CIA · President's Daily Brief · declassified 2015–2016
Romania in the President's Daily Brief: 1966
18 days in 1966 on which the CIA's brief for the US president names Romania: 20 paragraphs, scanned and transcribed, with the withheld passages marked.
named in passing
4. Albania
In recent weeks the Albanians have been showing an uncharacteristic interest in mending their political fences with a number of nearby states, both Communist and non-Communist.
The leaders in Tirana have recently responded warmly to overtures from Rumania and Poland and have made friendly approaches to the Hungarians. They have also taken steps to improve relations with Turkey, France, and Italy on the other side of the curtain.
The most likely explanation of this unusual behavior is a growing Albanian dissatisfaction with the scope and timeliness of the economic support they have been getting from their ideological cohorts, the Chinese. Tirana still parrots without let up all the vitriol from Peking, but these latest maneuvers may signal a desire eventually to loosen ties with China.
Chou En-lai will visit Rumania in "mid-March," and there are indications he may also go to Albania. The Chinese may hope to demonstrate that they are not entirely isolated in the Soviet-led bloc, and the Rumanians could use the visit to demonstrate their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet hassle.
The reported timing of the trip would permit Chou to show up in Moscow for the Soviet party congress scheduled to begin on 29 March. He led the Chinese delegation to the last congress in 1961--but stomped out when the Soviets attacked Albania.
Chief of State Liu Shao-Chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi are to arrive in Karachi later this month as official guests for the celebration of Pakistan Day. The two officials may also stop in Afghanistan.
Peking may have in mind a rather broad diplomatic effort to try and regain some of the ground it has lost abroad in recent months. Premier Chou En-lai has scheduled a March trip which, at last report, includes Rumania and Albania.
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville is set to visit Rumania and Bulgaria in late April. He may also go to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary sometime this summer. These trips could, of course, be the forerunner of a grand De Gaulle swing through Eastern Europe.
Bucharest remains dissatisfied with the Warsaw Pact and may be trying to draw a parallel between its own position and the current French stand on NATO.
The Shah, who appears increasingly unhappy with the US, wants to know well before 26 May if he is going to be allowed to buy the military equipment he asked for some months ago. This deadline, he says, is to permit him to initiate procurement measures elsewhere, if necessary, before leaving on an official visit to Rumania.
Reports of recent Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt or Iraq have probably heightened his determination to get more equipment somewhere, and he has the money to pay for it. He particularly wants to beef up defenses in southern Iran and along the Persian Gulf--areas he is convinced are threatened by Nasir.
The official press in Eastern Europe has come up with mixed reactions to President Johnson's speech on Tuesday. At the same time, some Eastern European officials have offered favorable comments in private.
The party daily in Prague noted that the speech represented a "somewhat revised" expression of US policy toward Eastern Europe. Other Czech papers said the speech was meant to exert "political pressure" on the unity of the socialist camp. This same line was put forth in the only comment so far from Hungary.
All major Rumanian papers treated the speech in a favorable context, quoting the President's view that the new trade bill "will have the possibility of increasing trade" with Eastern Europe.
A Rumanian official, who commented positively to an American official on the attitude of the executive branch toward improving trade relations, also expressed skepticism about the possibility of favorable congressional action. Bulgarian officials have reacted similarly.
Warsaw has given the speech only brief factual coverage; the Bulgarians have not mentioned it.
Brezhnev's arrival in Bucharest today suggests, in part, a Soviet effort to point out to the Rumanians their narrowing room for maneuver between Moscow and Peking.
Press reports say Brezhnev is being accompanied by a Soviet specialist in relations with ruling Asian Communist parties. With a particular eye to Chou En-lai's impending trip to Rumania later this month, the Russians are sure to try to obtain greater Rumanian backing for their position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The high-level Rumanian visitors to Hanoi seem to have accomplished little if anything. Reading between the lines of the joint communiqué issued on their departure leaves the impression of important areas of disagreement.
The communiqué included the usual mutually gratifying language, but omitted the customary reference to a "complete identity of views." The Rumanians very likely tried to budge the North Vietnamese on the issue of negotiations and got nowhere.
Soviet leader Brezhnev's talks in Bucharest this week with Rumanian leaders suggest that differences between the two countries are indeed basic.
These differences are illustrated by the highly nationalistic tone of a recent speech by Rumanian party chief Ceausescu, widely reported in this morning's press. Contrary to the press, however, we believe this speech was intended to make the Rumanian position clear before Brezhnev arrived, rather than being the cause of his visit. The trip was scheduled as early as April.
More to the point, there is good evidence that the Russians have been concerned with Rumania's apparent independent efforts to widen its neutralist role in Asian affairs, both in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in seeking for the first time to establish a role for itself in the Vietnam situation.
The other major issue between Moscow and Bucharest is probably Rumania's long efforts to reduce its role in Warsaw Pact affairs and perhaps to disengage from the Pact coincident with France's decisions concerning NATO.
