CIA · President's Daily Brief · declassified 2015–2016
Romania in the President's Daily Brief: 1964
45 days in 1964 on which the CIA's brief for the US president names Romania: 51 paragraphs, scanned and transcribed, with the withheld passages marked.
named in passing
G. Hungary-US
There has been some reduction in Hungarian jamming of VOA (and BBC) transmissions, and the foreign ministry in Budapest has indicated that it will be stopped completely in a short time. Rumania cut out jamming VOA last summer.
The winter wheat harvest in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia may be reduced this year because of a drought during the fall planting season and a subsequent lack of adequate snow cover. These countries have planned large increases in agricultural production for 1964. Any setback to these plans may necessitate more purchases of Western wheat.
a. The Rumanians are taking on an extraordinary role in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
b. At Peiping's invitation, they are sending a Politburo-level delegation to China next week to discuss party relations and problems of unity in the socialist camp.
c. To date, the Chinese have shown no disposition to reach an accommodation with the Soviets, and at first blush this invitation looks like another attempt to chip away further at Moscow's support. We find it hard to imagine that the Soviets look upon this well-publicized maneuver with enthusiasm.
a. The top-level Rumanian party delegation was greeted with great fanfare on arrival in Peiping yesterday.
b. We still believe the Rumanians want to mediate between the USSR and China--incidentally reflecting glory on Bucharest as an independent power--but there are signs that the Soviets do not approve.
The Rumanians on their way to Peiping avoided Moscow, choosing instead a single refueling stop at Omsk.
d. Whatever the Rumanians' intention, the Chinese obviously intend to play the visit as a break in the solid front of East European support for Moscow.
a. Evidence is building up that the Soviets have finally decided to face up to a showdown with the Chinese and will call another world conference for the purpose.
c. We doubt that they will get any satisfaction from Peiping, which has already publicly belittled Moscow for failing to do anything despite earlier threats to deal the Chinese a "worthy rebuff."
d. The Soviets are probably holding off to see the results of Rumanian talks with the Chinese.
e. Most foreign parties, while basically backing Moscow, are most reluctant to face a showdown. Some are actively trying to restrain the Soviet party from calling a conference at present.
named in passingpartly withheldcontinues on another page
2. Sino-Soviet Dispute:
a Moscow-sponsored meeting of Communist parties are still coming in.
The Rumanian delegation's visit to Peiping--which was apparently intended to head off a Peiping-Moscow showdown--ended in a curt, non-committal communique. It appears now that nothing will change Soviet plan to hold the meeting, perhaps during Khrushchev's trip to Hungary late this month.
a. The USSR, reversing an earlier decision, has agreed to supply equipment for the giant metallurgical combine being built at Galati.
b. Moscow previously infuriated the Rumanians by opposing construction of this complex on grounds that it was economically questionable.
relations among members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance will be conducted on a bilateral basis for a long time. Multilateral arrangements are impossible now because of "differences" among council members.
d. Moscow may have changed its mind about Galati in order to prevent Western interests, who hope to play a major role in the project, from making too much political capital with the Rumanians.
GOMULKA, ALREADY THE TARGET OF A VIOLENT ATTACK FOR HIS "UNORTHODOX" POLICY BY PARTY LEFTWINGERS, IS NOW BEING ROUNDLY CRITICIZED FOR BEING TOO MUCH A "LACKEY OF MOSCOW" BY THE MORE NATIONALISTICALLY INCLINED. THEY SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT GOMULKA HAS TRIED TO MEDIATE THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE RATHER THAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT FOR POLAND'S ADVANTAGE AS RUMANIA HAS DONE.
a. Khrushchev is having some trouble in his own back yard in lining up support for his new counter-offensive against Peiping and in particular for a new international conference of Communist parties.
b. The more independent-minded East Europeans know they would lose their newly won maneuver room if they had to commit themselves definitively to Moscow in a showdown with the Chinese.
c. The Hungarians have not yet specifically backed the conference proposal and are thought to prefer no action at all to the possible break with the Chinese that might follow from such a meeting.
d. There are reports circulating in Budapest that Khrushchev is going to stay on there until 13 April, presumably in the hope of bringing Kadar around.
e. The Rumanians are also dragging their feet. The Poles, who have said nothing publicly on the issue, are believed willing to attend a conference only if its purpose is to seek a means of reconciliation with Peiping.
f. Khrushchev does seem to have the East Germans in his pocket, and the Bulgarians and Czechs are also on record as favoring a conference this year.
