CIA · President's Daily Brief · declassified 2015–2016
Romania in the President's Daily Brief: 1971
23 days in 1971 on which the CIA's brief for the US president names Romania: 24 paragraphs, scanned and transcribed, with the withheld passages marked.
about Romaniapartly withheld
COMMUNIST CHINA - ROMANIA
The Romanian ambassador in Washington says that the long-term, interest-free credit extended Bucharest by Peking last November amounts to $100 million in convertible currency.
A $100-million cash loan would be the largest China has ever extended. It comes at an appropriate time for the Romanians, who face substantial repayment commitments to a number of countries over the next several years. The Soviets will take further umbrage at this latest instance of Romanian independence, but Bucharest believes the economic benefits outweigh the credit's political risks.
Ceausescu has strongly reasserted his country's independent foreign policy. At the Romanian party's 50th anniversary celebrations last week, the party leader flatly rejected the idea that the Communist world movement should be directed from Moscow, and insisted that there is no contradiction between Romania's pursuit of national interests and the preservation of international socialist unity. Ceausescu also implicitly reaffirmed his criticism of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Ceausescu disputed recent Western press allegations that Romania is backing away from its nationalistic stance. To quell doubts on this score, he asserted that the principles of independence are as essential to Romania as air is to life.
Ceausescu's revival of contentious issues that have been dormant in past months and his frequent praise of the Chinese Communists are sure to irritate Moscow. In addition to his downgrading of the USSR's contribution to the building of socialism in Romania--the theme of Moscow's sparse commentary on the anniversary--his reference to the necessity for strengthening party unity suggests that he still fears the Soviets might try to cultivate ultraconservative elements in the Romanian party.
Although Ceausescu is known to prefer regular consultations to iron out problems with the Soviet leaders, the two sides have not met in recent months. Brezhnev did not hold private discussions with Ceausescu during the Soviet party congress.
Reports leave little doubt that President Ceausescu intends to tour Peking, Pyongyang, and Hanoi, most likely in June. Despite Moscow's inevitable objections, Ceausescu presumably for some time has been considering a visit to his Chinese benefactors, who only recently granted Romania a sizable long-term loan. In the Romanians' view such a prestigious trip is called for because of the steadily improving political and economic relations with Peking, and would help to balance Ceausescu's private tour of the US last fall.
Politburo member Kang Sheng appeared yesterday at a reception for visiting Romanian Party chief Ceausescu after being politically sidelined for over six months. The listing of Kang in his customary place among the regime's top leaders indicates that he retains his position on the elite politburo standing committee. The regime's failure to account for Kang's temporary eclipse and its curious handling of the status of several other politburo members strongly suggest that China's leadership remains beset by major differences on a wide range of policy and personnel issues.
Kang Sheng, who appeared on 3 June at a reception for visiting Romanian party chief Ceausescu after being politically sidelined for over six months, "no longer occupies a post," according to Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu. In a conversation with the US ambassador, the Romanian described Kang as a sick man who had left the hospital only to greet the delegation as a courtesy.
Kang's principal "illness" is almost certainly political. Removal of a leader of his stature--he ranked fifth on the elite politburo standing committee--for health reasons does not accord with past Chinese Communist practice.
Kang's brief reappearance indicates that the influence of leftist forces with which he has been associated has not waned completely. The continued fluidity in Peking's leadership was further underscored last week by the extraordinary fact that none of China's top officials put in a public appearance during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Communist Party.
The Communist Party's call on Wednesday for intensification of ideological and cultural orthodoxy appears to stem from uncertainty over relations with Moscow following Ceausescu's recent Asian tour. The new directive comes down particularly hard on Romanian youth, some of whom are termed "parasites." The statement is more dogmatic and regressive than a similar directive issued last February, when on the surface at least Bucharest's relations with Moscow appeared to be moving toward an acceptable modus vivendi.