Virtually the entire top command of the Soviet armed forces has gathered in East Berlin with counterparts from East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The purpose of this meeting has not been announced, but we believe that Moscow and these key "northern tier" countries of Eastern Europe are attempting to work out a more closely integrated military arrangement in the face of Rumania's desire for a decreased role in Warsaw Pact affairs.
Chou En-lai arrived in Bucharest today after a much postponed visit. He will stop in Albania, and possibly Egypt, before returning to Peking. For the Rumanians his visit serves to demonstrate their independence. The Chinese, on the other hand, will try to use the visit to embarrass the Russians and to show that they have influence in Eastern Europe outside of Albania.
The embassy in Bucharest has a good source who has filled in some of the details of the bitter exchange between the Rumanian leaders and Chou En-lai over Vietnam on Thursday.
The Rumanians are said to have argued cautiously but firmly that the Vietnamese crisis cannot be settled by armed force. They said the situation demands political maneuvering, not military force.
Chou countered this by stressing that even if virtually all of Vietnam were destroyed and only a handful of people were left to triumph, it would be worth the price since the victors could build the "greatest civilization ever." When it became clear that his hosts would not buy this line, Chou blew up and called the Rumanian party chief a "revisionist worse than Tito because you are so hypocritical."
The Rumanian, in turn, shouted that Chou was guilty of "shameful insolence" and stormed out of the discussions, slamming the door.
Chou later apologized, but the joint communiqué showed that heavy strains remained in the Bucharest-Peking relationship.
Kosygin's reason for cancelling his scheduled trip to Sweden in July is turning into a real riddle.
The first announcement out of Moscow said that "unforeseen circumstances" had arisen.
Ambassador Kohler reports that the Czech Embassy in Moscow believes the Supreme Soviet session will be related somehow to the Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest early in July. It is difficult to conceive what might emerge from Bucharest that would require urgent action by the Russian parliament.
In sum, we have a situation that is not at all clear, but one that we are watching.
We doubt that Hanoi has given its blessing to recent Polish soundings on negotiations.
Twice within the past week Polish officials have urged us to stop bombing North Vietnam and accept--"in principle"--Hanoi's oft-repeated four points. Such signs of faith by us, the Poles hint broadly, could produce a more cooperative North Vietnamese position.
There is little doubt that the North Vietnamese would like to see the bombing end. However, there has been no sign of give in any public or private statements coming from Hanoi. Only yesterday, the North Vietnamese reiterated their uncompromising position in a foreign ministry statement condemning an Asian peace initiative proposed by the Thais.
We believe the latest Polish proposals represent a unilateral effort to promote some US concessions which Warsaw hopes might bring Hanoi and Washington closer to the negotiating table.
The current Polish effort is quite similar to that undertaken by the Rumanians last May--in fact, the price tag is identical. Both the Poles and the Rumanians seem convinced that the first move must come from Washington.
As for the Soviets, there has been no sign from that quarter of any change in position nor of any effort to prod the North Vietnamese along.
We believe it is likely that the recent Yalta meeting between top Soviet leaders and a very senior North Vietnamese delegation concerned itself with Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam--and not with bringing the war to a conference table.
Rumania's relations with the USSR and other Eastern European countries have sunk, despite recent outward signs of improvement. Relations will not deteriorate completely, but are unlikely to improve in view of Bucharest's nationalistic position and its refusal even to mention the Sino-Soviet dispute, let alone side with Moscow.
Moscow's public blasts against Peking became a step shriller today. Kosygin told a gathering in Sverdlovsk that Chinese leaders are going "further and further along the road of division and are causing serious damage to the struggle for socialism." This morning's Pravda carries an editorial on the "cultural revolution" calling it a "political purge" aimed at destroying the culture of the Chinese people.
In recent weeks it has become increasingly clear that the Soviet leadership is encouraging foreign Communist parties to join in this concert of condemnation. It has published calls from two obscure parties for a world party conference on the Chinese problem. On this, however, Moscow can expect strong opposition from such Communist "neutrals" as Yugoslavia, Rumania, and North Korea.
Whether the Soviets are any closer now than they were a month ago to some kind of joint and formal anti-Chinese action is unclear. It is a sure bet, however, that they are taking soundings and preparing for that possibility.
Cuba's president and deputy premier arrived in Moscow today to join the meeting of East European Communist leaders. Rumania is also sending a high-level delegation, ending speculation that Bucharest might boycott the gathering because of differences with Moscow over treatment of the Chinese.
The assembling Communist leaders were greeted by three separate articles in today's Pravda calling for "unanimous condemnation of the political course taken by the Chinese leadership."
Bulgarian party first secretary Zhivkov has become the first bloc leader to endorse the proposal--originally advanced by minor nonbloc parties--to convene a world Communist meeting to "deal with the new problems facing the Communist movement," i.e., China.
Zhivkov's statement at his party's congress does not bring such a meeting much closer, however, since Rumania, North Vietnam, North Korea, and others continue to oppose it. It does, however, indicate that the issue is still very much alive for some parts of the Communist world and will be a recurrent theme in future conclaves.
