia. The Rumanians and the Yugoslavs no longer fear, however, that the Soviets are prepared to go as far as outright military intervention. They are probably right. Even so, the anxieties aroused in Eastern Europe will be felt in Western Europe, and there will be renewed concern in NATO about the security of its southern flank.
* * *
Soviet Military Pressures
In the wake of its decision to stamp out reformism in Czechoslovakia, Moscow has set out to force the Rumanians to reduce their awkward defiance of Soviet authority. The Soviets also hope to insulate Eastern Europe from the insidious influence of Yugoslav "revisionism."
As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania is more susceptible to Soviet pressures applied through that organization than is Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, with its demonstration of Soviet readiness to use military force for political purposes in Eastern Europe, and Moscow's declaration concerning the limitations on the sovereignty of members of the "socialist commonwealth," Soviet pressures on Rumania will be felt keenly in Yugoslavia.
Rumanian Participation in the Warsaw Pact
In recent years Rumania has reduced its participation in Pact affairs, coming last spring very nearly to the point of having a "vacant chair" at Pact gatherings.
Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, their own discretion and, no doubt, a good measure of "comradely persuasion" from Moscow have recommended a more accommodating policy to the Rumanians. Top-ranking Rumanian and Soviet military officers have exchanged visits, among these a visit to Bucharest by the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. It was not by chance that Bucharest was the site of the annual meeting of the chiefs-of-staff of the Pact countries convened late last year.
In the offing early this year is a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, which will be, in effect, a summit meeting of the party, government and military chiefs of the seven member states. It can be expected that pressure will mount at that time on Rumania to make concessions--potentially damaging to Rumania's claims to national sovereignty--in the name of strengthening the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis NATO.
The Soviets might revert,for example, to earlier demands that Rumania expand its own armed forces or agree to increased standardization of military equipment within the Pact. The Rumanians are also apprehensive about a possible attempt to give the Pact command tighter control over national forces.
The Rumanian Response
The Rumanian position is delicate. Bucharest will have to give some ground--as it already has in agreeing to combined exercises--but will struggle hard against being drawn more tightly into the Warsaw Pact net. In negotiating with the Russians on the timing and scope of the exercises, the Rumanians will seek to obtain hard-and-fast assurances that foreign forces will withdraw at a specific time.
Soviet Intentions
There is no reason to think that Moscow considers either Rumania or Yugoslavia a real and present danger to its security position. The chances of extreme military action against either are not great. But even while applying lesser pressures, Moscow will arouse sharp new anxieties in Bucharest and Belgrade. If the Pact forces are slow to withdraw from Rumanian soil, as they may be, the atmosphere of tension that prevailed last summer will begin to settle again over Eastern Europe. If the Russians were to go a step further and leave their forces in Rumania for a protracted period, there would be real concern within NATO that the Soviets had set out to fasten their hold on all of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav request for economic and military assistance from NATO countries would be sure to follow. The US would be pressed, on the one hand, to issue warnings to Moscow and, on the other, to avoid taking a stance which might seem to challenge the USSR.
Tabel cu cheltuielile militare din bugetele est-europene: România prevede 6,4 miliarde de lei pentru 1969, față de 5,2 miliarde în 1968, o creștere de 23,1%, până la 4,2% din buget.
COUNTRY (and currency) | 1968 Planned (in millions) | 1969 Planned (in millions) | 1969 Percentage Change from 1968 | Military Expenditures as Percentage of Total Budget 1968 | 1969
YUGOSLAVIA (New Dinars) 6,030 6,860 +13.8* 56.6 60.4
*In December 1968, Yugoslavia announced a supplementary defense expenditure which brought actual military spending up to 6,425 million new dinars. The increase of planned defense expenditure in 1969 over actual expenditures in 1968 is only 6.8 percent.
Toate țările est-europene au anunțat bugete militare mai mari pentru 1969, cu creșteri de peste 20% în România și Ungaria. Nimic nu indică însă o înarmare de amploare.
All the Eastern European countries have announced increased military budgets for 1969, most of them for the fourth consecutive year. The increases, however, are generally larger than in the past few years, ranging from a low of nine percent for East Germany to more than 20 percent for Rumania and Hungary, and almost 40 percent for Albania. The military budgets in all countries account for an equal or larger percentage of their total budgets than in 1968.
There is no evidence that the increases in military spending are because of large-scale military buildups. It is probable that the Warsaw Pact members are responding to Soviet pressures to bring their military capabilities up to previously planned levels. With the introduction of economic reform and more realistic budget planning, the understatement of military expenses may be coming to an end. Other factors also may include higher real costs from the use of more sophisticated equipment, the effects of inflation, and the budgetary and price reforms.
SOVIET MILITARY PRESSURES ON RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA
Moscova folosește Tratatul de la Varșovia ca să-i facă pe români mai cooperanți, iar în 1969 sunt prevăzute manevre comune în România. O intervenție militară sovietică e însă puțin probabilă.
SIGNIFICANCE: Uncertainty about Soviet military intentions is likely to rise again in Eastern Europe in 1969 when the military forces of the Warsaw Pact conduct a combined exercise in Rumania, something Bucharest had been able to fend off since 1962. The Soviets are using the Warsaw Pact as a lever to exact greater cooperation from the Rumanians and, indirectly, from non-Pact member Yugoslavia. The Rumanians and the Yugoslavs no longer fear, however, that the Soviets are prepared to go as far as outright military intervention. They are probably right. Even so, the anxieties aroused in Eastern Europe will be felt in Western Europe, and there will be renewed concern in NATO about the security of its southern flank.