The Rumanians are desperately trying to head off Soviet moves toward a showdown meeting and, we understand from press reports, have called a special party meeting for next week.
The Rumanian party has issued a major statement of policy. On first reading it appears to be no less than a Rumanian "declaration of independence" from the USSR. While it represents a serious defeat for Khrushchev, it does not line Bucharest up with Peiping, but rather places it on the road of national Communism.
The Rumanian party has issued a major statement of policy. On first reading it appears to be no less than a Rumanian "declaration of independence" from the USSR. While it represents a serious defeat for Khrushchev, it does not line Bucharest up with Peiping, but rather places it on the road of national Communism.
A Rumanian Government industrial and commercial delegation hopes to begin talks in Washington next Friday. Included in its shopping list are rubber plants, chemical and synthetics factories, several oil industry plants, a nuclear power station, and a glass factory.
The Rumanian Government's industrial and commerical delegation hopes to begin talks in Washington next Friday. Included in its shopping list are rubber plants, chemical and synthetics factories, several oil industry plants, a nuclear power station, and a glass factory.
The Chinese appear confident that Khrushchev cannot muster the support he needs to call an international Communist meeting. Peiping's published letter of 7 May to the Soviet Communist Party takes note of the point made by the Italian, Rumanian, and other parties that if the Soviets rush into a meeting, Moscow will have to shoulder the blame for splitting the movement. The letter states that adequate preparation would take several years and adds that even a bilateral meeting could not be held in less than one year.
a. The Rumanian party has followed up last month's declaration of independence with an intensive indoctrination campaign which, by accounts reaching US officials in Bucharest, is taking on a pronounced anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev cast.
b. At meetings throughout the country, the Soviets are being criticized for 20 years of economic exploitation and for infiltrating the Rumanian secret police.
c. Khrushchev has been called a "thief" and a "corn and pig specialist" who lectures Rumanian farmers but does not know what he is talking about.
d. The dominant theme, however, seems to be about the same as in the April party documents, that "Khrushchev and Mao can do what they want, Rumania will go its own way."
The Rumanian party has followed up last month's declaration of independence with an intensive indoctrination campaign which, by accounts reaching US officials in Bucharest, is taking on a pronounced anti-Soviet and anti-Khrushchev cast.
At meetings throughout the country, the Soviets are being criticized for 20 years of economic exploitation and for infiltrating the Rumanian secret police.
Khrushchev has been called a "thief" and a "corn and pig specialist" who lectures Rumanian farmers but does not know what he is talking about.
The dominant theme, however, seems to be about the same as in the April party documents, that "Khrushchev and Mao can do what they want, Rumania will go its own way."
A 24-man Rumanian mission, including the minister of heavy industry and the vice minister of planning, arrived in Brussels last week, probably to discuss the acquisition of Belgian industrial plants on credit. Belgium has already built several plants for the Rumanians.
A. THE ROUND OF ANTI-KHRUSHCHEV, ANTI-SOVIET RALLIES IS HAVING AN EXTRAORDINARY IMPACT ON THE RUMANIAN MAN IN THE STREET.
B. ACCORDING TO WHAT THE US LEGATION HEARS, THE RUMANIANS HAVE REACTED WITH "ELATION, INCREDULITY AND ADMIRATION" FOR THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT IS EXPRESSING ITS INDEPENDENCE.
C. GRATIFYING AS THIS MUST BE, THE GOVERNMENT IS STILL A BIT DISTURBED SINCE THE RESPONSE IN SOME CASES HAS BEEN STRONGER THAN WAS DESIRED.
D. THE LEGATION FEELS THAT THIS COULD LEAD THE AUTHORITIES TO BEAT A TACTICAL RETREAT TO TAKE SOME OF THE EDGE OFF. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL GO SO FAR AS TO ABANDON THEIR PROUD NEW INDEPENDENT COURSE.
E. THAT COURSE IS ALREADY HAVING AN IMPACT IN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES. WE HEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT VOICES ARE BEING RAISED IN HIGH CZECH CIRCLES IN FAVOR OF SOME PUBLIC SHOW OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR.