Since neither youth nor intellectuals represent a threat to Romania's internal stability, the new directive seems designed to remove grounds for any Soviet questioning of Ceausescu's commitment to Communism. The Bucharest press continues to publish endorsements of the tour in a manner intended to demonstrate firm Romanian popular support of Ceausescu. More expressions of solidarity can be expected as Bucharest holds out against participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in Bulgaria later this summer.
A desire to avoid saying anything that might even indirectly further disturb Moscow may account also for the reluctance of Romanian officials to discuss details of Ceausescu's travels with Western diplomats.
top Soviet leaders criticized Ceausescu for the "anti-Soviet" tone of his Peking visit when the Romanian leader stopped over in Moscow on 24 June The Soviets feel that the Chinese-Romanian final communiqué accepted the Chinese thesis that the socialist bloc is divided into large and small states with conflicting interests. That communiqué was also a major matter of controversy during Ceausescu's later stop in Mongolia.
Ceausescu, while in Mongolia, questioned the rationale for participation in the Warsaw Pact because "there is no threat from imperialism."
Ceausescu's remark reflects both his general disapproval of all military blocs and Romanian reluctance to join Pact exercises. Other reports confirm that Ceausescu's visit to Mongolia, which always echoes Moscow, was marked by ideological disputes that prevented agreement on more than an innocuous communiqué and bland speeches.
Romanian leader Ceausescu will continue to oppose Moscow's version of economic integration at the annual session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) that opens today in Bucharest. Divergent interests at the three-day meeting are likely to generate some low-caliber fireworks, especially between Romania and the Soviet Union, over the draft program for developing socialist economic integration.
Ceausescu has reaffirmed his opposition to economic integration in several recent speeches. Last Friday, for example, he stated that "interdependence in production must in no way infringe on national sovereignty." He added that "the times of the policy of domination and diktat are gone forever." Nevertheless, he may be forced to give a little at the meeting and agree to some limited aspects of integration, perhaps as a sop to the Soviets.
Yesterday's meeting of Brezhnev and two other top Soviet leaders with counterparts from all of the USSR's East European allies save Romania was meant to highlight Bucharest's isolation and to put pressure on it to conform to Soviet foreign policy.
The communiqué's formulations are generally routine, but the broad range of topics covered, from economic integration in CEMA to Vietnam and the Middle East, formalizes the seemingly informal vacation gathering in the Crimea and underscores Romania's deviant status.
In view of frequent bilateral meetings of Soviet and East European leaders in the past month capped by a CEMA summit in Bucharest last week, there was scant substantive reason for consultations, except for Romanian recalcitrance. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the meeting was called quite abruptly. East Germany's Honecker had been on vacation but was reported in yesterday's press as having met, presumably on 1 August, with the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin.
Romania has irritated Moscow in recent years by not siding with the Warsaw Pact positions on the Middle East war and Soviet disarmament proposals. Romania also has resisted Soviet plans to integrate CEMA, and did not suppress its delight that this goal, as defined at the CEMA summit last week, will take 15 to 20 years to implement.
Perhaps Ceausescu's greatest present sin, however, is to insist upon neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to cultivate good relations with Peking, and to welcome the thaw in Sino-US relations. The USSR is gravely worried about a possible rapprochement between Peking and Washington, and it suspects that Romania has assisted in nourishing these contacts. Unable to stop the Chinese, Moscow is determined at least to force the Romanians back into line.
The Romanians, judging by their recent behavior, have not been expecting a sharp squeeze from the Soviets. Earlier this summer, the Romanians were apprehensive that Moscow would try to force them to take part in a joint military exercise in Bulgaria or, alternatively, to permit Soviet troops bound for the exercise to cross Romanian territory. Such reports have died out and there are no indications that the Soviets have reopened the matter of Romanian participation. The exercise is scheduled to start in mid-August.