* * *
Soviet Military Pressures
In the wake of its decision to stamp out reformism in Czechoslovakia, Moscow has set out to force the Rumanians to reduce their awkward defiance of Soviet authority. The Soviets also hope to insulate Eastern Europe from the insidious influence of Yugoslav "revisionism."
As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania is more susceptible to Soviet pressures applied through that organization than is Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, with its demonstration of Soviet readiness to use military force for political purposes in Eastern Europe, and Moscow's declaration concerning the limitations on the sovereignty of members of the "socialist commonwealth," Soviet pressures on Rumania will be felt keenly in Yugoslavia.
Rumanian Participation in the Warsaw Pact
In recent years Rumania has reduced its participation in Pact affairs, coming last spring very nearly to the point of having a "vacant chair" at Pact gatherings.
Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, their own discretion and, no doubt, a good measure of "comradely persuasion" from Moscow have recommended a more accommodating policy to the Rumanians. Top-ranking Rumanian and Soviet military officers have exchanged visits, among these a visit to Bucharest by the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. It was not by chance that Bucharest was the site of the annual meeting of the chiefs-of-staff of the Pact countries convened late last year. Last month Bucharest in a very limited way rejoined the Warsaw Pact communications intelligence intercept network from which it had withdrawn in December 1966.
In the offing early this year is a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, which will be, in effect, a summit meeting of the party, government and military chiefs of the seven member states. It can be expected that pressure will mount at that time on Rumania to make concessions--potentially damaging to Rumania's claims to national sovereignty--in the name of strengthening the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis NATO. The Soviets might revert, for example, to earlier demands that Rumania expand its own armed forces or agree to increased standardization of military equipment within the Pact. The Rumanians are particularly apprehensive about a possible attempt to give the Pact command tighter control over national forces.
The Rumanian Response
The Rumanian position is delicate. Bucharest will have to give some ground--as it already has in agreeing to combined exercises--but will struggle hard against being drawn more tightly into the Warsaw Pact net. In negotiating with the Russians on the timing and scope of the exercises, the Rumanians will seek to obtain hard-and-fast assurances that foreign forces will withdraw at a specific time. If the Soviets seek to hold the exercises in the region bordering Yugoslavia, Rumania will surely argue for a less provocative locale.
Soviet Intentions
There is no reason to think that Moscow considers either Rumania or Yugoslavia a real and present danger to its security position. The chances of extreme military action against either are not great. But even while applying lesser pressures, Moscow will arouse sharp new anxieties in Bucharest and Belgrade. If the Pact forces are slow to withdraw from Rumanian soil, as they may be, the atmosphere of tension that prevailed last summer will begin to settle again over Eastern Europe. If the Russians were to go a step further and leave their forces in Rumania for a protracted period, there would be real concern within NATO that the Soviets had set out to fasten their hold on all of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav request for economic and military assistance from NATO countries would be sure to follow. The US would be pressed, on the one hand, to issue warnings to Moscow and, on the other, to avoid taking a stance which might seem to challenge the USSR.
Moscova și Lima stabilesc relații diplomatice într-o zi sau două. De la preluarea puterii, în octombrie, militarii peruani au stabilit deja legături diplomatice cu România, Iugoslavia și Cehoslovacia.
The Soviet Union and its allies have reacted quickly in response to Peru's overtures for closer contacts. Diplomatic relations will be established between Moscow and Lima in the next day or two. Since the military took over in Peru last October, they have established diplomatic ties with Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Hungary is now pressing to join the list.
Vizita lui Tito în România arată că nici el, nici Ceaușescu nu s-au lăsat intimidați cu totul de ultimele presiuni ale Moscovei. Despre conținutul discuțiilor se știe încă puțin.
Tito's well-publicized visit to Rumania over the weekend indicates that neither he nor Rumania's Ceausescu have been entirely intimidated by the latest round of pressures from Moscow. We do not yet know much about what was discussed, and the communiqué issued by the two leaders is longer on atmospherics than on substance.
amintită în textîn parte încă secretcontinuă pe altă pagină
fără titlu
Potrivit unui înalt funcționar iugoslav, Moscova nu mai face presiuni ca România să găzduiască în primăvară manevre ale Tratatului de la Varșovia, fiindcă sovieticii sunt încă implicați în Cehoslovacia.
* * *
The US Ambassador in Belgrade has been told by a high-level Yugoslav Foreign Office official that Rumania is no longer under pressure from Moscow to hold Warsaw Pact maneuvers this spring because of continuing Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest is said to have told his Yugoslav colleague that no maneuvers would be held in Rumania until the end of the year.
The Rumanians also told the Yugoslavs that they believe developments in Czechoslovakia will cause the Moscow Conference of World Communist Parties, scheduled for this spring, to be postponed. If and when the conference is held, the Rumanians will attend but the Yugoslavs will not.
* * *
The arrival in East Berlin yesterday of Soviet Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, supreme commander of the Warsaw
Mareșalul Iakubovski, comandantul suprem al Tratatului de la Varșovia, conduce în RDG o reuniune a șefilor de stat-major, între care și cel român, probabil pentru planificarea manevrelor din 1969.