Bucharest is showing more signs of wanting to follow in Belgrade's footsteps. two "urgent" invitations from Rumania recently for a visit by Tito sometime this summer. Khrushchev may have tried to head off such an entente during his talk with Tito on Monday in Leningrad.
a. France may be about to insert itself into the delicate matter of a nuclear power station for Rumania.
b. The head of France's atomic energy program is in Bucharest, where, we suspect, he will emphasize France's ability to fulfill Rumania's desires for such a plant.
c. He joins a team from one of Britain's largest nuclear power outfits which is in Rumania discussing the sale of a uranium-fired reactor.
Rumania continues to show signs of independence. Khrushchev may have tried to block a Rumanian-Yugoslav entente during his meeting with Tito in Leningrad last Monday.
The Rumanians are still casting about for a nuclear power station.
b. In the past week or so, Rumanian commentary of Soviet economic policies for the bloc has become increasingly acerbic.
c. On 13 June, Rumania's leading economic journal accused Moscow of authoring regional economic proposals aimed at dismembering Rumania. The article in question hinted for the first time at Soviet economic reprisals.
d. We expect the next round will bring public broadsides by leaders on both sides.
In the past week or so, Rumanian commentary on Soviet economic policies for the bloc has taken on a sharp edge.
Bucharest's leading economic journal accused Moscow of authoring regional proposals aimed at dismembering Rumania. One article hinted for the first time at Soviet economic reprisals.
We expect the next round will bring public broadsides by leaders on both sides.
a. In a conversation with Ambassador Elbrick at Brioni last week, Tito said he thought that the Rumanians were going much too far in attacking the Soviets.
b. He expressed concern lest Western overtures designed to encourage the Rumanians provoke "dangerous" consequences for them.
c. The Yugoslav leader will probably make much these same points when he meets with Gheorghiu-Dej at the border today. This meeting may have been arranged after Tito's Leningrad talks with Khrushchev.
d. Tito told Elbrick that he had counseled Khrushchev against an international Communist conference on the dispute with Peiping. There will be no such meeting "for the time being," Tito added.
e. According to Tito, the US and USSR should be able to get together on the Laotian situation, which Khrushchev finds every bit as "unpleasant" as the US does.
Tito last week told Ambassador Elbrick that the Rumanians were going much too far in attacking the Soviets. The Yugoslav leader expressed concern lest Western encouragement provoke dangerous consequences for the Rumanians.
Tito, who seems genuinely worried that the Rumanian stand undermines East European stability, probably made much the same points in his border talks with Gheorghiu-Dej.
Tito also told Elbrick that he had counseled Khrushchev against an international Communist conference on the dispute with Peiping. There will be no such meeting "for the time being," Tito added.
According to Tito, the US and USSR should be able to get together on the Laotian situation, which Khrushchev finds every bit as "unpleasant" as the US does.
President Novotny has made a personal gesture aimed at improving US-Czech relations. At an official ceremony in Prague on 23 June, he made a special point of singling out Ambassador Horsey for a long and agreeable discussion. Novotny--probably with the Rumanian example in mind--declared "we intend to be free and are not a satellite."
De Gaulle's next press conference is now scheduled for 23 July. There are signs that he will devote considerable attention to the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe and to France's historic ties with this area. He may follow this up with an offer of aid, perhaps in the nuclear energy field,to Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer who calls a few days later.
a. A high-ranking delegation from Bucharest led by number-two man Maurer showed up in Moscow yesterday.
b. The Rumanians have been working fast to make their new independent outlook felt, especially in the West and to soothe ruffled feathers in the bloc.
c. Moscow may be sounding out the possibilities for Rumanian attendance at an interparty conference. Such a conference, attended by selected Communist parties, is being discussed as a way to restore at least a facade of unity among Moscow's supporters in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
d. Almost any deal Moscow might make with Rumania now, however, would be interpreted as implying acceptance of Rumania's independent position.
Premier Maurer's delegation got a good hand when it appeared at the opening session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 13 July. This is slim evidence, but it does suggest Rumanian-Soviet talks may be going reasonably well. We have had no other indications since the Rumanian delegation's first days in Moscow early last week.
a. We have no further word on why ambassadors Soldatov and Dobrynin dashed back to Moscow during last weekend.
b. It appears that the Soviet ambassador to Rumania also returned hastily.
c. While this sort of activity has in the past given us the first tip-off that the party central committee is about to meet, some of the other usual indications are lacking. Nor would these men normally be recalled for the Supreme Soviet session now in progress.
d. The next important fixture on Khrushchev's ceremonial schedule is 22 July, in Warsaw, for the celebration of the Polish regime's 20th anniversary. He may be contemplating some new bombshell, and wished to get advice from his ambassadors in certain key capitals.
e. Given the rumors in Moscow of high-level personnel changes, however, we cannot rule out completely that the central committee was in fact convened.
