CIA · President's Daily Brief · declassified 2015–2016
Romania in the President's Daily Brief: 1972
21 days in 1972 on which the CIA's brief for the US president names Romania: 22 paragraphs, scanned and transcribed, with the withheld passages marked.
named in passing
WARSAW PACT
The Warsaw Pact summit meeting to be held in Prague later this month is expected to deal with issues related to European security. The Soviets have convened such Pact meetings at key intervals in their push toward detente.
Besides calling for ratification of the Polish and Soviet treaties with West Germany, Moscow may also seek to use the meeting to keep the East Germans in step. Pankow has been conducting a sharply worded anti - West German press campaign, which reflects its concern over the destabilizing impact of the current detente atmosphere on the East German internal situation.
The Soviets also are likely to use the summit to give another push to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The summit may reiterate last month's call by the Pact's foreign ministers for the start of multilateral preparatory talks for the conference. Moscow continues to propose convocation of the conference itself in 1972, but probably is willing to settle for preparatory steps this year.
Another important agenda item may be the implications for bloc solidarity of President Nixon's trip to Peking. Moscow would like to obtain a strong condemnation of Peking's opening to Washington. In the face of Romanian ties with Peking, however, the Kremlin probably will have to be satisfied with a boilerplate call for continued unity against imperialist intrigues.
On the eve of today's political summit meeting in Prague, several East European states have intensified their propaganda attacks on China. Soviet criticism of the Chinese has, of course, been running at a high level since the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the UN General Assembly session. Polish and East German articles in the past week specifically attack Peking's "splitting activities" in the socialist world and its "diplomatic maneuvers" in the Balkans.
Warsaw and Pankow seem to be fronting for Moscow on this issue, and Bucharest is the unspecified but obvious target. The Romanians, who have been subjected to this kind of performance before, will strongly resist any efforts to push through a resolution condemning Peking and will seek to confine the meeting to questions of European security.
One of the more unlikely proposals made in recent weeks has been Sudanese President Numayri's idea that the US enlist Libyan President Qadhafi's support for Egyptian-Israeli proximity talks. Qadhafi has rarely given even lip service to the idea of negotiating the unfinished Arab-Israeli war, and Numayri's suggestion seemed to be his own brainstorm rather than a product of his discussions with Qadhafi. However, a re-examination of Qadhafi's recent statements and published Libyan views suggests that his and Numayri's distrust of Soviet influence in Egypt may be leading both of them to revise their priorities.
Numayri told Ambassador Bush on 5 February that he believed the US should use Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to persuade President Sadat to take Egypt into the interim agreement talks. Sadat cannot make the decision on his own, Numayri said, but could be given the necessary push if these three countries--the aid givers--indicated their support of proximity talks. Numayri offered Sudan's own support for any US initiative that did not embarrass or weaken Egypt and urged an immediate US contact with Qadhafi.
The Sudanese suggestion to Ambassador Bush came only a few days after Qadhafi's talks with Sadat and Numayri. The Sudanese minister of information, who had attended the Numayri-Qadhafi talks, later told Bush that Qadhafi was so worried about massive Soviet influence in Egypt that he would probably be willing to weigh in with Sadat.
While there may be considerable exaggeration in these Sudanese allegations about Qadhafi's views, they can be fitted into the trend of his recent statements. Addressing Egyptian troops at Aswan last month, Qadhafi repeated his customary line that the "battle" with Israel was inevitable but went on to insist that the timing must be left to the "political leadership." This argument, which supports Sadat's position, has been repeated in Libya's armed forces journal, which sometimes serves as Qadhafi's personal mouthpiece. Other themes he has struck in recent months include the inability of the Arab armies to defeat Israel now and the folly of starting hostilities without adequate planning and training. Over the same period, he has expressed concern about the spread of Soviet "imperialism" in the Middle East in several widely publicized speeches and interviews.