The Soviets and East Germans have confirmed that Marshal Yakubovsky, supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact, has been chairing a meeting in East Germany of the organization's chiefs of staff and deputy defense ministers. Yesterday's announcements did not give the precise location of the meeting, but it may have been at a training area west of Berlin where artillery and tactical air exercises have been noted. The Rumanian chief of staff was listed among the participants. Although the announcements of the meeting avoided any hint of its purpose, this is the time of year and the right level of military representation for planning 1969 maneuvers. (FBIS 39, 43, 13 Feb 69)
Luni și marți are loc la Budapesta o reuniune a Tratatului de la Varșovia, cu Brejnev și Kosîghin în delegația sovietică. România e așteptată cu o delegație de rang similar.
There will be a major Warsaw Pact meeting next Monday and Tuesday in Budapest. The roster of the Soviet delegation includes Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Defense Minister Grechko. The Warsaw Pact Commander, Marshal Yakubovsky and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces are also traveling to Budapest. It is expected that the other Pact members, including Rumania, will send delegations of similar rank. The participants are expected to discuss European security and the "high command" of the Pact. Other likely topics include Pact maneuvers and transit of Pact forces through the territories of member countries.
Also on Monday, representatives of at least sixty Communist parties are scheduled to meet in Moscow to draw up final plans for the "World Communist Conference" which the Soviets hope to stage in May.
La Budapesta, liderii Tratatului de la Varșovia au aprobat noi reguli pentru forțele armate și comandamentele comune. Faptul că România le-a acceptat ar putea însemna că s-au schimbat puține.
The story behind the 120-minute Warsaw Pact summit conference in Budapest yesterday has not yet unfolded. The main point in the final communiqué merely states that the participants approved "new regulations on combined armed forces and combined commands." This suggests that the discussions--at least nominally--succeeded in drawing the member states into closer military cooperation. Rumania's readiness to subscribe to the new arrangements, however, may well mean that little has changed. The Rumanians have long resisted Russian efforts to obtain control over Rumania's armed forces.
A Washington Post story this morning alleges that the Rumanians vetoed a major Soviet effort to "integrate" Rumania's forces under the Pact. The New York Times claims that disagreement emerged at the meeting over a Soviet attempt to get a resolution condemning the Chinese as "aggressors." There is nothing substantial at this point to back either of these claims.
The Soviet leaders are already en route back to Moscow by train. The Rumanians, East Germans, and probably others have also left. This means that there was little or no time for bilateral talks after the formal meeting adjourned.
Surse din misiunea militară cehoslovacă din Berlinul de Vest spun că Tratatul de la Varșovia va da statelor membre mai multe funcții de comandă, cum cer mai ales românii.
According to members of the Czechoslovak military mission in West Berlin, Warsaw Pact leaders have "confirmed" that there would be a reorganization of the Pact to provide for increased command responsibilities for personnel from member states. They said that East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman, who is the logical choice for a high position because of his age and experience, has been in Moscow preparing for his new duties.
The Soviets presumably also consider Hoffman to be a logical candidate for any new job because he is likely to be more amenable to their direction than any of the other defense ministers. The continuing absence from public view of Bulgarian Defense Minister Dzhurov has led to speculation that he too may be in line for a new job, possibly as Hoffman's deputy.
In recent years, the Eastern European members of the Pact--particularly the Rumanians--have been pressing the Soviets for a share in the Pact's command structure. All the members will probably welcome any institutional change, but many of them probably will have doubts that any practical effects will flow from the appointment of such hard-line dogmatists as Hoffmann and Dzhurov.
Românii își păstrează neutralitatea în disputa sovieto-chineză: presa nu a mai scris din 4 martie despre problema frontierei și a publicat un mesaj destul de cald către congresul partidului chinez.
The Rumanians are keeping firmly to their long-standing policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The press has not mentioned the Sino-Soviet border problem since 4 March; last week it published a relatively warm message from the Rumanian party central committee addressed to the Chinese party congress and its chairman "Comrade Mao Tse-tung."
Moscova a amenințat Partidul Comunist Italian cu tăierea subvenției anuale, iar românii, aliați ai italienilor împotriva dominației sovietice, au acceptat înțelegeri comerciale care i-ar aduce partidului 800.000 de dolari.
The Soviets are increasing pressure on the Italian Communist Party to fall into line as 5 June, the date for the Conference of World Communist Parties, approaches. The Italians have been serving as unofficial leaders of the dissidents in the international Communist movement.
A number of smaller parties, including the Australians and British, backed the Italians and Rumanians in their opposition to Moscow's dominance at last month's preparatory meeting for the June conference. The Rumanians, however, disagreed with Italian tactics, The French, who had earlier backed the Italians, this time caved in to the Soviets.
Moscow has already threatened to cut its annual subsidy to the Italian party, reputed to be in the neighborhood of 6.5 million dollars. To counter this, the Rumanians have agreed to trade deals which would net the party in Rome $800,000 over a one to two year period. Yugoslavia is said to be considering a similar arrangement.
Soviet irritation with the Italian position came through clearly in a Pravda article yesterday which criticized the Italians' stand on Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border dispute and reminded them not to forget "the principles of proletarian internationalism." pressure from Moscow may bring latent conflicts within the leadership to the surface,
Rolul CAER e de mult disputat între membri: URSS și Polonia vor mai multă coeziune economică, iar România, la polul opus, e foarte sensibilă la orice îi atinge suveranitatea.
