A Chinese officer’s remark, a documented practice
The cabbage strategy: a phrase from an interview, not a doctrine
The layers of ships are documented. The phrase is one officer’s, and not every fishing boat is militia.
What the documents show
AttributedThe phrase comes from a television interview of May 2013 with Zhang Zhaozhong, an officer of the Chinese army, described in the English-language press as a “Major General”. About Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal) he said: “The island is thus wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage.”12
The source’s words
The island is thus wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage.
AttributedIn the translated transcript the fishermen go in large ships and take small boats into the lagoon, administration and surveillance ships patrol, and in the outer ring are warships. Zhang says the method can be used elsewhere.1
The source’s words
We can adopt this method elsewhere.
The practice is documented separately from the phrase. The standoff at Scarborough began on 10 April 2012. Ryan Martinson (Naval War College) describes an “echelon defense”: at the front, China’s coast guard forces, and behind them, on a second line, the surface fleet of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Warships do not simply lurk beyond the horizon, he writes.3
The source’s words
On the front line, China deploys coast guard forces…
The maritime militia is documented too: CSIS and C4ADS estimate roughly 300 militia vessels operate in the Spratlys on any given day. But identification is vessel by vessel: at Whitsun Reef in 2021 AMTI could name 23 vessels of the more than 200 reported by the Philippines.45
The source’s words
roughly 300 militia vessels are operating in the Spratly Islands on any given day…
The arbitral tribunal at The Hague (award of 12 July 2016) found that the way Chinese law-enforcement vessels operated at Scarborough in April and May 2012 created a serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel. The tribunal made no ruling on sovereignty.6
The source’s words
created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and personnel…
The 501-page award does not use the word “militia”. In paragraph 755 the tribunal says the evidence supports an inference that Chinese fishing vessels are “organised and coordinated by the Government”, more than escorted and protected. The paragraph sits in the section on fishing near Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, with evidence from Subi and Scarborough; it is an inference about attribution to the state, not a finding about the status of each vessel.6
The source’s words
organised and coordinated by the Government…
China rejected the award the same day: its foreign ministry called it “null and void” and without binding force. In March 2021 the Chinese embassy in Manila said of Whitsun: “There is no Chinese maritime militia as alleged.”78
The source’s words
the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it.
What does not follow
- That the phrase is official Chinese doctrine: the sources opened show no official text using it.
- That all fishing boats in a swarm are militia: at Whitsun AMTI named 23 of more than 200.
- That the tribunal ruled on the militia or on sovereignty over Scarborough: it did not.
- That the layers are ordered as Zhang described: Martinson puts the coast guard in front and the navy behind.
Who coined the name, and when
- 10 April 2012The standoff at Scarborough begins, between Philippine and Chinese ships.3
- May 2013Zhang Zhaozhong says on television that Scarborough is “wrapped like a cabbage”. The Philippine press reports the interview on 31 May and publishes the transcript on 4 June.1
- October 2013The New York Times Magazine brings the phrase to a world audience.2
- 12 July 2016The tribunal at The Hague issues its award, and China declares it null and void the same day.67
Sources
- 1How China’s “cabbage strategy” kept out Phl (transcript of the Zhang Zhaozhong interview)
Federico Pascual · 2013 · The Philippine Star, 4 June 2013 · opened 14 November 2026 - 2A Game of Shark and Minnow
Jeff Himmelman · 2013 · The New York Times Magazine, 27 October 2013 · opened 14 November 2026 - 3Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy
Ryan D. Martinson · 2018 · Naval War College, China Maritime Studies 15 · opened 14 November 2026 - 4Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia
Gregory Poling, Tabitha Mallory, Ben Prétat · 2021 · CSIS AMTI and C4ADS · opened 14 November 2026 - 5Caught on Camera: Two Dozen Militia Boats at Whitsun Reef Identified
2021 · CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 21 April 2021 · opened 14 November 2026 - 6The South China Sea Arbitration, Award of 12 July 2016, PCA Case No. 2013-19
2016 · Permanent Court of Arbitration · opened 14 November 2026 - 7Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC on the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 12 July 2016
2016 · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · opened 14 November 2026 - 8China denies militias, says fishing vessels in its territory
2021 · The Philippine Star, 23 March 2021 · opened 14 November 2026