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If Qadhafi now views the confrontation with Israel as a protracted struggle which needs careful preparation, he may also see some utility in proceeding with talks for an interim agreement. He may have come to believe that an Israeli withdrawal from the canal would permit the Egyptians to scale down considerably the Soviet personnel manning SAM sites in the canal sector, something Sadat has said he is anxious to do. Qadhafi appreciates Egypt's long-term need for Soviet military aid, but he may hope that the breathing space provided by an interim agreement would at least enable the Egyptians gradually to displace the sizable contingent of Soviet military advisers.
Apart from this, Ambassador Bush's conversation with Numayri tells a good deal about current Sudanese thinking on the war. Numayri is clearly anxious for rapid progress toward a settlement. He claims that the closure of the Suez Canal has imposed an economic burden on Sudan in the range of $65-75 million annually.
The Sudanese President's interest in achieving an interim agreement and in involving the US in that effort also reflects his own concern about the Soviet presence in Egypt. Since the pro-Communist coup attempt last July, Numayri has been extremely suspicious of Soviet motives and is attempting to replace Moscow's military aid and technical assistance programs by developing contacts with the West, China, Yugoslavia, and Romania. He is well aware that any reduction of the Soviet presence in the Middle East hinges on a political solution of the Middle East conflict. Egypt's successful pressure on Sudan in the past few weeks to accept a Soviet ambassador--the latest reminder of the weight that the Soviets carry in Cairo--is likely to make Numayri even more resentful.
Neither Sadat nor Qadhafi has been heard from directly since their meetings before and after Sadat's trip to Moscow. Nevertheless, if he could now count on Qadhafi and Numayri to protect his rear from radical Arab critics and Soviet disapproval, he might find it politically easier to take another step with the United States and Israel in search of an interim agreement.
Presidents Ceausescu and Sadat talked past one another during an exchange of toasts in Cairo on Sunday, holding to their disparate views on the Middle East. By stressing the "integrity and sovereignty of all states," which by implication includes Israel, Ceausescu showed an unwillingness to curry favor with his Arab host. In his reply, Sadat scarcely mentioned Romania, referred flatteringly to the USSR as the "leader of the socialist states," and dwelt almost entirely on Egypt's view of the Middle East situation. Nevertheless, simply by being received in Cairo after a long tour of Africa, Ceausescu succeeded in underlining Romania's independent stance.
In his May Day speech Fidel Castro announced that this week he will begin a two-month tour to Guinea, Algeria, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and, finally, the Soviet Union. He both praised Soviet support for Cuba and condemned US "international diplomacy"--suggesting that the idea of a secret US-Soviet deal on Cuba still haunts him. Castro warned that any interference with Cuban warships operating against exile vessels on the high seas could bring reprisals against Guantanamo. A US-Cuban rapprochement is not possible under present circumstances, he concluded.
President Ceausescu has suddenly postponed trips to Japan and West Germany that were scheduled for next month.
Domestic politics appear to have been the reason for the postponement. Recent high-level personnel shifts that have received little public explanation have caused uneasiness--and perhaps opposition--among party members, who seem to fear that more extensive changes may be made at a party conference in July. Ceausescu's recent trip to eight African and Arab countries also has caused some criticism at home, particularly his promise of aid to developing nations, given at a time when Romania is struggling with a large foreign debt.
None of these problems, either singly or collectively, constitutes a threat to Ceausescu's leadership at the moment. Given his autocratic nature, however, Ceausescu will not overlook even a minor challenge. Apparently he has decided to take the initiative against internal grumblings by staying at home, defending his policies, and personally overseeing preparations for the party conference in July.
Fidel Castro is still wending his way through Eastern Europe prior to his planned arrival in Moscow in mid- to late June. His nine days in Bulgaria, most of it spent sightseeing, were evidently somewhat of a strain on his hosts. Castro, now in Rumania for four days, is expected to move on to Hungary on Tuesday. He then visits East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia before finally arriving in the USSR.
The only Warsaw Pact government to be represented at the Stockholm conference on the environment opening today will be Romania. Bucharest announced it would attend on Thursday, after it had become clear that the USSR and its other Eastern European allies would boycott the meeting in protest against the exclusion of East Germany. Although they may have preferred not to go it alone, the Romanians presumably believed their participation would provide a relatively innocuous demonstration of their independence.