CEMA was formed in 1949, during the period when Moscow--in the Stalinist pattern--was forcing heavy industrialization on all the East European countries. Parallel development of this sort, without any adaptation to market forces, fostered inefficient, competitive economies, rather than a complex of complementary trading partners.
The proper role of CEMA has long been a subject of dispute--at times acrimonious--among the member countries. For political reasons, the Soviet Union and Poland believe that the organization should promote greater economic cohesiveness. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary are interested in increased cooperation, but are apprehensive lest Soviet domination increase. Rumania, at the other end of the scale, is extremely sensitive to any move that impinges on its sovereignty. Thus, it is not surprising that CEMA has been most effective in technical areas of cooperation among its members--such as the railway freight car pool and the integrated electric power network--where conflicts of national interest are minimal.
All the countries rely and will continue to rely on bilateral barter trade with one another--a major factor in the inefficiency of their economies. In their bilateral trade negotiations, the countries run head on into gross price distortions that result from artificially set prices which do not reflect costs or scarcity. There is no multilateral medium of exchange to settle trade imbalances. The CEMA International Bank for Economic Cooperation provides only a limited clearing service for trade imbalances which must still be settled by bilateral negotiations.
The Soviets have recently engaged in a series of bilateral talks with the East European countries on development of the five-year trade plans for 1971-75. These plans will also be considered at length in CEMA committees.
In its day-to-day work, CEMA has evolved into a service-type organization, currently housed in a new headquarters building in Moscow and employing personnel from all member states. It is a clearing house for administrative, technical, and financial guidance to its members in their bilateral trading arrangements with each other. The members have also not been averse to having CEMA's technical staff wrestle with such problems as pricing of items, joint investment projects, and problems of currency convertibility.
CEMA also explores means of achieving the benefits of large-scale production through cooperation, economies that are not possible within a single country. It is obvious, however, that no CEMA member, including the USSR, will surrender control over the development of its economy to an international authority. Areas where a start toward integration can be made are indeed limited. They might include more cooperation in research and development, selected industrial specialization, and increased enterprise-to-enterprise contacts. Multilateral planning probably will continue to be limited largely to coordination of trade requirements
Sovieticii încearcă să reducă divergențele cu celelalte partide comuniste înaintea conferinței mondiale din 5 iunie. Mai multe, în primul rând cel român, au încă rezerve serioase față de unele documente.
The Soviets are working hard to narrow areas of difference with other Communist parties as 5 June, the day the world conference of Communist parties is supposed to begin, approaches. Representatives from some 70 parties are now gathering in Moscow for a final preparatory session. Several parties--most notably the Rumanian--still have strong reservations about some of the documents which are to be approved at the June meeting. Nevertheless, differences among the parties will probably be papered over enough to permit the conference to open on schedule.
Comitetul Central al partidului român l-a desemnat pe Ceaușescu șef al delegației la conferința comunistă din 5 iunie, cu „mandatul” de a obține amendamentele respinse la Moscova și Varșovia.
The Rumanian party central committee held a one-day meeting Wednesday at which party boss Ceausescu was chosen to head the delegation to the 5 June international Communist conference. He received a "mandate" to work toward improving the language of the conference document--that is to get approval for insertion of changes he unsuccessfully sponsored in recent visits to Moscow and Warsaw.
Husák începe epurarea partidului cehoslovac. Comunicatul reuniunii pregătitoare de la Moscova arată că divergențele asupra documentului principal persistă, iar partidele român și italian, principalii disidenți, rămân nemulțumite.
At a Czechoslovak party plenum on 29-30 May Husak and his colleagues began a housecleaning of the party membership in order to consolidate their own position and to convince the Soviets that they are speeding the process of "normalization." The leadership reprimanded or expelled a number of unreconstructed reformists and initiated investigations into the activities of others. Husak indicated that these measures were just the beginning and that the party would take action in the future against dissidents in other sectors of society--for example, the trade unions, intellectuals and students. Punitive actions, however, will probably be confined to expulsion from the party and possibly dismissal from jobs. Arrests are apparently not contemplated.
Pro-Soviet conservatives, who have been making a concerted bid for power, failed to make significant gains at the plenum and are probably only partly satisfied with the results. Husak has made it clear that he will not tolerate hardliners who want to return to the repressive practices of former party boss Novotny. The expected removal of a liberal from the party secretariat, however, appears to have given the conservatives a slight majority on that body.
* * *
The communiqué issued at the end of the preparatory meeting of Communist parties in Moscow indicates that differences over the text of the main document--on imperialism--remain unresolved and that the chief dissidents, the Rumanian and Italian parties, are still unappeased. Although the communiqué does not specifically state 5 June will be the opening date of the conference, there is no positive evidence of further postponement. Soviet prestige has been bolstered by the announcement that the hitherto recalcitrant Cuban party will send a delegation of high-level observers to the conference. The Yugoslav party has officially announced that it will not attend.
La conferința comunistă, doi vorbitori au atacat Pekinul. Românii, cărora li se dăduse de înțeles că nu se va întâmpla, au protestat imediat și ar putea pleca dacă se insistă.
In a move clearly timed to undercut Moscow's position in the world Communist conference, Peking yesterday rebutted recent Soviet charges of border provocations by issuing lengthy allegations of its own.
The Soviets will feel compelled to respond in full, although they obviously would prefer not to become involved in full-scale acrimony during the sensitive proceedings of the conference. A preliminary foreign ministry statement yesterday maintained that the frontier is "absolutely quiet."