East Germany, Poland,and Czechoslovakia had higher rates of industrial growth in the first half of 1964 than in 1963, the postwar low, largely because of the return of normal weather during the past winter. The southern satellites are doing much better. Bulgaria had a 10% growth rate and Rumania 16%. Hungary also had a 10% rate, but an incipient labor shortage threatens this.
Tito's schedule is getting crowded. It now calls for talks before the month is out with Kadar, Gheorgiu-Dej, Ulbricht and Novotny. We incline to connect this flurry of activity with Khrushchev's call for a December meeting of 26 Communist parties and presume that Tito will be urging caution in dealing with the thorny China issue.
Tito's schedule is getting crowded. It now calls for talks before the month is out with Kadar, Gheorgiu-Dej, Ulbricht and Novotny.
We incline to connect this flurry of activity with Khrushchev's call for a December meeting of 26 Communist parties and presume that Tito will be urging caution in dealing with the scratchy China issue.
Tito is encouraging Rumania's opposition to Moscow's proposed 15 December conference of Communist parties. He probably fears the conference would reduce the freedom of maneuver his and other Communist parties now enjoy.
We have another symptom of Rumania's independence. A US historian has been asked to prepare studies on Rumanian history, including one intended to prove that the regime's policy has been "consistently anti-Soviet."
Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer is going to Peiping's 1 October National Day celebrations, but he may be lonely. a number of Soviet bloc leaders, including Khrushchev, suggested pointedly they might be "too busy" to attend. Sihanouk, however, is going, probably in search of some strong political guarantees.
a. Sihanouk is in Peiping, exuding pro-Chinese sentiments. He appears to be the stellar attraction for the celebration of the Peiping regime's 15th anniversary on 1 October.
b. As far as we know, the only other chiefs of state in attendance will be Massamba-Debat from the Congo (Brazzaville) and Modiba Keita of Mali. Rumania's Premier Maurer is also due to show.
Sihanouk is in Peiping, exuding pro-Chinese goodwill. He appears to be the stellar attraction for the celebrations Thursday of the Peiping regime's 15 anniversary.
As far as we know the only other chiefs of state due to show will be Massamba-Debat from the Congo (Brazzaville) and Modiba Keita of Mali.
Premier Maurer of Rumania leads the bloc delegations. He stopped in Moscow and may be once again trying to serve as a go-between in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
a. East European leaders apparently still hope to remain semi-independent of Moscow and dampen the domestic effect of Khrushchev's ouster.
b. None of them has given solid backing to Pravda's 17 October denigration of the former Soviet leader. Rumania has not published the article, and Hungary and Yugoslavia have printed only partial texts, omitting references to Khrushchev.
c. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia praised him, and even East Germany mentioned his "merit."
d. Nearly all of the East Europeans are singling out the new Moscow regime's avowed dedication to the policies approved at the 20th and 22nd Soviet party congresses. These included de-Stalinization and recognition of the sovereignty of each Communist party.
e. Only Zhivkov of Bulgaria has made a strong pledge of loyalty to the new regime. He owes his job to Khrushchev, and opponents in his own party are in a position to threaten his control.
Novotny apparently intends to show his independence by skipping the 7 November Moscow meeting of bloc leaders. This puts him in the same category as Rumanian party first secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, also a stay-at-home. Prague still has not criticized Khrushchev, and Moscow has thanked all the East European leaders, except Novotny, for their congratulatory messages to Brezhnev and Kosygin.
Our embassy reports that non-Communist French publications are now regularly available at newsstands in Bucharest. This is the first time Rumania's Communist regime has allowed the public to see the Western press on a regular basis. The embassy speculates that US newspapers may also become available soon.
Party boss Kadar, like Dej in Rumania and Novotny in Czechoslovakia, apparently is determined to continue his more independent course in relations with the bloc.
Kadar does not appear to have altered his position as a result of his subsequent visit to Moscow.