A national party conference, the second since Nicolae Ceausescu became party chief in 1965, opens today in Bucharest. We expect the conference to be a relatively low-keyed affair, with discussion focused on the economy and educational reform. As in the case of the last conference in 1967, we expect some high-level personnel shifts in party and state agencies but Ceausescu will remain in firm control.
Prospects for the Soviet grain harvest continue to deteriorate with the onset of freezing temperatures in much of the New Lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan. Recent reports of negotiations for wheat from West Germany and Romania may reflect a reassessment of Soviet needs. Confirmed Soviet purchases of grain for delivery by mid-1973 now stand at almost 27 million tons, of which about 18 million tons is wheat.
Corneliu Manescu has been replaced as foreign minister by his first deputy, George Macovescu.
We expect Manescu, after more than a decade as foreign minister, to retain an important advisory role in Bucharest. President Ceausescu may well name him a member of the Council of State.
Macovescu, a leading expert on European security matters, has promoted the coming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in his frequent foreign travels. He will bring new verve to the post, but the change does not mean a shift in Romanian foreign policy.
President Ceausescu has publicly taken positions on European security and force reductions which mean that Romania has again broken ranks with the Warsaw Pact. On Tuesday he declared his opposition to separate talks on these two major issues, expressing fear that talks on force reduction without participation of all European states would result in the division of the continent into Soviet and US spheres of influence. In Ceausescu's view such a step would mean Romania's domination again by the Soviets.
In addition, Ceausescu called for a European detente to include withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other states, the closing of all foreign military bases, the creation of regional nuclear-free zones, an end to military maneuvers, and lower military budgets.
Most of these Romanian policy goals are contrary to those of the USSR. Ceausescu does not expect to achieve them, but he calculates that, if Romania remains silent on such issues during this period of negotiations, its independence will be eroded.
The large Romanian delegation at the talks in Helsinki preparing for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making a strenuous effort to establish itself as an equal participant, independent of the Soviets. In order to stay independent, the Romanian delegation is fighting hard, chiefly against the USSR and its allies, on procedural matters. The Romanians tell us that one of their motives is to block any joint consideration of conference matters by the Warsaw Pact states as a bloc.
General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Hungary last week appears to have gone according to expectations with no signs of significant differences. With a bow to Hungary's special approach to some economic matters, such as its departures from centralized planning, the communiqué asserted the need for continued "reciprocal study and sharing of experiences." The absence of the discord that surfaced earlier in the year undoubtedly reflected Moscow's wish to avoid tensions in Eastern Europe when broader European negotiations are beginning. Romania is already asserting its independent role in the Helsinki talks.
Romania's strenuous efforts at Helsinki to establish itself as an independent participant in preparations for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have provoked sharp criticism from its allies. Warsaw considers that Bucharest's breaking of ranks is unnecessary, and fears that Moscow now may try to tighten Pact discipline. Party leader Gierek, who has considerably improved relations with Romania in his two years in power, has shown his displeasure by suddenly canceling a trip to Romania scheduled to begin on Sunday.
Despite these reactions, the Romanians will continue pressing their own line in order to preserve and hopefully increase their room for maneuver as Europe moves toward detente.
Moscow will soon respond favorably to the West's invitation to open discussions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions early in the new year. General Secretary Brezhnev acknowledged during a speech in Hungary last week that consultations were already under way on the matter among Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies. These may culminate in a formal Pact meeting later this month. Romania's insistence that it attend all stages of the MBFR talks has caused some complications for Moscow.