Having carried their dispute with Romania into the open in this fashion, however, the Soviets are not likely to let the matter rest. If Romania does not cease its misbehavior, Moscow may step up economic pressures, and insist on closer adherence to the Warsaw Pact's foreign policy goals. Ceausescu will be reluctant to appear to give ground under attack, but he may well decide to pull in his horns for a time.
On Wednesday, two days after signing the Crimean summit communiqué, Kadar convened an unusual joint meeting of the party's central committee, the government's council of ministers, and popular front leaders. The meeting produced a communiqué which included an uncharacteristically harsh foreign policy line.
Between the lines of the communiqué we read a serious concern over Budapest's relations with Moscow as well as a warning that this is not the time for independent flings. Kadar, in most respects one of Moscow's staunchest supporters, has been tacitly pushing for a more forthcoming attitude toward China for several months.
Kadar resisted a Soviet attempt in June to stir up old animosities between Romania and Hungary. On 30 July Brezhnev and Podgorny talked with Kadar in Moscow, and we believe they criticized him for not sufficiently supporting the USSR's Romanian policy as well as for his initiatives regarding China. If the Soviets are adopting an increasingly tough attitude on the Romanian issue, they would almost certainly make a special effort to get Kadar in line early rather than risk a repetition of the moderating tack he took in 1968 on Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta yesterday reprinted an article from the Polish party daily of 30 July, which indirectly but clearly criticized Bucharest's policies. Claiming that China views the USSR as its chief enemy, the article commented that "all nods of approval for Peking's splittist policy cannot be considered as anything but harmful to the unity of the socialist community." This was followed by a warning that there can be no "neutral stand" on this issue and that "the attitude toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU is a gauge of the attitude toward the fundamental interests of the socialist community."
Romania shows no sign of backing off from its independent stance. An article yesterday in the party daily Scinteia reaffirmed Bucharest's desire to strengthen links with "all socialist countries" (read China included). The Romanian article also condemned "imperialism" for using tactics such as "domination and...economic and political pressure,...the installment of puppet regimes...and even overt military intervention." While the imperialists were not specifically named, the Soviets will see the article as still another infuriating example of Romania's following a pro-Peking line.
If the scheduled visit of a Chinese military delegation to Romania actually takes place later this month, the Soviets will not be made any happier. Should Moscow want to increase the pressure on Romania, a Warsaw Pact exercise tentatively scheduled in Bulgaria in late August would offer opportunities for intimidating posturings. Although such moves would clearly worry the Romanians, it is doubtful that they would have any basic effect on Bucharest's determination to maintain its independent stance.
Moscow is responding more vigorously to Peking's efforts to erode Soviet influence in the Balkans. Romania has now been linked with the Balkan heretics--Albania and Yugoslavia--in a Soviet-inspired warning to recalcitrants who continue to cultivate relations with the Chinese.
Yesterday a Hungarian newspaper, clearly at Soviet behest, reported that Chou En-lai planned to visit Tirana, Belgrade, and Bucharest this fall. (There is no confirmation of this, although there have been other reports to this effect.) The article warned that if this should result in an "anti-Soviet axis," an "extremely dangerous situation" would be created.
The Hungarians are particularly vulnerable to Soviet pressure on this score because they too have been attempting to improve relations with China. The Soviets recently forced Hungarian Premier Fock to cancel a trip he had been planning to make to Peking.
Ceausescu convened a highly unusual meeting yesterday of all leading party and government bodies. The meeting was called to hear and endorse unanimously a report by Premier Maurer on last month's CEMA meeting at Bucharest and a discourse by Ceausescu on his Asian tour.
The meeting apparently is intended to provide a clear demonstration of internal solidarity in the face of criticism by Bucharest's allies of its obstructionist tactics in CEMA and of Ceausescu's independent stance in foreign affairs, especially his trip to Peking. Since the Crimean summit conference (discussed in The President's Daily Brief of 3 August), criticism of the trip has spread from Hungary--where it appeared first at the behest of Moscow--to the media of other East European capitals.