Moscow's sensitivity to this sort of friction, however, is evident from the high level of Soviet military activity along the border since early May. In addition, the Soviets appear to be preparing for a large-scale combined forces exercise, perhaps to emphasize their military superiority in the area.
* * *
There already has been discord in the Communist conference over the Chinese question. Two speakers--Poland's Gomulka and the Paraguayan delegate--lashed out at Peking. It can be taken for granted that they had the Russians' blessing. The Rumanians, who had been given to understand that this would not happen, lodged an immediate protest. On past form, the Rumanians should walk out if the issue is pressed too hard. By sticking together, however, they and such others as the Italian and British party delegates could yet succeed in getting the Russians to back down. Brezhnev's speech, scheduled for this morning, should point the way.
Brejnev a atacat conducerea chineză la conferința comunistă, iar partidele care au evitat să condamne China, mai ales cel român și cel italian, se vor simți obligate să răspundă.
Moscow's decision to bring the China issue to the floor of the international Communist conference has made it clear that the meeting will be remembered primarily for its display of disunity.
Brezhnev, on Saturday, accused the Chinese leaders of preparing their people for war against the USSR, of supporting splinter groups in foreign Communist parties, and of thwarting "anti-imperialist" unity.
Those parties which support Moscow's line can be expected to endorse these remarks in their conference speeches. This will give the Soviets a condemnation of China for the record even if it does not appear in the formal document. By raising the issue in such stark terms, however, Brezhnev is challenging those parties which have sought to avoid condemnation of China, and some of these--particularly the Rumanian and Italian parties--will feel called upon to reply.
Some of the parties may actually walk out of the conference after giving their address. Others may remain but withhold their signature from the conference document, which reportedly is not yet fully agreed upon. Still others may follow the Australian party's lead and take the offensive on the Czechoslovakian invasion or other divisive issues in the Communist community.
La conferința comunistă, Ceaușescu a fost mai moderat decât italienii: a susținut dreptul României la dezacord și la independență față de Moscova, dar a spus că nu va părăsi lucrările.
The international Communist conference continues to bump shakily along with dissident parties challenging Moscow's position on China, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and points in the conference document.
The speech by the Italian party representative yesterday was particularly critical of the invasion and anti-Chinese statements on the floor. He said his delegation was not willing to sign the document in its present form. Czech party chief Husak rebuked the Italians later in the session.
The speech of Rumanian party boss Ceausescu on Monday was moderate by comparison with the Italians. He did insist on Rumania's right to dissent and to be independent of Moscow. He hinted that he might not be able to sign the final document but said his delegation would not walk out.
Many delegations are said to be critical of the vague and haphazard methods of the meeting, and much work still must be done on the wording of the basic document. No decision has yet been reached as to whether the parties must approve the document in toto or will be allowed to abstain on some sections.
Conferința comunistă s-a încheiat cu un document pe care cinci partide din 75 nu l-au semnat integral. Altele, între care cel român, se vor delimita probabil de unele pasaje.
The international Communist conference ended yesterday with adoption of a much worked-over basic document on the extent of the "imperialist threat" and the "unity" of the Communist world. The communiqué acknowledged that five of the 75 attending parties--including the Italian--did not sign all or part of the document. There are reports that seven other parties expressed reservations about some portion of it. Several of them--including the Romanian--will probably find ways of dissociating themselves from objectionable sections. The document has just been made public this morning and will be reported further when analysis has been completed.
În urma anunțului vizitei președintelui SUA în România, liderii sovietici par să-și fi anulat sau amânat venirea la București, unde urmau să semneze luna aceasta un nou tratat de prietenie.
One result of the President's plans to visit Romania has apparently been the cancellation or at least postponement of a projected visit to Bucharest by Soviet leaders. Lower-level officials in Moscow now are saying that Brezhnev and company will not go to Romania this month to sign a new friendship treaty, and a Soviet Embassy counselor in Bucharest hinted that the Romanians might have to travel to Moscow for the signing. Romanian First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu, who had hinted earlier that the Soviet visit was still scheduled, said Friday that nothing had been decided.
Further Soviet countermoves to the Presidential trip are probably still under review in Moscow. The Soviet ambassador to Romania failed to return to Bucharest last week as expected, and the lack of direct editorial comment on the trip in the Soviet press will probably continue until a decision on further moves is reached.
Meanwhile, the Romanian party daily published a long editorial yesterday--clearly with top-level approval--pledging Romania to continue to develop relations with all states regardless of their politics. This would appear to be a defense of Bucharest's invitation to the President, although his name was not specifically mentioned, and is the government's first official reference to state visits since the President announced he was making the trip.
O escadră navală sovietică merge pentru prima dată în vizită în Cuba, dar nimic nu arată că ar fi un răspuns la apropiata călătorie a președintelui Nixon în România.
A small Soviet naval squadron--two submarines, three guided-missile ships, and two support vessels--are en route to Cuba to represent the USSR at Cuban holiday observances on 26 July. This is the first time Soviet warships have visited Cuba, an event probably intended to point up the improvement in Cuban-Soviet relations. the Cubans are not planning any formal celebrations this year, however. Thus the impact of the Soviet gesture may be less than anticipated.