Warsaw Pact members are censuring Romania for its attitude during the preparatory talks leading to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the past week criticism of Romania's position has appeared in a number of East European newspapers and Polish party chief Gierek canceled a visit to Bucharest. At the same time, pact diplomats have been boycotting official Romanian functions. Last Friday, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister kept his appointment for an official visit to Bucharest, but he minced no words in criticizing the Romanians for breaking ranks with the Warsaw Pact during the Helsinki talks. There is no sign that the Romanians intend to modify their positions and we expect the pact states to increase political pressure on the Ceausescu government.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A NEW SHRILLNESS
The intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute has increased considerably over the past two months. The Chinese, who have been on the diplomatic and propaganda offensive throughout the period, have used a variety of means to press their case--hard-hitting speeches in the UN, authoritative People's Daily commentaries, comments to visiting delegations, stopover visits by Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in London, Paris, and Bucharest, and an economic mission to Eastern Europe. The immediate goals have been to impede any further movement toward detente between Moscow and the nations of Western Europe, to nip in the bud any improvement in relations between Moscow and Tokyo, and in general to project the image of Peking as a rational and moderate player in the global arena.
The Soviets, clearly on the defensive, are worried by the scope and vehemence of Chinese attacks and have responded with propaganda counterattacks. The most authoritative of these was a speech by General Secretary Brezhnev on 30 November in which he was more outspoken in condemning Peking than he has been since the border talks began more than three years ago.
Europe
In Europe Peking has warned of the dangers of both a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and negotiations on military reductions. The Chinese see these as Soviet ploys aimed at reducing pressure in the West in order to free Soviet military and diplomatic energy for use against China. They have missed no occasion to sow seeds of doubt about Soviet intentions by underlining Moscow's past use of military force and insisting that Moscow simply cannot be trusted. Chinese spokesmen have also argued that a mutual reduction of US and Soviet forces would give Moscow a strategic edge because US forces could not return to Europe quickly enough to meet a Soviet conventional attack. They have even made it known that they approve of Europe's continued reliance on the US nuclear umbrella and favor a strong NATO.
Moscow is clearly concerned over these Chinese attempts to frustrate their initiatives in Western Europe. The Soviets were obviously annoyed at Chiao's European junket. The USSR lashed out at the UK following British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home's visit to Peking and published a barrage of propaganda attacks refuting Chinese allegations about Moscow's motives in pushing its detente schemes.
Japan
the Chinese have warned that Moscow is the primary threat to security in Asia. Peking has gone out of its way to say that neither Tokyo's close military ties to Washington nor the continued development of the Japanese self-defense force are obstacles to further improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. China has offered support for a permanent UN Security Council seat for Japan and endorsed Japan's territorial claims to the Soviet-held islands northeast of Hokkaido.
Most importantly, Peking has moved toward economic policies which will help expand the already substantial Sino-Japanese trade. Although the USSR is a far more attractive trading partner for Japan, at least in the short run, Peking is making a concerted effort to compete by indicating a willingness to accept long-term credits to finance the import of new technology from Japan, as well as to enter into long-term contracts to supply Japan with raw materials, including petroleum.
Support for elevating Japan's UN status poses no problem for Moscow, but Peking's open support for Japanese claims to the northern islands complicates that difficulty for the USSR. The Japanese have made return of the islands the first condition for improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations, and the Soviets have been acutely sensitive to any intimation that the Japanese might try to use improved relations with Peking to nudge the USSR into becoming more accommodating on the territorial issue.
Moscow is increasingly unhappy with the slow pace of negotiations on Japanese participation in joint projects to exploit natural resources in Siberia. There is evidence that the Soviets suspect China may be partly responsible for Tokyo's reluctance.
Chinese Chances
China may not expect any spectacular gains from these maneuvers, but it is intent on frustrating Moscow's diplomacy as much as possible. Prospects are brighter in Asia than in Europe. Soviet-Japanese exchanges have not gone well, whereas
The Warsaw Pact countries, who have yet to respond to the West's invitation to begin force reduction talks, may confer in January before doing so. Warsaw Pact leaders did not meet as a group in Moscow during the week of the Soviet Union's 50th anniversary celebration as some Soviet officials had suggested they would. Instead they conferred separately with General Secretary Brezhnev.
Their delay in replying to the West may result from differences between the Soviet Union and Romania over the latter's desire for full participation in the MBFR talks.