Yesterday's meeting occurred one day after Soviet Ambassador Drozdenko called on Ceausescu. Romanian media have described their talk as "comradely," a term that implies disagreement. If Drozdenko adopted a menacing approach, yesterday's unusual meeting may have been intended as a defiant reaction. Ceausescu has in the past been willing to compromise without sacrificing national interests, although since late June he has been particularly assertive.
There continues to be no evidence of any overt military pressure being directed against Romania.
A long-rumored joint Warsaw Pact exercise in Bulgaria apparently is not going to occur this month; instead, preparations for a Bulgarian national exercise are now under way. Numerous bloc-instigated reports of the planned exercise may only have been intended to generate pressure on Romania. The relative calm displayed by Bucharest in the face of this war of nerves suggests that it had a good reading on the intent of these reports all along.
The Yugoslavs believe that, because the visit of Brezhnev to Yugoslavia on 22-24 September is Moscow-initiated, Belgrade has a tactical edge in seeking important concessions. Tito's negotiating position centers on a demand that any communiqué include a renewal of the Soviet declarations of 1955 and 1956 guaranteeing Yugoslavia's sovereignty and the right of all Communist parties to pursue "different roads to socialism." Belgrade is also demanding that Moscow clamp down on the activities of Yugoslav émigres in the USSR.
Tito's demands are likely to be more than Moscow can accept, thus casting doubt on whether the visit will take place on schedule. Tito, however, appears determined to hold his ground. On 19 July Belgrade publicly denied Soviet-inspired reports circulating in Eastern Europe alleging the formation by Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania of a pro-Chinese "axis" and accused Moscow of dictating the foreign policy of its allies. This accusation clearly indicates Yugoslav willingness to fuel latent anti-Soviet sentiment throughout the area.
Brezhnev probably wants to assess the new Yugoslav governmental apparatus and to make known his views on Belgrade's policies before Tito's visit to the US in October. He may also be seeking ways to weaken Yugoslav-Romanian solidarity, to block growing Chinese influence in the Balkans, and to enlist Belgrade's support for new peace initiatives.
USSR: an unusually large number of Soviet ships are involved in a naval exercise in the Black Sea. At least 18 warships, including both of the navy's antisubmarine helicopter carriers, have been noted active in the western area of the Black Sea; naval aviation also was active. Other Soviet military activities in eastern Europe are at seasonal levels Although apparently not aimed directly at the Romanians, this activity will reinforce Soviet psychological pressures on Bucharest.
Warsaw Pact: Satellite photography through strengthens the conclusion that there is no military activity in western USSR that could be construed as an imminent threat to Romania. The photography shows no signs of troop concentrations or alerts. At military installations, there was no massing of civilian trucks indicative of a mobilization, nor were there any concentrations of military transport aircraft similar to those photographed prior to the Czech invasion of 1968. Photography showed preparations then under way for the exercises now taking place in Bulgaria, but there was nothing unusual near the Bulgarian-Romanian border, and military activity appeared normal elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including Romania.
a controversy over heir-designate Lin Piao's political position may be at the root of the unsettled leadership situation in Peking.
--The latest issue of China Pictorial--which features Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao together on its front cover is unavailable in the capital.
--The display at Peking airport of the recently published set of colored photographs of Mao does not include those showing him with Lin, although the full set is on display at several other locations in the capital.
--The guidance provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protocol department concerning toasts addressed to Chinese leaders at a recent Romanian banquet in Peking omitted any reference to Lin.
Similar guidance apparently was also provided a visiting Turkish delegation and appears to follow a decision taken approximately two weeks ago to halt the customary New China News Agency reporting of toasts to Mao and Lin by foreign visitors.
These alterations in Peking's hagiology, together with the absence of incantations to Lin's political rectitude in domestic propaganda over the past two weeks, point to an effort to downplay Lin that goes beyond what would be required if his problem were purely physical.