The voyage also reflects Moscow's increased interest in expanding its area of naval operations, which, from the Soviet point of view, may be more important than flattering the Cubans. The squadron has been under way since mid-June, and there is no indication the Soviets planned the visit in response to President Nixon's upcoming trip to Romania.
Zvonurile despre un exercițiu masiv al Tratatului de la Varșovia în august, la granițele RFG, Austriei și Iugoslaviei, par o operațiune de intimidare, care ar putea viza România și Iugoslavia.
Rumors are being circulated in Eastern Europe, that a Warsaw Pact exercise in mid-August will bring massive forces (32 to 40 divisions) to the borders of West Germany, Austria, and Yugoslavia; this would, of course, also put them close to Romania. Such an exercise cannot be completely ruled out but seems improbable. The rumors, bear the marks of a scare operation. They may be intended to intimidate Romania and Yugoslavia. They could also have a chilling effect in Western Europe, especially in Bonn.
În discursul din Sovietul Suprem, Gromîko a avertizat China și a fost conciliant cu SUA și Occidentul, părând să-și înghită nemulțumirea față de vizita plănuită a președintelui Nixon la București.
Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet yesterday combined warnings to China with a conciliatory line toward the US and the West. According to a TASS summary, Gromyko indicated that Moscow is ready for early talks with the US on strategic arms limitation.
Seeming to swallow any displeasure over President Nixon's planned visit to Bucharest, Gromyko went back several months to refer approvingly to the President's statement favoring a "well prepared" summit conference. He took a moderate stance on West European affairs and, according to press reports, made a carefully hedged expression of willingness to discuss Berlin with the three Western powers with a view to preventing future crises there.
The Soviet foreign minister gave the first public indication that the Sino-Soviet border navigation talks in Khabarovsk are not going well. His references to "certain statements" by Chinese representatives and the "recent new provocation" on the Amur River suggest that the USSR anticipates a breakdown of the negotiations.
Gromyko reiterated the idea of a collective security system for Asia, which Brezhnev broached in June, but TASS mentioned no clarification. In recent weeks, Soviet diplomats have touted this vague scheme but have provided no details.
Gromyko had nothing new to offer on the Middle East. While decrying the dangers to peace in that area, he made it clear that Moscow still considers Israeli withdrawal from occupied areas as a prerequisite for a settlement, along with recognition of Israel's right to exist.
Ambasadorul României la Paris a anunțat că liderii sovietici și-au amânat până în toamnă vizita la București prevăzută luna aceasta, motivul invocat fiind „îndatoriri urgente și neprevăzute”.
The Romanian ambassador in Paris announced yesterday at a press conference that top Soviet leaders have indeed postponed their scheduled visit to Bucharest this month, presumably to sign a revised friendship treaty, until fall. The reason given was "urgent and unforeseen duties" on the part of the Moscow entourage. The semiofficial statement is
S-a publicat doar finalul paragrafului, potrivit căruia se urmărește probabil atenuarea stânjenelii Moscovei în fața știrilor că relațiile sovieto-române s-au înrăutățit de la anunțarea vizitei președintelui SUA la București.
probably intended to minimize Moscow's embarrassment over reports that Soviet-Romanian relations had worsened since the President's trip to Bucharest was announced.
Înaintea vizitei președintelui SUA, Bucureștiul face gesturi prietenoase, mai ales culturale: directorul USIA, Shakespeare, a fost primit cu neobișnuită curtoazie, iar românii par gata să convină asupra unei biblioteci americane.
In anticipation of the President's upcoming visit, Bucharest has made a few friendly moves, particularly in the cultural field, to prepare the way. USIA Director Shakespeare was received with unusual courtesy during his recent unofficial visit and due notice was paid to his presence in the press. In contrast, former director Marks got only perfunctory treatment and no publicity during a visit in 1967. Shakespeare was treated as a VIP by the Foreign Office, even though the trip was unofficial, as well as by the State Committees for Art and Radio and Television. He was guest at several social functions and was invited back for an official visit by the First Deputy Foreign Minister.
In talks with Shakespeare, the Romanians seemed ready to reach agreement on the questions of establishing a US library in Romania and exchanging magazines. Both of these issues have been under negotiation for some time, and Bucharest would probably like to formalize agreements on them during the President's visit.
În română
În așteptarea apropiatei vizite a președintelui, Bucureștiul a făcut câteva gesturi prietenoase, mai ales în domeniul cultural, ca să pregătească terenul. Directorul USIA [Agenția de Informații a Statelor Unite], Shakespeare, a fost primit cu o curtoazie neobișnuită în recenta lui vizită neoficială, iar presa a consemnat vizita cum se cuvine. Prin contrast, fostul director Marks avusese parte doar de un tratament de formă și de nicio publicitate la vizita din 1967. Shakespeare a fost tratat ca un oaspete de rang înalt de Ministerul de Externe, deși călătoria era neoficială, ca și de comitetele de stat pentru artă și pentru radio și televiziune. A fost invitat la mai multe recepții, iar prim-adjunctul ministrului de externe l-a poftit să revină într-o vizită oficială.
În discuțiile cu Shakespeare, românii au părut gata să ajungă la un acord în privința înființării unei biblioteci americane în România și a schimbului de reviste. Amândouă chestiunile se negociază de ceva vreme, iar Bucureștiul ar vrea probabil să încheie acordurile în timpul vizitei președintelui.
Activitatea militară sporită a Tratatului de la Varșovia ține probabil de pregătirea exercițiilor sezoniere obișnuite. Unități aeriene și antiaeriene sovietice, bulgare și române au făcut joi un mic exercițiu.
The increase noted in Warsaw Pact military activity this week is probably in preparation for normal seasonal training exercises. Naval craft assembling off the East German and Polish coasts are expected to conduct an amphibious exercise. Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian air and air defense units conducted a small exercise on Thursday.
Moscova a comentat în revista „New Times”, mai dur ca oricând, vizita președintelui SUA în România și trimite la congresul partidului român un secretar de rang relativ modest.
Moscow has used the propaganda journal, New Times, to make its sharpest comment yet on the President's visit to Romania.
The fact that New Times is not an authoritative party organ suggests that the Soviets are not ready to commit themselves to a specific position. Nevertheless, a deputy editor of the journal called the article to the attention of the US Embassy last week, indicating it was probably meant to be an "unofficial" statement of Soviet policy.
In the article, "American ideologists" were charged with advocating extension of "suitable trade agreements" and license contracts to promote East European nationalism. The journal warned that machinations against socialism would "inevitably" evoke resistance from the USSR. Although no names were mentioned, the article clearly applied to Romania and the President's trip.
Soviet officials have implied that Moscow will oppose any subsequent steps to strengthen US-Romanian ties. Soviet displeasure with Romania has been shown by the protocol snub of sending a relatively low-ranking party secretary to head the delegation to the party congress beginning in Bucharest today. Brezhnev headed the delegation to the last such affair in 1965.
La congresul partidului român, Ceaușescu și șeful delegației sovietice, Katușev, și-au reafirmat pozițiile diferite, dar au evitat ciocnirea deschisă. Katușev a condamnat „construirea de punți”, aluzie la vizita președintelui SUA.
At the Romanian party congress now under way in Bucharest, both Ceausescu and the Soviet chief delegate, Katushev, have restated their respective regimes' disparate views, but they have avoided an open clash.
In his opening address, the Romanian party leader spoke of a system of sovereign Communist states but reiterated his opposition to the concept of blocs. His definition of imperialism could be applied to both Moscow and Washington. While vowing to preserve Romania's independence, he also took a conciliatory line toward the USSR.
Katushev, for his part, condemned "the perfidious practice of bridge-building"--an indirect reference to the President's visit. He also reminded all present that the Kremlin considers itself entitled to act against dissidents who threaten the socialist system. His speech met with strong opposition from the Yugoslav, Italian, and Spanish parties.
In Moscow yesterday, Izvestia published an article containing the first direct and authoritative Soviet statement linking criticism of the "bridge-building" concept with the President's trip. Moscow probably still plans to avoid an open break with Bucharest, however, as indicated by Pravda's publication of a lengthy summary of Ceausescu's congress speech.
Șeful delegației sovietice la congresul partidului român, Katușev, a vorbit prietenos într-o fabrică și a încheiat cu o urare pentru prietenia româno-sovietică, absentă din discursul său de la congres.
The Soviet chief delegate to the Romanian party congress, Katushev, visited a machine tool factory on Friday. While he repeated several major points of his generally critical address to the congress, he spoke in a friendly vein and ended with the declaration "long live the unshakeable friendship between Romania and the Soviet Union." The entire text of his remarks were carried by the Romanian party daily Scinteia on Saturday. The declaration of friendship was absent in Katushev's address to the congress and may reflect Moscow's desire to soften the impact of his critical remarks at the congress.
La congres, Ceaușescu și-a arătat autoritatea necontestată în partid, a promovat comuniști din „a doua generație” și a reafirmat linia externă independentă, prezentând totuși cât mai favorabil relațiile cu URSS.
Ceausescu demonstrated his unchallenged leadership over the Romanian Communist Party at the congress which ended on Tuesday. Seventy foreign parties sent delegations to the meeting.
Ceausescu advanced numerous "second generation" Communists to national-level party positions by deftly manipulating the composition of top-level bodies to ensure a membership tipped more to his favor. By electing representatives of the military and security forces, the intelligentsia and ethnic minorities, the congress advanced the image of national unity. At the same time the few "old guardists" still in top-level posts, although downgraded, were not displaced.
Romanian speakers at the congress reaffirmed Bucharest's independent course in foreign affairs. Ceausescu, in his opening speech, left little doubt about Romania's determination to resist any attack by "imperialists," which he defined in a way that could equally apply to both the US and the USSR.
Aware that the President's visit was still fresh in the mind of the Romanian people, Ceausescu tried to redress the balance. He labored to put the best face possible on Romanian-Soviet relations. He paid lip-service to Bucharest's attachment to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. He also spent some time discussing the Soviet army's role in "liberating" Romania and predictably criticized the US four times in his speech.
Now that the congress is ended, Bucharest is prolonging its festive atmosphere until 23 August, when the country will celebrate the 25th anniversary of its "liberation." It seems doubtful at this point that the Soviets and their allies will send high-level delegations to this event. Some Romanian leaders are expected, however, to meet their allies on the highest-level on 9 September, in Sofia, when Bulgaria celebrates its 25th "liberation" anniversary. Unidentified diplomats in Bucharest have claimed that Moscow may take the Romanians to task at the Sofia meeting. The Romanians can be expected to hold their ground.
Delegațiile est-europene la funeraliile lui Ho, de la Hanoi, zboară cu avioane sovietice pe ruta sudică, ce ocolește China. Singurii care zboară prin Pekin sunt românii.
Delegations from East European and several Afro-Asian countries are en route to Hanoi for Ho's funeral. Except for the Romanians, the contingents from eastern Europe are traveling aboard Soviet aircraft flying the southern route that skirts China. The Romanians are flying via Peking.
Brejnev și ceilalți lideri din Tratatul de la Varșovia sunt la Berlinul de Est pentru a 20-a aniversare a RDG. Doar România a trimis un reprezentant de rang mai mic.
Brezhnev and leaders of all the Warsaw Pact states (save Romania, which sent a lower level representative commensurate with East Germany's treatment of its own recent festivities) are gathered in East Berlin, but it does not appear that a summit conference is in progress. The activities of the visitors and the strenuous schedules of the East German leaders tend to indicate that the primary purpose of this turnout is to demonstrate solidarity with Pankow on the occasion of its 20th anniversary. East German party boss Ulbricht was looking fit and natty for his 76 years; apparently he is fully recovered from his indisposition of July and August.
Bolivia a naționalizat compania Gulf și, la câteva ore după aceea, a stabilit relații diplomatice cu România. Potrivit unor informații, aproape imediat s-au semnat și acorduri de asistență tehnică.
Bolivians generally are overjoyed at their government's decision to nationalize Gulf--so much so that editorialists and political leaders are calling for the nationalization of other US-owned industries. A wave of anti-American sentiment has swept the country, accentuated by some attacks on official US installations. Army guards have been provided to prevent further damage.
The government is already seeking aid to operate the Gulf facilities. Diplomatic relations were established with Romania within hours of the expropriation, and we have reports that agreements for technical aid were signed almost immediately.
Ovando is the kind of leader who finds out where the parade is going and then gets in front of it. In spite of his previously expressed reluctance to nationalize Gulf, he could not resist pressure from the militant leftists in the government. Now that Ovando has taken his first step, the leftists, under the leadership of anti-American Minister of Mines Quiroga, can push him along faster and farther than he wants to to. Quiroga wants to be president, and the leftists have a scheme to take over altogether if Ovando resists being their front man.
Statele Tratatului de la Varșovia au dat încă o declarație despre conflictul arabo-israelian, fără nimic cu adevărat nou. România, mereu în dezacord cu politica proarabă a aliaților, nu s-a asociat.
The Warsaw Pact powers yesterday issued a new statement on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The declaration contained nothing really new, repeating the now familiar attacks on Israel and its "imperialist sponsors," and reaffirming support for the Arabs. Romania, which has consistently been at odds with its allies' pro-Arab policy, was not associated with the statement.
The Soviets probably intended the declaration as a backdrop to the resumption of four-power talks, now scheduled for 2 December. Moscow has for some time appeared to be writing off the chances for progress through bilateral talks with the US. Egypt has already indicated it considers the latest US proposals unacceptable, and Moscow can be expected to follow Cairo's lead.
The Russians may accompany their talks with the US, UK, and France with renewed efforts to enlist UN support for a settlement in line with the Security Council resolution of November 1967, calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. Moscow probably believes that both forums offer better opportunities for gaining an agreement favorable to the Arabs than the two-power discussions.
Un funcționar român a spus ambasadei SUA că sovieticii fac presiuni neîncetate ca România să admită public că invadarea Cehoslovaciei a fost justificată. CIA se îndoiește că Bucureștiul va accepta.
A Romanian official has told our embassy in Bucharest that the Soviets are putting unremitting pressure on Romania to admit publicly that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was justified. The Romanian leadership, according to the source, is meeting to consider a response to the Soviets, and will make a decision soon.
The Romanian position on this issue has clearly weakened now that Moscow has forced the Czechoslovaks to acknowledge the validity of the invasion and has persuaded Belgrade to drop the subject. Romania has been silent on Czechoslovakia since early this year but has not renounced its condemnation.
We are inclined to doubt that Bucharest would agree that the invasion was justified. To do so would imply renunciation of Romania's basic policy against interference in the affairs of other states, which could in turn open the way to additional Soviet pressure. Still, some softening of Romanian adamancy on the Czechoslovak issue is possible.
Enver Hoxha a spulberat orice speranță de împăcare între Albania și URSS, numind ocuparea Cehoslovaciei „punctul de plecare al unor aventuri și mai mari” împotriva României, Iugoslaviei și Albaniei.
Whatever hope there may have been for a reconciliation between Albania and the USSR was destroyed last Friday by party chief Enver Hoxha. In a speech marking the 25th anniversary of Albania's "liberation," Hoxha excoriated the Soviet leadership, denounced the occupation of Czechoslovakia as "the starting point for even bigger adventures" against Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, and decried "armed provocations" against Communist China. Thus far, the USSR has taken no public notice of Hoxha's remarks.
Mănescu i-a spus ambasadorului Meeker că reuniunea Tratatului de la Varșovia va privi, crede el, politica estică a lui Brandt și că nu vede rostul condamnării Israelului.
Foreign Minister Manescu told Ambassador Meeker yesterday that he and Ceausescu would be leaving for Moscow today for the Warsaw Pact meeting. Although the meeting was ostensibly called to deal with the broad question of European security, Manescu thought it actually would be centered more narrowly on Brandt's eastern policy. Manescu also called to Meeker's attention Romania's refusal to participate in the recent Warsaw Pact statement on the Middle East, commenting that he saw no utility in condemning Israel.
